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The  present  study  sets  out  to  examine  British  policy  over  the  area  of  Western  Asia 
Minor  and  the  Straits,  one  of  the  three  vital  strategic  spots  that  Britain  sought  to  safeguard  in  the 
area  of  the  Near  and  Middle  East,  alongside  Persia  and  Iraq,  after  the  end  of  the  First  World 
War.  The  focus  is  on  Britain's  attitude  towards  the  Greek  Expedition  in  Asia  Minor  and  the 
ensuing  Greek-Turkish  war  from  1919  to  1922  with  the  settlement  of  1923  with  the  Treaty  of 
Lausanne. 
The  work  centres  on  examining  British  policy-making  process  regarding  Western  Asia 
Minor  and  the  Straits.  Within  the  British  policy-making  elite  there  was  a  split  between  those 
favouring  the  establishment  of  Greece  as  the  new  protector  of  British  interests  in  the  area,  after 
Turkey's  defeat,  and  those  wanting  to  continue  supporting  Turkey  for  this  role.  The  War, 
Colonial  and  India  Offices  inclined  towards  the  former  while  David  Lloyd  George  and  elements 
within  the  Foreign  Office  opted  for  the  Greek  solution.  The  inability  of  the  Greek  forces  to 
establish  firmly  the  Greek  occupation  of  Western  Asia  Minor  by  defeating  the  Turkish 
Nationalist  forces  in  1921  made  a  drastic  change  in  the  minds  of  those  British  policy-makers 
who  had  initially  supported  the  Greek  option  inevitable.  This,  along  with  developments  such  as 
the  Nationalist  movement  in  Turkey  and  the  attempts  of  Britain's  friends  and  foes  alike  to 
contain  its  supremacy  in  the  region  contributed  to  the  change  of  policy.  The  study  illuminates 
themes  like  the  Anglo-French  relations  over  the  Near  and  Middle  East  and  British  attitudes 
towards  the  role  of  Soviet  Russia  in  the  region. 
With  the  Treaty  of  Lausanne  British  policy  returned  to  the  traditional  policy  of 
supporting  Turkey  as  the  British  proxy  in  the  region.  British  policy-makers  by  1923  had 
achieved  a  relative  stability  in  the  area  of  the  Near  and  Middle  East  which  remained 
unchallenged  up  until  the  outbreak  of  the  Second  World  War. lu 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I  would  like  to  thank  the  staff  of  the  Public  Record  Office,  Kew,  London;  the  House  of 
Lords  Record  Office,  London;  the  National  Archives  of  Scotland,  Edinburgh;  the  Churchill 
College  Archives,  Cambridge;  Kings  College  Archives,  London;  the  Service  of  Historical 
Archives,  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Athens,  Greece.  I  am  particularly  thankful  to  the  Director 
of  the  Service  of  Historical  Archives,  Dr.  Fotini  Thomai-Konstantopoulou.  I  would  like  to 
extend  my  thanks  to  the  Department  of  History  of  the  University  of  Glasgow  both  academic  and 
administrative;  especially  to  Professor  Mawdsley  for  his  advice  during  the  first  year  of  my 
research  and  to  Ms  Alison  Peden,  Head  Secretary  of  the  History  Department  for  her  help. 
I  am  especially  indebted  to  Professor  Hew  Strachan  and  Dr.  Neville  Wylie  for  their 
detailed  comments  and  invaluable  advice.  Last,  but  certainly  not  least,  I  am  particularly  thankful 
to  my  thesis  supervisor  Dr.  Phillips  O'Brien  for  his  patience,  guidance  and  advice.  His  advice 
and  comments  on  the  work,  both  during  and  off  term,  were  invaluable.  His  encouragement  and 
friendly  attitude  helped  me  immensely. 
Above  all,  I  thank  my  family  and  friends.  My  family,  my  parents,  Niko  and  Mary,  and 
my  brother,  Joseph,  for  being  always  on  my  side.  Their  love  and  understanding  kept  me  going. 
A  special  thanks  to  all  my  friends  back  home  and  in  Glasgow,  for  putting  up  with  me,  especially 
to  my  best  friend  during  my  research  years  in  Glasgow  Elia  Delaporta. 
This  thesis  is  dedicated  to  my  parents  and  to  the  loving  memory  of  my  two 
grandparents,  Joseph  Dalezios  and  Stelios  Rountos,  and  my  godmother,  Eleftheria  Skoulaxenou. iii 
ABBREVIATIONS 
ADINI  Admiralty  Papers,  Public  Record  Office,  Kew,  London 
BDFA  British  Documents  on  Foreign  Affairs 
CHAR  Churchill  College  Archives,  Cambridge 
DBFP  Documents  on  British  Foreign  Policy  1919-1939 
FO  Foreign  Office  Papers,  Public  Record  Office,  Kew,  London 
FRUS  Papers  Relating  to  the  Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States 
HLRO  House  of  Lords  Record  Office,  London 
KCA  Kings  College  Archives,  King  College,  London 
MFA  Service  of  Historical  Archives,  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Athens,  Greece 
NAS  National  Archives  of  Scotland,  Edinburgh 
NMM  National  Maritime  Museum  Archives,  Greenwich,  London 
PD.  C  Parliamentary  Debates,  Commons 
PD.  L  Parliamentary  Debates,  Lords 
T  Treasury  Papers,  Public  Record  Office,  Kew,  London 
wo  War  Office  Papers,  Public  Record  Office,  Kew,  London PAG  ; 
NUlVI  RIN-G 
AS  ORIGINAL 2 
Table  of  Contents 
Abstract 
Acknowledgments  ii 
Abbreviations  iii 
TabIe  of  Contents  2 
Introduction  4 
Chapter  One  19 
The  Quest  for  Stability  and  Security-  The  Near  and  Middle  East  in  British  imperial 
planning.  19 
BRITISH  IMPERIAL  POLICY  AND  THE  EASTERN  MEDITERRANEAN:  SECURITY  BY 
TROXY.  '  19 
BRITISH  FOREIGN  POLICY  TOWARDS  THE  OTTOMAN  EMPIRE  BEFORE  THE  WAR  - 
THE  STRAITS  AND  CONSTANTINOPLE.  21 
THE  FRAMEWORK  OF  BRITISH  DECISION  MAKING:  THE'MANAGEMENVOF  THE 
NEAR  EASTERN  QUESTION.  25 
BRITISH  STRAINS  AND  STRENGTHS  AT  HOME  AND  ABROAD  IN  THE  AFTERMATH  OF 
THEWAR.  35 
FROM  ARMISTICE  TO  CONFERENCE.  44 
Chapter  Two  47 
Britain  and  Greece:  From  Benevolent  Neutrality  to  Moderate  Support  471,  ýý  THE  GREEK  CASE  IN  BRITISH  PLANNING  AND  POLICY.  47 
BRITISH  PERCEPTIONS  OF  GREECE  AND  THE  OTTOMAN  EMPIRE  -  THE  GREEK 
EXPECTATIONS.  52, 
THE  GREAT  WAR  AND  THE  DARDANELLES  -  GREECE  ENTERS  THE  WAR  ON  THE  SIDE 
OF  THE  ALLIES.  54 
THE  ARMISTICE  OF  MUDROS  -  ALLIED  TACTICS  AND  BRITISH  PREPONDERANCE.  62 
THE  GREEK  REACTION  TO  THE  ARMISTICE.  67 
BRITISH  PLANS  BEFORE  THE  PARIS  PEACE  CONFERENCE  AND  THE  WORK  OF  THE 
BRITISH  POLITICAL  INTELLIGENCE  DEPARTMENT.  71 
THE  SITUATION  IN  WESTERN  ASIA  MINOR  PRIOR  TO  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE: 
'TURKEY  FAR  FROM  DEADT  75 
THE  GREEK  CASE  IN  THE  NEGOTIATIONS  IN  PARIS.  77 
THE  GREEK  RATIONALE  FOR  THE  SMYRNA  LANDING.  84 
THE  SITUATION  IN  THE  SMYRNA  DISTRICT,  JANUARY  TO  APRIL  1919:  THE 
FORMATIVE  MONTHS.  87 
THE  ALLIED  DECISION  FOR  THE  GREEK  LANDING  AT  SMYRNA.  88 
BRITISH  POLICY-MAKING  IN  PARIS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MAY  1919  -A  RETROSPECT.  90 
Chapter  Three  93 
The  initial  British  'foster-mothering'  of  the  Greek  movement  from  May  1919  to  the 
summer  of  1920.93 
THE  GREEK  LANDING  AT  SMYRNA  IN  MAY  1919.93 
THE  BRITISH  LOCAL  ELEMENT  AGAINST  THE  GREEK  TUTELAGE  OF  SMYRNA.  96 
THE  BRITISH  OFFICIALS  ON  THE  SPOT  AND  THE  SITUATION  IN  THE  SMYRNA 
ENCLAVE.  99 
THE  SPECTRUM  OF  ALLIED  DIPLOMATIC  ACTIVITY  UP  TO  SPRING  1920.106 
ALLIED  POLICIES:  THE  FATE  OF  THE  STRAITS  AND  CONSTANTINOPLE  III 
THE  LONDON  CONFERENCE  OF  FEBRUARY  1920.114 
GREEK  CAPABILITIES  AND  WEAKNESSES  IN  1919  -  EARLY  1920.119 
THE  INTERDEPARTMENTAL  DISCUSSIONS  IN  SPRING  1920  -  TURKEY:  'THE 
POTENTIAL  BARRIER  TO  OUR  INTERESTS.  '  123 
THE  SAN  REMO  CONFERENCE  AND  THE  UNLEASHING  OF  GREEK  DESIGNS  IN  ASIA 
MINOR:  THE  BRITISH  SANCTION  OF  JUNE  1920  AND  THE  GREEK  ADVANCE.  126 THE  DILEMMA  OF  GREEK  SANCTION  AND  THE  BRITISH  CABINET'S'SILENT' 
ACQUIESCENCE.  131 
THE  SHIFT  IN  THE  MILITARY  SITUATION  IN  ANATOLIA  AND  THE  BOLSHEVIK 
FACTOR  IN  BRITISH  THINKING.  134 
THE  BRITISH  CASE:  THE  DEBATES  AMONG  THE  BRITISH  OFFICIALS.  141 
BRITISH  POLICY  MAKING  OVER  THE  NEAR  EAST  FROM  MAY  1919  TO  AUGUST  1920. 
149 
Chapter  Four  152 
The  'inextricable  Turkish  situation'  and  the  summer  Greek  Offensive  of  1921. 
THE'VENIZELIST'PARAMETER. 
THE  NOVEMBER  1920  GREEK  ELECTIONS  AND  THE  DEFEAT  OF  VENIZELOS. 
THE  GREEK  CASE  RECONSIDERED  -  THE  CHANGES  IN  THE  ARMY  -THE  INTERNAL 
SITUATION. 
152 
152 
156 
165 
THE  ECONOMIC  AND  COMMERCIAL  EFFECTS  OF  THE  GREEK  OCCUPATION  IN  THE 
SMYRNA  REGION.  168 
THE  BRITISH  REACTION  TO  THE  ELECTIONS  -  THE  VIEW  FROM  ATHENS.  171 
THE'LONDON  RESPONSE'AND  THE  ERRONEOUS  GREEK  IMPRESSION  ABOUT 
BRITISH  HELP.  173 
THE  IMPACT  ON  THE  BRITISH  NEAR  EASTERN  POLICY  -  THE  BRITISH-GREEK 
DISCUSSIONS  OF  WINTER  192  1.  181 
THE  WAR  OFFICE  'ALTERNATIVE':  TURKEY  RECONSIDERED.  184 
THE  GREEK  MARCH  OFFENSIVE  AND  ITS  EFFECTS.  188 
THE  BOLSHEVIK  FACTOR  IN  BRITISH  THINKING.  190 
THE  QUESTION  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE  ATTEMPTED  BRITISH 
RAPPROCHEMENT  WITH  KEMAL  PRIOR  TO  THE  SUMMER  OFFENSIVE.  195 
THE  BRITISH  POLICY  OF'WAIT  AND  SEE.  '  199 
Chapter  Five  203 
The  diplomatic  deadlock  and  the  'Greek  tragedy.  '  203 
THE  SUMMER  GREEK  OFFENSIVE  AND  THE  WAR  OFFICE  REACTIONS.  203 
THE  BRITISH  APPRECIATION  AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  SANGARIOS.  206 
THE  IMPLICATIONS  OF  THE'GREEK  POLICY.  '  208 
THE  FRENCH  CONNECTION.  214 
ANGORA  REJOICED  AND  ATHENS  DESPAIRED:  THE  LONDON  RESPONSE.  222 
THE  GREEK'MUDDLE'AND  THE  BRITISH  REFUSAL  OF  FINANCIAL  HELP.  227 
THE  ASIA  MINOR  DEFENCE  MOVEMENT  AND  THE  ILLUSIVE  PLAN  FOR  A  GREEK 
OCCUPATION  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE.  236 
THE  COLLAPSE  OF  THE  GREEK  FRONT  IN  ASIA  MINOR.  242 
THE  BOLSHEVIK  CONNECTION.  244 
BRITISH  POLICY  MAKING  FROM  THE  SUMMER  OF  1921  UP  UNTIL  THE  GREEK 
DEBACLE  OF  SEPTEMBER  1922.  248 
Chapter  Six  251 
'Turkey  reconstituted'  and  the  Empire  strikes  back  at  Lausanne  251 
THE  END  OF  THE  GREEK  ANATOLIAN  ENTANGLEMENT.  251 
THE  BRITISH  SCHEME  ON  THE  STRAITS  PRIOR  TO  THE  CHANAK  CRISIS.  255 
THE  CHANAK  CRISIS  OF  SEPTEMBER  1922:  'AN  AVALANCHE  OF  FIRE.  '  258 
THE  FALL  OF  THE  COALITION  GOVERNMENT.  271 
THE  MUDANIA  ARMISTICE.  276 
THE  SITUATION  IN  GREECE-THE  EXECUTION  OF  THE  SIX.  278 
THE  LAUSANNE  CONFERENCE.  284 
THE  FINAL  SETTLEMENT.  292 
BRITAIN,  GREECE  AND  TURKEY  IN  THE  INTER  WAR  YEARS.  296 
THE  SETTLEMENT  OF  THE  TROUBLING  NEAR  AND  MIDDLE  EAST.  299 
Conclusion  301 
Bibliography  316 
Appendix  1  333 
Appendix  11  335 4 
Introduction 
On  18  November  1918,  Lord  Curzon  in  a  House  of  Lords  session,  outlined 
Britain's  position  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Great  War:  'the  British  flag  never  flew  over  a 
more  powerful  or  a  more  united  Empire,  '  and  declared  that  Britain  'never  had  better 
cause  to  look  the  world  in  the  face.  '  Britain  was  'determining  the  future  of  mankind.  " 
Indeed,  a  victorious  Britain  was  leading  the  way  to  the  post-war  era.  By  1918  Britain 
had  passed  the  test  of  the  War  and  had  increased  its  already  vast  Empire.  In  the 
meantime,  the  immediate  post-First  World  War  era  saw  the  commencement  of  a  period 
that,  according  to  many  historians,  put  to  the  test  the  capabilities  of  the  Empire,  a  period 
that  has  been  treated  as  a  crucial  phase  in  terms  of  Britain's  position  as  a  world  and 
imperial  power. 
The  First  World  War  'did  not  come  to  an  end  in  1918.  Only  the  fighting  in 
Europe  had  in  fact  ended  in  November  of  that  year;  in  Russia  allied  troops  continued 
fighting  until  the  end  of  1919,  in  Persia  until  1921,  and  in  Asia  Minor  the  hostilities 
lasted  until  September  1922.  In  contrast  to  the  wishes  of  the  majority  of  the  people,  the 
immediate  post-war  period  could  not  have  been,  and  in  fact  was  not,  an  era  of  peace  and 
tranquillity.  It  was  a  pivotal  period,  a  time  for  re-drawing  the  boundaries  and  spheres  of 
influence  and  the  end  for  three  mighty  Empires. 
It  was  in  the  area  of  the  Near  and  Middle  East  that  the  British  Empire  most 
immediately  faced  the  necessity  of  establishing  stability  and  security;  an  area  that  had 
long  been  seen  as  vital  to  the  safeguarding  of  British  interests.  Its  settlement  was  crucial 
1  PARLIAMENTARY  DEBATES,  HOUSE  OF  LORDS,  [thereafter  called  PD.  L],  vol.  32,  c.  162,18 
November  1918. 5 
for  'the  future  of  the  British  Empire  in  the  East.  2  This  area  in  the  immediate  post-war 
period  serves  as  an  important  indicator  for  the  central  theme  of  British  power  and 
prestige.  Traditionally,  the  fundamental  and  overriding  aim  of  British  policy  in  this  part 
of  the  world  had  been  the  safeguarding  of  communications  with  India.  Alongside  came 
the  need  to  bar  any  Russian  ambitions  to  challenge  British  interests,  whether  in  the 
Mediterranean  or  along  the  frontiers  with  India.  The  defeat  of  the  Ottoman  Empire, 
which  had  served  as  guarantor  and  barrier  to  British  strategic  aims  and  interests, 
necessitated  immediate  and  above  all  efficient  settlement. 
The  War  and  developments  connected  to  and  derived  from  it  had  utterly  changed 
the  situation,  especially  in  the  vast  territories  of  the  defeated  Ottoman  Empire.  There 
was  a  dramatic  turn  of  events  regarding  affairs  concerning  the  other  great  adversary  of 
the  British  in  that  region,  Russia.  The  Bolshevik  revolution,  the  treaty  of  Brest  Litovsk 
and  the  departure  of  Russia  from  the  war  had  only  put  further  strains  on  British  policy 
makers  in  this  new  and  complex  post-wan  scene.  In  the  meantime,  Britain's  allies, 
France  and  Italy,  awaited  their  turn  to  'reap  the,  'spoils'  of  the  War  regarding  the 
Ottoman  lands.  Lastly,  Britain,  because  of  the  progress  of  the  War,  had  found  itself  in 
occupation  of  a  vast  and  as  yet  'unprotected'  territory  at  the  cross-roads  of  the  route  to 
India. 
The  effective  British  military  presence  in  the  various  theatres  of  the  Middle  East 
along  with  the  successful  operations  there  had  clearly  left  Britain  the  dominant  power  in 
a  region  that  stretched  from  Constantinople  and  the  Straits  to  the  western  Indian 
boundaries  and  the  Caspian  Sea.  However,  British  policy  makers  were  caught,  in  a 
sense,  by  surprise  with  the  final  outcome  and  the  totality  of  British  dominance  over  this 
area.  Yet  no  clear-cut  provisions  and  plans  could  have  been  made,  due  to  the  fluidity  of 
the  military  situation  and  the  various  secret  treaties  that  had  been  concluded  during  the 
2  In  Curzon's  words  found  in  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  [thereafter  called  PRO],  CAB  27/24,27 
November  1918. 6 
war  years.  3  In  the  meantime,  the  Bolsheviks  in  1917  had  published  the  secret  Allied  war 
agreements  which  the  Tsar  had  signed,  agreements  that  provided  for  the  dissolution  and 
scramble  for  the  territories  of  the  Ottoman  Empire;  however  the  rest  of  the  'contestants' 
were  very  much  present.  The  task  that  fell  on  the  shoulders  of  British  policy  makers  was 
enormous.  4 
One  of  British  desiderata,  right  after  the  end  of  the  War,  was  to  extend  its 
control  over  the  areas  of  the  Near  and  Middle  East.  5  The  focus  of  this  aim  was  an'area 
that  had  long  been  seen  as  vital  to  British  strategic  priorities:  Mesopotamia  and  the 
territories  adjacent  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  the  fate  of  which  remained  largely  an  issue  of 
negotiation.  Britain's  'hegemony'  over  the  region  was  assured  primarily  by  its  control 
over  Suez.  However,  the  firm  control  over  the  rest  of  the  region  after  the  war  was  also 
of  primary  importance. 
--  The  sensitive  area  of  Western  Asia  Minor  that  included  the  Straits  and 
Constantinople  certainly  constituted  a  vital  area.,.  On  the  question  of  the  Straitg,  the 
British,  'up  until  the  beginning  of  the  Great  War,  -had  relied  with  greater  or  lesser 
justification  on  the  friendly  ties  with  their  master,  the  Ottoman  Empire.  The  security  of 
these  waterways  and  its  adjacent  territories  constituted  a  serious  priority  for  British 
defensive  strategy.  British  interests  had  been  well  served  by  the  Ottomans  up  until  the 
beginning  of  the  twentieth  century  when  the  Ottomans  sided  with  Germany  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  Great  War.  However,  after  the  war,  British  policy  did  not  manage  from 
the  beginning  to  tackle  the  problem  effectively,  a  first  sign,  among  others  in  the  broader 
3  The  secret  treaties  of  the  war  years  were  four.  First,  it  was  the  March  1915  agreement  between  Britain, 
France  and  Russia  over  the  cession  of  the  Straits  and  Constantinople  to  Russia.  In  April  1915  the  Allies 
with  the  Treaty  of  London  had  vaguely  allotted  territories  on  the  coast  of  Western  Asia  Minor  to  Italy  in 
return  for  its  entry  into  the  war  on  their  side.  With  the  Sykes-Picot  agreement  of  February  1916,  French 
interests  in  Syria  and  Lebanon  were  recognised,  British  interests  in  Mesopotamia  and  Russian  interests  in 
Armenia  and  Kurdistan.  Lastly,  Italy  with  the  St.  Jean  de  Maurienne  Agreement  of  April  1917  was  to 
receive  Smyrna  in  Anatolia. 
4  During  the  War  there  were  considerable  attempts  to  'define'  British  territorial  requirements  in  the  area 
with  the  de  Bunsen  Committee,  the  Hussein-McMahon  correspondence  and  with  the  Sykes-Picot 
agreement. 
3  Covering  the  areas  occupied  by  Egypt,  Palestine,  Iraq,  Persia,  Caucasus,  Turkey,  Greece  and  the  Arabia. 7 
area  of  the  Middle  East  for  many  scholars,  of  British  inability  to  cope  efficiently  with 
the  current  problems. 
The  conduct  of  British  policy,  for  most  of  the  period  covered  by  this  study,  fell 
on  the  shoulders  of  the  Coalition  Government  led  by  David  Lloyd  George.  On  the  issue 
of  filling  in  the  'power  vacuum'  in  the  area  of  the  Straits  and  Western  Asia  Minor,  the 
British  Premier  had,  vaguely  but  openly  enoughi  introduced  an  innovative  solution:  he 
had  'supported'  the  case  of  a  small  regional  ally  of  Britain,  led  by  a  Liberal  and  pro 
British  politician  who  had  dragged  his  country  onto  the  side  of  the  Entente  in  the  final 
years  of  the  war.  Greece,  a  small  country  standing  at  the  gates  of  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean,  could  partly  provide  for  the  security  of  British  interests,  lightening  the 
load  of  'surveillance'  for  the  area.  Britain  was  looking  for  alternative  ways  to  exert  even 
more  influence  in  the  region,  without  the  entanglement  of  actual  British  forces. 
.-  Greece  seemed  to  qualify  for  this  position  following  the  Ottoman  alliance  with 
the  Central  Powers  during  the  war.  'The  creation  and  backing  of  a  'Greater  Greece'  in 
the  Eastern  Mediterranean  guarding  Western  Asia  Minor  and  the  Straits  seemed  an 
attractive  prima  facie  solution.  However,  it  was  not  one,  that  was  supported 
wholeheartedly  by  the  majority  of  the  British  policy  making  elite. 
On  the  other  hand,  Greece  seemed  ready  to  seize'the  opportunity  to  establish 
itself  as  a  significant  power  in  the  area,  realising  the  long-lived  dream  of  the  Megali 
Idea.  In  foreign  policy,  'small'  states  are  often  driven  by  one  objective,  one  chief 
6 
operative  goal.  For  Greece  this  was  the  wish  to  include  all  Greeks  within  the  confines 
of  the  state,  called  the  Megali  Idea.  The  foreign  policy  of  Greece  was  guided  by  this 
vision,  coupled  with  hostility  to  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Everything  else  took  its  meaning 
6  'Most  of  the  literature  [on  small-state  diplomacy]  agrees  that  the  range  of  interests  and  influence  of  the 
weak  states  is  relatively  limited.  Annette  Baker  Fox  combines  their  marginal  importance  to  the  great 
powers  with  their  limited  range  of  interests:  "Small  states  are  almost  by  definition  local  powers  whose 
demands  are  restricted  to  their  own  and  immediately  adjacent  areas...  "  In  other  words,  the  outlook  of 
weak  states  and  their  leaders  is  provincial  or  parochial.  "Where  the  great  affairs  of  the  world  impinge  on 
them  directly,  the  leaders  of  a  small  power  will  therefore  generally  find  themselves  operating  in  the  light 8 
from  this.  Greece  seemed  ready  and  above  all  willing  to  serve  British  interests  in  the 
area,  but  was  backing  Greece  the  right  course  for  the  British  policy-making  elite?  In  the 
meantime,  following  the  collapse  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  the  alternative  solution  was  a 
nationalist  group,  the  Nationalist  Turks,  who  had  taken  up  the  lead  from  the  Sultan,  still 
nominally  holding  authority  at  Constantinople,  that  opposed  the  Great  Powers  and  their 
right  to  'divide  and  rule'  the  post-war  world.  The  Greek  choice,  on  the  other  hand, 
provided  a  seemingly  cheap  and  safe  solution  that  could  guarantee  British 
predominance  in  the  area  of  Western  Asia  Minor  through  the  medium  of  a  small 
regional  ally. 
The  handling  of  the  defeated  Ottoman  Empire,  the  Russian  factor,  which  had 
given  way  to  the  Bolshevik  threat,  and  the  desiderata  of  Britain's  allies,  France,  Italy 
and  Greece  were  the  factors  which  were  shaping  the  situation.  Britain  faced  the  'power 
vacuum'  created  by  the  defeat  of  the  Ottomans.  Right  after  the  end  of  the  war,  Russia 
remained  an  unstable  factor.  Britain's  wartime  allies,  the  French,  seemed  wary  from  the 
beginning  -for  the  security  of  their  new  territories  in  the  Near  East,  as  Greece  would 
certainly  serve  British  interests.  Similarly,  Italy  had  interests  in  the  area  which  were 
opposed  to  a  Greater  Greece.  The  national  policies  of  the  powers  in,  the  area'of  the 
Eastern  Mediterranean  were  thus  contradictory.  Great  Britain  was  advocating  the 
freedom  of  the  Straits  and  opportunities  for  trade.  Its  goal  was  to  avoid  having  any 
power  achieve  absolute  supremacy.  The  security  of  the  communication  with  the  East 
remained  of  utmost  importance.  Was  Britain  in  a  position  to  assert  its  influence  on  the 
region  after  the  War? 
British  policy  in  the  area  by  this  study  is  examined  in  the  light  of  the  Greek 
Expedition  in  Asia  Minor  and  the  ensuing  Greek-Nationalist  Turkish  war  of  1919-1922, 
with  its  final  settlement  in  Lausanne  in  1923.  The  Greek  landing  at  Smyrna,  on  the  coast 
of  their  own  regional  interests...  "'  Michael  Handel,  Weak  States  in  the  International  System  (London, 
198  1),  p.  44. 9 
of  Western  Asia  Minor,  was  initiated  in  May  1919  to  'protect'  the  local  Christian  and 
Greek  populations  in  the  city  of  Smyrna  and  the  surrounding  territories.  7  In  essence,  the 
Greek  presence  was  considered  by  the  British  vital  to  counterbalance  a  similar  Italian 
landing  during  the  previous  month  at  Adalia,  further  south  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor.  The 
Greek  presence  was  warmly  supported  by  David  Lloyd  George  during  the  Paris  peace 
negotiations.  The  area  of  Smyrna  was  included  in  the  Greek  desiderata  of  the  peace 
settlement. 
Smyrna  and  the  territories  adjacent  to  the  city  became  the  starting  point  of  Greek 
expansionist  plans.  However,  the  venture  was  not  without  practical  obstacles.  The 
Ottoman  Empire  was  soon  on  fire  with  a  nationalist  movement  and  had  an  army  led  by 
an  aspiring  ex-officer  of  the  Ottoman  Army,  Mustapha  Kemal.  Soon,  Allied  forces 
stationed  in  the  area  of  the  Straits  and  Constantinople  and  the  Greek  units  in  the  area  of 
Smyrna  met  armed  resistance.  In  the  meantime,  France  and  Italy  had  been  definitely 
excluded  from  any  major  shares  in  the  Near  and  Middle  East.  On  the  other  hand,  Britain 
pursued  a  more  favourable  settlement  for  the  area  of  the  Straits  and  needed  a  settlement 
that  would  safeguard  its  interests.  I 
Greece  could  take  over  the  role  of  the  protector  of  British  interests  in  the  area 
and  as  such  was  chosen  in  May  1919  to  occupy  Smyrna.  When  the  situation  arose,  the 
Greek  forces  were  called  in  to  march  forward  in  June  1920,  defending  the  limited 
British  forces  in  the  region  of  the  Straits  against  the  forces  of  Kemal.  Greek  aspirations 
and  Turkish  nationalist  feelings  soon  collided  on  a  larger  scale.  Britain  found  itself 
alone  in  siding  with  the  Greek  claims.  France  and  Italy  stepped  forward,  taking  the 
Nationalist  movement  of  Kemal  under  -  their  wings  in  an  attempt  to  contain  British 
supremacy.  Kemal,  however,  played  a  card  that  touched  a  sensitive  chord  in  British 
7  Smyrna  was  the  centre  of  Hellenism  in  Asia  Minor  with  a  compact  Greek  population.  The  Greek 
communities  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  had  suffered  reprisals  during  the  Balkan  Wars  and  the  Great  War. 10 
strategic  thinking:  the  Bolshevik  bogey  and  the  question  of  Russian  contaimnent  in  the 
area  of  Near  and  Middle  East. 
The  present  study  seeks  to  follow  British  policy  over  the  area  of  Western  Asia 
Minor  and  the  Straits,  one  of  the  three  vital  strategic  spots  that  Britain  sought  to 
safeguard  in  the  area  of  the  Near  and  Middle  East,  alongside  Persia  and  Iraq.  It  focuses 
on  Britain's  attitude  towards  the  Greek  Expedition  in  Asia  Minor  and  the  ensuing 
Greek-Turkish  war  in  the  years  1919-1922  up  until  the  final  settlement  of  1923  with  the 
Treaty  of  Lausanne.  It  is  the  intention  of  this  study  to  examine  how  the  Lloyd  George 
Coalition  Government  decided  on  its  policy,  why  Greece  was  chosen  as  Britain's 
'proxy'  in  the  region  and  the  soundness  of  this  course  of  action.  British  policy  over  the 
area  of  Straits  and  Western  Asia  Minor  was  part  of  its  bigger  plans  for  predominance 
over  the  region.  In  that  sense,  the  snapshot  of  the  Greek  Expedition  in  Western  Asia 
Minor,  the  ensuing  Greek-Turkish  War  and  Britain's  involvement  in  it  serves  as  an 
indicator  for  the  assessment  of  Britain's  place  in  the  world  through  analysis  of  British 
ýonduct  in  this  region. 
Britain's  approach  to  the  Greek  expedition  and  the  ensuing  Greek-Turkish 
conflict  is  treated  in  detail  on  all  levels  of  British  foreign  policy-making,  in  political, 
diplomatic  and  military  terms.  Further,  these  questions  are  examined  within  the 
parameters  of  the  Nationalist-Bolshevik  relation  and  the  Anglo-French  animosity  over 
the  region.  The  study  attempts  a  close  observation  of  British  external  and  internal 
governmental  behaviour  but  at  the  same  time  draws  the  attention  to  non-governmental 
forces  such  as  the  British  local  element  in  Smyrna  and  their  perception  of  the  Greeks  in 
the  region.  Diplomatic  history  cannot  restrict  itself  only  to  government  files  and  Cabinet 
decisions,  because  diplomacy  was  not  practised  in  a  vacuum  after  the  end  of  the  War. 
Although  departmental  papers,  Cabinet  decisions  and  the  'testimonies'  of  the  major 
players  largely  form  the  picture,  in  this  post-war  settlement,  a  considerable  part  was 11 
played  by  a  factor  outside  the  formal  governmental  channels:  the  British  local  element 
in  Smyrna,  a  thriving  business  community,  wealthy  and  well  established. 
Admittedly,  in  order  to  highlight  in  the  best  possible  manner  the  views  and 
rationale  of  the  British  policy  making  elite,  it  has  been  necessary-  to  omit  detailed 
accounts  of  the  military  effort.  Further,  it  was  considered  essential  to  follow,  at  least  in 
an  outline  manner,  the  internal  policy-making  procedures  in  both  Greece  and  Nationalist 
Turkey.  Only  events  which  were  strongly  linked  with  British  standing  are  treated  and 
analysed  in  detail,  such  as  the  Greek  elections  of  November  1920  -and  the  fall  of 
Anglophile  Vcnizelos.  There  are  no  exhaustive  accounts  of  the  series  of  international 
conferences,  in  order  to  avoid  lengthening  an  already  long  narrative.  However,  there  is 
detailed  discussion  and  analysis  of  all  parts  of  British  policy  making  prior  to  and  after 
the  conferences. 
The  focus  of  the  study  is  upon  British  and  Greek  interaction,  based  on  evidence 
drawn  from  research  at  the  Public  Record  Office,  'with  material  not  limited however  to 
Foreign  Office  files.  There  has  been  extended  research  in  Admiralty,  Cabinet,  War 
Office  and  Treasury  files  held  at  the  Public  Record  Office.  There  is  also  use  of 
deciphered  diplomatic  messages  intercepted  from  1919  onwards  by  the  Foreign  Office 
Department,  called  the  Government  Code  and  Cipher  School  (GCCS),  in  PRO  files 
known  as  HW  12.  These  intercepts  were  called  'bJs'  or  blue  jackets  after  the  blue 
folders  in  which  they  were  kept.  An  array  of  British  private  papers  has  also  been 
consulted.  On  the  Greek  side,  there  has  been  extended  research  at  the  Archives  of  the 
Greek  Foreign  Ministry.  Much  secondary  literature  was  consulted,  both  British  and 
Greek. 
Based  on  British  and  Greek  sources,  the  study  attempts  to  trace  and  analyse  the 
evolution  of  British  strategies  and  policy  regarding  Greece  and  its  position  in  Western 
Asia  Minor.  The  thesis  addresses  three  distinct  historiographical  questions:  that  of 12 
British  power  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Great  War  in  the  region  of  the  Near  and  Middle 
East;  the  conduct  of  the  Coalition  Government  of  1918-1922  and  the  role  of  David 
Lloyd  George;  in  particular  the  policy  followed  in  the  case  of  the  Greek  presence  in 
Anatolia  and  the  practicality  of  choosing  it  as  a  British  barrier  in  the  region.  Alongside 
comes  the  question  of  the  Greek  decision  to  involve  itself  in  Asia  Minor  by  offering  its 
&services'  to  Britain. 
The  question  of  British  power  has  preoccupied  an  array  of  distinguished  and 
reputable  scholars,  experts  on  every  possible  parameter,  whether  political,  military,  or 
economic.  Economic  stringency,  the  need  for  demobilisation,  public  demand  for  peace 
and  tranquillity  had  indeed  added  massive  strains  to  the  task  of  controlling  the  Empire. 
The  end  of  the  Great  War,  had  witnessed  the  addition  of  yet  more  territories  to  the 
already  vast  collection  of  British  possessions.  At  first  sight,  it  was  as  if  the  Empire  had 
already  shown  signs  of  an  approaching  disaster.  The  prognosis  was  there  and  events 
mounted  too  fast  for  an  already  'weary  Titan.  '  The  'inability'  of  Britain  to  immediately 
establish  after  the  end  of  the  war  its  own  will  and  safeguard,  by  its  own  means,  its 
interests  has  been  treated  as  a  sign  of  decline.  The  view  of  British  descent  after  the  end 
of  the  war  is  represented  in  the  works  of  historians  like  Paul  Kennedy,  Correlli  Barnett, 
Bernard  Porter  and  Keith  Robbins.  8  Paul  Kennedy  in  his  celebrated  work  The  Rise  and 
Fall  of  the  Great  Powers  offers  a  paradigm  for  great  powers'  decline,  conceptualising 
the  fall  as  a  result  of  imperial  over  expansion  and  a  financial  inability  to  maintain  its 
possessions  and  responsibilities.  Britain  in  the  late  nineteenth  and  early  twentieth 
centuries  follows  exactly  this  paradigm.  Historians  detect  signs  of  the  decline  that  was 
to  follow  in  the  period  right  after  the  end  of  the  War.  For  example,  Barnett  sees  the 
decline  clearly  starting  in  1918,  as  he  explains  in  the  preface  of  The  Collapse  of  British 
This  is  the  theme  of  such  works  as  Paul  Kennedy,  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Great  Powers  (New  York, 
1988),  Correlli  Barnett,  The  Collapse  ofBritish  Power  (London,  1972),  Bernard  Porter,  The  Lion's  share: 
A  short  History  ofBritish  Imperialism,  1850-1970  (London,  1975),  Keith  Robbins,  The  Eclipse  ofa  Great 
Power.,  Modern  Britain  1870-1975  (London,  1983). 13 
Power.  9  For  Barnett,  the  First  World  War  marked  the  beginnings  of  British  decline.  The 
idea  of  the  over-stretched  and  burdensome  Empire  is  also  supported  by  Bernard  Porter 
and  Keith  Robbins. 
On  the  other  side  of  the  spectrum,  there  are  those  who  support  the  view  that 
Britain  had  managed  to  maintain  its  status  'as  still  the  greatest  power,  '  during  the  inter- 
war  period,  an  idea  entertained  by  historians  like  John  Ferris,  B.  J.  McKercher,  P.  J. 
Cain  and  A.  G.  Hopkins.  10  Ferris  more  specifically  deals  with  the  question  of  British 
military  power  in  the  aftermath  of  the  war  and  challenges  the  long  held  idea  that  Britain 
had  neglected  its  forces  and  strategic  thinking  during  this  period.  Along  this  line,  Cain 
and  Hopkins  in  their  British  Imperialism,  Innovation  and  Expansion  question  the  notion 
that  the  history  of  the  British  Empire  from  1914  to  1939  is  one  of  slow  and  irreversible 
decline.  On  the  contrary,  'Britain's  determination  to  retain  her  Empire  and  her  informal 
influence  was  undiminished,  not  only  after  1914  but  also  after  1945.  "  1 
In  the'meantime,  John  Darwin,  who  has  specifically  treated  the  question  of 
British  imperial  policy  over  Egypt  and  the  Middle  East,  in  his  study,  Britain;  Egypt  and 
the  Middle  East  has  concluded  that  'it  may  be  doubted,  '  whether  Britain's  conduct  in 
the  area  'with  all  its  disappointments  and  frustrations  can  provide  a  paradigm  for  the 
eventual  collapse  of  British  world  power  after  1940,!  as  'Britain  retained  the  will  and 
the  ability  to  guard  her  strategic  positions  in  the  Middle  East.  '  12  The  present  thesis 
follows  this  line  by  examining  the  British  position  in  the  area  of  Western  Asia  Minor 
and  the  Straits. 
The  task  of  formulation  and  implementation  of  foreign  policy  during  these  years, 
which  constitute  a  watershed  in  British  diplomatic  conduct,  fell  on  the  shoulders  of  the 
9  Corelli  Bamettý  The  Collapse  ofBritish  Power  (London,  1972),  p.  xi. 
10  John  Ferris,  '  "Tbe  Greatest  Power  on  Earth":  Great  Britain  in  the  1920s,  '  International  History 
Review,  XIII,  4  November  199  1,  B.  J.  McKercher,  "'Our  Most  Dangerous  Enemy":  Great  Britain  pre- 
en-dnent  in  the  1930s,  '  International  History  Review,  XIII,  4  November  199  1. 
"  P.  J.  Cain  and  A.  G.  Hopkins,  British  Imperialism.  -  Crisis  and  Deconstruction  1914-1990  (London, 
1993),  p.  308. 14 
Coalition  Government  of  Lloyd  George.  Opinions  of  its  handling  are  fairly  evenly 
divided.  The  historiography  on  Lloyd  George  and  the  Coalition  goverment  is  indeed 
rich  on  all  aspects  ranging  from  Lloyd  George  hagiographies  to  fierce  criticisms,  the 
extreme  views  represented  mostly  by  contemporary  admirers  and  critics.  13 
Contemporary  critics  had  even  accused  him  of  a  'damnosa  hereditas'  in  the  domain  of 
foreign  affairs,  being  'the  man  whose  great  defects  went  far  to  lose  the  peace.  '  14  of 
course,  there  are  also  works  that  take  a  more  moderate  approach,  such  as  Kenneth 
Morgan's  Consensus  and  Disunity,  a  balanced  approach  of  the  days  and  works  of  Lloyd 
George's  Coalition  Government  with  insights  into  foreign  policy  issues  as  well.  In  the 
realm  of  foreign  affairs  however,  Morgan  notes  that  'the  prestige  of  the  government  in 
its  conduct  of  foreign  policy  was  diminished  still  further  by  the  course  of  events  in  Asia 
Minor.  "  5  Morgan  has  even  characterised  the  'Greek  policy'  as  'the  one  great  aberration 
in  Lloyd  George's  foreign  policy,  the  one  area  of  belligerent  commitment,  totally  at 
variance  with  his  otherwise  conciliatory  Policy.,  16 
The  discussion  of  the  conduct  of  Lloyd  George  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference 
negotiations  is  also  vast,  although  primarily,  if  not  exclusively,  concerned  with  the 
Versailles  Treaty.  Peacemaking  and  the  'personal  diplomacy'  of  the  British  Premier  is  a 
recurring  theme  in  the  works  of  Dockrill  and  Goold  and  Anthony  Lentin.  17  A  generally 
accepted  view  suggests  that  Lloyd  George  predominated  over  issues  of  foreign  policy, 
eliminating  the  role  of  the  Foreign  Office,  often  with  disastrous  consequences.  Along 
12  John  Darwin,  Britain,  kgypt  and  the  Middle  East,  Imperial  Policy  in  the  aftermath  of  the  War  1918- 
1922  (London,  198  1),  p.  277. 
13  An  excellent  review  of  the  existing  literature  on  Lloyd  George  is  Chris  Wringley's  article,  'David 
Lloyd  George  1863-1945,  '  The  Historian,  26,1990. 
14  Valentine  Chirol,  'Four  Years  of  Lloyd  Georgian  Foreign  Policy,  '  The  Edinburgh  Review,  237, 
(January-April  1923):  1-20. 
15  Kenneth  Morgan,  Consensus  and  Disunity  (London,  1979),  p.  318. 
16  Ibid.,  p.  319. 
17  Michael  Dockrill,  and  Douglas  Goold,  Peace  without  Promise:  Britain  and  the  Peace  Conferences, 
1919-1923  (London,  1981)  and  Anthony  Lentin,  Guilt  at  Versailles  (London,  1984). 15 
with  this  theory  comes  also  the  assumption  that  Lloyd  George  exercised  an  autocratic 
diplomacy,  disregarding  completely  the  Foreign  Office  and  above  all  its  head,  Curzon.  18 
We  have  to  examine  more  recent  studies  in  order  to  see  a  different  approach  to 
and  interpretation  of  Lloyd  George  and  the  Coalition  in  the  realm  of  foreign  affairs.  An 
excellent  recent  study  of  British  foreign  policy  during  this  period  is  G.  H.  Bennett's, 
British  Foreign  Policy  during  the  Curzon  Period.  19  Bennett  examines  the  policies 
pursued  between  1919-1924,  covering  Curzon's  service  on  a  regional  basis.  Her  overall 
conclusion  is  that  the  'eclipse  of  the  Foreign  Office,  '  and  thus,  Lloyd  George's 
predominance  over  foreign  policy,  has  been  exaggerated.  More  specifically,  on  the  Near 
East,  Bennett  suggests  that  'the  broad  thrust  of  Near  Eastern  policy  was  determined  by 
Lloyd  George  and  Curzon  in  partnership.  20  Another  recent  study  which  deals  with 
British  foreign  policy  during  this  period,  is  Inbal  Rose's,  Conservatism  and  Foreign 
Policy.  during  the  Lloyd  George  Coalition 
.21  Rose,  although  ,  focused  on  the 
Conservative  conduct  during  this  period,  gives  interesting  accounts  of  the  conduct  of 
Lloyd  George.  The  present  thesis  also  addresses  the  relationship  between  Lloyd  George 
and  Curzon  and  questions  the  widely  held  view  that  Lloyd  George  alone  conducted 
British  diplomacy,  focusing  specifically  on  the  issue  of  the  Greek  question.  True,  the 
two  politicians  did  not  agree  upon  how  effectively  British  interests  would  be  served  in 
the  area  but  they  were  both  committed  in  the  idea  of  eliminating  Ottoman  presence  from 
the  Straits  and  Constantinople.  It  was  rather  on  issues  of  practical  conduct  rather  than  on 
policy,  that  they  disagreed.  This  thesis  argues  against  the  widely  held  view  that  Lloyd 
George  kept  Curzon  out  of  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs,  showing  that  there  were 
instances  of  agreement,  even  on  the  Greek  question,  hitherto  characterised  as  a  great 
point  of  disagreement  between  the  two. 
"  See  for  example,  Alan  Sharp,  'The  Foreign  Office  in  eclipse,  1919-1922,1  History,  61,1976. 
19  G.  H.  Bennett,  British  Foreign  Policy  during  the  Curzon  period,  1919-1924  (Basingstoke,  1995). 
20  lbid.,  p.  183. 16 
On  the  'Greek  policy'  of  Lloyd  George,  as  it  has  been  hitherto  characterised,  this 
study  attempts  a  closer  look  at  Lloyd  George's  conduct  and  interaction  with  his 
ministers.  It  seeks  to  detect,  if  any  existed,  the  degree  of  influence  his  advice  had  on  the 
policies  of  the  Greek  side.  Critics  and  friends  alike  have  all  commented  on  his  personal 
methods.  'Lloyd  George  became  adept  at  phrasing  his  promises  so  that  the  impression 
of  what  was  on  offer  was  stronger  that  what  was  defined  by  his  exact  wording,  '  as  Chris 
Wrigley  points  out.  22 
The  Greek  expedition,  in  Asia  Minor  has  been  treated  in  general  accounts 
concerning  the  Allied  policies  in  Turkey  and  the  Near  and  Middle  East  after  the  end  of 
the  Great  War  and  the  Paris  Peace  settlement.  These  include  among  others,  Briton 
Cooper  Busch's  study  of  British  policy  in  the  region,  Mudros  To  Lausanne  that  deals 
with  the  non-Arab  Middle  East  with  particular  attention  to  India  and  its  effect  on  British 
policy-making.  23  The  Greek  Expedition  is  discussed,  being  one  in  a  series  of  episodes  of 
British  intervention  in  the  region.  Helmreich's  study.  of  Allied  policies  from  1918  to 
-1920,.  From  Paris  to  &vres  is  a  study  of  the  conflicting  Allied  aims  over  the  defeated 
Ottoman  Empire's  territories.  24  His  focus  is  the  Paris  negotiations  seen  from  British, 
American  and  French  perspectives.  An  interesting  account  of  the  fall  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire  and  the  creation  of  the  Modem  Middle  East  is  the  work  of  the  journalist  David 
Fromkin,  A  Peace  to  End  all  Peace.  25  It  spans  from  1914  to  1922  offering  a  detailed 
account  of  events  leading  up  to  the  settlement  of  the  Middle  East.  It  examines  the  role 
of  the  British,  seen  through  the  actions  and  ideas  of  men  like  Kitchener  and  Churchill. 
A  useful  study,  from  the  Turkish  point  of  view,  is  Sonyel's  Turkish  Diplomacy;  it  is, 
21  Inbal  Rose,  Conservatism  and  Foreign  Policy  during  the  Lloyd  George  Coalition,  1918-1922  (London, 
1999). 
22  Chris  Wrigley,  Lloyd  George  (Oxford,  1992),  p.  153. 
23  Briton  Busch,  Mudros  to  Lausanne:  Britain'sfrontier  in  West  Asia,  1918-1923  (New  York,  1976). 
24  Paul  Helmreich,  From  Paris  to  S&res:  the  Partition  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  at  the  Paris  Peace 
Conference  of  1919-1920  (Columbus,  Ohio,  1974). 
2'  David  Fromkin,  A  Peace  to  End  All  Peace  (New  York,  1989). 17 
however,  somewhat  dated. 
26  A  recent  study  which  examines  British  and  Russian 
interests  over  the  Ottoman  Empire  during  this  time  span  is  BUIent  G6kay's,  A  Clash  of 
27  Empires.  Some  of  the  above  studies  deal  on  a  limited  scale  with  the  issue  of  the  Greek 
Expedition  in  Asia  Minor  and  the  ensuing  Greek-Turkish  conflict,  others  are  dated  and 
others  do  not  deal  exclusively  with  British  policy  in  the  region. 
The  Greek  historiography  on  the  issue  of  the  Greek  Expedition  in  Asia  Minor 
right  after  the  debacle  of  1922  offers  two  perspectives,  influenced  mainly  by  the 
national  schism  already  present  in  the  Greek  political  scene  from  1914.  There  were  the 
'Venizelist'  and  the  'Royalist'  accounts.  28  The  Venizelists  put  the  blame  for  the  Asia 
Minor  debacle  on  the  Royalist  governments  for  taking  up  the  leadership  at  a  time  when 
the  Allies  had  expressed  their  disapproval  of  King  Constantine,  thus  putting  the 
country's  fate  at  stake.  With  the  return  of  Constantine  the  Allies  stopped  supporting 
Greece.  The  Royalists,  on  the  other  hand,  put  the  blame  on  Venizelos'  acceptance  of 
Smyrna  in  the  first  place.  More  balanced  approaches,  however  dated  and  with  little  or 
no  use  of  archival  material,  are  offered  by  Alexander  Pallis  and  Konstantinos 
Sakellaropoulos.  29 
In  his  1973  study,  Ionian  Vision,  Greece  in  Asia  Minor,  1919-1922,  Michael 
Llewellyn  Smith  focuses  on  British-Greek  relations.  30  However,  it  is  his  treatment  of  the 
question  of  the  national  schism  and  its  impact  on  the  course  of  the  Greek  presence  in 
Anatolia  that  is  still  of  paramount  importance.  A  more  detailed  analysis,  based  primarily 
on  British  archives  -  mainly  Foreign  Office  files  and  the  published  Documehts  on 
26  S.  Sonyel,  Turkish  Diplomacy  1918-1923  (London,  1975). 
27  BUlent  G6kay,  A  Clash  ofEmpires,  Turkey  between  Russian  Bolshevism  and  British  Imperialism  1918- 
1923  (London,  1997). 
28  Leonidas  Paraskevopoulos,  Memoirs  -  Avo;  qv4avq  (Athens,  1933),  Panayiotis  Danglis,  Memoirs  - 
Axopvt7gove6para  (Athens,  1948).  For  'Royalist'  accounts  written  after  the  debacle  see  loannis  Metaxas, 
His  Personal  Diary  -  To  1ýpoacoziK6  Tov  HpcpoA6yio  (Athens,  195  1),  Xenophon  Stratigos,  Greece  in 
Asia  Minor  -H  EUdq  Ezq  -r.  7v  MiKpjtv  Aalav  (Athens,  1929,  reprint  1994). 
29  Alexander  Pallis,  Greece's  Anatolian  venture  and  after:  A  Survey  of  the  diplomatic  andpolitical 
aspects  ofthe  Greek  Expedition  in  Asia  Minor  (London,  1937)  and  Konstantinos  Sakellaropoulos,  The 
shadow  ofthe  West  -H  om6  rqqJ6accoq  (Athens,  1954). 
'0  Michael  Llewellyn  Smith,  Ionian  Vision,  Greece  in  Asia  Minor  1919-1922  (London,  1973). 18 
British  Foreign  Policy,  with  limited  use  of  Greek  sources  -  is  the  unpublished  Ph.  D. 
thesis  of  Theodossios  Karvounarakis,  Anglo-Greek  Relations  1920-22  .31  Nikos  Petsalis- 
Diomedes,  in  his  work  Greece  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference  provides  an  excellent 
analysis  of  Greek  claims  and  its  presence  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference  for  the  period 
1919-1920.32  He  treats  in  detail  the  conduct  of  British  and  Greek  officials  at  the  Paris 
theatre.  Nikos  Psiroukis,  in  his  work  The  Asia  Minor  Disaster,  in  Greek,  offers  an 
alternative  analysis  of  the  expedition  from  a  Marxist  point  of  view,  being  the  only  study 
which  deals  with  material  and  literature  from  Eastern  Europe  and  the  Soviet  Union.  33 
The  present  study,  following  the  course  and  the  finale  of  British  conduct  in  the 
Greek-Turkish  conflict,  in  this  snapshot  of  post-war  settlement,  attempts  to  show  that 
Britain  in  the  end  took  the  lead  again  in  dealing  with  the  overall  Near  and  Middle  East 
settlement,  reaping  as  many  fruits  as  it  could  at  the  Treaty  of  Lausanne,  achieving,  in 
the  meantime,  its  goal  of  free  access  through  the  Straits  in  the  Near  East  and  a  relative 
order  in  the  Middle  East  which  was  to  last  until  the  outbreak  of  the  Second  World  War. 
It  thus  dissents  from  the  view'that  Britain  was  fast  losing  its  place  among  the  Great 
Powers  and  therefore  from  the  views  of  those  that  treat  the  immediate  post-war  period 
as  the  threshold  for  Britain's  descent  as  an  imperial  power.  The  end  of  the  war  had 
introduced  new  realities  to  which  all  nations  had  to  adjust.  Britain  faced  the  challenge, 
not  without  making  mistakes.  However,  it  managed  to  remain  fairly  intact  even  in  the 
context  of  these  post-war  realities,  very much  in  control  of  the  areas  of  interest  to  the 
Empire,  until  the  outbreak  of  the  Second  World  War. 
31  Theodossios  Karvounarakis,  'Anglo-Greek  Relations  1920-22'  (unpublished  doctoral  thesis,  University 
of  Cambridge,  1990). 
32  Nikos  Petsalis  -Diornedes,  Greece  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference  ('111essaloniki,  1978). 
33  Nikos  Psiroukis,  The  Asia  Minor  Disaster  -H  MiKpamariK4  Karaarpo(p4  (Athens,  1964). 19 
Chapter  One 
The  Quest  for  Stability  and  Security-  The  Near  and 
Middle  East  in  British  imperial  planning. 
BRITISH  IMPERIAL  POLICY  AND  THE  EASTERN  MEDITERRANEAN:  SECURITY  BY'PROXY.  ' 
For  the  British,  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  was  a  corridor,  a  precious  'pathway' 
to  their  great  possessions  elsewhere,  namely  India.  It  was  a  vital  link  in  the  chain  of 
their  interests.  In  this  context,  a  primary  British  aim  concerning  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean  and  its  adjacent  territories  was  to  keep  their  great  adversary,  the  Russian 
Empire,  out.  Because  of  this  effort  the  Ottoman  Empire,  lying  between  the  two  mighty 
powers,  was  Britain's  protigi  through  continuous  struggle  in  the  nineteenth  century 
with  treaties,  conventions,  congresses  and  wars.  Throughout  the  nineteenth  century  the 
control  of  the  Straits  was  a  major  issue  of  British  foreign  policy.  The  fear  was  that. 
Russia  would  push  south,  seize  the  Straits  and  finally  gain  access  to  the  Mediterranean. 
The  British  response  to  that  was  the  protection  of  the  area  of  the  Empire  which  stood  in 
between  its  own  strategic  and  imperial  interests  and  those  of  Russia. 
The  first  Russian  challenge  to  British  strategic  interests  was  made  early  in  the 
nineteenth  century.  Russia  appeared  as  the  protector  of  its  'orthodox  Balkan  brothers' 
which  longed  for  independence  under  the  Ottoman  occupation  in  an  orchestrated 
attempt  to  reinforce  the  turbulence  that  was  shaking  the  weakening  Ottoman  Empire  and 
gain  access  to  the  Straits.  However,  Napoleon's  grandiose  plans  put  a  stop  to  Russian 
acquisitiveness  since  he  kept  them  busy  in  the  North.  The  Vienna  settlement  Of  1815 
was  intended  to  secure  the  European  Empires  from  any  sorts  of  national  movements  and 
uprisings.  The  balance  of  power  was  of  the  utmost  importance.  However,  things  were 
not  going  well  for  the  Ottoman  Empire,  which  suffered  especially  due  to  the  rise  of 
nationalism.  The  uprising  of  the  Greeks  in  the  1820s  was  the  first  in  a  series  of  uprisings 20 
in  the  Balkans.  In  1827  Britain,  France  and  Russia  colluded  to  arrange  a  settlement 
among  the  Greeks  and  the  Ottoman  Empire.  In  1832  they  guaranteed  Greece's 
sovereignty  and  agreed  that  the  newly  formed  state  would  be  a  monarchy.  However, 
Britain  was  not  convinced  that  the  'Greek  settlement'  would  leave  its  Ottoman  protigi 
without  further  blows.  Russia  had  not  abandoned  its  dreams  for  the  Mediterranean  and 
the  Crimean  War  was  the  next  episode.  Britain  took  arms  against  the  Russians  in  an 
attempt  to  destroy  its  fleet  and  stop  any  further  advances  in  the  Balkans!  The  Russians 
were  defeated  and  the  Ottomans  found  themselves  even  more  vigorously  protected  by 
Britain. 
Russia  continued  working  on  its  plans  outside  formal  channels:  Pan-slavism, 
initiated  by  them,  found  its  way  through  the  Balkan  peoples  still  under  Ottoman  rule. 
The  Congress  of  Berlin  in,  1878  was  the  next  stop  for  readjustment:,  Britain  stepped 
forward,  establishing  for  itself  a  safe  base  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  by  taking 
Cyprus  from  the  Ottomans.  The  Balkan  peoples,  Bulgarians,  Rumanians,  Serbs  and 
Montenegrins  acquired  their  independence.  In  the  meantime,  the  Ottoman  Empire, 
despite  the  losses,  continued  to  reap  the  fruits  of  Great  Powers'  protection.  Britain 
especially  'suffered  nightmares,  92  still  dreading  the  collapse  of  the  foothold,  which 
would  allow  the  Russians  a  free  hand  in  the  Mediterranean  and  even  down  to  Persia 
threatening  the  communications  with  India. 
During  the  period  from  1815  to  1907,  when  Russia  and  England  allied  against 
Germany,  Great  Britain  was  Russia's  most  consistent  rival  in  the  area  of  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean.  British  interests  had  thus  far  resulted  in  a  kind  of  consistent  support  for 
the  weak  Ottoman  Empire:  Britain  had  intervened  against  the  Turks  in  the  Greek 
revolution  in  the  1820s,  primarily  to  block  Russian  influence  and  went  to  war  against 
On  the  Crimean  war  a  recent  study  is  Winfried  Baurngart,  The  Crimean  War  1853-1856  (London, 
1999),  with  an  international  perspective  of  the  war. 21 
Russia  in  1853  on  Turkey's  behalf,  again  to  block  Russian  descent  in  the 
Mediterranean.  Britain  needed  to  secure  the  shipping  lanes  to  India;  those  trade  routes 
passed  through  areas  like  Suez  that  were  nominally  Ottoman.  The  Ottomans  were  too 
weak  to  act  as  a  threat;  British  policy  in  return  opposed  France,  Russia  and  Gennany, 
when  those  states  seemed  most  likely  to  get  power  over  a  weak  Ottoman  Empire. 
The  1890s  was  the  decade  of  the  transformation  of  the  picture  that  Britain  held 
for  the  Ottoman  Empire.  'The  unspeakable  Turk'  image,  a  term  coined  by  William 
Gladstone  soon  after  atrocities  committed  by  the  Ottomans  on  their  Christian  subjects 
reached  the  wider  public,  had  emerged:  British  public  opinion  turned  against  the  'Sick 
Man  of  Europe'  and  politicians  followed.  3  Reforms  were  soon  dictated  to  the  Ottomans 
by  the  Great  Powers  for  the  protection  of  minorities;  reforms  that  the  Ottomans  werd  not 
willing  to  accept  and  adopt.  A  new  protector  was  ý  thus  sought  from  the  Ottoman  side: 
Germany  willingly  stepped  forward  to  acquire  this  role  starting  in  the  early  1900s,  with 
the  economic  penetration  of  Asia  Minor  and  the  construction  of  the  Baghdad  Railway. 
The  tide  was  changing  fast  this  time.  The  Ottoman  Empire  was  slipping  out  of  the 
British  orbit.  4 
BRITISH  FOREIGN  POLICY  TOWARDS  THE  OTTOMAN  EMPIRE  BEFORE  THE  WAR  -  THE 
STRAITS  AND  CONSTANTINOPLE. 
Britain's  concern  and  policy  for  Eastern  Mediterranean  had  always  been  to 
maintain  a  friendly  stronghold.  British  interests  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  were  primarily 
concerned  with  the  sensitive  areas  of  Mesopotamia  and  the  Persian  Gulf,  areas  adjacent 
to  India  and  thus  central  to  strategic  thinking.  The  regime  of  the  Straits  was  a  further 
2  David  French,  7he  British  Way  in  Warfare  1688-2000  (London,  1990),  p.  123. 
3  There  were  reports  of  massacres  committed  by  the  Ottomans  in  Bulgaria  in  1875  and  massacres  in 
Armenia  in  1894. 
4  For  British  policy  towards  the  Ottoman  Empire  prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  War  see  Joseph  Heller, 
British  Foreign  Policy  towards  the  Ottoman  Empire,  1901-1914  (London,  1983). 22 
area  of  anxiety  for  Britain  because  of  Russia,  a  fear,  however,  which  had  been  allayed 
due  to  the  gradual  rapprochement  of  the  two  old  rivalS.  5 
It  was  the  Anglo-Russian  competition  of  the  nineteenth  century  and  the 
increasing  importance  of  India  and  its  total  defence  which  had  elevated  the  Straits  in 
British  strategic  thinking.  Control  of  the  Straits  was  a  principal  Russian  goal  as  a  way 
out  to  the  Mediterranean,  a  scheme  directly  in  opposition  with  British  thinking  of 
predominance  in  that  same  area.  During  the'nineteenth  century,  Great  Britain  had 
opposed  a  Russian  'descent'  into  the  Mediterranean  through  the  Straits.  Throughout  the 
course  of  the  century,  its  policy  makers  had  formulated  and  advocated  the  principle  of 
closing  the  Straits  to  foreign  warships.  6 
The  situation  changed  -not  for  long-  with  the  turn  of  the  twentieth  century.  Due 
to  the  German  rise  and  its  imperialistic,  designs,  Great  Britain  and  Russia  finally  put 
aside  their  rivalry  forming  in  1907  an  entente  cordiale.,  It  was  the  beginning  of  British 
'withdrawal  of  objection'  to-Russian  access  in,  the,  Mediterranean,  which  culminated 
with  the  secret  agreements  and  treaties  among  the  Entente  Powers  in  1915-1917.7  Great 
Britain  agreed  to  a  plan  that  called  for  a  Russian  occupation  of  the  Straits  and 
Constantinople  in  the  event  of  the  Ottoman  Empire's  dismemberment.  The  events  in 
Russia,  that  is,  its  withdrawal  from  the  alliance,  changed  British  policy  again.  With  the 
Treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk  signed  with  the  Central  Powers  on  3  March  1918,  Russia  and  its 
leaders  renounced  all  its  previous  claims  and  participation  in  dismemberment  schemes. 
5  Namely  the  1907  Anglo-Russian  Convention  over  spheres  of  influence  in  Asia.  However,  the  question 
of  the  Straits  was  not  directly  discussed. 
6  With  the  Treaty  of  London  (1840),  the  Straits  Convention  (184  1),  the  Treaty  of  Paris  (185  6),  the  Treaty 
of  London  (187  1)  and  with  the  decisions  of  the  Congress  of  Berlin  (1878). 
7  The  treaties  are  discussed  in  this  Chapter:  'British  strains  and  strengths  at  home  and  abroad  in  the 
aftermath  of  the  War.  '  p.  35. 23 
The  Straits  once  again  needed  'another  protector.  '8 
The  Balkan  Wars  of  1912-3  was'the  cause  for  another  retreat  of  Britain's 
backing  to  the  Ottoman  Empire.  The  armed  conflict  in  this  sensitive  part  of  the  world 
was  putting  British  interests  in  danger:  the  Ottoman  Empire  was  on  the  verge  of  a  final 
collapse,  facing  the  united  forces  of  its  former  subjects.  It  was  also  the  time  in  which 
Greece  appeared  for  the  first  time  as  a  potential  stronghold  in  the  eyes  of  several  British 
politicians.  9  Greece  had  proved  capable  of  becoming  a  major  power  in  the  area, 
defeating  the  Ottoman  Empire  that  seemed  even  more  ready  to  revert  completely  to 
German  influence.  10 
A  factor  that  had  worked  in  favour  of  Greece  during  this  period  was  the  Greek 
Prime  Minister,  Eleftherios  Venizelos,  who  had  undertaken  the  leadership  of  the 
country  since  1910,  and  had  been  an  ardent  supporter  of  pro-British  feelings.  ýHis 
attitude  was  epitomised  with  the  outbreak  of  the  war.,  The  Great  War  and  the  Ottoman 
entry  on  the  side  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  on  31  October  1914,  had  also  been  the  event 
destined  to  alter  the  British  attitude  towards  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Greece  seemed  to 
have  two  alternatives,  given  the  British  supremacy  in  the  Mediterranean,  neutrality  or 
war  on  the  side  of  the  Entente.  Venizelos  came  out  strongly  for  a  policy  of  war,  on  the 
side  of  the  Entente  Powers  as  early  as  in  August  1914.  However,  Constantine  I,  the 
King  of  Greece,  brother-in-law  of  the  German  Kaiser,  despite  his  pro-German  feelings, 
8  The  end  of  the  War  witnessed  the  fall  of  the  Straits  zone  and  Constantinople  to  the  Allies.  The  Armistice 
of  Mudania  (November  1918)  catered  for  the  opening  of  the  Straits  and  gave  to  the  Allies  'the  right  to 
occupy  any  strategic  points,  in  the  event  of  a  situation  arising  which  threatens  the  security  of  the  Allies.  ' 
Great  Britain,  Parliamentary  Papers,  Cmd.  53,  Terms  ofthe,  4rmistices  concluded  between  the,  41lied 
Governments  and  the  Governments  of  Germany,  4  ustria-Hungary  and  Turkey  (HMSO,  1919).  See  also 
Chapter  Two:  'The  Armistice  of  Mudros  -  Allied  tactics  and  British  preponderance.  '  p.  62. 
9  The  Balkan  Wars  constitute  a  landmark  for  Greek  history,  through  joint  military  action  with  its  Balkan 
neighbours  the  country  acquired  a  major  part  of  Macedonia,  South  Epirus,  some  of  the  Aegean  islands 
and  Crete.  Greece  had  mobilised  an  army  of  282,000  during  the  course  of  the  two  Balkan  Wars,  1912-3. 
Andr6  Andr6a&s,  Les  effets  iconomiques  et  sociaux  de  la  guerre  en  Gr&e  (Paris,  1928),  p.  5. 
'0  For  a  survey  of  German-Ottoman  relations  prior  to  the  Great  War  see  U.  Trumpener,  'Germany  and  the 
End  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  '  in  The  Great  Powers  and  the  End  ofthe  Ottoman  Empire,  ed.  by  M.  Kent 
(London,  1984),  pp.  111-140. 24 
given  the  unrivalled  supremacy  of  Britain  in  the  Mediterranean,  was  advocating 
neutrality  as  the  right  course  for  Greece.  The  clash  between  the  two  was  inevitable  and 
led  to  a  political-constitutional  crisis  and  to  a  foreign  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  the 
country.  Venizelos  was  thrown  out  of  office.  The  King  and  the  subsequent  Governments 
advocated  neutrality.  Greek  neutrality  however  favoUred  German  plans.  When  on  23 
May  1916,  Greek  forces  'surrendered'  Fort  Rupel,  the  key  to  East  Macedonia,  to 
Bulgarian  and  German  troops,  the  Allies  demanded  dissolution  of  parliament  and 
demobilisation  of  the  Greek  army.  In  the  meantime,  Venizelos  had  established  a 
provisional  government  in  Thessaloniki.  In  June  1917  Constantine  resigned,  Venizelos 
came  back  to  power  and  the  country  joined  forces  with  the  Allies.  II 
In  return  for  Greek  participation,  Venizelos  reserved  for  Greece  a  place  among 
the  victors  and  thus  a  chance  to  pursue  the  chief  operative  goal  of  the  country's  foreign 
policy,  the  Megali  Idea.  The  Greek  Prime  Minister  had  only'  a  vague  Allied  offer, 
coming  though  from  the  British  Foreign  Office,  in  January  1915  for  'most  important 
territorial  compensations  for  Greece  on  coast  of  Asia  Minor.  '  12  The  Greek  Premier 
enjoyed  the  full  support  of  the  British  government  and  at  long  last  the  Ottoman  Empire 
seemed  unable  to  show  any  kind  of  resistance  at  the  end  of  the  Great  War.  However, 
Greek  territorial  aims  after  the  end  of  the  War  were  shaped  by  Allied  desiderata:  the 
Greek  wish  for  expansion  beyond  Macedonia  was  rejected  while  plans  for  the  taking 
over  of  the  Dodecanese,  Northern  Epirus  and  Cyprus  were  blocked.  13  The  one  area  for 
11  For  the  National  Schisrn,  as  it  has  been  hitherto  called,  up  until  1918,  see  the  works  of  Ch.  Theodoulou, 
Greece  and  the  Entente,  August  1914  to  September  1916  (Thessaloniki,  197  1)  and  D.  Portolos,  Greek 
Foreign  Policy,  September  1916  to  October  1918  (London,  1974). 
12  There  were  substantial  Greek  populations  on  the  shores  of  Western  Asia  and  particularly  in  the  city  of 
Smyrna  and  the  surrounding  territories. 
"  The  Italians  blocked  Greece's  claim  for  the  Dodecanese  islands.  Italian  forces  had  occupied  the  islands 
in  April-  May  1912  during  the  war  with  Turkey  over  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica.  Only  part  of  Northern  Epirus 
was  flinally  allocated  to  Greece,  the  rest  was  ceded  to  Albania.  The  island  of  Cyprus  had  been  offered  by 
the  British  to  Greece  as  an  inducement  to  enter  the  War  on  the  side  of  the  Allies.  On  Cyprus,  Petsalis- 
Diomedes  notes  that  despite  the  fact  that  its  cession  to  Greece  was  supported  by  certain  Foreign  Office 25 
expansion  was  Asia  Minor,  the  area  for  which  during  the  war  the  Allies,  and  primarily 
Britain,  had  'encouraged'  Greek  aspirations  with  their  vague  offer-14 
THE  FRAMEWORK  OF  BRITISH  DECISION  MAKING:  THE  'MANAGEMENT'  OF  THE  NEAR 
EASTERN  QUESTION. 
Several  people  and  departments  shaped  post-war  policy  in  the  area  of  the  Near 
and  Middle  East.  It  was  not'a  one-man  show;  that  is,  it  was  not  exclusively  the  work  of 
David  Lloyd  George.  Lloyd  George  was  rather  in  the  epicentre  of  a  complex  web  of 
Cabinet  committees,  international  conferences,  departments  and  personal  advisers. 
Along  with  the  head  of  the  Coalition  Government  in  the  task  of  formulating  policy  in 
the  region  came  of  course  the  Foreign  Office,  with  its  head,  first  Arthur  Balfour  and 
later  Curzon.  These  two  were  followed  by  the  Secretaries  of  State  for  War,  for  the 
Colonies  and  India,  with  their  respective  heads,  Winston  Churchill,,  later  replaced  by  Sir 
Worthington  Evans,  Lord  Milner,  replaced  by  Churchill  in  1921,  and  Edwin  Montagu, 
replaced  in  March  1922  by  Viscount  Peel.  A  number  of  people  in  diplomatic, 
bureaucratic  and  military  positions  were  also  assisting  in  the  formulation  of  policy:  the 
Cabinet  Secretariat  and  the  Private  Secretariat  of  the  Prime  Minister,  Foreign  Office 
officials  and  representatives  abroad,  Chiefs  of  Staff,  military  and  intelligence  personnel. 
When  Lloyd  George  became  Prime  Minister  at  the  end  of  1916,  he  had 
immediately  established  a  War  Cabinet  to  deal  with  the  war  situation.  The  limited  but 
effective  six-member  cabinet  was  devoted  entirely  to  the  conduct  of  war.  The  Welsh 
politician  had  further  established  a  private  Secretariat,  which  in  the  domain  of  foreign 
affairs  was,  for  the  period  under  examination,  led,  first,  by  Philip  Kerr  and  later  by 
officials,  the  Colonial  Office,  the  Treasury,  but  above  all,  the  Military,  Naval  and  Air  Staffs  'fiercely 
opposed'  such  a  plan.  Petsalis-Diomedes,  Greece  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference,  p.  64. 
14  For  an  analysis  of  these  events  and  an  ovetview  of  British-Greek  relations  prior  to  1919  see  Chapter 
Two:  'The  Great  War  and  the  Dardanelles  -  Greece  enters  the  War  on  the  side  of  the  Allies.  '  p.  54. 26 
Edward  Grigg.  In  the  beginning,  still  in  the  context  of  the  Paris  Peace  Conference,  it 
was  Balfour  and  Lloyd  George  that  were  directly  involved  in  the  issue  of  the  Near  and 
Middle  East  settlement  on  the  part  of  the  executive  branch  of  the  Government.  Later, 
Edwin  Montagu  of  the  India  Office  and  Churchill,  first  from  the  post  of  the  Secretary 
for  War  and  then  in  charge  of  the  Colonial  Office,  were  also  directly  involved. 
In  the  war  of  impressions  however,  Lloyd  George  was  the  dominant  figure  over 
issues  of  foreign  policy  and  Curzon  was  often  ignored.  15  The  relationship  between  the 
Prime  Minister  and  his  Foreign  Secretary  is  of  paramount  importance  in  the  conduct  of 
foreign  affairs.  In  the  case  of  Lloyd  George  and  Curzon  the  pattern  was  that  the  Prime 
Minister  appeared  to  be  the  dominant  figure  in  the  relationship.  According  to 
Ronaldshay,  the  official  biographer  of  Curzon,  'harmonious  collaboration  between  the 
Prime  Minister  and  his  Foreign  Secretary  might  have  been  possible,  had  those  posts 
been  held  by  men  of  less  antithetical  natures.  than  Lord  Curzon  and  Mr.  Lloyd 
George.  06  Much  has  been  written  about,  Curzon's  personality,  'universally  called 
pornpous,  '  suffering  'from  absurd  megalomania.  '  17  These  characteristics  were  not 
tolerated  by  the  Prime  Minister.  Admittedly,  Lloyd  George  was  never  the  ideal  person 
to  work  with,  and  this  statement  is  of  value  coming  as  it  does  from  a  person  who  was  so 
close  to  him  in  the  years  of  his  tenure  of  office,  Maurice  Hankey:  '[  ... 
]Lloyd  George's 
erratic,  inconsequent,  and  hasty  methods  are  the  negation  of  organisation,  '  complained 
his  close  associate.  18  Curzon  detested  exactly  these  characteristics,  himself  being  the 
personification  of  order  and  discipline.  Despite  their  differences,  Lloyd  George  trusted 
his  Secretary  on  several  matters,  while  Curzon  himself,  although  he  had  made  it  a  habit 
15  Curzon  took  over  the  position  of  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  on  29  October  1919. 
16  Earl  of  Ronaldshay,  The  Life  ofLord  Curzon  (London,  1957),  Vol.  III,  p.  260. 
17  J.  D.  Gregory,  On  the  Edge  ofDiplomacy  (London,  1928),  p.  254. 
"'  Hankey  Diary,  14  March  1920,  cited  in  Stephen  Roskill,  Hankey,  Man  ofSecrets  1919-1931  (London, 
19704),  Vol.  1,  p.  148. 27 
to  prepare  letters  of  resignation,  never  really  ýmeant  to  leave  his  Office.  19  Robert 
Vansittart,  Curzon's  Secretary,  used  to  be  the  messenger  of  these  threats  which  never  in 
fact  materialised.  20  It  was  December  1918  when  Lloyd  George  put  Curzon  in  charge  of 
the  Foreign  Office,  as  Balfour  had  to  travel  with  the  British  Delegation  to  Paris.  In  the 
meantime,  Curzon  had  been  at  the  forefront  of  discussions  and  plans  concerning  the  fate 
of  the  area  of  the  Middle  East  during  the  War.  21 
Foreign  Office  officials  had  laid  their  hopes  for  a  return  to  normal  conditions 
upon  the  conclusion  of  peace.  By  normal  conditions  they  meant  the  return  of  the 
administration  of  foreign  affairs  to  its  natural  place,  the  Foreign  Office.  However,  the 
Heads  of  States  dominated  the  Paris  Peace  Conference  theatre,  while  Lloyd  George 
continued  to  rely  on  himself  and  on  the  services  of  Philip  Kerr  and  Maurice  Hankey,  as 
he  did  in  wartime.  Curzon  was  rather  caustic  about  that  saying: 
r  there  arc  in  reality  two  Foreign  Offices:  the  one  for  which  I 
am  for  the  time  being  responsible,  and  the  other  at  number  10  - 
with  the  essential  difference  between  them  that,  whereas  I  report 
not  only  to  you  but  to  all  my  colleagues  everything  that  I  say  or 
do.  [ 
... 
]  it  is  often  only  by  accident  that  I  hear  what  is being  done 
by  the  other  Foreign  Office.  22 
Lloyd  George  did  not  have  an  amicable  attitude  towards  the  Foreign  Office  and 
diplomats  in  general.  During  the  war  years  he  had  relied  on  the  services  of  the  Cabinet 
19  Harold  Nicolson,  Curzon:  the  last  phase  (London,  1937),  p.  214  and  Robert  Vansittart,  The  Mist 
Procession  (London,  1958),  p.  270. 
20  It  has  been  suggested  that  Curzon  did  not  want  a  real  breach  with  the  Prime  Minister  as  he  did  not  want 
to  be  out  of  office.  He  wanted  to  become  Prime  Minister  and  out  of  office  he  would  miss  his  chance.  See 
Donald  Bishop,  The  Administration  ofBritish  Foreign  Relations  (New  York,  1961),  p.  92. 
21  A  recent  study  of  Curzon's  involvement  in  British  planning  for  the  Middle  East  is  John  Fisher,  Curzon 
and  British  Imperialism  in  the  Middle  East  1916-1919  (London,  1999).  The  study  follows  closely  the 
course  of  events  and  negotiations  during  the  war  on  the  fate  of  the  Middle  East  where  Curzon  was  a  key 
figure. 
22  Curzon  to  Lloyd  George,  cited  in  Ronaldshay,  The  Life  OfLord  Curzon,  p.  316.  Most  probably  Curzon 
referred  to  the  deciphered  messages  by  the  Foreign  Office's  department,  Government  Code  and  Cypher 
School. 28 
and  his  Private  Office's  Secretariats,  the  last  mostly  known  as  the  'Garden  Suburb.  923 
The  Cabinet  Secretariat  had  taken  over  functions  that  were  conducted  by  the  Foreign 
Office.  24  The  degree  of  influence  of  the  Private  Secretariat  on  the  Prime  Minister  can 
not  be  established  with  certainty.  What  can  be  said,  though,  is  that  on  numerous 
occasions  Lloyd  George's  secretaries  had  intervened  in  the  domain  of  the  Foreign 
Office.  25  The  'alternative  lines  of  diplomatic  communication,  '  as  Donald  Watt  has 
described  Lloyd  George's  use  of  his  private  secretaries  in  foreign  policy,  annoyed  the 
Foreign  Office.  26  It  is  known  that  in  the  Near  East  settlement,  Philip  Kerr  favoured  the 
idea,  supported  by  the  Prime  Minister,  of  keeping  Greece  as  Britain's  ally  in  the  area, 
starting  with  its  presence  in  Smyrna,  contrary  to  the  opinion  of  Curzon.  27  During  1916- 
1918  he  was  very  much  involved  in  policy  and  decisions  regarding  British  war  policy  in 
the  Balkans  and  consequently  with  Greece.  28  Kerr  was  actually  the  person  playing  the 
intermediary  role  between-the  Greek  represýntatives  and  the  Prime  Minister,  until  his 
resignation  from  the  post  of  Lloyd  George's  Private  Secretary  in  1921.  In  Kerr's  private 
papers,  but  mostly  in  the  papers  of  Lloyd  George,  one  can  trace  the  numerous  meetings 
Kerr  had  with  the  Greeks  before,  during  and  after  the  Paris  Peace  Conference.  29 
23  The  so-called  'Garden  Suburb,  '  a  term  coined  by  The  Times  to  describe  Lloyd  George's  Secretariat, 
housed  in  the  garden  of  10  Downing  Street.  After  the  end  of  the  war,  their  influence  was  transferred  in  the 
realm  of  foreign  affairs.  This  was  something  that  continuously  annoyed  the  Foreign  Office. 
24  'They  [the  Cabinet  Secretariat]  took  over  from  the  Foreign  Office  the  responsibility  for  several  other 
functions  -  organising  international  conferences,  providing  the  secretariat  for  the  British  delegations, 
circulating  the  proceedings  and  resolutions  of  the  various  conferences,  and  handling  relations  with  the 
League  of  Nations,  '  Ephraim  Maisel,  The  Foreign  Office  and  Foreign  O)Tice  Policy,  1919-1926 
(Brighton,  1994),  p.  71. 
25  Kerr  was  involved  in  the  writing  of  the  Fontainbleau  Agreement  along  with  Lloyd  George.  In  the 
Papers  of  Kerr,  there  is  a  copy  letter  from  Kerr  to  Lloyd  George  where  the  first  clearly  sets  his  views  on 
the  principal  problems  in  foreign  affairs  and  his  recommended  course  of  action.  NATIONAL 
ARCHIVES  OF  SCOTLAND  (thereafter  called  NAS),  Lothian  MSS,  GD/40/17/1280,  Copy  letter  from 
Kerr  sending  at  the  Prime  Minister  at  his  request  his  views  on  Foreign  Affairs,  2  September  1920. 
26  Donald  Watt,  Personalities  and  Policies  (London,  1965),  p.  178. 
27  NAS,  Lothian  MSS,  GD  40/17/1088,  Minute  by  Kerr,  22  November  1919.  For  Kerr  see  Chapter  Three: 
'The  British  officials  on  the  spot  and  the  situation  in  the  Smyrna  enclave.  '  p.  99.  Also  Chapter  Four:  'The 
"London  response"  and  the  erroneous  Greek  impression  about  British  help.  'p.  173. 
28  See  especially  John  Turner,  Lloyd  George's  Secretariat  (Cambridge,  1980),  pp.  60-76. 
29  HOUSE  OF  LORDS  RECORD  OFFICE  (thereafter  called  HLRO),  Lloyd  George  Papers,  F/20/1/36, 
Report  of  interview  with  Venizelos  at  the  Hotel  Majestic,  27  January  1921.  This  is  an  example  of  the 
meetings  Kerr  had  with  Venizelos  even  after  his  [Venizelos']  fall  from  power. 29 
The  Prime  Minister  had  explicitly  stated  to  his  Foreign  Secretary  in  1919  that  he 
preferred  that  'great  questions  should  be  discussed  between  principals,  meeting 
alternately  in  London,  Paris  and  Italy,  and  that  details  should  be  sorted  by 
communications  between  the  Foreign  Offices.  30  The  way  Lloyd  George  conducted 
British  policy  regarding  the  Near  East  settlement  and,  more  specifically,  the  Greek 
parameter,  has  often  been  cited  as  a  classic  example  of  the  Prime  Minister's  sole  course 
of  action  in  the  realm  of  foreign  policy.  31  However,  although  there  were  interventions 
on  the  part  of  the  Prime  Minister,  Curzon  was  not  ignored  on  key  issues.  As  the  records 
of  the  negotiations  and  the  files  of  the  Foreign  Office  suggest,  there  is  no  doubt  that  on 
the  issue  of  the  Near  and  Middle  East  settlement  his  services  and  those  of  his  Office 
were  sought.  I 
The  Prime  Minister  was  in  favour  of  the  idea  of  keeping  Greece  as  Britain's 
&ally'  in  the  area,  leaving  the  Turks  aside.  In  a  letter  to  Lord  Riddell  he  had  stated 
The  Turks  nearly  brought  our  defeat  in  the.  war.  It  was  a  near 
thing.  You  cannot  trust  them  and  they  are  a  decadent  race.  The 
Greeks,  on  the  other  hand,  are  our  friends,  and  are  a  rising 
people  ... 
We  must  secure  Constantinople  and  the  Dardanelles. 
You  cannot  do  that  effectively  without  crushing  Turkish 
power.  32 
It  seemed  that  Lloyd  George  was  quite  certain  that  Greece  had  the  potential  of  replacing 
Turkey  as  Britain's  proxy  in  the  area.  On  that  issue  he  was  supported  by  the  Greek 
Prime  Minister,  who  had  convinced  him  that  Greece  could  do  the  job  for  Britain  with  no 
further  costs  for  the  Empire,  a  satisfying  clement  to  the  agreement.  All  seemed  quite 
settled  but  this  period  of  tranquillity  did  not  last  long.  Both  Prime  Ministers  failed  to 
30  HLRO,  Lloyd  George  Papers,  F/12/2/1  1,  Lloyd  George  to  Curzon,  10  December  1919. 
31  The  most  characteristic  example  is  the  'advice'  of  Lloyd  George  given  to  the  Greek  Delegation  at  the 
backstage  of  the  London  Conference  of  February  -March  192  1.  The  Foreign  Office  was  'informed'  about 
it  by  the  intercepted  messages  of  the  Greek  delegates  to  Athens.  See  Chapter  Four:  'The  impact  on  the 
British  Near  Eastern  policy  -The  British-Greek  discussions  of  winter  1921.,  p.  181. 
ý  32  Lloyd  George  to  Lord  Riddell  cited  in  Riddell,  Intimate  Diary  ofthe  Peace  Conference  and  After 
(London,  1933),  p.  208. 30 
see,  or  they  chose  to  ignore  one  fact.  In  Turkey,  despite  Lloyd  George's 
-statement 
in 
July  1920  that  '[Turkey  was]  no  more'  there  was  a  nationalist  movement  that  worked 
fervently  and  efficiently,  assisted  as  well  by  their  Allies,  to  reverse  the  situation.  33 
In  August  1919,  Lloyd  George  asked  Curzon  to  be  in  charge  of  the  negotiations 
regarding  the  issue  of  peace  with  Turkey  and  the  Middle  East  mandates  in  Paris.  Curzon 
was  already  an  expert.  His  service  as  Viceroy  of  India  from  1899  to  1905  had  allowed 
him  a  deep  knowledge  of  the  adjacent  to  India  territories.  He  had  also  been  in  charge  of 
the  Eastern  Committee  regarding  the  fate  of  the  Near  and  Middle  East  in  November 
December  1918.34  Curzon  had  his  own  scheme  on  the  issue  of  the  fate  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire  and  the  issue  of  the  security  of  British  imperial  interests.  He  had  been  in  favour 
of  a  plan  that  included  the  creation  of  a  line  of  independent  buffer  states.  He  believed 
that  the  Turks  should  be  ejected  from  Europe  and  kept  confined  in  Asia  Minor,,  trying  to 
avoid  any  kind  -of  encroachments.  Curzon  was,  against  the  Greeks  established  in 
Western  Asia  Minor.  However,  his  desire  to  see  the  Turks  expelled  from  Europe  and 
confined  in  Asia  was  stronger.  35 
Curzon  was  assisted  by  a  number  of  people  in  his  task  as  Foreign  Secretary. 
Prominent  positions  were  held  by  the  Permanent  Under-Secretary,  Charles  Hardinge 
and  the  Assistant  Under-Secretaries  of  State,  Sir  Eyre  Crowe,  who  later  replaced 
Hardinge,  Sir  William  Tyrell  and  Sir  Ronald  Lindsay.  Curzon's  Private  Secretary  was 
Robert  Vansittart.  A  number  of  Foreign  Office  officials  dealt  with  the  everyday  matters 
of  the  settlement  in  the  Near  and  Middle  East,  the  most  prominent  and  most  frequently 
met  through  their  memoranda  and  minutes  in  the  Foreign  Office  files,  Harold  Nicolson, 
33  PARLIAMENTARY  DEBATES,  COMMONS  [thereafter  cited  as  PD.  C],  v.  132,  c.  479,21  July  1920. 
34  For  the  Eastern  Committee  see  this  Chapter:  'From  Armistice  to  Conference,  '  p.  44. 
35  HLRO,  Lloyd  George  Papers,  F/12/3/24,  Curzon  to  P.  M,  9  April  1920.  '1  am  the  last  man  to  wish  to  do 
a  good  turn  to  the  Turks  but  I  do  want  to  get  something  like  peace  in  Asia  Minor,  and  with  the  Greeks  in 
Smyrna  and  Greek  divisions  ranging  out  Venizelos'  orders  and  marching  about  Asia  Minor  I  know  this  to 
be  improbable.  ' 31 
Allen  Leeper,  Erik  Forbes  Adam,  W.  S.  Edmonds.  Further,  there  were  the  British 
diplomatic  representatives  in  Athens,  Earl  Granville  until  November  1921  and  Francis 
Lindley  until  1923.  The  British  High  Commissioner  in  Constantinople  had  a  most 
prominent  position  in  the  handling  of  the  affairs,  the  post  occupied  by  Admiral  de 
Robeck  until  1920,  replaced  by  Sir  Horace  Rumbold,  a  most  successful  career  diplomat, 
who  later  presided  at  the  second  phase  of  the  Lausanne  Conference.  In  the  neuralgic 
post  of  Smyrna  the  British  representatives were,  first,  James  Morgan  up  until  March 
1921  replaced  by  the  career  diplomat  Sir  Harry  Lamb,  who  remained  until  the  total 
Greek  retreat  from  the  city  in  1922.36  Further,  in  Constantinople,  the  chief  Dragoman, 
interpreter  Andrew  Ryan,  was  also  an  important  figure. 
Charles  Hardinge,  the  Permanent  Under-Secretary,  followed  Curzon's  opinions 
regarding  the  settlement  in  the  Near  East.  He  favoured  the  Secretary's  plan  of  keeping 
Turkey  intact'and  limited  in  Asia  Minor  while  excluding  it  once  and  for  all  from 
Europe.  He  was  adamant  regarding  the  Greek  presence  in  Smyrna  which  threatened 
exactly  this  part  of  the  Secretary's  plan: 
I  doubt  if  the  Greeks  realise  what  it  is  going  to  cost  them  to  hold 
Thrace  and  Smyrna.  The  Turks  will  never  agree  to  the  handing 
over  of  Adrianople  and  Smyrna  to  the  Greeks  whom  they  hate 
and  despise.  This  is  not  my  personal  view  only  but  I  believe  it  to 
be  the  view  of  all  those  who  have  been  any  time  in 
Constantinople  and  know  both  the  Turks  and  the  Greeks.  37 
Sir  Eyre  Crowe,  the  Assistant  Under-Secretary  of  State,  responsible  also  for  the 
Western  and  Central  Departments  of  the  Office,  had  a  rather  different  opinion  on  the 
Greek  presence.  During  the  course  of  the  Paris  negotiations,  Crowe  participated  in  the 
Greek  and  Albanian  Affairs  Committee,  along  with  Sir  Robert  Borden  of  Canada,  on 
the  part  of  the  British  Delegation.  Overall,  he  maintained  a  favourable  attitude  to 
Greece.  In  various  instances  in  his  minutes,  Crowe  was  advocating  that  it  was  in  British 
36  Harry  Lamb  had  previously  served  in  Constantinople  as  Dragoman,  interpreter,  from  1903  to  1907. 32 
interest  to  have  a  friendly  Greece  on  its  side.  He  favoured  the  idea  of  replacing  Turkey 
with  Greece  as  Britain's  ally  in  the  region.  However,  he  had  reservations  on  the  issue  of 
Smyrna.  38 
Robert  Vansittart,  the  Private  Secretary  to  Curzon  shared  his  superior's  ideas. 
Curzon  considered  Vansittart  experienced  on  the  issues  of  the  Near  East,  due  to  his 
position  as  Acting  Head  of  the  Eastern  Section  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference.  39  The 
Private  Secretary  to  Curzon  had  strongly  criticised  the  Prime  Minister's  eastern  policy: 
Our  position  in  the  East  has  been  imperilled.  [  ...  ]  and  a  weak 
European  powerlet  has  been  straddled  into  Asia,  where  even 
Great  Britain  finds  the  foothold  increasingly  difficult.  Greece 
must  get  between  our  legs  and  trip  us  at  every  turn.  [  ...  ]  The  first 
essential  is  that  foreign  policy  should  be  returned  whole  to  the 
Foreign  Office,  and  not  be  run  spasmodically  behind  its  back 
(Greece)  and  over  its  head  (Russia).  40 
The  War  Office  was  another  Department  directly  involved  in  the  every  day 
affairs  over  the  issue  of  the  Near  East  settlement.  The  Department  was  responsible  for 
the  distribution  of  manpower  in  the  various  theatres  and  dealt  with  intelligence.  Also,  it 
was  responsible  for  the  Military  Attach6s  posted  to  diplomatic  missions;  the  last  formed 
ca  specific  source  of  military  information.  '41  The  appreciation  and  reports  compiled  by 
the  War  Office  representatives  and  officials  were  desperately  needed  for  the  formation 
of  policy.  The  head  of  the  Department,  Winston  Churchill,  was  deeply  involved  in  the 
formulation  of  policy  in  the  area.  Churchill  in  February  1921  moved  to  the  Colonial 
Office  and  was  replaced  by  Sir  Laming  Worthington  Evans. 
37  PRO,  FO  371/5043-EI297/3/44,  Minute  by  Hardinge,  n.  d. 
38  See  Chapter  Two:  'The  Greek  case  in  the  negotiations  in  Paris.  '  p.  77. 
39  Actually,  he  was  recalled  to  London,  along  with  Erik  Forbes  Adarn,  in  December  1919,  to  prepare  for 
the  upcoming  conference  with  the  French  on  the  issue  of  the  Near  East  settlement.  The  two  Foreign 
Office  officials  'saw  in  Greek  ambitions  a  factor  which  threatened  to  sabotage  the  entire  Turkish 
settlement.  '  Norman  Rose,  Vansittart,  Study  ofa  Diplomat  (London,  1978),  p.  48. 
40  Vansittart  to  Curzon,  30  March  192  1,  Curzon  Papers  F/4/3,  Rose,  Vansittart,  Study  ofa  Diplomat,  pp. 
57-8. 33 
The  Chiefs  of  Staff  during  these  years  were:  Chief  of  the  Imperial  Staff,  Sir 
Henry  Wilson  and  at  the  later  stages  Lord  Cavan,  Lord  Trenchard,  as  Chief  of  the  Air 
Staff,  and  Lord  Beatty  as  First  Sea  Lord.  In  Constantinople,  there  was  no  need  for  a 
Military  Attach6,  since  the  city  was  flooded  with  British  officers.  In  Greece  the  post  was 
taken  by  Brigadier  General  E.  S.  Hoare-Naime,  who  in  various  instances  infonned  the 
War  Office  and  in  effect  the  British  Government  on  the  state  of  affairs  in  the  Greek 
Anny.  42  Of  special  significance  was  the  British  Naval  Mission  in  Greece.  The  head  of 
the  enlarged  mission  from  1919  to  -  1921  was  Vice-Admiral  Kelly.  From  1921  Rear 
Admiral  A.  C.  H.  Smith  occupied  the  post.  43 
It  also  has  to  be  noted  that  in  Constantinople,  the  British  had  established  an 
intelligence  operation,  under  the  auspices  of  the  Directorate  of  Military  Intelligence.  In 
fact,  the  British  conducted  intercept  operations  from  Constantinople  which  primarily 
targeted  'Soviet  communications  in  Soviet  Russia,  '  however,  as  time  progressed  and  a, 
final  settlement  was  nowhere  in  sight,  the  British  were  getting  information  concerning 
the  Nationalists  and  Greece  and  French  designs  and  actions  in  the  area.  44  On  the  delicate 
issue  of  the  Nationalist-Soviet  relations,  the  reports  were  in  fact  especially  continuous 
and  numerous.  45  One  could  draw  the  conclusion  that  summaries  of  that  sort,  once 
collected,  compiled  and  distributed,  alarmed  those  who  read  them.  Winston  Churchill 
was  certainly  one  of  those  alanned. 
41  'The  Attach6  would  submit  both  regular  despatches  to  the  War  Office  and  also  occasional  reports  on 
topics  of  particular  interest.  '  In  Keith  Jeffery,  'British  Military  Intelligence  following  World  War  I,  '  in  K. 
G.  Robertson  (cd.  ),  "at  is  Intelligence?  British  andAmerican  Approaches  (Basingstoke,  1987),  p.  58. 
42  Actually  he  was  called  twice  to  visit  the  Greek  forces  in  Asia  Minor  and  his  reports  were  dispatched 
and  used  extensively  in  reports  and  evaluations  found  in  War  Office  and  Foreign  Office  Files. 
43  Since  its  establishment  in  1911  until  1923  the  heads  of  the  mission  were  Admirals,  L.  G.  Tufnell, 
(1911-1913),  Mark  Kerr,  (1913-1916),  W.  C.  Palmer,  (1916-1917),  W.  A.  H.  Kelly,  (1919-192  1),  A.  C. 
H.  Smith,  (1921-1923).  They  had  all  been  of  considerable  advantage  to  British  interests.  For  accounts  of 
the  British  Naval  Mission  in  Greece  see  PRO,  ADM  1/8555/91,1/8592/127,1/864  8/228,1/8756/157. 
44  Jeffery,  'British  Military  Intelligence  following  World  War,  '  p.  64. 
45  PRO,  WO  106/349,  no  number,  27  August  1920.  'Nationalists  seem  to  be  striving  to  restore  their  lost 
prestige.  Increasing  Bolshevik  propaganda  probably  intended  to  draw  the  Bolsheviks  to  their  assistance. 
Pronouncement  by  M.  K.  [Mustapha  Kemal]  that  he  has  definitely  thrown  in  his  lot  with  the  Bolsheviks  is 
to  be  expected.  ' 34 
The  Department  of  State  for  India,  with  Edwin  Montagu  at  its  head,  was  also 
connected  with  the  settlement  in  the  Near  East.  The  issue  of  the  fate  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire  encroached  upon  the  Department's  domain,  in  the  sense  that  the  Sultan  at 
Constantinople  was  also  the  religious  leader  of  the  Muslims  living  outside  the  Ottoman 
Empire.  Montagu  feared  that  the  maltreatment  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  would  put  a 
further  strain  in  the  relations  of  Britain  with  its  Muslim  subjects.  The  Secretary  for  India 
had  asked  Lloyd  George  in  the  beginning  of  the  Paris  negotiations  to  allow  the  Indian 
representatives  to  express  their  views  on  the  issue  of  the  Turkish  settlement.  During  the 
course  of  the  negotiations  for  the  treaty  with  Turkey,  the  Department  was  a  continuous 
source  of  objection  regarding  the  way  the  British  handled  the  Ottomans  and  the  fact  that 
this  would  cause  upheaval  in  the  Muslim  opinion  in  India.  The  appeasement  of  Muslim 
sensibilities  was  an  additional  weapon  in  the  hands  of  those  who  favoured  Turkey  for 
being  the  British  proxy  in  the  area.  The  India  Department  claimed  as  early  as  April  1919 
that  the  situation  in  India  was  stirring  already  and  required  special  attention.  46  Edwin 
Montagu  had  specifically  warned  the  Prime  Minister  that,  according  to  his  information, 
'Mohammedan  unrest  is  at  the  foot  of  the  troubles  in  India,  '  and  'that  a  just  peace  with 
Turkey  would  go  far  to  remedy  the  situation.  A7  The  Department  maintained  that  the 
Indians  had  a  claim  to  their  views  since  '[they  had]  supplied  the  majority  of  the  troops 
through  whose  agency  the  Turks  had  been  overthrown.  948 
Overall,  the  multiplicity  and  complexity  of  the  international  affairs  at  the  time 
led  to  one  great  necessity  in  the  conduct  of  foreign  policy:  flexibility.  Two  elements 
characterised  British  policy  making  during  this  period:  flexibility  and  realpolilik.  The 
46  There  was  unrest  in  India.  Of  central  importance  at  the  time  was  the  Amritsar  Massacre  of  April  1919. 
See  Muriel  Chamberlain,  Decolonization  and  Fall  of  the  European  Empires  (London,  1999),  p.  20. 
47  HLRO,  Lloyd  George  Papers,  F/40/2/50,  Montagu  to  Prime  Minister,  16  April  1919. 
48  PRO,  CAB  23/44,19  May  1919.  One  million  and  a  quarter  men  from  India  had  served  in  the  Turkish 
front. 35 
multiplicity  of  agencies  and  ideas  was,  however,  a  delay  factor  in  formulating  a  fast, 
'working'  solution  for  the  settlement  of  the  area. 
BRITISH  STRAINS  AND  STRENGTHS  AT  HOME  AND  ABROAD  IN  THE  AFTERMATH  OF  THE  WAR. 
At  the  close  of  1918  all  was  quiet  in  the  Western  front;  the  guns  had  ceased,  in 
Europe  at  least.  However,  the  post  bellum  situation  for  Britain  was  not  quite  settled. 
Indeed,  the  Empire  had  emerged  victorious,  even  enlarged  by  the  potential  shares  of 
former  German  and  Ottoman  possessions  . 
49  Victory  had  temporarily  removed  the 
German  threat  and  Britain  was  the  dominant  power  in  the  Middle  East  and  Africa.  Yet, 
there  were  certain  limitations  that  became  evident  in  the  months  before  or  right  after  the 
signing  of  the  armistices  and  certainly  before  the  opening  of  the  Paris  Peace 
Conference. 
The  British  Prime  Minister  was  'the  man  who  had  won  the  war.  '  His  popularity 
wa  s  at  its  height.  It  was  the  right  time  to  call  the  people  at  the  polls  for  what  everybody 
predicted  as  a  great  victory:  and  great  it  was.  The  Coalition,  Lloyd  George's  Liberals 
and  the  Conservatives,  had  won  'a  vast  and  unreal  majority.  50  However,  it  was  the 
Conservatives  who  commanded  the  majority  in  the  House  of  Commons.  Andrew  Bonar 
Law,  the  leader  of  the  Conservative  Party  had  lent  his  unquestionable  support  to  Lloyd 
George.  In  his  electioneering  manifesto  in  November  1918,  Lloyd  George  had  promised 
to  the  British  people: 
[ 
... 
]a  just  and  lasting  peace  [ 
... 
]  the  care  of  the  soldiers  and 
sailors,  officers  and  men,...  increased  production,  [ 
... 
]a  fresh 
impetus  to  agriculture,  housing,  education,  [ 
... 
]  to  carry  through 
the  inevitable  reductions  in  our  military  and  naval 
establishments  with  the  least  possible  suffering  to  individuals 
51  and  to  the  best  advantage  of  industry  and  trade. 
49  The  final  scramble  was  to  be  decided  among  the  victors  at  the  Paris Peace  Conference. 
50  Morgan,  Consensus  and  disunity,  p.  42. 
51  F.  W.  S.  Craig,  British  General  Election  Manifestos  1900-1974  (London,  1975),  pp.  28-30. 36 
The  exhaustion  of  the  country's  material  resources,  coupled  with  the  need  to  pay 
off  the  war  debts  and  return  to  normality  in  the  economy  required  cuts  to  government 
expenditure  wherever  possible.  For  the  public,  as  the  war  was,  nominally  at  least,  over, 
the  armed  forces  was  indeed  an  area  in  which  to  cut  government  spending.  In  1918,  the 
General  Staff  had  at  its  disposal  over  three  million  men;  in  less  than  a  year  that  figure 
dropped  to  just  under  800,000  and  in  1922  to  370,000  men.  52  Military  expenditure  had 
to  be  reduced.  On  15  August  1919,  the  'Ten  Year  Rule'  was  enforced.  The  War  Cabinet 
instructed  that  the  service  departments,  in  framing  their  estimates,  should  assume  that 
the  British  Empire  would  not  be  engaged  in  any  great  war  during  the  next  ten  years. 
Thus,  despite  the  over-stretched  military  security  commitments  for  Britain,  the 
government  had  to  adjust  its  policies  in  such  a  manner  that  would  entail  the  protection 
of  both  the  country  and  its  Empire  at  the  lower  possible  cost. 
Europe  struggled  to  return  to  pre-war  donditions.  Britain  did  not  wish  to  keep 
up  with  a  costly  army  for  the  purposes  of  defence.  A  realistic  alternative  to  maintaining 
annies  overseas  to  protect  the  Empire's  interests,  was  the  idea  of  letting  others  do  the 
job  instead.  Retrenchment  was  one  parameter:  this  did  not  necessarily  mean  that  the 
Empire  was  to  be  lcft  unattended.  It  meant  however  that  'alternative  ways'  were  to  be 
found.  Advocates  of  the  British  'descent'  theory  use  this  cut  down  in  expenditure  as  a 
clear  sign  of  decline.  However,  according  to  John  Ferris,  even  with  the  cut  in 
expenditure,  'the  government  did  not  starve  the  armed  forces  of  the  funds  needed  to 
meet  their  requirements.  '  53 
In  late  1918  there  was  military  unrest,  in  rest  camps  at  Dover  and  Folkestone, 
among  soldiers  that  were  to  be  transferred  to  mainland  Europe.  The  objective  of  these 
mutinies  was  to  force  the  government  to  speed  up  demobilisation.  Following  the  rioting 
52  Keith  Jeffery,  The  British  Army  and  the  Crisis  ofEmpire  (Manchester,  1995),  p.  13. 37 
soldiers,  the  workers  in  the  cities  expressed  their  concern  and  uncertainty  for  the  future 
in  cities  like  Glasgow,  Belfast  and  Edinburgh.  Strikes  or  the  threat  of  them  alarmed  the 
government.  In  Glasgow,  however,  things  went  out  of  control,  and  fighting  took  place 
between  the  police  and  strikers  on  31  January  1919  while  troops  and  tanks  surrounded 
the  centre  of  upheaval,  George  Square.  People  expressed  a  'moral  repugnance'  for  war: 
'The  attitude  of  the  press,  public  and  trade  unions  gave  the  impression  that,  unless 
British  interests  were  directly  threatened  in  any  dispute,  a  declaration  of  war  would  very 
definitely  be  greeted  with  a  general  strike.  954 
On  the  domestic  scene,  there  was  another  issue  that  required  attention  for  British 
policy-makers.  The  Irish  question  was  a  constant  problem  in  the  years  that  followed  the 
end  of  the  Great  War,  being  'a  continual  source  of  weakness  close  to  home.  '55  It 
required  army,  money  and  political  handling.  Asquith's.  Home  Rule  Act  of  1914  had 
given  Ireland  a  Parliament  with  limited  powers  which,  however,  extended  to  the  whole 
island,  but  it  was  suspended  for  the  war.  Throughout  the  war  the  problem  was  there  and 
with  the  end  of  it,  Irish  nationalism  had  emerged  strengthened  and  intensified.  In  late 
1918  there  was  a  gradual  escalation  of  the  Irish  nationalist  guerrilla  campaign.  The  Sinn 
Fein  Party  in  the  December  1918  elections  had  won  almost  three-quarters  of  the  Irish 
seats.  On  21  January  1919  a  declaration  of  independence  was  issued  followed  by  'an 
appeal  for  recognition  by  the  nations  assembled  at  the  Peace  Conference  in  PariS.,  56 
Slowly  war  broke  out  between  the  British  Government  and  the  military  part  of  the  Sinn 
Fein,  the  Irish  Army,  the  IRA.  The  treaty  that  was  signed  on  6  December  1920  was  not 
the  end  of  the  story. 
53  See  John  Ferris,  'Treasury  Control,  the  Ten-Year  Rule  and  British  Service  Policies,  1919-1924,  ' 
Historical  Journal,  30,1987:  859-883. 
54  Bennett,  British  Foreign  Policy,  p.  19  1.  There  is  a  debate  on  just  how  much  'repugnance'  to  war  existed 
in  the  aftermath  of  W.  W.  I.  Some  historians  like  Gerald  De  Groot,  Blighty:  British  Society  in  the  era  ofthe 
Great  War  (London,  1996)  see  the  British  as  far  more  militaristic  than  others  like  Jay  Winter,  The  Great 
War  and  the  British  People  (London,  1987). 38 
Great-power  relations  had  also  entered  a  new  phase;  Russia  after  the  Revolution, 
the  still  uncertain  role  of  the  United  States,  the  friction  with  France  over  the  Middle 
East,  already  evident  before  the  end  of  the  war,  were  forming  the  international  picture. 
Tsarist  Russia  had  always  been  'the  enemy'  for  the  British  Empire.  Russia  was  the  only 
power  capable  of  threatening  British  interests  in  Central  and  South  Asia  and  able  to 
challenge  its  position  in  India.  The  Revolution  of  1917  and  the  negotiations  of  peace 
that  the  Bolsheviks  launched  with  the  Central  Powers  had  alarmed  the  British.  Since 
1918,  Britain  and  France  had  been  assisting  the  various  counter-revolutionary  annies 
conducting  a  war  against  the  Bolsheviks. 
In  the  first  stages  of  the  Revolution  and  up  to  1920,  fear  of  Bolshevism  and 
toying  with  the  idea  of  more  eminent  intervention  characterised  the  British  position 
towards  Soviet  Russia.  The  official  British  policy  favoured  the  continuation  of 
intervention  and  aid  to  the  anti-Bolsheviks.  Lord  Curzon,  Lord  Milner  and  Winston 
Churchill  advocated  stronger  intervention,  while  Lloyd  George  and  Balfour  were  more 
critical,  Lloyd  George  insisting  on  peace  and  trade  with  Russia.  Yet,  they  all  agreed  that 
they  were  certainly  not  anxious  to  see  a  powerful  and  united  Russia  after  the  war.  A 
weak  Russia  would  be  no  threat  to  British  interests,  their  aim  was  the  same,  the  means 
however  that  each  side  favoured  differed.  Lloyd  George  believed  that  an 
accommodation  with  the  Soviets  could  be  reaclýed  peacefully  and  during  1920  and  1921 
he  worked  for  a  trade  agreement  with  Moscow.  Churchill,  on  the  other  hand,  was  of  the 
opinion  that  Britain  should  try  and  eliminate  this  particular  menace  actively  supporting 
the  White  Russian  campaign  in  the  Russian  Civil  War  between  the  Bolsheviks  and  their 
adversaries  in  1919. 
55  Jeffery,  The  British  Army  and  the  Crisis  ofEmpire,  p.  95. 
56  Charles  MowaL  Britain  between  the  Wars,  1918-1940  (London,  1968),  p.  58. 39 
On  29  January  1920,  the  Cabinet  had  decided  that:  'There  can  be  no  question  of 
making  active  war  on  the  Bolsheviks,  for  the  reason  that  we  have  neither  the  men,  the 
money,  nor  the  credit,  and  public  opinion  is  altogether  opposed  to  such  a  course.,  57  In 
the  meantime,  they  maintained  that  there  was  'no  question  of  entering  into  peace 
negotiations  with  the  Bolsheviks  until  they  had  demonstrated  their  capacity  to  conduct 
an  orderly,  decent  administration  on  their  own  country  and  their  intention  not  to 
interfere  by  propaganda  or  otherwise,  in  the  affairs  of  their  neighbours.  58  Max  Beloff, 
in  his  Imperial  Sunset,  notes  that  '...  it  was  natural  to  connect  all  the  symptoms  of 
industrial  and  social  unrest  that  appeared  inevitably  in  war-weary  Britain  with  the 
machinations  of  Moscow,  and  it  was  also  true  that  many  of  the  energies  of  the 
communist  movement  appeared  to  be  directed  against  Britain's  imperial  position, 
notably  in  India.  59  However,  he  also  stressed  that,  despite  the  fear  of  Bolshevism,  there 
was  no  'red  scare'  in  Britain.  60 
Britain,  in  this  post-armistice  period,  had  also  to  deal  with  America's  uncertain 
role  in  European  affairs.  There  were  hopes  expressed  during  the  war  that  the 
participation  of  the  United  States  in  the  final  victory  would  'foretell'  a  continued  period 
of  close  Anglo-American  co-operation.  British  hopes  were  to  build  at  least  the  Turkish 
settlement  around  American  mandates  over  Armenia  and  the  territories  surrounding  the 
Straits.  61  However,  the  prospects  of  an  American  acceptance  of  the  mandates  began  to 
fail  the  minute  the  discussion  was  set  at  the  Senate  for  the  Treaty  of  Versailles.  After 
withdrawing  into  political  isolation  in  1919  the  United  States 
( 
... 
]  continued  to  annoy  the  British  government  by  their 
anti-colonial  attitude,  especially  over  Ireland,  and 
57  PRO,  CAB  23/30,29  January  1920. 
58  Ibid. 
59  Max  Beloff,  Imperial  Sunset  (London,  1969),  Vol.  1,  p.  275  and  note  3. 
60  Beloff,  Imperial  Sunset,  p.  275. 
61  For  British  hopes  and  American  reaction  see  Seth  Tillman,  Anglo-American  relations  at  the  Paris 
Peace  Conference  of  1919  (Princeton,  1961),  p.  365. 40 
demands  for  the  open  door  to  United  States  oil  interests  in 
the  British  Middle  Eastern  mandates  and  in  Persia.  62 
British  foreign  policy  makers  had  also  to  deal  with  the  unfortunate  and  often 
conflicting  wartime  promises  and  commitments.  The  country  had  managed  up  until 
1914  to  keep  itself  almost  entirely  free  from  binding  commitments  and  treaties  to  other 
countries.  Even  the  treaty  signed  in  1905  with  France  was  kept  at  a  minimum  regarding 
commitments.  However,  the  situation  was  completely  reversed  during  the  wartime 
years.  These  agreements  were  denounced  when  the  Bolsheviks  in  1917  made  them 
public  but  no  power  was  willing  to  step  back  on  what  were  considered  vital  and  just 
claims  over  the  former  Ottoman  territories. 
The  first  agreement  was  concluded  between  Britain,  France  and  Russia  in  March 
1915  and  included  the  granting  of  the  Straits  and  Constantinople  to  Russia  in  the  event 
of  the  Ottoman  Empire's  collapse.  With  the  Treaty  of  London  of  26  April  1915,  signed 
to  induce  Italy  join  the  Allied  cause,  the  Italians  were  to  receive  'an  equitable  part  in  the 
Medite  rranean  region  of  Adalia,  '  in  the  event  of  total  or  partial  partition  of  Turkeý  in 
Asia.  63  Earlier  that  year,  in  January  1915,  Sir  Edward  Grey,  while  attempting  to  recruit 
the  Balkan  nations  to  the  Allied  cause  had  offered  Greece  'most  important  territorial 
concessions  in  Asia  Minor.  '64  However,  Greece  rejected  this  offer,  the  result  of  the 
internal  dichotomy  in  the  Greek  political  scene  at  the  time.  65  On  16  May  1916,  with  the 
signing  of  the  Sykes-Picot  Agreement  between  Great  Britain  and  France,  the  latter  was 
to  get  half  of  the  northern  Arab  provinces  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  And  finally,  with  the 
62  Bennettý  British  Foreign  Policy,  p.  160. 
63  H.  W.  V.  Temperley,  ed.,  A  History  of  the  Peace  Conference  ofParis  (London,  1924). 
64  The  offer  of  Smyrna,  Doc.  434,  [FO  371/2242],  Grey  to  Elliot,  23  January  1915  in  BRITISH 
DOCUMENTS  ON  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS:  REPORTS  AND  PAPERS  FROM  THE  FOREIGN  OFFICE 
CONFIDENTIAL  PRINT  [thereafter  called  BDFA],  Part  II,  Series  11,  ed.  by  Kenneth  Boume  and  Donald 
Cameron  Watt  (Washington,  1983),  Vol.  X,  p.  226. 
65  See  Chapter  Two:  'The  Great  War  and  the  Dardanelles-  Greece  enters  the  War  on  the  side  of  the 
Allies.  'p.  54. 41 
St.  Jean  de  Maurienne  Agreement  of  17  April  1917,  Italy's  hopes  for  control  of  West 
Asia  Minor,  including  the  area  of  Smyrna  were  secured. 
All  the  above  treaties  and  agreements  were  a  strain  upon  foreign  policy  right 
after  the  signing  of  the  Armistices,  especially  with  the  complicated  issues  regarding  the 
Ottoman  territories.  The  lands  were  many  but  so  were  the  contestants  and  none  seemed 
willing  to  pull  back.  66  Britain  had  formal  treaties  with  the  Italians  and  the  French  and 
had  promised  Greece  a  share  in  Smyrna  in  the  event  of  its  joining  the  War.  Greece 
joined  in  1917,  two  years  after  the  initial  British  offer  was  made.  ,, 
France  was  another  factor  affecting  Britain's  position  after  1918.  The  two  Allies 
evidently  had  strained  relations  due  to  differences  over  the  Gennan  and  Eastern 
European  questions.  67  The  disagreement  with  France  over  the  German  settlement  was 
exasperated  by  bitter  competition  in  the  Middle  East.  The  differences  'formed  the 
background  of  the  intense  mutual  distrust  and  suspicion  excited  by  the  problems  of  the 
Near  East  settlement.  ý68  In  the  final  stages  of  the  War,  the  British  had  made  their  first 
attempts  to  maximise  their  already  strong  hold  in  Mesopotamia  and  Palestine  while 
leaving  even  less  'space'  for  the  French  to  do  the  same  in  Syria.  69 
The  Sykes-Picot  Agreement  of  16  May  1916  was  a  step  for  an  Anglo-French 
reconciliation  but  the  stakes  were  much  higher  on  both  sides  . 
70  France  strongly  opposed 
a  British  presence  in  the  area.  Yet  Britain  was  determined  not  to  leave  anyone  in  the 
area,  especially  since  it  was  British  forces  that  had  done  most  of  the  fighting  in  the 
66  See  Appendix  II  Maps  1.  Turkey:  Wartime  Partition  Agreements. 
67  For  an  account  of  Anglo-French  relations  over  the  German  Question  during  the  Paris  Peace  Conference 
see  P.  M.  H.  Bell,  France  and  Britain  1900-1940:  Entente  and  Estrangement  (London,  1996),  pp.  1  15-126. 
68  F.  S.  Northedge,  The  Troubled  Giant  -  Britain  among  the  Great  Powers,  1919-1939  (London,  1966), 
W26. 
For  an  analysis  of  Anglo-French  relations  over  the  Near  East  issue  see  Chapter  Five:  'The  French 
Connection.  '  p.  214. 
70  With  the  Treaty  of  San  Remo  -  April  1920-  Syria  and  Lebanon  were  allocated  to  France  while  Palestine 
and  Mesopotamia  along  with  the  area  of  Mosul  were  assigned  to  Britain. 42 
region.  71  During  the  last  two  years  of  the  war,  France  had  been  engaged  in  Europe  and 
had  offered  little  assistance  to  Britain  in  its  handling  of  the  situation  in  Palestine  and 
Mesopotamia.  With  the  end  of  the  war,  British  forces  controlled  Syria  and  Palestine.  It 
was  natural  for  Britain  not  to  desire  any  international  administration  over  Palestine  or  to 
be  willing  to  assist  the  French  to  establish  their  authority  in  Syria.  Indicative  of  British 
intentions  was  the  fact  that  Vice-Admiral  Calthorpe,  the  Naval  Commander  of  the 
British  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean,  signed  the  Armistice  of  Mudros  with  the  Ottomans, 
on  30  October  1918,  on  board  the  British  battleship  Agamemnon,  with  no  French 
presence. 
Italy's  interest  in  Western  Asia  Minor  had  been  expressed  through  the  secret 
treaties  that  had  finally  induced  it  to  join  forces  with  the  Allies.  Italian  interests  in  this 
part  of  the  Mediterranean  dated  back  to  the  Turco-Italian  War  of  1912  over  Tripoli. 
During  this'6onflict,  in  an  attempt  to  force  the  Ottomans  to  evacuate  Tripoli,  Italian 
forces  had  occupied  the  Dodecanese  islands  off  the  coast  of  South-Western  Asia  Minor. 
With  the  end  of  the  war,  the  Italians  remained  in  possession  of  the  islands,  a  short 
distance  off  the  Anatolian  coast  which  they  saw  as  a  potential  theatre  for  colonial 
expansion,  a  wish  that  had  been  partly  achieved  with  the  secret  treaties.  However, 
Britain  did  not  entertain  the  idea  of  having  any  one  power  dominant  over  Eastern 
Mediterranean  and  Italy  would  be  in  such  a  position  of  power,  if  it  were  to  get  hold  of 
the  territories  that  the  rest  of  the  Allies  had  gallantly  offered  to  it  in  order  to  attract 
Italian  alliance  during  the  war.  72 
The  British  continued  to  seek  freedom  for  the  Straits,  the  security  of 
communications  with  the  East  and  primarily  with  India,  and  there  was  also  concern  to 
71  For  the  British  war  effort  in  the  Middle  East,  the  Armistice  of  Mudros  and  British-French  animosity 
over  it  see  Chapter  Two:  'The  Armistice  of  Mudros  -  Allied  tactics  and  British  preponderance.  '  p.  62. 
72  Britain  blocked  Italian  aspirations  for  Western  Asia  Minor  with  the  counter  proposal  to  send  the  Greeks 
in  Smyrna  in  May  1919.  See  Chapter  Two:  'The  Allied  decision  for  the  Greek  landing  at  Smyrna.  '  p.  8  8. 43 
avoid  the  pre-eminence  in  the  Mediterranean  of  any  one  power.  France,  on  the  other 
hand,  sought  predominance  in  the  Mediterranean,  followed  by  a  political  and  economic 
supremacy  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  region.  Italy  rivalled  France  on  the  issue  of 
Mediterranean  predominance,  seeking  economic  outlets  in  the  region  as  well.  Russia,  in 
the  meantime,  had  always  sought  a  foothold  both  in  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Persian 
Gulf.  It  was  true,  that  the  Soviets  had  denounced  the  secret  treaties  and  thus  all  the 
'imperialistic  designs'  of  the  Tsarist  regime;  however,  the  vital  interests  and  priorities 
for  a  country  can  never  be  ignored.  Despite  the  turbulent  state  of  affairs  in  the  country 
Russia,  remained  a  great  adversary  and  contestant  in  the  region.  Lastly,  Greece  was 
seeking  to  fulfil  its  territorial  ambitions  and  establish  itself  in  the  Aegean,  aiming  at  the 
reduction  of  Turkey.  The  latter  was  a  defeated  nation  but  the  final  nail  in  its  coffin  had 
not  yet  been  hammered  home. 
Britain  retained  in  the  region  of  the  Middle  East  900,000  men,  in  Egypt, 
Mesopotamia,  Palestine,  Syria  and  the  Mediterranean  and  Indian  Ocean  fleets.  73 
Furthermore,  the  Empire's  armies  were  in  France,  Belgium,  Germany,  Austria-Hungary, 
Serbia,  Bulgaria  and  Russia.  In  contrast  to  the  strong  British  presence  in  the  region  of 
the  Near  and  Middle  East  the  French  were  poorly  represented  in  the  region  by  6,000 
74  75  men.  The  British  troops  overall  accounted  for  three  and  a  half  million  men.  True, 
with  mobilisation  under  way  these  figures  would  drop  but  the  crucial  point  remained  the 
same:  British  troops  had  been  in  all  theatres  of  the  War.  In  the  meantime,  the  British 
Navy  remained  the  largest  and  most  efficient  fleet  in  the  world.  76 
73  Howard  Sachar,  The  emergence  ofthe  Middle  East  1914-1924  (New  York,  1969),  p.  246. 
74  Ibid.,  p.  253. 
75  Jeffery,  The  British  Army,  p.  13. 44 
FROM  ARMISTICE  TO  CONFERENCE. 
Britain  took  the  lead  in  strategy  issues  during  the  War  and  was  determined  to 
take  control  of  the  diplomatic  negotiations  as  well.  They  had  proceeded  alone  with  the 
negotiations  and  the  signing  of  the  Armistice  of  Mudros  with  Turkey  on  30  October 
77  1918.  This  was  clear  proof  that  Britain  sought  to  assert  its  influence  over  the  territories 
of  the  defeated  Ottoman  Empire,  including  the  region  of  the  Western  Asia  Minor,  the 
Straits  and  Constantinople.  The  fate  of  these  territories  had  been  the  issue  of 
Committees  and  War  Cabinet  discussions  during  the  final  months  of  the  War  and  with 
the  conclusion  of  the  armistice  the  question  was  no  longer  a  theoretical  one.  British 
supremacy  had  been  asserted  on  the  battlefield  and  British  policy  makers  had 
unanimously  agreed  to  pursue  the  task  of  the  enhancement  of  British  power  in  the 
territories  of  the  defeated  Ottoman  Empire. 
While  consensus,  in  loose  terms,  existed  over  the  policies  which  were  to  be 
pursued  regarding  Palestine,  Syria  and  Mesopotamia  this  was  not  the  case  over,  the 
78 
political  fate  of  Western  Asia  Minor,  Le  Constantinople  and  the  Straits.  British  policy 
makers  seemed  to  be  of  two  minds.  Lloyd  George  backed  by  the  Foreign  Office, 
Balfour  and  Curzon,  had  decided  upon  the  expulsion  of  the  Turks  from  Constantinople 
and  the  Straits.  The  War  and  India  Offices  however,  along  with  the  Government  of 
India  were  not  of  the  opinion  that  the  Ottomans  should  be  evicted  from 
76  'The  Royal  Navy  emerged  from  the  First  World  War  in  a  very  strong  position  as  its  carrier  strength 
continued.  '  Stephen  Roskill,  Naval  Policy  between  the  Wars,  1919-1929  (London,  1968),  Vol.  1,  p.  60. 
77  For  the  signing  of  the  Armistice  of  Mudros  see  Chapter  Two:  'The  Armistice  of  Mudros.  '  p.  62. 
78  The  Eastern  Committee's  conclusions  regarding  the  three  areas  had  been  the  following:  On  Syria  the 
cancellation  of  the  Sykes-Picot  Agreement  would  be  pursued,  followed  by  the  creation  of  an  autonomous 
state,  recognition  of  French  interests  over  Lebanon  and  Alexandretta  and  British  influence  over 
Transjordan.  On  Mesopotamia,  British  policy  makers  had  opted  for  the  establishment  of  an  autonomous 
state  under  a  British  mandate  since  straight  annexation  was  ruled  out.  On  Palestine  the  Committee 
believed  that  a  mandate  was  the  best  possible  option.  For  a  summary  of  the  Eastern  Committee's 
meetings  in  November-December  1918  see  Erik Goldstein,  Winning  the  Peace  (Oxford,  1991),  pp.  155- 
179. 45 
Constantinople.  79  For  the  areas  adjacent  to  the  Straits  and  Constantinople  the  Eastern 
Committee  had  not  discussed  the  allocation  of  territories  or any  specific  policies  which 
were  to  be  pursued.  According  to  secret  treaties  and  vague  promises  however,  Italy  and 
Greece,  were  to  receive  parts  of  the  coast  of  Western  Asia  Minor,  south  of  the  Straits.  In 
the  meantime,  Lloyd  George,  along  with  certain  elements  within  the  Foreign  Office,  had 
favoured  the  establishment  of  Greece  in  the  area  of  Smyrna,  on  the  coast  of  Western 
Asia  Minor. 
Even  in  November  1918,  there  were  differences  on  an  interdepartmental  level 
over  the  way  a  Near  East  settlement  should  be  achieved.  However,  hardly  anyone 
believed  that  Britain  should  not  retain  control  of  the  area  of  the  Straits  and  western  Asia 
Minor.  British  policy  makers  had  expressed  their  desire  for  a  complete  British 
supremacy  in  the  region.  British  policy  of  support  for  the  Ottomans  and  their  retention 
in  Europe  had  been  based  on  the  assumption  that  they  would  remain  faithful  allies.  This 
had'not  been  the  case.  For  leading  . figures  of  theý  Briltish  policy  making  elite  this  meant 
80  the  opportunity  for  the  expulsion  of  the  Turks  from'  Europe.  In  addition,  public  and 
press  opinion  in  the  aftermath  of  the  War  was  largely  anti-Turk  . 
81  The  British  presence 
in  Constantinople  was  called  by  Yhe  Times  'the  iron  hand  in  velvet  glove,  '  underlining 
the  need  to  control  and  punish  Turkey.  82 
What  was  certain  during  the  last  few  months  before  the  commencement  of  the 
peace  negotiations  in  Paris  was  that  British  policy  makers  seemed  unwilling  to  turn  over 
79  The  heads  of  these  two  departments  subsequently  led  the  fight  for  the  retention  of  Constantinople  by 
the  Turks  in  the  Cabinet  discussions  of  January  1920. 
go  For  example,  Curzon  considered  them  'a  source  of  distraction,  [ 
... 
],  oppression  and  misrule  to  the 
subject  nationalities,  and  an  incentive  to  undue  and  unweening  ambitions  in  the  Moslem  world.  '  PRO, 
CAB  29/2-P  85,  'The  Future  of  Constantinople,  '  Memorandum  by  Curzon,  2  January  1918.  It  was 
circulated  to  the  Cabinet  in  January  1919.  Cited  by  Petsalis-Diomedes,  Greece  at  the  Paris  Peace 
Conference,  p.  53. 
81  See  for  example  the  way  The  Times  had  covered  the  treatment  of  the  war  prisoners  held  in  Turkey  once 
the  latter  returned  home  with  the  signing  of  the  Armistice.  More  specifically,  see  the  articles  of  The  Times 
on  22,23  and  24  November  1918. 
92  The  Times,  26  November  1918. 46 
control  of  territories  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  to  any  of  their  Allies.  Although  annexations 
had  been  unanimously  ruled  out  by  all  the  Allies  control  could  still  be  sought  via  other 
means:  the  mandate  system  and  the  establishment  of  friendly  'regimes'  seemed  an 
alternative  solution.  For  the  area  of  Western  Asia  Minor  adjacent  to  the  Straits  and 
Constantinople,  opinions  were  divided.  There  were  the  supporters  of  the  retention  of  the 
Turks  in  the  area  with  the  military  and  the  India  Office  as  the  main  exponents  of  this 
option,  and  Lloyd  George  and  the  Foreign  Office  supporting  Greece  as  an  alternative 
option. 47 
Chapter  Two 
Britain  and  Greece:  From  Benevolent  Neutrality  to 
Moderate  Support 
THE  GREEK  CASE  IN  BRITISH  PLANNING  AND  POLICY. 
Greece  had  gained  hard  won  independence  from  the  Ottoman  Empire  after  a 
long  occupation.  The  whole  of  the  nineteenth  century  had  witnessed  tension,  quarrels 
and  even  a  war  between  the  two.  What  was  Britain's  position?  Although  the  British 
response  to  Greece's  expectations  was  positive  in  many  respects,  nevertheless  up  until 
the  First  World  War  it  had  not  proved  to  be  the  firm  shoulder  upon  which  Greek  foreign 
policy  could  permanently  rest.  1  It  had  retained  an  attitude  of  benevolent  detachment  as 
British  interests  in  this  region  were  secured  by  the  retaining  of  the  status  quo. 
However,  the  situation  was  slightly  altered  with  the  advent  of  the  twentieth 
century  and  certain  changes  which  had  taken  place  on  both  the  international  and  Greek 
domestic  scene.  In  1830s  the  Greek  State  included  in  its  boundaries  47,516  square 
kilometres  and  730,000  Greeks.  Over  five  million  Greeks  were  still  beyond  the  new 
state's  boundaries  in  Macedonia,  Northern  Epirus,  Thrace,  Asia  Minor,  Cyprus,  the 
Aegean  and  Ionian  Islands.  2  The  newly  formed  kingdom  had  one  immediate  concern,  to 
include,  ultimately,  all  Greeks  under  its  confines.  From  the  very  beginning  of  the 
nation's  building  this  issue  underlay  its  foreign  policy 
For  almost  four  hundred  years  the  Greek  people  were 
passionately  attached  to  a  foreign  policy  inspired  by  the 
Megali  Idea  the  independence  and  unification  of  all  the 
Greeks.  3 
1  Cession  of  the  Ionian  Islands  in  1864  by  Britain,  Thessaly  and  Arta  ceded  to  Greece  at  the  Congress  of 
Berlin  in  1878. 
2  Petsalis-Diomedes,  Greece  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference,  p.  15.  See  also  Appendix  1.  Tables  1.  Table 
showing  the  area,  population  and  territory  acquired  by  Greece  in  1913  and  in  1920. 
3  Harry  Psorniades,  The  Eastern  Question:  the  lastphase  (Thessaloniki,  1968),  p.  1  8 48 
The  Great  Powers,  Britain,  France  and  Russia  were  the  ones  that  had  established 
the  new  kingdom  of  Greece  and  placed  it  under  their  guarantee  as  Protecting  Powers 
with  the  Treaty  of  May  1832.  During  the  course  of  the  nineteenth  century,  largely  due  to 
their  considerations,  the  country  acquired  in  1864  the  Ionian  Islands,  ceded  by  Great 
Britain,  and  in  1881  Thessaly  and  Arta.  However,  these  were  minor  additions  compared 
to  the  grandiose  plans  of  the  Megali  Idea. 
At  the  close  of  the  century,  in  1897,  the  island  of  Crete,  one  of  the  excluded 
Greek  inhabited  areas  under  the  Ottoman  Empire,  tried  to  achieve  union  with  Greece. 
However,  at  that  time  the  riot  caused  great  friction  in  the  already  fragile  Greek-Turkish 
relations.  Greece,  overestimating  its  power,  resources  and  allies,  took  up  the  challenge. 
In  February  1897,  a  flotilla  of  torpedo  boats  sailed  over  to  Crete  from  Piraeus  and  1500 
troops  landed  near  Canea.  In  the  meantime,  there  was  a  passing  of  irregulars  in  the 
Greek-Turkish  frontiers  between  Thessaly  and  Macedonia.  On  17  April  1897,  the  Sultan 
in  Constantinople  declared  war.  What  was  perceived  by  the  Greek  political  leadership 
as  a  means  to  realise,  at  least  partly,  the  Megali  Idea  ended  up  as  a  Greek  debacle.  After 
only  a  month  of  warfare,  the  Turks  had  managed  to  find  their  way  into  Thessaly  and 
occupied  the  city  of  Larissa.  The  Great  Powers  mediated  for  the  final  peace.  Crete 
became  autonomous  under  Turkish  suzerainty  after  the  intervention  of  the  Great 
Powers.  Under  the  peace  terms,  dictated  to  both  belligerents  by  the  Great  Powers' 
representatives  in  Constantinople,  Greece  had  to  pay  an  indemnity  of  four  million 
Turkish  pounds.  In  addition,  the  Powers  created  an  international  financial  committee  in 
order  to  secure  the  payment  of  the  indemnity  and  the  payback  of  the  loans  that  Greece 
had  received  up  until  that  point.  4 
4  Diplomatic  Books,  Correspondence  Respecting  the  Negotiationsfor  the  Conclusion  ofPeace  between 
Turkey  and  Greece.  Draft  protocolfor  Peace  Treaty  1897  between  Turkey  and  Greece,  1897.  C8851 
(London,  1898),  p.  189. 49 
The  debacle  of  1897  did  not  put  a  stop  to  Greek  aspirations  but  it  did  lay  the 
foundations  for  an  overall  change  in  the  pursuit  of  its  aims  and  the  course  of  Greek 
policy.  The  political  leadership  understood  that  the  country  had  little,  if  any  chance,  of 
finding  powerful  allies  in  its  fight  for  the  realisation  of  its  goals.  Foreign  support  was 
necessary  for  its  continued  existence  and  the  freedom  of  manoeuvre  ultimately 
depended  on  the  Great  Powers  and,  above  all,  on  the  view  the  Powers  took  on  the 
prospects  of  the  Ottoman  Empire's  survival.  Macedonia  was  another  domain  of  Greek 
claims.  In  the  years  preceding  1897,  volunteers  from  Greece  had  joined  the  Greek 
populations  in  the  region  as  they  were  fighting  for  liberation.  However,  the  Ottoman 
province  of  Macedonia  was  the  apple  of  discord  for  all  three  of  the  Balkan  States  that 
surrounded  it:  Greece,  Bulgaria  and  Serbia.  5  Immediately  after  the  debacle  of  1897, 
there  was  an  intensification  of  the  struggle  in  Macedonia.  Volunteers  along  with  trained 
Greek  army  officers  were  sent  to  organise  and  conduct  guerrilla  activity,  in  an  attempt 
to  counter  the  actions  taken  by  the  other  two  Balkan  states  but  primarily  by  Bulgaria. 
From  1905  to  1908,  the  Greek  bands  had  established  a  strong  hold  in  Macedonia;  this 
helped  the  Greek  cause  during  the  Balkan  Wars  and  the  Greek  claims  to  the  area. 
The  two  decades  following  the  war  of  1897  constituted  a  period  of  'confusion, 
isolation,  introspection  and  questioning  in  Greece.  6  The  open  issues  of  Macedonia  and 
Crete,  coupled  with  the  economic  difficulties  and  a  diplomatic  isolation  from  European 
politics  were  all  together  consolidating  Greece's  poor  standing  on  the  international 
scene.  The  crisis  manifested  itself  in  a  military  revolt  in  1909.  It  started  as  a  mutiny  of 
non-commissioned  officers  against  a  bill  restricting  their  promotion  and  ended  up  as  an 
5  The  Bulgarians  had  created  in  1893  the  1UR0,  the  Internal  Macedonian  Revolutionary  Organisation, 
with  the  aim  of  preparing  the  people  of  Macedonia  for  an  uprising  against  the  Ottoman  Empire.  The  Serbs 
had  created  the  Society  ofSaint  Sava  in  1886  with  the  purpose  of  stimulating  nationalism  in  all  the 
Serbian  lands,  including  Macedonia.  In  Greece,  the  Ethniki  Elaireia  was  formed  with  the  aim  of 
liberating  all  Greeks  under  Turkish  rule.  L.  S.  Stavrianos,  Vie  Balkans  since  1815  (New  York,  1958), 
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opposition  to  the  government  and  king  with  a  general  demand  for  changes  and  reforms 
at  all  levels  of  administration,  justice,  education  and  armed  forces.  An  overall 
resentment  for  the  established  political  leadership  was  expressed  and  the  Military 
League  which  had  initiated  the  revolt  entrusted  Eleftherios  Venizelos  with  the  fate  of 
Greece.  7 
The  Greek  political  scene  found  the  person  who  was  destined  to  dominate  it, 
during  the  critical  period  between  1910  and  1923,  in  Eleftherios  Venizelos,  who  was 
called  upon  in  Greece  to  give  a  solution  to  the  deadlock  of  the  1909  revolution.  He 
remained  as  Greece's  powerful  premier  in  the  turbulent  years  which  followed  although 
his  rule  was  not  uninterrupted.  A  lawyer,  educated  in  Athens,  Venizelos  returned  to  his 
homeland  and  entered  Cretan  politics  in  1889  as  a  member  of  the  Cretan  Assembly. 
From  1889  until  the  final  settlement  of  the  Cretan  Question,  Venizelos  was  at  the 
forefront  of  events,  negotiations  and  struggles.  In  a  matter  of  few  months,  in  1910,  he 
led  the  country  out  of  the  crisis.  In  the  elections  that  were  held  in  December  1910,  his 
party,  the  Liberal  Party,  commanded  a  majority  of  250  seats  in  the  Parliament  that  was 
formed  on  21  January  1911.  Under  Venizelos'  leadership,  the  attempts  that  were 
launched  before  his  advent  by  his  predecessors  for  social,  military  and  economic 
reorganisation  of  the  country  continued  intensively.  8 
In  1911  the  outbreak  of  the  Turkish-Italian  war  was  a  tangible  sign  of  the  decay 
of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  The  times  seemed  ripe  for  a  move  that  would  definitely  deal  a 
blow  to  the  'Sick  Man  of  Europe.  '  However,  the  Great  Powers  were  not  at  the  time 
ready  to  watch  the  tearing  up  of  their  protege.  Thus,  the  Balkan  states  had  to  proceed 
alone.  Eleftherios  Venizelos  was  the  Balkan  leader  who  initiated  the  formation  of  the 
6  Richard  Clogg,  A  Short  History  ofModern  Greece  (Cambridge,  1979),  p.  94. 
7  For  the  1909  coup  see  V.  Papakosmas,  The  military  in  Greekpolitics:  the  1909  coup  detat  (Kent  State 
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Balkan  League  in  1911-2.  By  the  end  of  September  1912,  Bulgaria,  Serbia, 
Montenegro,  and  Greece  were  ready  for  a  confrontation  with  the  Ottoman  Empire.  The 
war  was  provoked  by  a  Montenegrin  attack  upon  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Bulgaria  and 
Serbia  followed  and  Greece  joined  them  within  a  fortnight.  The  outcome  of  the  Balkan 
Wars  witnessed  Greece's  territorial  expansion  at  the  expense  of  its  rivals  and  primarily 
at  the  expense  of  Turkey. 
On  an  international  level,  Britain  in  1907  had  concluded  an  entente  with  Russia, 
which  aimed  at  avoiding  a  confrontation  in  Central  Asia.  Further,  from  the  last  quarter 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  and  more  evidently  with  the  advent  of  the  twentieth  century, 
Germany  had  taken  it  upon  itself  to  replace  the  dominant  British  influence  in 
Constantinople  with  its  own.  In  the  coming  crises  concerning  the  fate  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire,  Britain  tried,  through  diplomatic  means,  to  support  its  protigg.  The  Ottoman- 
Italian  War  of  1911  and  the  Balkan  Wars  of  1912-3  constituted,  however,  a  period  of 
great  crisis  for  the  Ottomans. 
It  was  during  these  fateful  years  that  British  policy  towards  Greece  took  a  slight 
turn  from  benevolent  neutrality  to  moderate  support.  Evidently,  the  advent  of  Germany 
in  Ottoman  'waters'  had  proved  to  be  an  asset  for  the  Greek  case.  It  was  largely  due  to 
the  fori-nation  of  the  Entente  and  the  intensification  of  German-Ottoman  relations  that 
Greece  had  the  chance,  for  the  first  time,  to  pursue  its  goals.  In  the  meantime,  British- 
Ottoman  relations  had  reached  low  ebb  and  even  in  the  financial  realm,  where  the 
British  had  always  played  a  principal  role,  relations  had  deteriorated.  9 
8  For  Venizelos'  domestic  policies  see  T.  Veren-ýs  and  0.  Dimitrakopoulos,  eds.,  Studies  on  Venizelos 
and  his  times  -  McAerýpara  y6pa)  a7r6  mP  BevICNO  KCa  InP  EMOX4  7ov  (Athens,  1980). 
9  Marian  Kent  points  out  that:  'By  1914  Britain's  share  of  the  Turkish  public  debt  was  only  15  per  centý 
compared  with  the  German  share  of  22  per  cent  and  the  French  of  63  per  cent.  '  In  Marian  Kent,  Moguls 
and  Mandarins:  Oil,  Imperialism  and  the  Middle  East  in  Britishforeign  policy  1900-1940  (London, 
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Great  Britain  had  attempted  to  prevent  a  power  vacuum  in  the  area  of  the 
Eastern  Mediterranean  by  supporting  the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  throughout 
the  nineteenth  century.  Thus,  official  British  attitudes  towards  Greece  had  always  been 
carcfiil  not  to  cause  problems  that  would  eventually  cause  the  collapse  of  the  'Sick 
Man.  '  However,  the  Greek  claims  after  the  end  of  the  war,  presented  by  the  P.  M. 
Vcnizelos,  were  aimed  exactly  at  the  dismemberment  of  the  Ottoman  Empire;  a 
dismemberment  that  had  already  been  decided  -  on  vague  terms  however  -  by  the 
Entente  Powers  with  the  secret  treaties. 
BRITISH  PERCEPTIONS  OF  GREECE  AND  THE  OTTOMAN  EMPIRE  -  THE  GREEK 
EXPECTATIONS. 
Before  the  Balkan  Wars,  the  Admiralty  had  assessed  the  position  of  Greece  as  an 
emerging  naval  power  in  terms  of  the  country's  resources  and  the  role  of  the  navy  in  its 
strategy.  However,  British  strategic  and  commercial  interests  in  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean  would  be  threatened  only  '[by]  a  strong  naval  power.  [  ...  ]in  permanent 
occupation  of  any  territory  or  harbour  east  of  Malta  if  such  a  harbour  were  capable  of 
transforming  into  a  fortified  naval  base.  "O  Thus,  Greece  was  not  considered  a  first  rate 
ally  primarily  because  of  its  inability  to  acquire  a  role  that  would  threaten  British 
interests. 
Winston  Churchill,  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  in  1912,  aimed  to  affirm  the 
British  naval  presence  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean,  as  at  the  time  Italy  and  Austria  had 
already  plans  for  establishing  their  naval  presence  in  the  Adriatic.  Guided  by  this 
thought,  Churchill  had  formed  a  plan  that  included  Greece  in  British  strategic 
considerations:  he  asked  for  the  use  of  a  Greek  port  in  the  Ionian  islands,  the  port  of 
10  PRO,  ADM  116/3098,  Admiralty  memo,  26  June  1912. 53 
Argostoli  in  Cephalonia,  and  was  willing  to  consider  the  cession  of  Cyprus  to  Greece  in 
return.  11 
Venizelos  was  an  admirer  of  British  politics.  12  His  pro-Entente  and  British 
feelings  had  been  evident  from  the  very  first  years  of  his  tenure  of  office.  Greek  naval 
officers  were  sent  to  train  in  Britain  and  a  British  naval  mission  arrived  in  Greece  in 
May  1911  under  the  command  of  Admiral  Tufnell.  An  efficient  police  force  was 
established  on  the  British  model  instructed  and  organised  by  British  officers.  13 
Greece  definitely  looked  at  Great  Britain  as  a  powerful  ally  that  would  protect 
its  interests.  Venizelos  himself  was  a  warm  supporter  of  this.  According  to  Smith,  'the 
foundations  of  his  Anglophile  policy'  were  laid  in  the  meetings  he  had  with  David 
Lloyd  George  and  Winston  Churchill  in  December  1912.  An  account  of  these  meetings 
is found  in  the  personal  diary  of  Sir  John  Stavridi,  Greek  Consul  in  London,  and  friend 
of  David  Lloyd  George.  14  The  Greek  Prime  Minister  wished  'to  be  attached  to  Britain 
hoping  that.  Greece's  aspirations  would  be  realised  through  this  aligriment.  15 
Right  after  the  end  of  the  Balkan  Wars,  at  a  time  when  Greece  had  finally 
become  a  considerable  power  in  the  Balkans,  Venizelos  rushed  to  tie  it  down  to  the 
British  side.  During  January  1914,  he  had  visited  Paris,  Berlin,  St  Petersburg  and 
Vienna.  On  20  January  1914,  he  arrived  in  London  where  he  had  meetings  with  Sir 
Edward  Grey.  The  Foreign  Secretary  cabled  the  British  Minister  in  Athens,  Sir  Francis 
11  See  the  article  of  Eleni  Gardika-Katsiadaki,  'Venizelos  and  Churchill:  The  basis  of  the  Anglo-Greek 
Entente,  1912-3-  BEWýtkOq  Kca  Tod)PTCFIX:  Ot  p6ccret;  q(;  Ayy),  o-EUTjVIKý;  IuvEvv6Tlo-%,  1912-3,  '  in 
Veremis  and  Dimitrakopoulos,  Studies  on  Venizelos  and  his  times,  pp.  87-100. 
12  'Essentially  a  democrat  and  a  Liberal,  he  regarded  the  cause  of  European  Liberalism  as  being  bound  up 
with  the  fortunes  of  the  Western  Powers.  The  noble  ideals  about  the  freedom  of  small  nations  and  the 
self-determination  of  peoples,  Munpeted  volubly  from  London  and  Paris,  found  a  warm  echo  in  his 
heart.  '  Doros  Alastos,  Venizelos:  patriot,  statesman,  revolutionary  (London,  1942),  p.  148. 
13  Alastos,  Venizelos,  p.  13  1. 
14  Smith  has  used  parts  of  this  diary  for  his  PhD  dissertation,  The  Greek  Occupation  of  Western  Asia 
Minor,  1919-1922,  and  the  National  Schism  (Ph.  D.  Dissertation,  Oxford  University,  197  1).  Venizelos' 
meetings  with  Churchill  at  the  time  are  discussed  in  Gardika-Katsiadaki,  'Venizelos  and  Churchill:  the 
basis  of  the  Anglo-Greek  entente,  1912-3'  in  Veremis  and  Dimitrakopoulos,  Studies  on  Venizelos  and  his 
times,  pp.  87-  100. 54 
Elliot,  to  inform  him  that  Venizelos  had  made  a  proposal  for  an  entente  with  Great 
Britain  which  was  intended  'to  preserve  the  status  quo  in  the  Mediterranean.  '  16  Yet 
Grey  characterised  any  such  discussions  and  plans  as  being  'premature.  '  The  British 
were  not  interested  in  aligning  with  one  particular  Balkan  power.  In  Undon,  Venizelos 
also  met  David  Lloyd  George  and  Winston  Churchill.  Nevertheless,  at  the  time  'they 
were  not  ready  to  enter  into  negotiations  for  an  entente.  '17  On  13  February  1914,  the 
Great  Powers  recognised  Greek  sovereignty  over  all  the  islands  of  the  Aegean  which 
had  been  seized  by  the  Greeks  during  the  First  Balkan  War.  The  Ottomans  refused  to 
accept  the  decision  and  launched  a  campaign  targeting  the  Greek  communities  in  their 
territories.  Further,  the  Ottoman  Empire  was  pursuing  a  naval  reconstruction 
programme,  ordering  by  the  summer  of  1914  two  battleships  from  Britain,  and 
destroyers  and  submarines  from  France.  Venizelos  responded  immediately  by 
18  purchasing  two  old  American  battleships,  Idaho  and  Mississippi. 
THE  GREAT  WAR  AND  THE  DARDANELLES  -  GREECE  ENTERS  THE  WAR  ON  THE  SIDE  OF.  THE 
ALLIES. 
Up  until  the  outbreak  of  the  First  World  War,  the  British  aims  in  relation  to  the 
Ottoman  Empire  were  threefold:  to  continue  its  influence  in  the  Persian  Gulf  in  order  to 
safeguard  the  passage  to  India,  to  protect  its  commercial  interests  in  Asiatic  Turkey  and 
finally,  to  preserve  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  Empire,  safeguarding  the  Straits  from  a 
Russian  descent.  Grey  in  the  House  of  Commons  during  the  Balkan  Wars  had  stated: 
'Our  policy  towards  Turkey  is  of  consolidating  and  securing  Turkish  authority  and 
15  B.  Kondis,  'The  Aegean  islands  and  Great  Britain,  '  in  Greece  and  Great  Britain  During  the  First 
World  War,  ed.  by  the  Institute  for  Balkan  Studies  (Thessaloniki,  1983),  p.  54. 
16  BDFA,  Part  II,  Series  H,  vol.  X,  Doc.  56,  [FO  3307/98/114/44],  Grey  to  Elliot,  21  January  1914,  p.  25. 
17  Kondis,  'The  Aegean  Islands  and  Great  Britain  during  the  First  World  War,  '  p.  54. 
"  Idaho  and  Mississippi  were  bought  from  the  Americans  in  1914  renamed  as  the  Kilkis  and  Lemnos.  P. 
P.  O'Brien,  British  andAmerican  Naval  Power  (Westport,  Connecticut,  1998),  p.  9. 55 
Turkish  integrity  in  her  dominions  in  Asiatic  Turkey.  '19  On  Constantinople  and  the 
Straits,  the  aim  was  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo,  unless  it  was  altered  equally  for 
all  powers.  The  coming  of  the  First  World  War  and  Turkey's  siding  with  Germany 
completely  reversed  the  picture  that  Britain  had  of  Turkey. 
An  interdepartmental  committee  was  appointed  by  the  Asquith  government, 
under  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen,  in  order  to  state  British  war  aims  for  the  Middle  East.  The 
results  of  this  committee  were  made  known  in  June  1915.  Several  alternatives  were 
discussed:  annexation  of  the  Ottoman  territories  by  the  Allies,  creation  of  'spheres  of 
influence,  '  to  maintain  a  controlled  Ottoman  Empire  through  a  regime  which  would  be 
friendly  to  the  Allies,  or  to  decentralise  the  administration  of  the  territories  through  the 
creation  of  semi-autonomous  territories.  The  final  recommendation  was  that  'an 
independent  Ottoman  Empire  should  continue  to  exist  after  the  war  in  a  decentralised 
forrn.  1.20  Thus,  one  can  see  that  even  under  these  circumstances,  British  policy  did  not 
favour  a  dismemberment  scheme.  The  'decentralisation'  was  just  a  different  approach 
than  that  of  the  British  traditional  policy  which  favoured  the  maintaining  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire.  During  the  war,  several  agreements,  secret  treaties,  were  signed  among  the 
principal  Entente  allies,  having  as  their  prey  Ottoman  territories.  However,  this  could 
not  be  characterised  as  a  major  deviation  from  traditional  British  policy  since  all  powers 
had  agreed  to  this  carving  up.  21 
On  the  Greek  front,  Venizelos'  sympathies  were  on  the  side  of  the  Entente.  He 
had  accepted,  however,  a  position  of  neutrality  as  long  as  Bulgaria  and  Turkey  remained 
neutral.  Yet  the  Greek  political  scene  itself  was  not  of  one  mind  as  regarded  Greece's 
19  Marion  Kent,  'Constantinople  and  Asiatic  Turkey,  1905-1914,  '  in  British  Foreign  Policy  under  Sir 
Edward  Grey,  ed.  by  F.  H.  Hinsley  (Cambridge,  1977),  p.  155. 
20  For  a  complete  statement  of  British  war  aims  in  the  area  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  see  A.  S.  Klieman, 
'Britain's  War  Aims  in  the  Middle  East  in  1915,  'Journal  of  Contemporary  History,  3  (July  1968):  237- 
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foreign  policy.  Venizelos  was  committed  to  the  idea  that  Greece's  place  was  on  the  side 
of  the  Entente  Powers.  The  Greek  King,  Constantine  I,  who  had  just  succeeded  his 
father  and  aspired  to  guide  Greece's  destinies,  and  the  General  Staff,  were  considered  to 
nurture  pro-German  feelings.  Conscious,  however,  of  British  predominance  over  the 
Eastern  Mediterranean,  the  King  and  the  General  Staff  championed  the  idea  that  Greece 
should  remain  neutral  during  the  conflict.  22 
Venizelos'  policy  was  made  clear  with  the  Ottoman  Empire's  entry  into  the  war 
on  the  side  of  the  Triple  Alliance;  Greece,  now,  could  only  side  with  Britain  and  France. 
The  country  could  not  have  remained  neutral,  in  case  the  Triple  Alliance  and  the 
Ottomans,  now  on  its  side,  won  this  war;  and  in  case  the  Entente  won,  Greece  had  to  be 
on  the  side  of  the  victors. 
In  taking  part  in  this  World  War,  we  shall  not  only  regain 
the  national  territories  we  have  lost,  we  shall  not  only  re- 
establish  our  honour  as  a  nation,  we  shall  not  only 
effectively  defend  our  interests  the  Peace  Conference  and 
secure  our  national  future,  but  we  shall  also  be  a  worthy 
member  of  the  family  of  free  nations  which  that 
Conference  will  organise.  [  ...  ]23 
The  Greek  Premier's  belief  was  that  only  if  Greece  joined  the  Entente  could  the  country 
entangle  in  a  war  with  Turkey  having  on  its  side  'the  aim  of  many  and  powerful 
Allies.  24 
Venizelos  on  10  August  1914  had  proposed  to  the  Entente  Powers,  mainly  to 
Britain,  the  undertaking  of  an  attempt  either  to  draw  the  Balkan  nations  together  on  their 
21  The  secret  treaties  on  the  future  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  signed  among  the  Allies  in  1915,1916  and 
1917. 
22  The  German  influences  of  King  Constantine  had  been  attributed  first  to  the  fact  that  his  wife,  Queen 
Sophia,  was  the  Kaiser's  sister and  second  to  his  German  education.  Constantine  had  studied  at  the 
University  of  Heidelberg  and  had  received  his  military  education  at  the  Berlin  Military  Academy.  It  was 
at  the  Berlin  Military  Academy  that  most  of  the  officers  of  the  Greek  General  Staff  had  received  their 
education  as  well. 
23  Venizelos'  speech  on  26  August  1917  to  the  Assembly  cited  in  Alastos,  Venizelos,  pp.  178-18  1. 57 
side,  or  to  follow  neutrality.  A  Balkan  alliance  on  the  side  of  the  Entente  was  in 
accordance  with  a  plan  advocated  by  Winston  Churchill  and  Lloyd  George.  Initially,  the 
plan  was  well  received  and  a  more  organised  attempt  was  left  to  the  hands  of  Noel 
Buxton,  MP  and  President  of  the  British  Balkan  Committee.  25  Grey  cabled  to  Sir  F. 
Bertie:  'If  Turkey  does  come  on  the  German  side,  it  will  be  essential  to  have  Greece  as 
an  ally  on  our  side.  We  must  prepare  for  this  eventuality  by  doing  nothing  to  alienate 
Greece.  126 
Four  days  later  Venizelos  made  a  more  explicit  offer.  The  British  Minister  at 
Athens,  Sir  Francis  Elliot,  telegraphed  the  Foreign  Office  that  the  Greek  Premier:  'had 
formally  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Entente  Powers  all  the  naval  and  military  forces  of 
Greece  from  the  moment  when  they  might  be  required.  3,27  Grey  turned  down  the  offer 
for  he  still  hoped  that  the  Entente  would  get  Turkey  and  Bulgaria  on  its  side.  The  British 
Cabinet  'agreed  upon  a  cordial  acknowledgement  and  took  up  with  enthusiasm  the 
general  idea  of  a  Balkan  confederation,  embracing  Serbia,  Greece,  Romania  and 
Bulgaria.  28  The  Foreign  Office  wanted  to  develop  the  area  into  a  neutral  zone.  Others, 
like  Lloyd  George,  preferred  to  see  the  Balkan  States  united  and  mobilised  against 
Turkey  and  Austria-Hungary.  The  British  Prime  Minister  Herbert  Henry  Asquith  was 
attracted  by  the  plan 
[ 
... 
]If  we  offered  (1)  Bulgaria,  the  side  of  Macedonia 
irredenta  which  (Monastir,  etc)  the  Serbs  stole  from  her 
two  years  ago,  (2)  Serbia,  Bosnia  and  a  good  bit  of  the 
coast  of  Dalmatia,  (3)  Romania,  Transylvania  and  one  or 
24  Greek  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  The  Greek  White  Book  1913-1917  (New  York,  1919)  no.  6,  Mr 
Venizclos,  President  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  to  His  Majesty  the  King,  Athens,  August  25,1914,  pp.  7- 
10. 
25  Lynn  Curtright,  Muddle,  Indecision  and  Setback.  British  Policy  and  the  Balkan  States,  August  1914  to 
the  inception  ofthe  Dardanelles  Campaign  (Thessaloniki,  1986),  pp.  20-1. 
26  BDFA,  Part  11,  Series  H,  vol.  X,  Doc.  35,  Erskine  to  Grey,  10  August  1914,  p.  16  and,  Doc.  37,  Grey  to 
Buchanan,  II  August  1914,  p.  17.  See  also  Curtright  Muddle,  Indecision  and  Setback,  p.  25. 
27  PRO,  FO  800/63,  no  161,  Elliot  to  Foreign  Office,  19  August  1914,  cited  by  Curtright,  Muddle, 
Indecision  and  Setback,  p.  26. 
28  D.  Dutton,  The  Politics  ofDiplomacy-  Britain  and  France  in  the  Balkans  in  the  First  World  War 
(London,  1998),  p.  18. 58 
two  addinents  and  (4)  Greece,  Southern  Albania,  Rhodes 
and  the  other  islands,  and  perhaps  Smyrna  and  a  strip  of 
the  shore  of  Asia  Minor  in  that  region  -  we  could  bring 
the  whole  lot  in  the  fight  on  our  side.  [SiC]29 
Lloyd  George  had  even  put  himself  forward  in  the  role  of  ambassador  extraordinary  to 
visit  the  Balkan  states  and  try  to  bring  them  into  the  conflict.  30 
Greece  at  this  time  was  in  the  middle  of  a  yet  another  crisis  with  the  Ottomans 
over  the  issue  of  the  fate  of  the  Aegean  Islands.  Both  countries  were  in  the  midst  of 
rearming  their  navies.  An  innovative  part  of  Greece's  offensive  plans  against  the 
Ottoman  Empire  was  an  attack  on  the  Dardanelles,  a  strategy  produced  by  Ioannis 
Metaxas,  Aide-de-Camp  of  the  Greek  Prime  Minister.  31  Few  months  later  Metaxas 
opposed  Venizelos'  decision  to  enter  the  War  on  the  side  of  Entente. 
Venizelos  was  not  discouraged  by  the  decline.  of  his  offer  in  August.  In  October 
1914,  Grey  telegraphed  to  Elliot 
The  Greek  Minister  assured  me  that  Greece  had  sufficient  troops 
to  land  at  the  back  of  the  forts  of  the  Dardanelles  on  the 
Gallipoli  Peninsula.  [  ...  ]I  said  that  our  policy  still  was  not  to 
commit  any  hostile  act  against  Turkey  unless  Turkey  committed 
an  act  of  war  against  us.  [  ...  ]  the  Minister  said  that,  with  the 
ships  that  Greece  had  her  100,000  troops  could  be  transported 
anywhere  at  any  time.  32 
Hostilities  with  the  Ottoman  Empire  broke  out  on  31  October  1914.  The  Straits, 
so  vital  to  Entente's  strategic  thinking,  were  closed.  Efforts  turned  towards  wooing  the 
29  M.  and  F.  Brock,  eds.,  H.  H.  Asquith,  Letters  to  Venetia  Stanley  (Oxford,  1985),  pp.  380-1. 
30  Ibid,  p.  449.  Lloyd  George  had  served  as  Minister  of  Munitions  and  War  Secretary  under  Asquith's 
government.  He  took  office  as  head  of  the  Coalition  Government  on  7  December  1916.  He  had  been  in 
favour  of  an  'eastern'  strategy  and  had  lent  his  support  to  the  operations  in  the  Dardanelles,  Salonica  and 
Mesopotamia.  When  he  became  Prime  Minister,  he  turned  attention  and  forces  towards  the  eastern 
theatres,  actions  which  had  been  suspended  by  Asquith  after  the  failures  of  the  first  two  campaigns. 
31  P.  J.  Vatikiotis  in  his  biography  of  Metaxas,  notes  that:  'Metaxas  became  concerned  with  naval  strategy 
as  part  of  wider  defence  strategy,  and  supported  the  purchase  of  cruisers  in  the  USA,  shortly  before  the 
outbreak  of  the  Great  War  in  August  1914.  Metaxas  came  to  believe  that  war  with  Turkey  was  inevitable, 
prompting  him  to  prepare  a  paper  advocating  a  surprise  attack  on  Asia  Minor,  a  view  in  full  accord  with 
the  position  of  Prime  Minister  Venizelos  at  that  time.  '  P.  J.  Vatikiotis,  Popular  Autocracy  in  Greece 
1936-1941  (London,  1998),  p.  69. 59 
Balkan  States  into  the  War.  With  the  Straits  closed,  Russia  would  soon  be  in  trouble. 
There  seemed  to  be  only  one  way  out  of  the  crisis:  an  attack  on  the  Dardanelles.  Soon, 
75,000  soldiers,  25,000  of  them  Australians  and  New  Zealanders,  were  sent  to  the 
Eastern  Mediterranean.  33  The  campaign  was  a  debacle:  the  British  Empire's  casualties 
totalled  205,000  men.  34  It  was  a  campaign  'poorly  planned  and  ineffectually 
executed.  235  The  high  cost  of  lives  which  Britain  paid  fighting  for  the  Straits  in  1915 
and  the  damage  to  its  prestige  certainly  played  an  additional  role,  along  with'their 
undeniable  strategic  value,  in  confirming  the  Dardanelles  as  a  first  class  priority  after 
the  War.  ? 
In  early  1915,  with  the  Dardanelles  Campaign  already  on  its  way,  Venizelos 
appeared  ready  to  launch  his  designs  for  a  Greater  Greece  and  thus  to  abandon 
neutrality,  since  he  had  been  convinced  that  the  war  would  bring  the  Ottoman  Empire's 
partition.  The  Allies  needed  the  Balkan  states  on  their  side.  On  7  January  1915,  he 
informed  the  British  Minister  in  Athens,  Sir,  Francis  Elliot,  that  'public  opinion  would 
,  36 
never  approve  a  war  against  Austria  but  a  war  against  Turkey  would  be  popular.  In 
return  for  intervention,  the  Allies  should  guarantee  Greece  certain  territorial  gains  in 
Asia  Minor.  Elliot  on  24  January  1915  handed  Venizelos  the  following  note 
...  If  Greece  will  side  with  Serbia,  as  an  ally,  and 
participate  in  the  war,  I  know  that  France  and  Russia  will 
both  willingly  make  to  Greece  very  important  territorial 
concessions  on  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor  ... 
37 
32  BDFA,  Part  II,  Series  H,  Vol.  I,  Doc.  268,  Grey  to  Elliot,  October  1914,  p.  134. 
33  Gerald  De  Groot,  The  First  World  War  (Basingstoke,  200  1),  p.  92. 
34  Field  Marshal  Lord  Carver,  Britain's  Army  in  the  Twentieth  Century  (London,  1998),  p.  58. 
35  De  Groot,  The  First  World  War,  p.  95. 
36  MFA  A/5  no.  36  1,  Grey  to  Elliot,  23  January  1915  cited  by  George  Leon,  Greece  and  the  Great  Powers 
(Thessaloniki,  1970),  p.  99  and  p.  107. 
37  Grey  to  Elliot  cited  by  Leon,  Greece  and  the  Great  Powers,  p.  107. 60 
This  was  in  accordance  with  the  plan  already  entertained  by  the  Prime  Minister  Herbert 
Henry  Asquith. 
38 
Venizelos  had  finally  gained  from  the  Allies  the  offer  and  the  opportunity  which 
he  had  long  awaited.  Now,  it  was  time  to  persuade  the  King  and  the  General  Staff  to 
withdraw  their  objections  to  Greece's  entry  into  the  war.  For  the  P.  M.  there  were  also 
the  prospects  'to  save  Hellenism  in  Turkey  and  to  secure  the  creation  of  a  truly  Great 
Greece,  including  almost  all  the  territories  in  which  Hellenism  had  been  active  during 
its  long  history.  '  39 
Opposition  to  Venizelos'  plan  was  immediate,  first  by  the  General  Staff  and  then 
by  his  former  adviser,  Ioannis  Metaxas,  now  acting  Chief  of  the  Greek  General  Staff.  In 
a  memorandum,  Metaxas  outlined  the  difficulties  raised  by  the  acceptance  of  such  an 
offer 
It  is  difficult  to  divide  this  territory  [Western  Asia  Minor] 
politically,  without  creating  anomalies,  which,  reacting  on 
the  economic  and  ethnological  planes  will  inevitably  give 
birth  eventually  to  friction  which  will  lead  to  struggles  for 
the  reunification  of  these  territories  through  the 
domination  of  one  of  them.  40 
The  Prime  Minister  argued  that  such  an  opportunity  would  not  present  itself  twice  and 
that  Greece  had  to  join  the  Entente  Powers.  The  gap  between  the  King  and  Venizelos 
widened.  In  April,  the  Entente  Powers  repeated  the  offer.  The  Greek  government 
declined  the  offer  on  6  May  1915.  In  the  meantime,  on  26  April  1915,  Great  Britain, 
France,  Russia  and  Italy  signed  the  secret  treaty  of  London,  according  to  which  Italy 
was  to  gain  territorial  compensations  in  Western  Asia  Minor  to  enter  the  war  on  their 
39  See  this  Chapter,  pp.  55-6. 
39  Venizelos  Memorandum  to  the  King  cited  by  Smith,  Ionian  Vision,  pp.  46-7. 
40  Quote  from  Metaxas'  Diary,  loannis  Metaxas,  His  Personal  Diary  -  To  17poacoxIM3  Tov  11pEpoMyio 
(Athens,  1952),  pp.  386-390. 61 
side  . 
41  The  dream  of  Western  Asia  Minor  was  fading  away.  In  October  1915  Venizelos, 
without  the  approval  of  the  King,  had  allowed  four  Allied  divisions  to  land  at  Salonica. 
A  prolonged  crisis  emerged  between  the  two  opposing  camps  in  the  Greek 
political  scene.  On  the  one  side,  there  were  those  who  advocated  intervention  on  the 
side  of  the  Allies.  The  opposing  camp  supported  the  solution  of  neutrality  that  favoured 
the  Triple  Alliance.  Venizelos,  in  an  attempt  to  force  Greece  onto  the  side  of  the  Allies, 
left  Athens  for  Salonica.  After  successive  infringements  of  neutrality  by  the  Allies  and 
Venizelos'  movement  of  National  Defence  in  Salonica,  in  August  1916,  and  the 
separation  of  Greece  into  two  states,  Venizelos,  backed  by  the  Allies  returned  to  Athens 
in  1917.  Greece  immediately  joined  the  war  on  their  side.  However,  this  was  without 
guarantees  or  promises  of  compensation.  42 
The  Greek  Army  joined  forces  with  the  Allied  forces  of  General  Franchet 
d'Esperey'  in  Macedonia.  According  to  the  Statistics  of  the  Military  Effort  of  the  British 
Empire  during  the  War,  the  Greek  forces  on  the  Balkan  front  numbered  129,300 
troopS.  43  The  Greek  troops,  who  fought  in  May  1918  against  the  Bulgarians  at  Skra, 
destroyed  a  Bulgarian  regiment  and  captured  its  position.  Later,  in  September,  under  the 
command  of  the  French  General  Marie  Guillaumat  the  Greek  forces  participated  in  the 
Balkan  offensive  which  ended  the  War.  44  By  September  1918  the  Allies  had  reinforced 
the  troops  in  Salonica  with  a  total  of  570,000  men.  In  less  than  three  weeks  time  the 
Bulgarian  forces  were  no  longer  in  a  position  to  resist  the  combined  forces  of  the  Allies. 
Bulgaria  admitted  defeat  and  surrendered. 
41  Petsalis-Diomedes,  Greece  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference,  p.  39.  In  October  1916  Great  Britain  had 
'offered'  Greece  Cyprus,  the  offer  was  declined  by  the  Zaimis  Government. 
42  For  a  recent  study  of  the  schism,  called  in  Greek  the  dichasmos  over  the  issue  of  Greece'  s  entry  in  the 
War  see  Dimitris  Michalopoulos,  The  National  Schism  -0  E0v1K6(;.  dtXaUP6q  (Athens,  1997). 
43  In  the  meantime  the  British  had  75,300,  the  French  144,500,  the  Serbs  63,050  and  the  Italians  3  1,000 
troops.  The  figures  are  quoted  from  Great  Britain,  Statistics  of  the  Military  Effort  of  the  British  Empire 
during  the  Great  War,  1914-1920  (London,  1922),  p.  625. 
"  Spencer  Tucker,  ed.,  The  European  Powers  in  the  First  World  War  (New  York,  1996),  p.  32  1. 62 
Greece  had  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Allies,  besides  the  soldiers,  its  navy 
with  its  arsenal  on  the  island  of  Salamis  and  its  docks  and  harbours.  The  light  units  of 
the  Greek  fleet  were  guarding  the  coastline,  relieving  the  Allied  fleet  in  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean.  The  Greek  Prime  Minister,  in  the  words  of  Balfour,  '[was]  an  illustrious 
member  of  an  illustrious  race:  one  of  the  great  contemporary  statesmen  of  the  world.  945 
Whether  that  'illustrious'  nation  would  get  something  in  return  for  its  services  remained 
to  be  seen.  46 
THE  ARMISTICE  OF MUDROS  -  ALLIED  TACTICS  AND  BRITISH  PREPONDERANCE. 
In  October  1918,  Lloyd  George  before  leaving  London  for  Paris  had  instructed 
the  Admiralty  and  the  War  Office  to  prepare  plans  for  an  armistice  with  Turkey.  His 
administration  was  determined  to  keep  control  of  the  area: 
We  have  taken  by  far  the  larger  part  of  the  burden  of  the  war 
against  Turkey  in  the  Dardanelles  and  in  Gallipoli,  in  Egypt,  in 
Mesopotamia  and  in  Palestine.  [  ...  ]  the  British  had  captured 
three  or  four  Turkish  Armies  and  had  incurred  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  casualties  in  the  war  with  Turkey.  47 
The  armistice  with  the  Ottoman  Empire  was  signed  on  30  October  1918  and  it 
was  a  wholly  British  operation,  since  it  was  primarily  Britain  that  had  military  control 
of  the  area  of  the  Near  and  Middle  East  with  nearly  one  million  men.  Britain  had  borne 
the  cost  of  the  major  campaigns  on  the  soil  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  with  2,551,000 
48  British  and  Dominion  soldiers  having  served  in  the  various  theatres.  First,  it  was  the 
attack  on  the  Dardanelles  and  Gallipoli  in  1915,  in  Mesopotamia  from  1914-1918  and  in 
Palestine  from  1916-1918.  The  first  two  campaigns  had  cost  Britain  dear:  casualties  of 
45  Balfour  at  a  Mansion  House  meeting  promoted  by  the  Anglo-Hellenic  League  on  17  November  1917, 
quoted  in  the  Daily  Telegraph,  17  November  1917.  KING'S  COLLEGE  ARCHIVES,  [thereafter  called 
KCA],  KCLCA,  Anglo-Hellenic  League  Archives. 
46  The  first  Allied  public  announcement  concerning  the  fate  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  was  the  Balfour  Note 
to  President  Wilson  on  16  December  1916.  One  point  was  'the  setting  free  of  the  populations  subject  to 
the  bloody  tyranny  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  as  decidedly  foreign  to  Western  civilisation.  ' 
47  Lloyd  George,  War  Memoirs  (London,  1933),  Vol.  Vl,  p.  33  10  and  p.  3314. 63 
the  Dardanelles  campaign  totalled  205,000  British  and  Dominion  soldiers  and  the 
Mesopotamia  campaign  92,000  casualties,  with  16,000  dead  in  battle  and  13,000 
49 
victims  of  disease.  In  October  1918  the  British  still  employed  900,000  in  the  region 
that  included  Egypt,  Mesopotamia,  Palestine,  Syria  and  the  eastern  Mediterranean.  " 
Germany  had  asked  for  peace  with  Switzerland's  help  on  4  October  1918.  The 
Ottoman  Empire,  along  with  Austria-Hungary  did  the  same  via  Spain  and  Sweden. 
British  forces  had  almost  exclusively  undertaken  the  task  of  fighting  in  the  Ottoman 
Empire.  However,  from  the  beginning  of  the  war  there  was  an  agreement  between 
France  and  Britain  that  the  French  would  be  in  control  of  naval  operations  in  the 
Mediterranean  and  the  British  in  all  other  waters.  This  decision  was  waived,  however, 
during  the  Dardanelles  campaign,  with  no  French  objection.  Thereafter,  the  British  had 
dominated  the  area.  Nevertheless,  now  that  peace  was  on  its  way,  the  French  insisted  on 
taking  over  the  command  in  the  area  and  thus  the  negotiations  as  well.  Lloyd  George 
protested  and  there  was  the  first  in  a  series  of  disagreements  on  Allied  policy  over  the 
region.  On  October  1918  Lloyd  George  told  the  Cabinet  that  'Britain  had  won  the  war 
in  the  Middle  East  and  there  was  no  reason  why  France  should  benefit  from  it.,  5  1  The 
British  ground  forces  in  the  area  consisted,  at  the  time,  of  Milne's  army  in  Macedonia 
and  Allenby's  in  Syria.  The  plans  of  Admiralty  and  the  War  Office  included  the  use  of 
these  forces  for  the  occupation  of  strategic  points.  The  French  objected  and  thus  the 
British  plan  was  modified  suggesting  instead  'Allied  occupation.  '  Admiral  Calthorpe 
was  sent  to  the  island  of  Lemnos  off  the  Western  Asia  Minor  coastline  to  negotiate  the 
armistice  but  the  French  insisted  on  having  the  naval  command.  In  the  meantime,  by  the 
48  Sachar,  The  emergence  ofthe  Middle  East,  p.  246. 
49  The  figures  for  the  Dardanelles  campaign  are  quoted  from  Carver,  Britain's  Army  in  the  Twentieth 
Century,  p.  58  and  for  the  Mesopotamia  campaign  from  De  Groot,  The  First  World  War,  p.  1  08. 
50  Sachar,  The  Emergence  ofthe  Middle  East,  p.  246. 
51  PRO,  CAB  23/14/,  13  October  1918  cited  by  David  French,  The  Strategy  of  the  Lloyd  George  Coalition 
1916-1918  (Oxford,  1995),  p.  262. 64 
autumn  of  1918  the  Ottoman  army,  out  of  a  total  of  2,850,000  conscripted,  had  only 
560,000  troops  left,  and  there  were  none  left  to  be  called  up.  From  the  560,000,  only 
one  fourth  was  available  for  combat  on  the  active  fronts.  52 
Admiral  Calthorpe  alone  signed  the  armistice  with  the  Ottomans,  representing 
the  Allies,  along  with  the  Ottoman  representatives,  on  30  October  1918,  at  the  port  of 
Mudros,  on  the  island  of  Lemnos,  aboard  the  British  ship  Agamemnon.  The  terms  called 
for  'the  immediate  demobilisation  of  the  Ottoman  army,  except  for  such  troops  as  are 
required  for  the  surveillance  of  the  frontiers  and  for  the  maintenance  of  international 
order,  the  Allies  to  have  the  right  to  occupy  any  strategic  points  in  the  event  of  any 
situation  arising  which  threatens  the  security  of  the  Allies  and  prohibition  to  destroy  any 
naval,  military  or  commercial  material.  953  The  Ottomans,  however,  had  specifically 
objected  to  any  occupation  of  their  forts  by  Greeks  and  Italians.  Admiral  Calthorpe  was 
authorised  to  agree  that  the  forts  of  the  Dardanelles  and  the  Bosphorus  would  be 
occupied  only  by  British  and  French  troops.  54 
-In  the,  terms  there  was  no  specific 
mention  made  of  disarming  and  disbanding  the  armies,  or  giving  up  munitions.  There 
was  simply  the  term  that  the  Turkish  army  was  to  be  demobilised  as  quickly  as  possible, 
'except  for  such  troops  as  are  required  for  the  surveillance  of  the  frontiers  and  for  the 
maintenance  of  internal  order.  55 
It  fell  to  the  British  to  carry  out  the  disarmament  and  reduction  of  the  Ottoman 
forces  in  Thrace,  as  well  as  of  the  great  bulk  of  the  armies  that  were  in  Asia  Minor, 
under  the  terms  of  the  Armistice.  The  area  assigned  to  the  British  was  vast.  The  dispute 
with  France,  over  the  command  issues  in  the  area,  plus  the  discussions  for  the  armistice 
52  G.  Dyer,  'The  Turkish  Armistice  of  1918,  'Middle  Eastern  Studies  8  (May-October  1972):  143-178. 
53  Temperley,  A  History  of  the  Peace  Conference  ofParis,  Appendix  V.  Armistices:  Part  IV.  The 
Armistice  Convention  with  Turkey  signed  30'h  October  1918. 
54  PRO,  WO  106/1433,  no  number,  Tel.  from  Admiralty  to  C  in  C,  28  October  1918.  'Only  British  and 
French  troops  will  be  employed  to  occupy  forts.  ' 
55  Temperley,  A  History  ofthe  Peace  Conference  ofParis,  Appendix  V. 65 
with  Germany  left  little  or  no  space  'to  ensure  that  the  terms  of  the  armistice  were 
effectively  implemented,  or  how  what  was  needed  was  to  be  supplied.  '56  The 
supervision  of  the  execution  of  the  armistice  was  granted  to  British,  French  and  Italian 
High  Commissions  at  Constantinople.  What  was  to  take  place  in  Asia  Minor  had  to  do 
with  the  fact  that  Allied  control  had  limited  effect  after  all  in  the  area.  57  The  armistice 
terms  with  the  Ottomans  were  mild.  However,  it  seems  that  it  was  the  result  of  a  general 
feeling  that  had  prevailed  among  the  Allies,  that  the  Ottoman  Empire,  the  'Sick  Man  of 
Europe'  was  finally  dead.  The  Eastern  Question,  the  fate  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  had  to 
be  treated  second,  after  the  settlement  in  Europe,  because  the  safeguarding  of  the 
balance  of  power  in  Europe  was  just  another  principle  of  British  foreign  policy  which 
had  to  be  maintained.  After  all,  it  seemed  that  the  Ottoman  Empire's  settlement  could 
wait:  a.  The  Empire  was  defeated  and  b.  all  Powers  had  agreed  on  a  partition  with 
various  treaties  signed  during  the  course  of  the  war.  However,  none  seemed  willing  to 
take  into  consideration  the  differences  that  were  bound  to:  anse  amongst  the  Allies  on 
the  spoils  and  the  fact  that  delays  in  settling  the  situation  exposed  the  Ottomans  to 
nationalist  feelings  which  could  well  put  obstacles  in  the  way  of  a  prearranged  partition. 
The  Ottoman  Empire  was  not  disarmed.  Great  Britain,  France  and  Italy  could 
not  agree  on  how  to  move  forward  since  their  ambitions  and  conflicting  interests  left  no 
space  for  co-ordination  in  policies.  Since  Britain  had  taken  upon  itself  the  initiative  to 
sign  the  armistice  with  Turkey  alone,  France  and  Italy  did  not  show  any  willingness  to 
contribute  large  forces  when  the  British  assumed  the  control.  In  the  meantime,  the 
Allied  forces,  mainly  British  in  composition,  in  Constantinople  secured  the,  control  of 
the  Straits  and  the  European  part  of  Turkey.  However,  there  were  no  measures  taken 
and  no  plans  formed  for  the  rest  of  the  big  centres  of  Asiatic  Turkey.  Count  Sforza, 
56  Sir  Frederick  Maurice,  The  Annistices  of  1918  (London,  1943),  p-23- 
57  See  Chapter  Tbree:  'Tbe  British  officials  on  the  spot  and  the  situation  in  the  Smyrna  enclave.  '  p.  99. 66 
Italy's  High  Commissioner  in  Constantinople,  recollects  on  the  first  period  right  after 
the  armistice: 
[ 
... 
]  the  reality  was  that  Turkey  was  far  from  dead;  that 
the  real  Turkey  was  only  temporarily  down  and  that,  if  we 
pulled  the  rope  so  tight,  she  would  escape  our  hands;  that 
we  might  remain  masters  of  Constantinople,  but  should  be 
masters  of  a  wonderfully  empty  house;  that  the  active 
forces  of  Turkey  would  retire  deeper  into  Asia  out  of  our 
reach,  and  that,  once  there,  they  would  turn  against  us.  58 
Unrest  in  Anatolia,  in  the  interior  of  Asia  Minor,  was  indeed  evident 
immediately  after  the  armistice.  There  were  a  considerable  number  of  regulars  scattered 
around  the  Empire,  armed  and  ready  to  oppose  anyone.  The  immediate  disarming  had 
been  overlooked,  and  these  discharged  soldiers  were  running  the  country,  looting  and 
killing.  Moreover,  even  before  the  armistice  negotiations:  'Nationalist  officers  - 
opposed  to  the  power  of  the  Sultan  in  Constantinople  -  were  either  in  positions  of 
power  in  Constantinople  or  on  their  way  to  assume  thern.  '59  The  Eastern  part  of 
Anatolia  was  especially  troublesome.  The  Turkish  government  was  asked  to  carry  out  a 
plan  to  control  the  unrest.  The  man  sent  finally  to  the  East,  with  the  consent  of  the 
Allied  High  Commissioners  of  Constantinople,  was  Mustapha  Kemal  who  left  the 
capital  on  15  May  1919  for  Samsun.  60 
Up  until  May  1919  the  reports  reaching  Whitehall  from  Turkey  did  not  depict 
the  full  picture  of  the  alarming  situation  in  Anatolia.  However,  there  was  evidence  for 
such  an  evaluation.  61  It  seemed  that  the  British  had  failed  to  see  that  'the  Turks  were  no 
58  Count  C.  Sforza,  Makers  ofModern  Europe  (London,  1930),  p.  350. 
59  G.  Dyer,  'The  emergence  of  the  Nationalist  Group  of  Officers  in  Turkey,  1908-1918,  '  Journal  of 
Contemporary  History,  8,  (October,  1973):  121-164. 
60  D.  Von  Mikusch,  translated  by  John  Linton,  Mustapha  Kemal  (London,  1931).  From  the  city  of 
Samsun  Kemal  started  materialising  his  plans  for  a  nationalist  uprising.  For  a  full  picture  of  the  Turkish 
situation  see  Chapter  Three:  'The  Shift  in  the  military  situation  in  Anatolia  and  the  Bolshevik  factor  in 
British  thinking.  '  p.  134. 
61  PRO,  FO  371/3411-202004,  Rumbold  (Bern)  to  F.  0,7  December  1918.  Rumbold,  the  British  Minister 
in  Bern  reported  the  following  regarding  Turkish  action  and  C.  U.  P  (Committee  of  Union  and  Progress): 
I  am  informed  that  members  of  C.  U.  P  who  have  failed  to  enter  either  Ilolland  or  Switzerland  from 67 
longer  a  submissive  enemy  on  whom  the  Allies  could  impose  their  Will.  962  Was  this  a 
failure  ofjudgement  or  had  the  British  decided  to  leave  all  their  options  open? 
THE  GREEK  REACTION  TO  THE  ARMISTICE. 
Greece  could  not  have  remained  indifferent  to  the  issue  of  the  Turkish  armistice. 
The  country's  hereditary  foe  lay  defeated.  Greece  ought  to  play  some  kind  of  part  in  the 
resolution  of  the  whole  affair.  Greek  participation  in  the  War  and,  above  all,  the  army's 
significant  role  on  the  eastern  front  and  in  Bulgaria's  defeat,  provoked  an  outburst  of 
references  in  the  press  relating  to  the  Greek  claims.  Asia  Minor,  Northern  Epirus  and 
Thrace  were  the  places  mentioned  the  most.  63 
However,  the  British  had  reserved  the  role  for  themselves,  excluding  even  the 
French  and  the  Italians.  On  31  October  1918,  the  British  Cabinet  had  decided  that  no 
Greek  man-of-war  should  be  sent  to  Smyrna  and  that  none  should  go  to  Constantinople, 
satisfying  the  Ottomans  who  had  specifically  requested  this  before  the  signing  of  the 
Armistice.  64  Indeed,  when  on  9  November  the  Allies  occupied  the  Bosphorus 
fortifications  and  the  Allied  fleet  entered  the  port  of  Constantinople  on  13  November, 
there  was  no  Greek  presence.  Only  on  27  November  1918,  the  Greek  battleship, 
Averoff,  entered  the  waters  of  Constantinople. 
In  Greece,  the  reception  of  the  news  of  the  armistice  was  not  enthusiastic.  On  the 
contrary,  the  Greek  side  believed  that  the  terms  were  lenient  and  above  all  lacked  any 
reference  to  the  substantial  Greek  populations  of  the  Empire,  although  there  were 
Germany  have  in  their  possession  several  million  pounds  worth  of  party  funds  for  the  purpose  of 
promoting  insurrections  amongst  Mohammedan  communities  under  Entente  rule  on  the  pretext  of 
furthering  well  being  of  Islam.  It  is  proposed  to  establish  centres  in  Switzerland,  Greece,  Spain  and 
Russia.  '  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  the  Greek  archives  there  are  reports  of  a  similar  nature  regarding 
Turkish  actions. 
62  Smith,  Ionian  Vision,  p.  102. 
63  PRO,  FO  371/3159-177564,  Granville  to  Balfour,  II  October  1918.  In  the  Greek  Press  see  the  main 
articles  of  the  Venizelist  paper  Eleftheros  Typos  -  EAc6OEpoq  T6;  roq  on  1,2  and  3  November  1918. 
64  PRO,  CAB  23/14,31  October  1918  and  PRO,  WO  106/1433,  Admiralty  to  the  Commander  in  Chief, 
Constantinople,  28  October  1918. 68 
references  to  the  protection  of  the  Armenians.  65  The  Greek  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
was  reported  to  have  said:  'We  should  certainly  be  greatly  disappointed  if  the  coming 
peace  congress  did  not  sanction  our  aspirations,  and  if  important  portions  of  Hellas 
[Greece],  actually  under  foreign  domination  were  not  be  freed,  we  ask  that  Epirus, 
Macedonia,  Thrace,  the  islands  and  the  countries  of  Hellenic  influence  in  Asia  Minor 
may  develop  freely  in  community  with  the  mother  country.  s66  It  seemed  that  in  Europe 
nobody  took  note  of  the  large  numbers  of  the  Greeks  of  the  Empire  that  were  deported 
from  their  homelands  in  Western  Anatolia  in  1914.  According  to  official  Greek 
estimations,  the  number  of  Greeks  expelled  from  Asia  Minor  during  the  War  was  circa 
105,000  and  the  number  of  those  deported  into  the  interior  of  Anatolia  at  circa  50,000.67 
In  the  Greek  press  there  were  continuous  references  to  the  lenient  armistice 
terms  and  there  was  even  a  publicity  campaign  launched  in  Europe  to  remind  them  of 
the  Greek  populations  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  which  had  suffered  during  the  War.  68  The 
British  minister  in  Athens,  in  his  communications  to  London,  underlined  the  volume  of 
all  this  activity  from  the  Greek  side. 
69  Greece's  rival  had  capitulated,  though  the  country 
had  nothing  to  do  with  this  and  as  Granville  correctly  communicated  to  the  Foreign 
Office:  'They  would  have  presented  a  longer  bulk  with  more  satisfactory  vouchers  at 
the  final  Peace  Congress.  70 
65  'All  Allied  prisoners  of  War  and  Armenian  interned  persons  and  prisoners  to  be  collected  in 
Constantinople  and  handed  over  unconditionally  to  the  Allies.  '  Temperley,  A  History  ofthe  Peace 
Conference  ofParis,  Appendix  IXV- 
66  The  Times,  'The  Claims  of  Greece,  '  16  October  1918. 
67  DOCUMENTS  ON  BRITISH  FOREIGN  POLICY  [thereafter  called  DBFP],  First  Series,  Vol.  XV,  no 
2  1,  Meeting  of  Allied  Representatives  and  Greek  Delegates,  [Treaty  of  S6vres:  Greek  Statistics  regarding 
Smyrna  and  Thrace),  24  February  1921,  pp.  1824. 
61  In  1914  the  Ottomans  had  started  deporting  Greeks  from  the  Smyrna  area  to  the  interior  of  Anatolia, 
Many,  150,000  people  approximately,  chose  to  flee  to  Greece.  See  George  Mavrogordatos,  Stillborn 
Republic,  Social  Conditions  and  Party  Strategies  in  Greece,  1922-1936  (Berkeley,  1983),  p.  199. 
69  BDFA,  Part  II,  Series  1,  vol.  11,  Doc.  18,  Memorandum  respecting  the  settlement  of  Turkey  and  the 
Arabian  Peninsula  compiled  by  the  Political  Intelligence  Department  of  the  Foreign  Office,  21  November 
1918,  pp.  51-73. 
70  PRO,  FO  371/3160-190858,  Granville  to  Curzon,  II  November  1918. 69 
In  the  meantime,  the  Greek  Ambassador  in  London,  Nikolaos  Caclamanos,  in  an 
attempt  to  inform  the  Ministry  on  the  sentiments  of  the  public  opinion  in  Britain  had 
reported  the  following: 
L'opinion  publique  en  Angleterre  est  forte  prononc6e 
pour  la  demembrement  de  la  Turquie  mais  vous  savez  que 
cette  We  senentre  a  une  forte  opposition  en  France.  Les 
d6nonciations  de  correspondants  des  journaux  Anglais 
contre  atrocitds  et  violences  commite6s  par  les  Turcs 
contre  leur  prisoniers  de  Guerre  monterent  beaucoup 
Fopinion  publique  Anglaise  contre  la  Turquie.  71 
The  reports  from  Rome  and  Paris  were  not  encouraging.  Indeed,  the  Greek 
government  was  aware  of  the  Italian  plans  for  the  Smyrna  district.  The  Italians  were 
after  all  entitled  by  the  Treaty  of  St.  Jean  de  Maurienne  to  claim  possession  of  Smyrna. 
The  Greek  Minister  in  Rome,  Panourgias,  on  30  November  1918,  reported  the  Italian 
plans  for  'an  organic  development  of  the  Aegean,  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Black  Sea 
where  there  are  from  the  ancient  times  flourishing  Italian  colonies,  according  to  the 
Italian  President  of  the  Government.  72  In  the  meantime,  the  British  press  seemed  on  the 
side  of  Greece  reporting  extensively  on  the  'just  Greek  claims.  73 
The  Greek  Prime  Minister,  immediately  after  the  Armistice,  in  an  attempt  to 
allay  the  fears  that  there  was  no  reference  of  the  Greek  populations  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire  and  to  put  the  case  for  the  claims  of  Greece  before  the  Peace  Conference,  visited 
London  and  Paris.  In  London,  Venizelos  had  an  interview  with  Sir  Louis  Mallet,  the  last 
British  minister  at  Constantinople  and  Head  of  the  South  Eastern  Department  of  the 
Political  Intelligence  Department  of  the  Foreign  Office,  with  whom  he  had  the  chance  to 
71  GREEK  MINISTRY  OF  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS,  SERVICE  OF  HISTORICAL  ARCHIVES,  [thcreafler 
called  MFA],  A'  1918,  A/I  2  1.  On  Peace,  no  11066,  Caclamanos  to  Politis,  9  November  19  18. 
72  MFA,  A'  1918  A/12  1.  On  Peace,  no  12033,  Panourgias  to  MFA,  30  November  1918. 
73  See  for  example  the  articles  of  The  Times,  Westminster  Gazette,  Morning  Post  of  October-November 
1918.  An  excellent  collection  of  press  cuttings  regarding  Greece  is  to  be  found  in  the  Anglo-Hellenic 
League  Papers  held  by  the  Kings  College  Archives. 70 
repeat  the  Asia  Minor  claim.  74  Further,  the  Greek  Premier  in  a  letter  to  Lloyd  George 
stressed  the  un  ustness  of  neglecting  the  future  of  the  Greeks  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  In 
this  letter,  Venizelos  outlined  the  obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  extension  of  Greece  into 
Asia  Minor,  Italy  being  the  primary  one.  He  reminded  Lloyd  George  that  'the 
strengthening  of  Greece  as  a  Mediterranean  power  would  aim  simply  at  assuring 
equilibrium  in  the  Mediterranean,  '  while  he  expressed  'the  genuine  support  of  his 
country  and  himself  that  had  been  evident  with  the  recent  participation  of  Greece  in  the 
War  on  the  side  of  the  Entente  Powers,  '  placing  his  hopes  'for  support  for  the  defence 
of  the  country's  legitimate  interests'  in  Entente  hands.  75 
Venizelos  had  already  formed  h  is  plans  and  strategy.  His  instructions  at  home 
necessitated  vigorous  action.  While  all  the  Great  Powers  were  demobilising,  the  Greek 
Army  was  on  war  footing  and  Venizelos  had  even  instructed  his  Staff  to  call  two  more 
divisions  to  the  colours.  Thus,  while  the  leaders  of  the  Entente  were  anxious  to  return  to 
normality  at  home,  Venizelos  had  grasped  the  opportunity  to  appear  willing  and  with  an 
army  ready  to  fight  and  serve  the  needs  and  interests  of  the  Entente,  until  pay-back  time. 
Lloyd  George  and  Clemenceau  could  only  welcome  this  gesture,  with  the  latter  seizing 
the  opportunity  to  ask  for  Venizelos'  assistance  in  the  Ukrainian  campaign  already 
launched  against  the  Bolsheviks  by  the  Allies.  Indeed,  two  Greek  divisions  were 
immediately  set  at  the  Allies'  disposal.  The  Greek  Prime  Minister  had  agreed  for  one 
reason  alone:  to  get  this  way  French  consent  and  support  for  the  Greek  claims  in  Eastern 
74  PRO,  FO  371/3147-19293  1,  Report  of  Granville  regarding  conversation  of  Venizelos  with  Mallet  on 
Greek  aspirations,  22  November  1918. 
75  David  Lloyd  George,  Memoirs  ofthe  Peace  Conference  (New  Haven,  1939),  Vol.  Il,  p.  794. 71 
Thrace  and  Asia  Minor.  76  He  finally  took  Clemenceau's  support  for  Thrace  but  not  for 
Smyrna  unless  Britain  or  the  United  States  proposed  it.  77 
Venizelos  returned  shortly  to  Athens  in  the  beginning  of  December,  to  report 
that  things  were  not  going  that  well  for  the  Greek  claims.  It  was  at  that  time  that  the 
Greek  Government  in  pursuit  of  support  from  every  side  sent  a  Note  to  the  Department 
of  State  stating  its  national  claims,  asking  for  the  support  of  the  United  States 
78  Government.  Venizelos  and  the  Greek  Legation  left  Athens  for  Paris  on  7  December 
1918. 
BRITISH  PLANS  BEFORE  THE  PARIS  PEACE  CONFERENCE  AND  THE  WORK  OF  THE  BRITISH 
POLITICAL  INTELLIGENCE  DEPARTMENT. 
The  signing  of  the  armistices  found  Britain  well  prepared  on  an  organisational 
level.  Preparation  and  planning  for  peace  had  started  as  early  as  in  1916.  At  the  Foreign 
Office,  a  whole  new  Department  was  set  up  for  this  purpose:  the  Political  Intelligence 
Department,  the  P.  I.  D  . 
79  The  Middle  East  section  of  the  P.  I.  D  was  headed  by  Sir  Louis 
Mallet,  who  was  the  last  ambassador  to  the  Ottoman  Empire  from  1913  to  1914.  Arnold 
Toynbee  and  Robert  Vansittart  were  the  experts  on  the  region.  The  South-Eastem 
Europe  section,  where  the  Balkans  were  assigned,  was  placed  under  the  direction  of  Sir 
80  Ralph  Paget  and  the  experts  on  the  Balkans  were  Alan  Leeper  and  Harold  Nicolson. 
The  work  of  these  people  involved  the  writing  of  memoranda  on  each  country  which 
76  For  the  Greek  presence  in  Odessa  see  A.  Zapantis,  Greek  Soviet  Relations  1917-1941  (New  York, 
1982).  Venizelos  had  stated  that:  'The  whole  venture  was  undertaken  purely  for  diplomatic  reasons  in 
order  to  enhance  the  prestige  of  Greece  among  the  Allies.  '  Cited  in  Alastos,  Venizelos,  p.  188. 
77  MFA,  1918,  A/4  1,  no  8064,  Romanos  to  Politis,  29  November  1918. 
78  PAPERS  RELATING  TO  THE  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES:  THE  PARIS 
PEACE  CONFERENCE,  1919  [thereafter  called  FRUS,  PPC,  1919]  (Washington,  194247),  vol.  11, 
Greek  Legation  to  the  Department  of  State,  6  December  1918,  pp.  276-7. 
79  Erik Goldstein's  excellent  monograph  Winning  the  Peace:  British  Diplomatic  Strategy,  Peace 
Planning,  and  the  P.  P.  C,  1916-1920  (London,  199  1),  traces  the  work  done  before  and  after  the  signing  of 
the  armistices  in  great  detail  and  particularly  the  role  of  the  Political  Intelligence  Department  in  Britain's 
planning  for  the  1919  Paris  Peace  Conference. 
(  Goldstein,  Winning  the  Peace,  pp.  81-2. 72 
were  destined  to  help  the  British  representatives.  On  the  Balkans,  four  memoranda  were 
produced,  while  on  the  Middle  East,  eighteen.  81 
Among  the  most  important  reports  produced  by  Arnold  Toynbee  on  the 
settlement  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  was  "The  Peace  Settlement  for  Turkey  and  the 
Arabian  Peninsula,  "  submitted  on  21  November  1918.  In  one  section,  entitled 
Desiderata,  one  reads  the  following: 
In  European  Turkey  and  Anatolia  his  Majesty's 
government  have  no  interest  in  preventing  the 
maintenance  of  an  independent  Turkish  national  state,  and 
the  substitution  of  some  satisfactory  alternative  for  the 
capitulations  in  the  area;  but  some  effective  safeguard 
must  be  found  for  the  non-Turkish  elements  of  the 
population,  and  especially  for  the  Greeks  in  Smyrna  and 
82 
other  important  centres  on  the  west  coast  of  Anatolia. 
The  Political  Intelligence  Department  reports  on  British  desiderata  in  South-Eastem 
Europe  were  favourable  to  Greek  claims.  It  seemed  that  there  was  an  overall  'pro- 
Greek'  attitude.  Great  Britain  at  the  time  needed  an  ally  in  the  region,  an  ally  which 
would  pose  no  threat  with  its  presence  in  the  area;  Greece  seemed  to  qualify. 
Britain  had  already  overextended  its  resources  but  remained  eager  to  maintain  its 
influence  over  the  areas  in  the  Near  and  Middle  East.  Primarily,  there  was  the  plan  to 
keep  Greece  as  a  kind  of  guardian  of  British  interests  in  the  area.  83  It  had  the  advantages 
of  being  a  small  country,  with  a  pro-British  government,  with  ambitions  which  did  not 
clash  at  all  with  Britain's  desiderata  and  that  could  certainly  be  injected  in  the  area  of 
the  Eastern  Mediterranean  in  the  Aegean,  as  a  regional  ally  against  Italian  ambitions. 
The  only  question  was  that  of  how  to  accommodate  the  Greek  claims. 
8'  Ibid.,  pp.  84-5. 
82  BDFA,  Part  II,  Series  1,  vol.  11,  Doc.  18,  Memorandum  by  the  Political  Intelligence  Department,  pp.  5  I- 
73. 
93  Goldstein,  Winning  the  Peace,  p.  243. 73 
On  the  question  of  Anatolia,  the  problem  ccntred  upon  the  distribution  of 
percentages  of  territory  to  the  various  contestants;  how  much  territory  would  be 
allocated  to  Greece,  to  the  Armenians,  to  the  Great  Powers  and  finally  to  the  Turks. 
However,  the  support  of  Greek  claims  was  not  as  profound  as  Greek  officials  had 
hoped:  a  report,  written  by  Toynbee,  suggested  that  it  would  not  be  in  the  interest  of 
Greece  to  annexe  the  territory  -  if  such  a  territory  was  finally  allocated  to  it  -  as  such  a 
transfer  would  have  caused  considerable  problems  of  an  ethnographic,  economic  and 
strategic  nature.  Toynbee's  suggestion  was  self-government.  84  Disappointingly  for  the 
Greek  aspirations,  reports  also  came  from  other  directions.  The  General  Staff 
maintained  that  it  was  in  the  British  interest  to  maintain  a  pro-British  Ottoman  Empire 
for  the  sake  of  British  strategic  aims  in  the  Middle  East,  thus,  Anatolia  should  remain 
independent  and  undivided,  obviously  under  Turkish  rule,  a  quasi  return  to  the  status 
quo,  and  the  traditional  British  policy. 
Lloyd  George  had  generally  expressed  his  aversion  towards  the  Ottomans,  for 
him  the  defeat  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  before  the  end  of  1916  could  'have  produced  a 
decisive  effect  on  the  fortunes  of  the  War.  85  The  British  Prime  Minister  had  been 
friendly  with  Venizelos  and  from  the  beginning  was  a  supporter  of  the  Greek  claims. 
However,  besides  personal  reasons  for  Greek  support  there  were  realpolitik  reasons 
behind  his  backing.  Britain  traditionally  backed  the  Ottoman  Empire  to  safeguard  its 
interests  in  the  area.  Now  that  the  Empire  was  defeated  and  there  were  already  plans 
among  the  Allies  for  the  division  of  its  territories,  it  was  unrealistic  to  place  the  hopes 
for  a  continuation  of  traditional  British  policy  on  it.  Greece,  on  the  other  hand,  seemed 
the  perfect  candidate  to  substitute  the  old  ally  of  Britain,  an  alternative  that  could  only, 
serve  British  interests.  Regarding  this  potential  Anglo-Greek  friendship  or  entente, 
84  Colonel  Metaxas,  Acting  Chief  of  the  Greek  General  Staff,  had  suggested  a  similar  position  when  Sir 
E.  Grey  made  the  offer  of  Smyrna  in  January  1915. 74 
Lloyd  George  had  the  support  of  certain  Foreign  Office  officials.  Curzon,  while  he 
supported  Lloyd  George's  plan  to  drive  the  Turks  out  of  Europe,  did  not  share  the  Prime 
Minister's  plan  to  see  Greece  established  in  Western  Asia  Minor.  86  The  military,  and 
primarily  General  Wilson,  had  also  expressed  a  view  against  the  Greek  presence  in 
Smyrna;  for  them  the  safeguarding  of  British  interests  could  be  achieved  via  the  support 
of  a  limited,  defeated  Turkish  state,  as  had  been  the  case  before  the  Great  War. 
Nevertheless,  this  contradiction  in  policy-planning  was  not  evident  only  among 
British  policy-makers,  but  also  on  a  Great-Power  level.  The  Italians  had  already  made 
their  position  on  getting  what  had  been  already  promised  to  them  in  the  secret  treaties 
clear.  Greece  was  a  contestant  in  the  area  of  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  and  primarily  in 
the  area  of  Asia  Minor  where  the  Greek  presence  in  population  terms  was  unrivalled. 
The  substantial  Greek  population  in  the  region  around  Smyrna  and  a  Greek  majority  in 
the  city  of  Smyrna  made  it  unlikely  that  the  Greeks  would  be  willing  to  denounce  or 
limit  their  claims  over  the  area.  Further,  the  Italians  were  well  aware  of  'British 
designs'  concerning  Greece  and  themselves.  Regarding  Italian  policy  in  the  Middle 
East,  it  was  obvious  that  Italy  preferred  the  reconstitution  of  a  weak  Turkey  rather  than 
the  establishment  of  a  greater  Greece  in  the  region,  backed  by  Britain. 
By  the  end  of  December  1918,  Venizelos'  memorandum  on  Greek  claims  had 
been  circulated  to  the  members  of  the  Political  Intelligence  Department  which  had 
moved  to  Paris.  The  memorandum,  dated  30  December  1918,  included  the  Greek 
claims:  the  areas  of  Northern  Epirus  and  Thrace,  the  Aegean  islands  of  Imbros,  Tenedos 
and  Castellorizo,  and  a  region  around  Smyrna.  On  Smyrna  and  the  surrounding  region 
the  Political  Intelligence  Department  had  underlined  the  following:  'It  would  be 
85  Lloyd  George,  War  Memoirs,  vol.  IV,  p.  66. 
86  PRO,  FO  371/46887-2863,  'A  Note  of  warning  on  the  Middle  East',  25  March  1919.  He  doubted  Greek 
capability  to  establish  peace  and  security  in  the  area.  'Could  Greece  who  cannot  keep  up  order  five  miles 
outside  the  gates  of  Salonica  be  trusted  to  establish  peace  and  security  throughout  the  vilayet  of  Aidin?  ' 75 
extremely  weakening  for  Greece  to  absorb  so  large  a  Turkish  element  within  a  zone 
coterminous  with  the  future  Turkish  state.  '  87  In  addition,  the  authors  of  the  report 
believed  that  Italy  was  'likely  to  make  a  strong  fight  for  the  southern  region  of  the  Aidin 
vilayet,  especially  the  districts  containing  the  harbours  of  Makri  and  Mannarice,  Giora 
and  Budrum.  '  88 
The  Greek  claims  were  published  in  a  pamphlet  which  was  distributed  to  the 
members  of  the  Foreign  Delegations.  Some  of  the  parts  referring  to  Smyrna  ran  as 
follows: 
Ottoman  sovereignty  must  be  limited  to  the  interior  of  the 
country,  where  the  Turkish  element  is  really 
predominant  ...  To  the  westward,  in  the  vilayets  of  Aidin, 
and  Brusa,  as  in  the  independent  sandjaks  of  the 
Dardanelles  and  Ismid,  live  in  compact  and  continuous 
masses  1,013,195  Greeks.  These  constitute  the  principal 
element  of  the  native  population.  They  have  been 
established  there  uninterruptedly  for  three  thousand  years. 
They  still  constitute  the  real  backbone  of  the  economic 
and  intellectual  life  of  the  country,  as  agriculturists, 
merchants,  manufacturers,  labourers  and  scholars  ...  The 
allocation  of  this  Asia  Minor  territory  to  Greece  is 
claimed  in  virtue  of  the  principle  already  accepted, 
according  to  which  the  'other  nationalities  which  are  now 
under  Turkish  rule  should  be  assured  an  undoubted 
security  of  life,  an  absolutely  unmolested  opportunity  of 
autonomous  development.  89 
THE  SITUATION  IN  WESTERN  ASIA  MINOR  PRIOR  TO  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE:  'TURKEY  FAR 
FROM  DEAD?  ' 
Following  the  signing  of  the  armistice,  on  6  November  1918,  the  British  monitor 
No  29  entered  the  port  of  Smyrna.  The  reaction  of  the  Greek  inhabitants  of  the  city  was 
a  wann  welcome  for  the  long  hoped  Allied  presence.  Reports  however,  from  the  regions 
87  PRO,  FO  608/37-775,  Greek  claims  at  the  Peace  Conference.  Summary  of  Memorial  presented  to 
Peace  Conference  by  M.  Venizelos  with  commentary  by  Political  Section,  British  Delegation,  26  January 
1919. 
88  Ibid. 
89  Eleftherios  Venizelos,  Greece  before  the  Peace  Congress  (London,  1919),  pp.  20-6. 76 
around  Smyrna,  talked  about  a  large  presence  of  Ottoman  irregular  troops,  especially  in 
the  adjacent  vilayets  of  Aidin  and  Brusa. 
A  report  sent  from  Smyrna  to  the  Greek  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  painted  a 
gloomy  picture  of  the  situation  right  after  the  Armistice: 
Turkey  is  not  disarmed.  Only  the  work  corps  that  were 
useless  after  all  are  discharged  from  service.  [  ... 
]  Turkey 
is  still  in  a  condition  of  war.  [ 
... 
]  The  troops  that  return 
finally  to  their  villages,  have  no  jobs  and  loot  and  kill.  [  ...  ] 
In  the  vilayets  of  Brusa  and  Aidin  there  are  70,000  troops, 
armed  with  Mausers  and  have  ammunition.  90 
On  21  November,  the  Greek  Government  secured  British  approval  to  send  its 
naval  commander,  stationed  at  Chios,  Captain  Papazafiropoulos,  to  Smyrna  to  report  on 
the  situation  as  representative  of  the  Greek  Government.  Papazafiropoulos  reported  to 
the  Greek  Government  that  in  Smyrna  there  were  already  British,  French  and  Italian 
ships.  'The  absence  of  a  Greek  ship  causes  anxiety  to  the  Greek  population  and  is 
considered  a  bad  sign,  '  warned  Papazafiropoulos.  91  He  reported  that  he  planned  to  send 
an  officer  to  organise  a  peaceful  demonstration  in  order  to  raise  the  morale  of  the 
people.  Concluding,  he  stressed  the  need  for  a  mission  of  Greek  ships  to  Smyrna. 
Venizelos'  reaction  to  his  naval  commander's  suggestion  for  a  demonstration  in  Smyrna 
was  immediate:  his  instructions  were,  first,  to  abstain  from  initiating  demonstrations  and 
second,  to  stress  that  'such  initiatives  are  against  his  commands  and  unacceptable.  '  92 
Venizelos  had  decided  to  go  'by  the  book,  '  waiting  for  the  right  moment  for  any  actions 
regarding  Smyrna.  He  was  aware  that  the  Allies,  primarily  the  British,  were  not  at  that 
time  ready  to  accept  any  initiatives  or  unrest.  Such  actions  could  only  harm  the  Greek 
cause. 
90  MFA,  1918,  A15NI  5.  Asia  Minor,  no  number,  Report  from  Smyrna,  n.  d.  91  MFA,  1918,  A15NI  5.  Asia  Minor,  Papazafiropoulos  to  MFA,  I  December  1918. 
92  Ibid.,  and  Venizelos'  reply  in  MFA,  1918,  A/5/  VI  5.  Asia  Minor,  no  12102,  Venizelos  to  MFA,  4 
December  1918. 77 
His  patience  was  rewarded.  Alexandropoulos,  the  Greek  representative  in 
Constantinople,  requested  consent  from  Calthorpe  to  send  Greek  ships  to  Smyrna.  The 
British  Admiral  expressed  his  objections  and  concern,  since  he  was  of  the  opinion  that  a 
Greek  presence  could  well  agitate  the  Turks.  On  the  reassurances  of  Alexandropoulos 
on  II  December,  the  Greek  destroyer  Leon  under  the  command  of  Captain  Mavroudis 
entered  the  port  of  Smyrna.  93  Captain  Mavroudis  was  the  official  representative  of  the 
Greek  Goverm-nent  in  Smyrna  from  December  1918  until  the  landing  in  May  1919. 
Further,  Venizelos  ordered  the  destroyer  Kilkis  to  set  itself  under  the  command  of  the 
Allied  ships.  In  the  same  communication,  Venizelos  expressed  his  desire  to  keep  this  a 
secret  and  warned  the  press  not  to  publish  anything  related  to  the  ship's  departure  and 
mission.  The  same  restriction  applied  to  the  population  of  Smyrna  as  well,  since  he 
-wanted  to  avoid  'any  expressions  of  sentiment  and  any  provocation.  t94 
THE  GREEK  CASE  IN  THE  NEGOTIATIONS  IN  PARIS. 
In  Paris,  Venizelos  had  already  launched  his  'crusade.  '  His  first  move  was  the 
memorandum  written  by  him.  For  this,  he  had  started  collecting  his  material  during  his 
first  European  tour  in  November  1918  . 
95  It  was  a  well-presented  thesis  on  the  Greek 
aims.  On  Smyrna,  the  memorandum  read  as  follows: 
Turkish  sovereignty  should  be  limited  to  the  interior, 
where  the  Turkish  populations  predominated  ...  In  western 
Asia  Minor  1,013,000  Greeks  lived  in  the  vilayets  of 
Aidin  and  Brusa  and  the  sandjaks  of  the  Dardanelles  and 
Ismid.  [  ... 
]  Smyrna  might  become  a  free  port  to  serve  the 
commercial  interests  of  Turkey.  96 
93  MFA,  1918,  A15NI  5.  Asia  Minor,  no  1213  1,  Alexandropoulos  to  MFA,  8  December  1918. 
Alexandropoulos  informs  the  Greek  Government  that  Admiral  Calthorpe  has  consented  in  sending  a 
Greek  ship  to  Smyrna. 
94  MFA'  1918,  A/5/VI  5.  Asia  Minor,  no  12759,  Venizelos  to  MFA,  6  December  1918. 
95  MFA,  1918,  A/12  1.  On  Peace,  no  11700,  MFA  to  Venizelos,  26  November  1918.  A  telegram  sent  to 
Venizelos  with  references  on  books  that  included  data  on  the  issue  of  Hellenism  in  Asia  Minor. 
96 
Ibid. 78 
In  Western  Asia  Minor  Venizelos  asked  for  the  islands  off  the  coast,  part  of  the  vilayet 
of  Brusa,  all  of  the  vilayet  of  Aidin  with  the  exception  of  the  sandjak  of  Denizli.  97 
On  16  January  1919,  Venizelos  had  a  conversation  with  Foreign  Office's  Harold 
Nicolson.  The  Greek  claims  in  Asia  Minor  were  the  most  debatable.  However,  the 
Greek  presence  in  Smyrna  was  a  long-lived  dream  of  Hellenism.  At  that  time,  the  other 
grandiose  plan,  to  see  the  Greeks  established  in  Constantinople,  was  not  feasible,  due  to 
the  Straits  issue.  98  The  British  were  worried  for  two  reasons:  first,  for  the  absence  of 
clear  geographic  frontiers.  Secondly,  the  British  feared  that  Greece  might  overextend  its 
resources,  thereby  weakening  itself  and  being  a  much  less  useful  ally  for  Britain. 
The  British,  arriving  in  Paris,  had  not  reached  well-defined  and  clear-cut 
conclusions  on  the  Ottoman  territorial  questions.  True,  there  were  the  various  Foreign 
Office  memoranda,  the  General  Staff  and  Admiralty  reports  and  the  Eastern 
Committee's  recommendations,  but  there  was  only  vague  consensus  and  only  on  certain 
issues,  like  the  internationahsation  of  Straits  and  the  free  passage  of  all  ships.  On  the 
issues  of  the  actual  control  of  the  Straits,  of  Armenia  and  of  Smyrna,  there  was  no 
consensus  at  all.  The  secret  treaties  and  the  position  of  the  United  States  further 
complicated  the  picture.  There  was  a  draft  outline  on  British  planning,  however,  this 
was  only  a  Foreign  Office  suggestion  and  policy  was  decided  on  a  governmental  level  - 
Cabinet  level.  99  On  31  January  1919,  it  was  agreed  that  Britain  required  free  passage  of 
the  Straits  in  peace  and  war  as  well  as  a  free  port  at  Constantinople,  with  the  entire  area 
being  put  under  international  control.  A  number  of  meetings  took  place  among  the 
British  delegates,  in  their  attempt  to  conclude  on  British  desiderata  and  policies  to  be 
97  See  Appendix  11  Maps  2:  Western  Asia  Minor. 
98  The  Admiralty  and  General  Staff  wanted  the  Straits  open  to  all  ships.  If  one  power  were  brought  to 
administer  the  city  the  military  considered  that  there  were  only  three  choices,  Greece,  USA,  and  Britain. 
Greece  was  rejected  as  being  too  vulnerable  to  defend  them  properly.  PRO,  WO  106/64,  'The  strategic 
importance  of  Constantinople  to  the  British  Ernpire,  '  War  Office  Paper,  22  December  1919. 
99  PRO,  FO  371/4156,  Draft  outline,  II  January  1919. 79 
pursued  during  the  course  of  the  conference.  It  was  during  these  meetings  that  the 
general  policy  of  approving  the  transfer  of  Smyrna  to  the  Greeks  was  decided.  On  31 
January  1919,  the  conflicting  aims  of  the  Greeks  and  the  Italians  were  discussed.  100  The 
British  policy-makers  agreed  that  'provided  full  economic  outlet  was  given  to  the  future 
Turkish  State  via  Smyrna  and  Scalanova,  there  would  be  no  objection  from  the  point  of 
view  of  British  interests  to  Greece  obtaining  a  territorial  zone  in  Smyrna  and  the  vilayet 
of  Aidin.  '101  The  reservations  were  the  result  of  the  General  Staff  recommendation 
submitted  to  the  British  Delegation.  102 
In  February  1919,  the  Conference  turned  its  attention  to  the  Near  and  Middle 
East,  and  Venizelos  had  finally  the  chance  to  present  the  Greek  case  on  3  and  4 
February.  103  He  had  divided  the  territorial  claims  of  Greece  into  four  different 
categories,  Northern  Epirus,  the  Islands,  Thrace  and  finally  Asia  Minor.  Regarding 
Constantinople.  and  the  surrounding  areas,  after  being  questioned  by  Lloyd  George,  he 
suggested  that  they  should  be  internationalised.  The  Prime  Minister  on  4  February  191.9 
presented  the  case  of  Smyrna,  with  the  presence  of  Nicolson  and  Leeper  from  the 
British  side  and  Clive  Day  and  William  Westermann  for  the  Americans.  Based 
primarily  on  Wilson's  Fourteen  Points  and  the  fact  that  'no  territory  previously 
belonging  to  Turkey  could  remain  a  part  of  the  future  Ottoman  Empire  unless  it 
100  PRO,  CAB  23/9,  War  Cabinet  516,15  January  1919.  Also,  PRO,  FO  371/4156  FO  recommendations, 
30  and  31  January,  5  March  1919.  See  also  Harold  Nicolson,  Peacemaking  1919  (London,  1963),  pp. 
252-53.  And  PRO,  FO  608/88,  Mallet  note,  25  January,  I  February  1919. 
101  PRO,  CAB  29/8,  War  Cabinet  118,  'The  conflicting  claims  of  Italy  and  Greece  in  the  Near  East,  '  15 
February  1919. 
102  The  military  advisers  based  their  objections  on  two  points:  first,  that  the  Greek  populations  did  not 
exceed  the  Turkish  populations  in  certain  areas  and  second,  on  the  point  that  the  separation  of  Smyrna 
and  its  hinterland  from  Anatolia  would  deprive  Turkey  from  its  main  outlet  to  the  Aegean.  The  three 
memoranda  of  the  General  Staff  in  PRO,  FO  371/3577-63989,  'Notes  on  Greek  War  Ainis,  '  General 
Staff,  18  January  1919.  FO  608/37-1575,  General  Staff  Memo,  7  February  1919.  FO  608/265-2659, 
'General  Staff  Desiderata  regarding  Territorial  Adjustments,  '  II  February  1919. 
103  The  literature  on  the  Peace  Conference  is  vast,  however,  it  mostly  covers  the  negotiations  over  the 
German  treaty.  Studies  that  deal  exclusively  with  the  settlement  of  the  Ottoman  Question  are  P. 
Helmreich,  From  Paris  to  Vvres  (Columbus,  Ohio,  1974)  and  N.  Petsalis-Diomedes,  Greece  at  the  Paris 
Peace  Conference  (Thessaloniki,  1978),  that  deals  exclusively  with  the  Greek  presence  in  the 
negotiations. contained  an  absolute  majority  of  Turks,  '  Venizelos  opened  his  presentation  on  Sm: 
Statistics  were  put  forward  to  assist  his  argument.  In  his  conclusion,  he  admitted 
'Greece  did  not  appear  before  the  Paris  Peace  Conference  with  the  full  titles  she  w 
have  possessed  but  for  the  betrayal  of  a  king,  '  referring  to  the  political  debate  an 
himself  and  King  Constantine  on  the  issue  of  Greece'  s  entry  in  the  War.  104 
The  British  delegation  proceeded  with  a  point  by  point  commentary 
Venizelos'  arguments,  which  had  been  drafted  by  Nicolson  and  revised  by  Crowe  on  28 
January.  On  Smyrna,  the  commentary  read  as  follows 
ASIA  MINOR 
(1).  Ethnical:  Even  according  to  Greek  statistics, 
M.  Venizelos'  line  would  incorporate  a  large  Turkish 
majority. 
(2).  Economic:  The  solid  Turkish  population  of  the 
Meander  valley  would  have  no  economic  outlet,  and  in 
fact,  all  Turkish  outlets  to  the  Aegean  would  fall  within 
Greek  territory. 
. 
(3).  Political:  -It  would  be  extremely  weakening  for  Greece 
to  absorb  so  large  a  Turkish  element  within  a  zone 
conterminous  with  the  future  Turkish  state. 
(4).  Whilst  Italy  probably  will  be  prepared  to  abandon  her 
pretensions  to  Smyrna,  she  is  likely  to  make  strong  fight 
for  the  Southern  region  of  the  Aidin  vilayet,  especially  the 
districts  containing  the  harbours  of  Makri  and  Marmarice, 
Giora  and  Budrum. 
Greek  claim  not  justified  within  frontiers  proposed  by  Mr. 
Venizelos.  105 
The  American  Delegation  was  completely  opposed  to  Venizelos'  claims  in  Asia  Minor: 
The  possession  of  the  Dodecanese  puts  Greek  people, 
Greek  ships  and  Greek  merchants  at  the  very  doors  of  the 
new  State.  To  give  her  a  foothold  upon  the  mainland 
would  be  to  invite  immediate  trouble.  Greece  would  press 
her  claims  for  more  territory,  Turkey  would  feel  that  her 
new  boundaries  were  run  to  give  her  a  great  handicap  at 
the  very  start.  106 
104  FRUS,  PPC,  1919,  vol.  III,  Secretary's  Notes  of  a  conversation  held  at  the  Quai  d'Orsay,  3  February 
1919,  pp.  859-75.  The  issue  of  Greece's  delayed  entry  in  the  War  as  discussed  in  this  Chapter:  'The  Great 
War  and  the  Dardanelles-Greece  enters  the  War  on  the  side  of  the  Allies.  '  p.  54. 
105  PRO,  FO  608/37-775,  Greek  Claims  at  the  Peace  Conference,  28  January  1919. 
106  Miller,  Diary,  4:  249,1/21/1919,  cited  in  HeInireich,  From  Paris  To  Vvres,  p.  42. 81 
The  Council,  after  Lloyd  George's  recommendations,  decided  to  leave  the  issue  of 
Greek  claims  in  the  hands  of  a  Commission,  composed  of  representatives  of  the  Big 
Four,  with  instructions  to  examine  the  Greek  claims  and  report  to  the  Council.  107  The 
Italians  did  not  entertain  the  idea  of  a  committee  which  could  accept  Greek  claims  about 
the  strong  Greek  element  in  the  region  which  Italy  aspired  to  get  hold  OE108  In  a  meeting 
of  the  representatives  of  the  departmental  missions  of  the  British  Delegation  on  31 
January  1919  Lord  Hardinge,  representing  the  Foreign  Office,  had  stated  that  'the 
presence  of  Greece  in  Smyrna  was  preferable  to  that  of  Italy.  '109  General  William 
Thwaites  for  the  General  Staff  had  suggested  the  retention  of  Smyrna  by  the  Turks.  The 
conclusion  of  the  meeting  was  that:  'subject  to  the  reservation  made  by  General 
Thwaites  on  behalf  of  the  General  Staff  that  provided  full  economic  outlet  was  given  to 
the  future  Turkish  state  via  Smyrna  and  Scala  Nuova,  there  would  be  no  objection,  from 
the  point  of  view  of  British  interests,  to  Greece  obtaining  a  territorial  zone  in  Smyrna 
and  the  vilayet  of  Aidin.  "  10 
The  claims  for  Asia  Minor  were  put  forward  again  on  21  February  1919.  The 
British  representatives  on  the  Greek  Committee  started  from  the  position  that  Greece 
should  have  its  Anatolian  irredenta.  This  could  help  to  fulfil  the  Megali  Idea  and  place 
a  British  ally  firmly  in  the  Aegean.  "  I  Westermann,  for  the  United  States,  was  against 
the  Greek  claim,  while  the  British  and  French  representatives  supported  it.  De  Martino, 
107  The  Committee  met  12  times  at  the  Quai  d'Orsay  from  12  February  to  21  March  1919.  Its  members 
were:  Sir  Eyre  Crowe  and  Sir  Robert  Broden  representing  the  British;  Jules  Cambon  and  Gout  for  France; 
W.  L.  Westermann  and  C.  Day  representing  the  United  States;  and  G.  de  Martino  and  Colonel  Castoldi 
for  Italy.  Petsalis-Diomedes,  Greece  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference,  p.  139. 
108  Nicolson,  Peacemaking,  p.  209.  As  Bosworth  points  out,  there  was  a  general  feeling  among  the 
Italians  that  'it  was  the  Greeks  who  won  greater  sympathy  for  their  ethnically  more  justifiable  ambitions 
in  Asia  Minor.  '  Bosworth,  'Italy  and  the  End  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  '  p.  7  1. 
109  PRO,  FO  371/4156-33952,  Minutes  of  a  meeting  at  Astoria  in  January  31,1919  between  the 
re  presentatives  of  Departmental  Missions  of  British  Delegation. 
Ibid. 
PRO,  FO  608/37-775,  Greek  Claims  at  the  Conference,  presented  to  Peace  Conference  by  Venizelos 
with  Commentary  by  the  Political  Sections  of  British  Delegation,  26  January  1919.  The  British  experts 
had  also  planned  a  number  of  potential  alternatives  to  direct  annexation.  One  alternative  was  to  allow 
direct  annexation  of  the  city  of  Smyrna  but  with  a  Greek  mandate  over  the  rest  of  the  region. 82 
the  Italian  representative,  attended  the  meeting  but  he  did  not  participate  in  the 
discussions,  since  the  Italian  and  Greek  claims  were  in  conflict. 
The  report  of  the  committee  on  the  Asia  Minor  claim  ran  as  follows: 
The  British  Delegation  are  fully  prepared  to  accept  the 
French  line  as  regards  the  northern  and  eastern  portions  of 
the  territory  claimed.  [ 
... 
]  Both  the  British  and  French 
Delegations,  however,  are  of  opinion  that  the  ports  of 
Smyrna  and  Aivali,  with  a  certain  dependent  region,  can 
justifiably  claim  union  with  Greece  on  ethnic  principles  as 
well  as  for  administrative  and  economic 
consideration<  ... 
]The  United  States  Delegates  are  unable 
to  join  in  the  above  proposals  for  the  following  reasons:  a. 
Although  their  estimates  of  the  Greek  population  of  Asia 
Minor  are  lower  than  those  submitted  by  the  Greek 
Government,  the  difference  is  not  so  great  as  to  make  a 
formal  protest  necessary.  But  the  American  Delegation 
cannot  accept  the  figures  represented  by  the  Greek 
Government  as  to  the  Turkish  population.  Their  own 
information  leads  them  to  place  the  Turkish  population  at 
a  figure  which  puts  the  Greeks  in  a  decided  minority  in 
every  sandjak  of  the  area  claimed  by  Greece,  except  in  the 
sandjak  of  Smyrna  itself.  [ 
... 
]  They  -are  also  of  opinion 
that  from  an  economic  point  of  view  it  will  be  inequitable 
to  separate  the  coastal  districts  of  western  Asia  Minor 
from  the  Central  Anatolian  plateau,  and  so  to  sever  what 
remains  of  the  Turkish  Empire  from  its  most  important 
natural  exits  to  the  sea  ... 
The  United  States  Delegates, 
however,  do  not  recognise  the  applicability  of  the  1915 
Trea!  7  with  Italy  as  affecting  the  settlements  in  the  Near 
East.  12 
Further,  Mallet  had  also  concluded  that  'there  should  be  no  annexation  to  Greece 
unless  political  necessity  made  it  inevitable.  '  113  It  should  be  noted  here  that  Venizelos 
had  asked  for  the  complete  annexation  of  the  territories  of  Western  Asia  Minor  on  the 
basis  of  the  population  statistics  he  had  presented  to  the  Conference.  114  The  opposition 
to  a  potential  Greek  presence  in  Asia  Minor  soon  became  evident.  Mallet,  the  British 
ex-ministcr  in  the  Ottoman  Empire,  was  among  those  who  opposed  such  a  scheme. 
112  PRO,  FO  371/3593-4244,  cited  by  Petsalis-Diomedes,  Greece  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference,  pp.  174- 
5. 
113  PRO,  FO  608/88-2809,  Minute  by  Mallet,  I  March  1919. 83 
Ardent  supporters  of  his  views  were  General  Milne  -  the  commanding  officer  at 
Constantinople,  and  General  William  Thwaites,  the  Director  of  Military  Intelligence.  11  5 
General  Thwaites  supported  the  telegrams  which  were  reaching  him  from 
Constantinople.  A  division  of  opinion  existed,  however,  in  the  War  Office  as  well.  '  16 
Nicolson,  in  a  meeting  with  Venizelos,  on  6  March  1919,  advised  the  Greek 
Prime  Minister  to  wait  for  President  Wilson's  return  from  the  United  States  and  'tackle 
him  direct"  on  the  issue  of  Asia  Minor.  '  17  Indeed,  Wilson,  in  May,  overruled  his  experts 
and  gave  his  full  support  for  the  Greek  landing  in  Smyrna.  '  18 
Venizelos,  in  view  of  the  American  opposition  and  the  Italian  disagreements, 
reshaped  the  Greek  claim  on  Asia  Minor,  proposing  a  mandate  scheme  for  the  areas 
outside  the  Smyrna  sandjak,  instead  of  asking  for  the  annexation  of  these  territories. 
This  alteration  was  due  to  Nicolson's  advice  and  the  report  of  the  Committee.  It  was 
officially  submitted  to  the  Conference  by  the  Greek  Premier  two  months  later.  In  the 
meantime,  on  12  March  1919,  he  communicated  to  the  Great  Powers  a  memorandum  in 
114  See  Venizelos,  Greece  before  the  Peace  Congress,  pp.  20-6. 
115  PRO,  FO  608/103-3968,  Note  by  General  Thwaites,  enclosing  Tel.  From  General  Staff  Constantinople 
to  the  Directorate  of  Military  Intelligence,  dated  27  February  1919,20  March  1919.  In  the  telegram  from 
Constantinople  we  read:  'Racial  hatred  is  so  strong  that  neither  Greeks  nor  Turks  can  remain  longer  under 
the  rule  of  the  other  ... 
Best  solution  is  to  place  it  under  a  mandatory  power.  ' 
116  'A  day  after  Thwaites  made  his  comment,  Military  Intelligence  produced  a  memorandum  which 
supported  Greek  control  of  Smyrna,  a  view  entirely  consistent  with  its  reports  as  far  back  as  December 
1918.  'FO  608/103-383/l/l/4795,  The  economic  importance  of  Smyrna  to  Anatolia  and  FO 
371/4356/FI92/PCI92,  'Notes  on  Greek  War  Aims,  '27  December  1918,  all  cited  by  Goldstein,  Winning 
the  Peace,  p.  248. 
117  Nicolson,  Peacemaking,  p.  227  and  in  Helmreich,  From  Paris  to  Uvres,  p.  103  note  36:  'Westermann 
commented  in  his  diary  on  February  21  that  he  was  opposing  French  and  British  proposals  to  give  land  in 
Asia  Minor  to  Greece  because  Turkey  was  to  be  a  mandatory,  and  to  partition  it  in  this  way  would  hinder 
the  work  of  the  mandatory  power.  Note  39:  The  day  of  Wilson's  return  to  Paris,  Vcnizelos  sent  him  a 
personal  memorandum  regarding  Greek  claims  in  Asia  Minor,  in  Wilson  Papers,  V-A,  Box  15,  Venizelos 
to  Wilson,  14/3/1919.  ' 
118  'He  [Wilson]  seems  to  have  supported  the  Greek  case  solely  because  of  the  Greek  population  on  the 
Smyrna  region.  '  Tillman,  Anglo-American  Relations,  p.  367.  'Westermann  gained  the  impression  that 
either  House  or  Wilson,  or  House  alone,  had  accepted  the  Smyrna  proposal.  '  The  reasons  were:  a.  The 
necessities  of  the  international  political  situation  and  b.  the  obvious  one  that  there  are  distinctly  two  sides 
to  the  question  of  the  Greek  claims  in  Asia  Minor  and  that  the  members  of  our  commission  [American] 
believed  more  strongly  in  the  Greek  side.  '  Harry  Howard,  The  Partition  of  Turkey  (Norman,  193  1),  p. 
224. 84 
an  attempt  to  refute  the  objections  raised  by  the  Americans.  '  19  His  points  included  the 
argument  that  the  future  Turkish  State  would  have  alternate  water  outlets  in  the 
Mediterranean  and  the  Black  Sea.  With  Wilson's  return,  the  Americans  made  a  slight 
turn,  and  on  24  March,  Colonel  House  told  Venizelos  that  they  would  accept  a  restricted 
Greek  zone  in  Asia  Minor.  120  It  was  at  that  time  that  Lord  Curzon  circulated  a 
memorandum  on  the  Middle  East,  suggesting  Turkish  sovereignty  over  Asia  Minor  in 
order  to  appease  them  'for  tuming  them  out  of  Europe.  '  121 
In  the  meantime,  the  question  of  the  mandates  was  put  forward  on  the  discussion 
table  for  the  British  and  the  Americans.  The  discussions  were  not  successful,  and  on  14 
April,  the  British  side,  in  a  memorandum  by  Toynbee  and  Nicolson  entitled,  "Peace 
with  Turkey,  "  suggested  that: 
Greece  should  take  Constantinople  and  the  European  shores  of 
the  Straits  and  the  Sea  of  Marmara  instead  of  Smyrna  that 
though  justifiable  on  ethnological  and  above  all  political 
grounds,  would  be  injurious  to  the  economic  future  of  Anatolia 
and  probably  weaken  Greece  instead  of  fortifying  her.  122 
Lloyd  George,  Clemenceau  and  President  Wilson,  however,  gave  their  consent  to  a 
Greek  landing  at  Smyrna,  which  signified  the  beginning  of  the  Greek  adventure  in 
Anatolia. 
THE  GREEK  RATIONALE  FOR  THE  SMYRNA  LANDING. 
Venizelos,  with  the  Smyrna  landing  was  about  to  achieve  the  realisation  of  a 
long-lived  dream  of  Hellenism,  the  Megali  Idea.  The  landing  at  Smyrna  was  part  of  the 
grandiose  plan  which  already  existed  in  the  Greek  Premier's  mind  when  the  British  first 
119  PRO,  FO  608/884519,  Memorandum  by  Venizclos,  12  March  1919.  It  ended  by  quoting  Wilson's 
writing  about  the  Asia  Minor  Greeks  being  'essential  to  the  future  economic  development  of  that  fertile 
country.  ' 
120  On  that  and  on  Wilson's  change  see  Hclnircich,  From  Paris  to  Uvres,  pp.  88-93. 
121  PRO,  FO  3179/46887-2863,  Memorandum  by  Earl  Curzon,  "A  Note  of  warning  on  the  Middle  East,  " 
25  March  1919. 
122  PRO,  FO  608/110-7335,  Peace  with  Turkey,  Memorandum  by  Toynbee  and  Nicolson,  14  April  1919. 85 
made  the  offer  of  Smyrna  in  1915.  The  plan  was  conceived  and  backed  by  Venizelos 
from  very  early  on. 
For  Venizelos,  Greece,  in  the  midst  of  the  Paris  Peace  Conference,  still  had  the 
potential  to  fight  its  own  way  in  order  to  establish  itself  in  the  region;  as  the  Greek 
armed  forces  still  had  resources  since  they  had  joined  in  the  Great  War  only  in  1917.  A 
key-point  for  the  success  of  Greece's  vision  was  also  the  fact  that  the  Greek  populations 
in  the  region  were  willing  to  help.  This  had  become  evident  from  very  early  on. 
However,  they  were  not  trained  in  the  same  way  as  the  Greeks  of  the  mainland.  Those 
who  had  served  in  the  Ottoman  Army  were  not  recruited  as  soldiers  for  combat  but  were 
enlisted  in  the  work  corps.  The  Greek  male  population  consisted  of  traders,  farmers  and 
academics,  willing  to  fight  but  with  no  experience  or  proper  training. 
In  addition,  the  Greek  Goverm-nent  relied  only  on  the  verbal  assurances  of  the 
British  and  the  French  for  support,  and  primarily  on  the  British  Government's 
reassurances.  Further,  there  was  the  hope  that  there  would  be  an  allied  presence  in  the 
neighbouring  regions,  based  on  the  fact  that  the  Italians  would  be  at  Adalia  and  the 
French  at  Cilicia.  Moreover,  Venizelos  hoped  that  the  Peace  Treaty  which  would  soon 
come  would  ensure  that  Turkey  would  not  revive  militarily.  The  open  issue  of  possible 
American  mandates  in  Constantinople  or  Armenia  could  have  acted  as  a  deterrent  for 
the  Turks  and  could  only  mean  support  for  the  Greeks.  Venizelos  was  also  counting  on 
America's  presence  in  the  region. 
However,  a  considerable  number  of  drawbacks  undermined  these  rather 
optimistic  evaluations  and  expectations.  First,  the  Greek  armed  forces  had  been  on  war 
footing  since  the  Balkan  wars  of  1912-3.  Further,  Britain  lacked  the  means  to  make  its 
&political  support'  effective  in  real  terms  and  this  was  made  quite  explicit  to  the  Greek 
Legation,  especially  during  the  negotiations  following  Venizelos'  presentation  at  the 86 
Paris  Peace  Conference.  Most  important  of  all,  British  strategy  did  not  require  the 
engagement  of  actual  forces  in  the  region  of  the  Straits  and  Constantinople.  British 
interests  would  be  served  through  an  effective  proxy  in  the  region.  The  French  and  the 
Italians  were  another  constraint  for  the  Greek  landing.  The  French  were  not  expected  to 
provide  military  or  financial  aid,  due  to  their  economic  interests  in  the  area.  Italy,  on  the 
other  hand,  could  not  be  expected  to  stand  aloof  and  not  stand  up  for  its  rights  in  the 
area.  The  Italians  were  already  'ardent  supporters'  of  the  crypto-nationalist  movement 
already  forming  itself  in  Constantinople,  through  the  actions  of  their  High 
Commissioner  there,  Count  Carlo  Sforza,  later  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
Concluding,  it  was  doubtful  as  early  as  in  May  1919,  whether  the  Americans  were 
willing  to  adopt  the  schemes  for  mandates  either  over  Constantinople  or  Armenia. 
Wilson  had  given  little  reason  to  expect  that  America  would  take  the  job.  On  14  May 
1919,  he  only  hgreed  to  accept  the  two  mandates  subject  to  the  assent  of  the  Senate.  123, 
. -However, 
Venizelos  had  no  hesitation  over  going  ahead  with  the  Smyrna 
landing.  It  was  Greece's  time  for  glory.  Once  started  there  was  no  turning  back.  The 
landing  was  just  the  beginning  of  a  journey  that  started  as  an  expedition  and  ended  up  as 
a  Greek  debacle  with  the  ensuing  expulsion  of  the  Greek  element  of  Western  Asia 
Minor.  In  the  meantime,  Greece's  only  ally,  Britain,  retained  a  free  hand.  In  the  words 
of  the  'pro-Greek'  Lloyd  George  'it  would  be  difficult  to  get  the  Greeks  out  of  Smyrna 
but  we  still  have  a  free  hand.  '  124 
123  'Wilson  expressed  pessimism  about  the  chances  of  persuading  the  Senate  to  accept  Constantinople  and 
Armenia.  Let  alone  all  of  Anatolia.  Some  of  Wilson's  staff  in  Paris  were  already  beginning  to  doubt 
seriously  the  wisdom  of  American  mandates  in  Turkey.  '  J.  De  Novo,  American  Interests  and  Policies  in 
the  Middle  East  1900-1939  (Minneapolis,  1963),  pp.  118-9. 
124  PRO,  CAB  23/44,19  May  1919. 87 
THE  SITUATION  IN  THE  SMYRNA  DISTRICT,  JANUARY  TO  APRIL  1919:  THE  FORMATIVE 
MONTHS. 
In  the  meantime,  the  situation  in  the  Smyrna  district  had  deteriorated.  Reports 
from  the  Greek  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  based  on  telegrams  reaching  Athens  from 
Smyrna,  were  alarming  and  were  at  once  communicated  to  the  Greek  Delegation  in 
Paris.  One  telegram  read  as  follows: 
Situation  Asic  Mineure  beaucoup  plus  grave  qu'on 
imagine.  Jeunes  Turks  ayant  laisse  dimes  et  munitions  aux 
demobilises  pr6parent  secr6tement  vaste  r6seau  de  bandes 
en  vue  d'actions  ev6ntuelles.  Ils  prechent  maximalise  a 
populations  ignorantes  en  exposant,  futur  bonheur  partage 
de  terrcs  ct  en  realit6  organisant  ainsi  nouvelle  pers6cution 
Chr6tiens.  [SiC]125 
Captain  Mavroudis,  the  official  representative  of  the  Greek  Government  in  Smyrna,  had 
continually  expressed  his  concerns  regarding  the  tensions  created  between  Greeks  and 
Turks,  which  was  attributed  by  the  Greek  Captain  to  'the  tolerance  of  Turkish 
subversive  activities  by  the  Allied  authorities.  '  126 
The  Italians  were  already  setting  their  plans  in  action  for  occupation  of 
considerable  territories  in  Western  Asia  Minor.  Their  first  step  was  to  establish  a  naval 
base  in  the  Dodecanese,  on  16  March  1919,  with  authority  over  the  Western  Asia  Minor 
coast  as  well.  On  28  March,  on  the  pretext  of  restoring  order  in  the  region  of  Western 
Anatolia,  they  landed  forces  in  the  city  of  Adalia.  Shortly  afterwards  they  disembarked 
troops  at  Makri,  Marmarice  and  Konia.  127  During  April,  while  the  negotiations  and 
discussions  at  Paris  were  reaching  their  peak  following  the  provocative  Italian  actions, 
125  MFA,  1919,  A/5/VI  6  File  Smyrna,  Diomedis  to  the  Greek  Legation,  Paris,  I  February  1919. 
126  See  Petsalis-Diomedes,  Greece  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference,  p.  194,  note  6  1,  an  issue  also  stressed 
by  the  Allies  thernselves.  See  also  PRO,  FO  608/103-9513,  Intelligence  Report,  29  March  1919. 
127  'The  Italian  High  Corrunissioner  in  Constantinople,  Sforza,  began  actively  to  solicit  Turkish  friendship 
and  support,  convinced  that  a  partition  of  Anatolia  would  be  disastrous  for  Italian  economic  interests 
there,  since  a  fragmented  Turkey  would  assure  the  predominance  of  British  and  French  influence  in  the 
Near  East.  '  Helmreich,  From  Paris  to  S&res,  pp.  94-5. 88 
Venizclos,  in  a  series  of  communications  with  the  rest  of  the  Greek  Government  in 
Athens,  expressed  his  concern  and  directed  actions  to  safeguard  the  interests  of  the 
Greek  population  in  Smyrna.  He  specifically  asked  for  the  sending  of  a  Greek  battleship 
to  Smyrna,  with  the  consent  of  Calthorpe,  to  keep  up  the  morale  of  the  Greeks.  128 
However,  it  was  not  only  the  Greek  sources  and  representatives  at  Smyrna 
which  reported  the  gravity  of  the  situation  in  the  Smyrna  district.  British  Intelligence 
reports  communicated  the  need  for  a  supervision  of  Turkish  activities  in  order  to  control 
any  uprisings. 
129 
THE  ALLIED  DECISION  FOR  THE  GREEK  LANDING  AT  SMYRNA. 
In  Paris,  the  Greek  delegation  had  welcomed  the  changes  in  American  opinion 
regarding  their  original  disagreement  over  Smyrna.  There  was  an  overall  optimistic 
spirit  regarding  the  Smyrna  claim,  after  four  months  of  negotiations.  'As  early  as  April, 
Clemenc-ead  referred  to  Smyrna  as  falling  to  the  Greeks.  '  130 
The  Italians  had  already  landed  considerable  forces  on  the  coast  of  Western  Asia 
Minor  at  Adalia,  Makri,  Konia  and  Marmarice.  Their  unauthorised  landings  were  not 
the  only  issue  that  had  caused  friction  with  their  Allies:  on  24  April  1919,  the  Italians 
left  the  Conference  on  the  Adriatic  issue.  131  Venizelos  had  expressed  his  fears  of 
potential  Italian  landings  in  Smyrna  to  Wilson  and  Lloyd  George  but  he  had  been 
assured  that  there  would  be  support  for  the  Greeks.  However,  in  the  Council  of  Three, 
on  30  April  1919,  there  were  reports  that  Italian  ships  were  approaching  Smyrna,  while 
Venizelos  submitted  further  evidence  of  Italo-Turkish  co-operation  in  the  area.  132 
128  For  the  events  of  17  to  24  April  see  MFA,  1919,  A15NI  6,  nos  3582,3633,3647,3726,3825,3904. 
129  For  example  see  PRO,  FO  608/103-9513,  Intelligence  Report,  29  March  1919. 
130  R.  S.  Baker,  Woodrow  Wilson  and  World  Settlement  (New  York,  1922),  vol.  11,  p.  19  1. 
131  On  Fiume  see  Baker,  Woodrow  Wilson  and  World  Settlement,  pp.  127-180. 
132  Reports  had  been  received  for  continuous  Italian  military  activities  and  the  dispatch  of  seven 
battleships  to  Smyrna.  FRUS,  PPC,  1919,  vol.  V,  Notes  of  a  Meeting  held  at  President  Wilson's  House  in 
the  Place  des  Etats  Unis,  I  May  1919,  pp.  412-3. 89 
On  6  May,  in  a  meeting  of  the  Council  of  Three,  Lloyd  George  referred  to  the 
Italian  activities  proposing  action  before  the  Italians  established  themselves  firmly. 
Simultaneously,  he  raised  the  issue  of  giving  Venizelos  permission  for  the  dispatch  of 
Greek  forces  'to  protect  his  fellow  countrymen  in  Turkey.  '  133  Five  days  later,  on  11 
May,  it  was  agreed  that  an  Anglo-French  fleet  would  be  dispatched  to  Smyrna  and 
landing  parties  put  ashore  to  supplement  the  Greek  forces.  134  On  13  May  1919,  the 
Greek  forces  sailed  for  the  port  of  Smyrna  under  the  protection  of  four  British  warships. 
The  landing  of  Greek  troops  in  Smyrna  took  place  on  15  May  1919.  The  members  of 
the  British  Delegation  in  Paris  had  concluded  that 
[  ...  ]  there  is  solid  Greek  population  around  Smyrna  as  far  as 
Scala  Nuova,  this  Greek  population  whatever  else  happens  to  it, 
should  neither  remain  under  Turkish  rule  nor  be  placed  under 
the  mandate  of  another  European  Power.  135 
Despite  the  concern  over  the  fate  of  the  Greek  populations  and  their  right  to  self- 
government  or  to  unite  with  their  mother  country,  the  Greek  presence  in  this  part  of  the 
world  safeguarded  vital  British  interests.  Additionally,  British  policy  makers  did  not 
entertain  the  idea  of  seeing  Italy  established  as  a  hegemon  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean. 
The  first  sign  had  been  the  occupation  of  the  Dodecanese  by  the  Italians.  As  early  as  in 
1912  the  Admiralty  especially  considered  the  possibility  of  Italian  predominance  as 
dangerous  for  British  strategic  considerationS.  136  Further,  in  April  1919,  in  a 
memorandum  prepared  by  the  Naval  Section  of  the  British  Delegation  in  Paris  it  was 
considered: 
133  FRUS,  PPC,  1919,  vol.  V,  Notes  of  a  Meeting  held  at  President  Wilson's  I  louse  in  the  Place  des  Etats 
Unis,  6  May  1919,  pp.  4834. 
134  FRUS,  PPC,  1919,  vol.  V,  Notes  of  a  Meeting  held  at  President  Wilson's  Ilouse  in  the  Place  des  Etats 
Unis,  12  May  1919,  pp.  577-8. 
135  HLRO,  Lloyd  George  Papers,  F/206/2/5,  Notes  of  the  British  Delegation  on  the  future  of  Anatolia,  13 
May  1919. 
136  As  described  in  an  Admiralty  memorandum  to  the  Foreign  Office  on  20  June  1912,  cited  by  R.  S. 
Bosworth,  'Britain  and  Italy's  acquisition  of  the  Dodecanese,  1912-1915,  '  Historical  Journal,  XIII,  4 
(December  1970),  689. 90 
...  very  undesirable  that  Italy  should  be  given  a  territorial  zone 
along  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor,  including  anchorage  on  the 
southern  coast.  British  naval  interests  are  not  directly  concerned, 
it  would  however  be  preferable  that  Greece  should  occupy  the 
coast  in  question  than  that  Italy  should  do  so.  137 
Greece,  obviously,  was  not  in  a  position  to  challenge  British  preponderance  in  the  area. 
BRITISH  POLICY-MAKING  IN  PARIS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MAY  1919  -A  RETROSPECT. 
The  British  Delegation,  headed  by  Lloyd  George,  had  arrived  in  Paris  with  no 
final  agreement  on  policy  regarding  the  Near  East.  The  drift  of  ideas  on  the  British 
interdepartmental  level,  however,  was  not  the  only  obstacle  to  a  fast  working  solution 
regarding  the  area  in  the  first  half  of  1919.  In  the  meantime,  the  complex  future  of  the 
Near  and  Middle  East  could  only  be  tackled  in  conjunction  with  all  the  Allies,  and  as 
proved  later,  not  always  amicably.  France  and  Italy  had  not  welcomed  Britain's  firm 
decision  to  ascertain  the  supremacy  it  had  won  on  the  battlefield.  Furthermore,  the 
prospect  of  Britain  establishing  Greece  as  its  proxy  on.  both  shores  of  the  Aegean  Sea 
was  not  entertained  either  by  the-  French  or  by  the  Italians.  In  particular,  the  French  tried 
to  fight  over  control  over  Constantinople  and  the  Italians,  along  similar  lines,  had 
decided  to  proceed  with  their  plans  for  annexing  territories  in  Western  Asia  Minor  by 
the  means  of  landing  troops  in  April  1919.138  The  Entente  had  started  to  appear  less 
cordial  during  the  Conference.  The  last  was  a  blow  to  British  planning  but  not 
necessarily  enough  to  entirely  block  British  policy  and  Greek  hopes  for  Smyrna  and  the 
surrounding  territories  in  the  first  half  of  1919. 
In  Paris,  the  Foreign  Office  proposals  regarding  the  Ottoman  territories, 
excluding  the  Arab  lands,  included:  the  creation  of  a  special  regime  for  the  Straits,  with 
137  PRO,  ADM,  Peace  Conference  (Naval  Section  Files),  Greece,  Memorandum  by  Naval  Section  on 
Greek  claims,  April  1919. 
"'  The  French,  as  Sachar  points  out,  had  tried  to  participate  in  the  negotiations  for  the  Mudros  Armistice. 
Calthorpe  however,  had  proceeded  alone.  The  French,  through  Clemenceau,  had  protested  to  the  Supreme 91 
free  passage  for  all  ships  in  peace  and  war  under  an  international  or  American  mandate, 
the  creation  of  the  state  of  Annenia,  the  detachment  of  Thrace  from  Ottoman  control 
and  the  cession  of  Smyrna  and  a  limited  zone  around  the  city  to  Greece.  These, 
however,  had  been  the  Foreign  Office  suggestions  with  the  approval  of  Lloyd  George. 
On  a  Cabinet  level,  no  conclusion  had  been  reached  on  the  specific  issues.  The  truth  of 
the  matter  was  that  since  no  decision  had  been  made  in  London  it  was  up  to  the  British 
Delegation  and  Lloyd  George  in  Paris  to  decide  and  pursue  policies  on  these  issues. 
While  there  was  consensus  over  the  policy  regarding  the  Straits,  their 
internationalisation  and  free  passage  of  ships  in  peace  and  war,  opinions  were  divided 
on  the  issue  of  the  control  of  the  surrounding  region  and  Constantinople.  Military 
advisers  objected  to  an  American  mandate  over  Constantinople.  139  In  addition,  the  India 
Office  and  the  government  of  India  representatives  objected  to  the  scheme  of  evicting 
the  Turks  from  Constantinople  raising  the  issue  of  Muslim  sensibilities.  Regarding 
Smyrna,  there  was  no  objection  by  the  British  policy  makers  to  its  fall  to  the  Greeks, 
subject,  however,  to  the  reservations  made  by  the  British  military  advisers.  140  On  the 
pro-Greek  side,  apart  from  Lloyd  George,  stood  Balfour,  Nicolson,  Forbes-Adam, 
Crowe  and  Borden.  141  On  the  other  side,  there  were  the  General  Staff  representatives 
along  with  Montagu  and  Mallet. 
The  processes  of  the  Peace  Conference  allowed  decisions  to  be  taken  among  by 
the  Supreme  Council  in  discussions  where  the  presence  of  experts  who  could  bring 
forward  their  suggestions  was  not  considered  essential.  142  Despite  the  cautious 
Council.  Sachar,  The  emergence  ofthe  Middle  East,  p.  246.  For  the  Italian  landings  see  this  Chapter:  'The 
situation  in  the  Smyrna  district,  January  to  April  1919.  the  formative  months.  '  p.  75. 
139  See  Chapter  Three:  'The  spectrum  of  Allied  diplomatic  activities  up  to  spring  1920,  '  p.  I  06.  Especially 
P.  107. 
140  See  this  Chapter:  'The  Greek  case  in  the  negotiations  in  Paris.  '  p.  77. 
14  1  Eyre  Crowe  and  Sir  Robert  Borden  were  also  members  of  the  Committee  for  the  Greek  territorial 
claims.  See  this  Chapter:  'The  Greek  case  in  the  negotiations  in  Paris.  '  p.  77. 
142  For  a  complete  picture  of  the  decision  making  process  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference  see  the  works  of 
H-W.  V.  Temperley,  A  History  ofthe  Peace  Conference  ofParis  (London,  1920-24),  and  the  minutes  of 92 
recommendations  of  the  British  Delegation  regarding  Smyrna,  Lloyd  George,  assisted 
by  the  pro-Greek  side  of  the  British  Delegation,  soon  found  fertile  soil  for  the  plan  to 
establish  Greece  on  the  coast  of  Western  Asia  Minor.  The  opportunity  was  given  in 
May  1919  with  the  Italian  machinations  over  getting  control  of  territories  in  Western 
Asia  Minor.  President  Wilson  did  not  approve  Italian  attempts  for  afait  accompli  either 
over  the  Adriatic  issue  or  over  Western  Asia  Minor.  The  American  President  and 
Clemenceau  simply  concurred  when  Lloyd  George  suggested  the  landing  of  Greek 
forces  in  Smyrna  to  pre-empt  an  Italian  landing.  With  a  vague  consensus  on  the  part  of 
the  British  policy-making  elite,  however,  with  the  full  support  of  Lloyd  George  and 
elements  of  the  Foreign  Office,  Greece  was  allowed  to  land  at  Smyrna  in  May  1919. 
The  decision  was  not  an  emotional  impulse  on  the  part  of  Lloyd  George  and  the 
members  of  the  British  Delegation  who  supported  his  decision.  143  Italy  had  also  plans  to 
establish  itself  on  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor.  The  British,  by  promoting  the  Greek  interests 
in.  the  area  eliminated  the  Italian  factor  in  the  region  and  put  a  faithful  proxy  on  the 
periphery  of  the  Straits  and  Constantinople. 
the  meetings  found  in  Papers  Relating  to  the  Foreign  Relations  ofthe  United  States  ofAmerica  [FRUS, 
PPC,  1919]  (Washington,  1942-47)  and  Paul  Mantoux,  Les  Dilibirations  du  Conseil  des  Quatre,  24 
Mars-28  Juin  1919  (Paris,  1955). 
143  See  this  Chapter:  'The  Allied  decision  for  the  Greek  landing  at  Smyrna.  '  p.  84. 93 
Chapter  Three 
The  initial  British  'foster-mothering'  of  the  Greek 
movement  from  May  1919  to  the  summer  of  1920. 
THE  GREEK  LANDING  AT  SNIYRNA  IN  MAY  1919. 
On  14  May  1919,  British,  Italian  and  Greek  troops  took  possession  of  the  ports 
at  the  entrance  of  the  Gulf  of  Smyrna  and  the  Ottoman  authorities  were  inforined.  of  the 
intended  occupation  of  the  city  by  the  Greeks  scheduled  for  the  following  day.,  James 
Morgan,  the  Representative  of  the  British  High  Commissioner  in  the  city,  Admiral 
Calthorpe,  and  Lieutenant  Colonel  Ian  Smith,  had  previously  notified  the  city's 
Ottoman  civil  and  military  authorities  of  the  fact.  However,  there  was  no  mention  of  the 
fact  that  this  would  be  a  Greek  landing.  It  was  only  in  the  evening  that  Morgan  and 
Colonel  Smith  informed  the  Vali,  the  civil  administrator  of  Smyrna,  and  the  commander 
of  the  Ottoman  forces  of  Smyrna,  that  the  town  would  be  occupied  by  Greek  troops  and 
instructed  them  to  take  measures  to  prevent  disorder.  Although  the  Ottomans 
specifically  requested  allied  assistance  to  work  with  their  police  and  gendarmerie  and 
keep  order,  the  Allies  did  not  comply.  Soon  the  news  of  the  Greek  involvement  spread 
across  the  city  and  two  printed  circulars  were  distributed,  calling  the  Ottomans  and  their 
families  'to  gather  together  at  the  Jewish  cemetery  to  show  the  world  that  the  Turks 
were  not  less  numerous  than  the  Greeks.  2  During  the  night,  the  Ottoman  authorities 
released  the  civil  prisoners. 
The  next  day  there  was  no  opposition  to  the  landing  of  the  Greek  forces  at 
around  08:  30.  During  the  passage  of  one  of  the  Greek  units  into  the  city,  a  shot  was 
fired.  All  sides  later  agreed  that  there  was  no  evidence  to  indicate  who  had  fired  that 
1  PRO,  ADM  137/1768,  no  number,  14  May  1919. 94 
first  shot,  whether  it  was  a  Turkish  soldier  or  one  of  the  crowd.  Panic  ensued,  the  Greek 
troops  opened  out  and  opened  fire.  Firing  then  started  from  the  barracks  of  the  Turkish 
troops  stationed  nearby.  The  Greek  units  panicked  and  fired  back.  Bloodshed,  with 
victims  from  both  sides,  ensued.  The  next  day  the  situation  had  improved,  -  as  martial 
law  was  proclaimed  and  a  Court  was  set  up.  However,  the  extent  of  the  disorder  called 
for  the  creation  of  an  international  commission  to  enquire  into  the  violence  which  had 
followed  the  Greek  landing  at  Smyrna. 
Within  three  days  of  the  incident,  the  command  of  the  Greek  Army  had  arrested 
those  chiefly  responsible.  According  to  the  official  report  of  the  Greek  Commander 
there  were  'two  dead  soldiers,  ten  wounded,  fifty  civilians  dead  and  many  more 
wounded.  On  the  Turkish  side  there  were  many  more  dead  and  wounded  but  nobody 
could  verify  any  numbers.  3A  court-martial  was  immediately  set  up.  Fifty  four  people, 
both  civilians  and  soldiers  were  convicted,  three  of  them  were  sentenced  to  death,  four 
to  hard  labour  for  life  and  the  rest  to  between  four  and'twenty  years  of  hard  labour. 
According  to  General  Paraskevopoulos'  report  to  Venizelos  in  Paris,  the  soldiers  that 
were  condemned  were  shot.  4  The  punishments  from  the  Greek  side  were  immediate  and 
harsh.  5  However,  the  damage  was  already  done,  to  the  image  of  the  Greek  Army,  in  the 
eyes  of  the  public. 
2  PRO,  FO  371/4217-96938,  Calthorpe  to  FO,  Enclosing  a  report  from  Smyrna  relative  to  the  landing  of 
the  Greek  troops  dated  24  May  1919  by  Colonel  Smith,  2  July  1919.  The  circulars  are  attached  to  the 
report  of  Colonel  Smith. 
3  MFA,  1919,  A/5NI,  6,  File  Smyrna,  no  number,  Report  by  Leon  Mavroudis,  4  May  1919. 
4  MFA,  1919,  A/AAK,  3,  File  Asia  Minor,  General  Paraskevopoulos  to  Venizelos,  Paris,  4  July  1919. 
5  For  a  detailed  account  see  FRUS,  PPC,  1919,  vol.  IX,  Notes  of  a  meeting  of  the  Heads  of  the 
Delegations,  8  November  1919,  pp.  35-73.  On  4  June  1919,  during  a  conference  of  the  Allied  senior 
officers  stationed  at  Smyrna,  it  was stated  that  the  Greek  commander  had  issued  a  proclamation  in  Greek 
and  Turkish  'most  moderate  in  tone  and  it  is  a  matter  of  regret  that  its  principles  were  not  carried  out  by 
the  Greeks.  '  In  PRO,  FO  371/4218-  84061,  Report  on  the  Greek  occupation  of  Smyrna,  4  June  1919. 
Colonel  Zafiriou,  in  charge  of  the  landing,  underlined  in  a  message  to  the  people  of  the  city:  'We 
specially  recommend  the  population  to  go  on  quietly  with  their  business,  independent  of  what  race  or 
creed  they  belong  to  and  peacefully  to  await  the  decision  of  the  Peace  Conference  as  to  the  fate  of  their 
beautiful  country.,  Captain  Mavroudis  had  admitted  that  there  was  a  plan  that  was  not  followed:  'I 
confess  that  I  would  not  have  imagined  more  unfortunate  way  for  the  Greek  landing  at  Smyrna.  '  In 
MFA,  1919,  A15NI,  6  File  Smyrna  (4000-6000),  no  4265,19  May  1919. 95 
The  International  Commission  that  was  immediately  set  up  to  enquire  as  to  the 
cause  of  the  bloodshed,  was  comprised  of  Brigadier-General  Stewart  Hare  for  Britain, 
Brigadier-General  Bunhoust  for  France,  Rear-Admiral  Mark  Bristol  for  America,  and 
Lieutenant-General  Dall'Olio  for  Italy.  As  the  Commission  was  investigating  the 
charges  against  the  Greek  Army,  the  Supreme  Council  decided  that  a  Greek  officer 
should  follow  the  proceedings  but  with  no  right  to  vote  or  to  take  part  in  the  writing  of 
the  report.  The  Greek  officer  was  Colonel  Alexandros  Mazarakis.  The  Commission 
submitted  its  report  in  October  1919,  with  disastrous  results  for  the  Greeks.  The  report 
was  officially  suppressed  but  copies  were  leaked  to  the  press,  firstly  to  Turkish 
newspapers  and  then  the  information  was  reproduced  in  European  papers  as  well.  The 
Greek  side  had  protested  on  grounds  of  prejudice  on  the  part  of  certain  members  of  the 
committee.  This  charge  was  directed  against  the  escorts  of  British  General  Hare, 
Lieutenant  Colonels  Thomson  and  Atkinson.  According  -to  the  Greek  side,  both  had 
links  with  Anatolia  and  were  known  for  their  pro-Turk  feelings.  6 
The  conclusion  of  the  Committee  proved  to  be  a  very  damaging  factor  for  the 
Greek  cause.  The  report  was  circulated  and  found  fertile  soil.  The  Greeks  had  devoted 
too  much  time  and  energy  trying  to  publicise  their  side  of  the  story.  It  was  wrong 
handling  of  the  situation  from  the  Greek  side;  however,  the  situation  itself  was  bound  to 
cause  disorder.  The  Turks  had  admitted  that  it  would  have  been  too  difficult  to  keep  all 
Turkish  troops  in  their  barracks  and  keep  the  crowds  in  order.  The  Vali  had  specifically 
requested  '100  marines  from  each  of  the  Great  Powers  to  work  with  the  Turkish  police 
and  gendarmerie.  0  Although  the  Commission  was  meant  to  deal  with  the  landing 
incidents  as  such,  its  members  went  a  little  bit  further  than  that.  Greece  had  been 
presented  in  the  report  as  acting  arbitrarily  on  the  issue  of  landing,  not  following  any 
6  FRUS,  PPC,  1919,  Vol.  IX,  Notes  of  a  meeting  of  the  Heads  of  the  Delegations,  8  November  1919, 
pp.  35-73. 96 
Supreme  Council  orders.  Thus,  the  country  could  have  been,  justifiably,  left  alone  to 
deal  with  the  consequences  of  its  action. 
The  Commission  of  Enquiry  bluntly  recommended  the  termination  of  the  Greek 
occupation  and  its  replacement  by  Allied  forces.  Sir  Eyre  Crowe,  had  objected  to  the 
publication  of  the  report  pointing  out  that  'the  Commission  in  its  report  had  gone 
beyond  its  competence.  8  But  most  important  of  all,  he  considered  it  'dangerous'  to  turn 
the  Greeks  out  before  peace  was  made.  Venizelos'  objection  focused  on  the  methods 
used  by  the  members  of  the  Commission  in-  collecting  the  evidence  that  helped  them  to 
reach  such  a  dismissive  conclusion.  9  The  British  Government,  when  pressed  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  repeatedly  refused  to  make  the  report  public.  10  The  Supreme 
Council  had  declared  itself  'unable  to  pronounce  definitely  on  responsibility  for  the 
incidents,  '  underlining  that  the  Greek  Government  had  proceeded  to  settle  the  situation 
'by  conducting  enquiry  and  inflicting  punishments.  "'  Officially,  the  report  of  the  Allied 
Committee  was  rejected  and  its  publication  restricted.  Nonetheless,  the  political  damage 
was  done  for  Greece. 
THE  BRITISH  LOCAL  ELEMENT  AGAINST  THE  GREEK  TUTELAGE  OF  SMYRNA. 
In  contrast  to  the  warm  reception  and  relative  support  which  Greek  claims  over 
Smyrna  had  met  with  in  Paris,  the  idea  of  a  Greek  administration  met  with  icy  reception 
from  the  British  citizens  residing  and  doing  business  in  the  city.  Prior  to  the  Greek 
landing  at  Smyrna,  in  May,  the  British  element  of  the  city  had  expressed  its  anti-Greek 
sentiments.  This  opposition  could  well  be  explained  by  taking  into  account  British  local 
7  PRO,  FO  371/4217-96938,  Report  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Smith,  2  JulY  1919. 
8  PRO,  FO  371/4222-151341,  Proceedings  of  the  Council  -  Paris,  Report  of  Commission  on  8  November 
1919,9  November  1919. 
9  FRUS,  PPC,  1919,  Vol.  IX,  Notes  of  a  meeting  of  the  Heads  of  the  Delegations,  8  November  1919, 
ý  . 
35-73. 
old  Toynbee,  The  Western  Question  in  Greece  and  Turkey  (London,  1923),  p.  366-7. 
PRO,  CAB  21/174,  no  number,  Telegram  from  FO  to  De  Robeck  with  the  Supreme  Council's  decision 
of  10  November  1919,12  November  1919. 97 
interests  which  apparently  had  been  well  served  'by  the  laxity  of  the  Turkish  regime  and 
the  system  of  capitulations,  '  up  until  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War.  12  After  all,  the 
Greeks  had  always  been  Britain's  commercial  rivals  in  the  area  of  Smyrna.  The  British 
Chamber  of  Commerce  there,  early  in  1919,  in  a  communication  to  the  Foreign  Office, 
had  urged  them  to  take  into  consideration  the  fact  that  the  Turks  'would  welcome 
British  tutelage  for  they  have  heard  what  we  have  done  in  Egypt,  but  above  all,  they 
know  that  we  are  the  victors,  and  would  not  be  restive  under  our  rule.  "  3  Smyrna, 
according  to  their  estimations,  would  be  better  off  under  British  control. 
James  Morgan,  the  British  Representative  in  Smyrna  of  the  High  Commissioner 
in  Constantinople,  was  a  key  figure  in  the  orchestrated  attempt  of  the  British  element  to 
oppose  any  change  in  the  administration  of  the  city  which  would  alter  or  damage  their 
commercial  and  industrial  rights.  His  communications  to  Constantinople  and  to  the 
Foreign  Office'were  continuous  and  had  only  one  target:  in  view  of  the  importance  of 
British  commercial  interests  in  the  area  of  Smyrna,  he  urged  his  superiors  to  safeguard 
them.  14  Morgan  was  repeatedly  furnishing  his  superiors  at  Constantinople  with  reports 
regarding  Turkish  accounts  of  events,  commented  upon  throughout  by  him,  strangely 
enough,  as  'the  only  impartial  story  of  events-'15  In  his  attempts,  he  counted  on  the 
goodwill  of  the  local  British  community  which  was  supplementing  his  reports  with  its 
own  accounts.  The  British  interests,  according  to  the  British  citizens  there,  were 
threatened  at  every  turn,  as  the  Greek  authorities  were  attempting  a  civil  penetration  that 
12  The  subjects  of  the  Western  European  Powers  enjoyed  privileged  position  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  since 
1535,  when  the  Ottomans  granted  first  to  the  French  and  subsequently  to  other  Europeans,  the  British 
being  among  the  first,  freedom  from  all  taxation,  exemption  from  Ottoman  law  and  liberty  of  religion  and 
commerce.  All  these  privileges  were  known  as  the  'Capitulations.  ' 
13  PRO,  FO  608/103-6815,  British  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Smyrna  to  FO,  14  February  1919,  and  PRO, 
FO  371/4157-40120,  Conditions  in  Smyrna.  British  Vice  Consul  in  Mitylene,  Chios,  W.  Lewis  Bailey  to 
FO,  25  March  1919. 
14  PRO,  FO  608/91-17254,  Calthorpe  to  Curzon,  Effect  on  British  local  interests  of  Greek  occupation  of 
Smyrna,  enclosing  copy  of  report  from  Morgan,  Smyrna  dated  June  17  regarding  Greek  insults  to  British 
subjects  in  Smyrna,  6  August  1919. 
Is  PRO,  FO  371/4221-130689,  Morgan  to  FO,  18  September  1919. 98 
endangered  their  privileged  position  in  Smyrna.  The  Foreign  Office  was  bombarded 
with  letters  and  petitions  of  British  subjects  in  Smyrna.  They  most  often  underlined  that 
the  entire  commerce  and  business  undertakings  were  in  British  hands,  thus  a  Greek 
administration  would  certainly  not  continue  to  favour  their  interests.  They  were  urging 
the  British  Government  to  consider  taking  over  control  of  the  region,  always  treating  the 
possibility  of  a  Greek  administration  with  suspicion  and  resentment.  Britain  declined 
then  most  of  them  opted  for  France  or  the  United  States.  16  Morgan's  zeal  was  such  that 
Earl  Granville,  the  British  Minister  in  Athens,  once  commented  in  one  of  his 
communications  to  London:  'Mr.  Morgan  can  certainly  not  be  accused  of  undue 
prejudice  in  favour  of  the  Greeks.  '  17 
The  issue  of  the  capitulations  was  of  utmost  importance  in  the  communications 
of  the  British  High  Commissioner  with  the  Foreign  Office.  Britain  had  always  been  in  a 
privileged  position  regarding  industrial  and  commercial  interests  in  the  Ottoman 
Empire.  The  British  community  had  enjoyed  this  special  relationship  and  the  privileges 
which  it  accorded  from  very  early  on  and,  as  it  was  suggested,  would  not  necessarily 
mean  letting  them  go.  '  8  Russell,  Charg6  d'  Affaires  at  Athens  writing  about  the  hostility 
of  British  citizens  at  Smyrna  regarding  the  Greek  occupation  in  late  August  1919, 
cabled  the  following  thoughts  to  Curzon: 
... 
[The  hostility]  is  partly  based  on  personal  grounds;  for  the 
personality  of  the  Greek  is  not  attractive,  while  the  Turkish 
character  makes  a  strong  appeal  to  the  sentiments  of  the  most 
Englishmen.  I  believe,  however,  that  it  would  be  wrong  to 
conclude  from  this  fact  anything  favourable  to  Turkish 
rule.  '  9 
16  An  example  is  a  letter  from  Langdon  Rees,  whose  father  owned  a  shipping  firm  in  Smyrna  in  PRO,  FO 
608/103-3836,  Curzon  to  Balfour,  Enclosure  Report  from  Lt.  Langdon  Rees  on  Smyrna. 
7  PRO,  FO  371/4223-154517,  Granville  to  FO,  4  November  1919. 
8  'The  capitulations,  or  extra-territorial  privileges  enjoyed  by  foreigners  residing  in  the  Empire  initially 
granted  unilaterally  by  the  Sultan  to  foreign  merchants,  later  extended  to  states  whose  citizens  traded  in 99 
Morgan  kept  furnishing  the  Foreign  Office  with  protests  and  questions  about  the 
capitulations.  The  Greeks  were  gradually  taking  over  the  administration  in  Smyrna  and 
the  British  local  element  felt  threatened.  There  was  even  a  collective  note  sent  to  the 
Foreign  Office,  signed  by  the  French  and  Italian  representatives  along  with  Morgan,  to 
express  the  combined  worries  of  the  Allied  nationals.  20  The  British  representative  felt 
that  the  Greeks  'had  made  [the]  original  mandate  of  military  occupation  of  Smyrna 
mean  virtual  annexation  and  exclusion  of  allied  control.  j,  2  1  The  opposers  of  Greek  plans 
for  Western  Asia  Minor  were  fighting  their  first  battles. 
THE  BRITISH  OFFICIALS  ON THE  SPOT  AND  THE  SITUATION  IN  THE  SMYRNA  ENCLAVE. 
The  British  officials,  stationed  in  Anatolia,  had  realised  from  the  beginning  that 
the  ambiguity  surrounding  the  Greek  landing  could  only  cause  further  friction  and 
unrest  in  the  Ottoman  Empire,  which  was  already  in  a  state  of  administrative  chaos. 
I 
These  people,  away  from  the  Whitehall  and  the  meetings  of  the  Supreme  Council  in 
Paris,  stationed  at  Constantinople,  in  the  vilayet  of  Aidin  and  the  sandjak  of  Smyrna, 
constantly  supplied  London  with  their  reports,  accounts  and  evaluations  of  the  situation 
that  was  forming  up  in  the  summer  of  1919.  The  plethora  of  reports  can  be  summarised 
as  follows:  immediate  withdrawal  of  the  Greeks  was  necessary. 
It  seemed  from  the  reports  reaching  London,  up  until  May,  that  the  situation  in 
Turkey  and  the  enforcement  of  the  terms  of  the  Armistice  were  quite  satisfactory.  And 
surely,  it  could  not  have  been  otherwise.  These  satisfying  reports  covered  the  period 
right  after  the  Armistice,  when  the  picture  for  the  future  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  was  still 
the  Ottoman  Empire.  '  Ahmad  Feroz,  'The  Late  Ottoman  Empire',  in  The  Great  Powers  and  the  End  of 
the  Ottoman  Empire,  ed.  by  M.  Kent  (London,  1994),  p.  21 
19  DBFP,  vol.  IV,  no  500,  Mr.  Russell  to  Curzon,  31  August  1919,  pp.  744-5. 
20  PRO,  FO  406/43,  January  to  June  1920,  Morgan  to  Curzon  enclosing  Collective  Note,  29  May  1920. 
'[  ...  ]private  persons,  industrial  and  commercial  establishments  and  companies  of  our  nationalities  protest 
against  the  abrupt  alteration  of  regime,  which  will  without  any  notice  deprive  them  of  guarantees  which 100 
unclear,  when  people  were  far  more  interested  in  trying  to  piece  together  their  own  lives 
and  properties.  Thousands  of  Ottoman  soldiers  were  trying  to  return  to  their  homes.  In 
this  formative  period  the  reports  would  have  been  reassuring  for  the  state  of  affairs.  It 
was  a  natural  reaction  after  a  defeat,  and  Allied  officers  were  not  in  a  position  to  control 
efficiently  the  chaotic  situation  in  the  Ottoman  Empire.  In  the  meantime,  at 
Constantinople,  the  Sultan  had  completely  succumbed  to  the  Allied  forces.  This, 
however,  did  not  necessarily  mean  that  all  political  elements  agreed  with  his  policy. 
Mustapha  Kemal  was  dispatched  in  May  1919  on  an  official  mission  from  the  Turkish 
War  Ministry  to  the  interior  of  Anatolia,  in  order  to  inspect  the  Turkish  demobilisation, 
according  to  Allied  guidelines.  From  this  position,  Kemal  started  the  organisation  for  a 
Turkish  nationalist  resistance  movement.  22 
Gradually,  intelligence  reports  were  giving  the  real  picture:  as  early  as  March 
1919,  the  Ottoman  civil  population  of  Smyrna  was  being  armed.  23  In  addition,  while  all 
Allied  occupation  had  been  achieved  through  surprise  attack,  the  Greek  army  in  May 
had  found  itself  before  organised  resistance  right  from  the  beginning,  a  point  stressed  by 
the  Greek  officers  and  Stergiadis,  the  Greek  High  Commissioner  himself,  in  his  reports 
to  Athens.  24  Calthorpe,  the  acting  British  High  Commissioner,  in  June,  was  expressing 
his  fears  over  the  tension  which  was  mounting  on  both  sides.  The  British  official 
estimated  that  only  the  early  signing  of  the  peace  treaty  seemed  appropriate  to  ease  the 
passions  and  the  bloodshed.  25  Calthorpe's  deputy,  Admiral  Webb,  believed  that  the 
they  have  enjoyed  for  centuries  and  to  which  they  have  adopted  thernselves,  '  stressed  the  Note,  signed  by 
all  three  Representatives. 
21  PRO,  FO  371/5144-1781,  Morgan  to  FO,  12  January  1920. 
22  For  Kemal's  activities  see  Kinross,  Atatark:  the  rehirth  ofa  nation  (London,  1964).  For  an  analysis  of 
the  Turkish  internal  situation  in  the  second  half  of  1919  see  this  Chapter:  'The  shift  in  the  n-Witary 
situation  in  Anatolia  and  the  Bolshevik  factor  in  British  thinking.  '  p.  134. 
23  PRO,  FO  608/108,  Intelligence  Surnmary  4.3.1919,31  March  1919. 
24  MFA,  1919  A/AAK  5,  File  Smyrna,  no  5843,  Smyrna,  Stergiadis  to  Athens,  13  June  1919. 
25  Calthorpe  acted  as  the  Representative  of  the  British  High  Cornmissioner  in  Constantinople  until  August 
1919.  He  then  handed  over  the  post  to  Vice-Admiral  Sir  John  de  Robeck.  DBFP,  vol.  IV,  no  434, 
Calthorpe  to  Curzon,  29  June  1919,  p.  657. 101 
insecurity  in  the  interior  of  Turkey  was  steadily  increasing  and  disorders  were 
widespread.  On  the  situation  in  Smyrna,  he  saw  'no  improvement  as  Turks  and  Greeks 
in  all  parts  of  the  Empire  are  ready  on  slightest  provocation  to  spring  at  one  another.  26 
For  him,  the  withdrawal  of  Greeks  would  automatically  mean  that  tranquillity  would 
give  way  to  disorder  in  Anatolia.  27 
While  negotiations  in  Paris  were  still  under  way  and  Venizelos  was  trying  hard 
to  convince  the  Supreme  Council  on  Greek  desiderata,  General  Staff  Intelligence 
Officer,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Smith,  commenting  on  the  situation  in  the  Smyrna  district, 
summarised  what  had  become  evident  with  the  actual  Greek  landing  and  the  incidents 
which  followed: 
If  an  occupation  by  the  Greekswere  to  be  carried  out,  it 
could  only  be  effected  peacefully  were  the  control  of  and 
policing  of  the  country  first  of  all  undertaken  by  French  or 
British  forces  under  whose  protection  the  administration 
could  be  taken  over  and  which  could  subsequently  gradually 
be  withdrawn  are  replaced  by  Greek  troops.  28 
The  British  officials  were  cautious  in  the  beginning  but  quite  open  as  time  went 
by  regarding  the  Greek  presence.  'The  root  of  all  evil  in  the  Turkish  situation  remains 
the  Greek  occupation  of  Smyrna,  '  wrote  Admiral  de  Robeck  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Admiralty.  29  The  need  for  an  immediate  peace  settlement  was  a  statement  found  in  the 
majority  of  the  communications  between  the  British  High  Commissioner  and  British 
officials  in  Paris  during  the  peace  negotiations. 
What  could  have  served  as  a  medium  to  ease  passions  on  the  Ottoman  side  was 
denied  to  the  Greeks:  in  repeated  attempts  by  the  Greek  representatives  in  Anatolia  to 
persuade  the  British  authorities  to  lend  them  an  air  of  Allied  authority  the  answer  was 
26  PRO,  FO  371/4157-56556,  Admiral  Webb  to  F.  0,  II  April  1919. 
27  DBFP,  vol.  IV,  no  486,  Admiral  Webb  to  Curzon,  29  June  1919,  pp.  730-2  and,  no  487,  Admiral  Webb 
to  Curzon,  17  August  1919,  pp.  7324. 
28  PRO,  FO  371/4157-72532,  General  Staff  Intelligence  Lieutenant  Colonel  Smith,  13  May  1919. 
29  PRO,  FO  899/1513,  de  Robeck  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Admiralty,  23  November  1919. 102 
always  in  the  negative.  One  such  example  was  connected  with  the  Greek  landing 
incidents  of  Smyrna.  When  the  Greek  High  Commissioner  at  Constantinople,  after 
conflicting  versions  regarding  the  numbers  of  Turks  that  were  killed  during  the 
occupation  of  Smyrna  were  circulated,  had  asked  whether  English  officers  could  be 
attached  to  the  Headquarters  of  the  Greek  Army  'in  order  that  in  their  impartial 
evidence  it  may  be  possible  to  establish  truth  and  to  prevent  formation  of  calumnious 
accusations,  '  the  answer  was  that  'British  officers  should  not  be  attached  to  Greek 
forces,  as  it  would  tend  to  give  colour  to  the  belief  that  Greek  occupation  was  a  result  of 
a  British  not  an  Allied  decision.  30  In  a  War  Office  communication  to  the  Foreign  Office 
we  read  the  following: 
The  despatch  of  the  Greek  troops  to  Smyrna  was  a  move 
undertaken  entirely  in  the  Greek  interests.  The  Army  Council 
are  therefore  of  the  opinion  that  it  would  be  most  undesirable 
to  associate  HMG  with  this  military  undertaking  on  the  part 
of  the  Greeks  as,  in  all  probability,  it  would  thereby  be 
involved  in  serious  military  and  political  difficulties  in  that 
area  at  no  distant  date.  31 
The  estimations  and  suggestions  by  the  British  representatives  on  the  spot  before  the 
May  landing  inclined  in  one  direction:  a  Greek  landing  and  occupation  would  have  to 
happen  under  Allied  tutelage.  This  certainly  did  not  happen  and  thus  Greek  presence  in 
Anatolia  began  under  unfavourable  circumstances.  The  British  High  Commissioner  was 
once  told  by  Canellopoulos,  the  Greek  High  Commissioner  at  Constantinople  'You  do 
not  see  the  Greek  interests  with  a  Greek  monocle  but  with  Allied  spectacles,  ' 
complaining  about  this  cautious  British  attitude.  32  It  was  more  than  evident  that  the 
Greeks  expected  at  least  a  more  open  moral  support  by  the  British  on  the  spot. 
30  Ile  petition  of  the  Greek  High  Conunissioner  to  be  found  in  PRO,  FO  371/4219-96253,1  July  1919, 
and  the  answer  in  PRO,  FO  371/4219-10066  1,10  July  1919. 
31  PRO,  FO  371/4219-103511,  WO  to  FO,  16  July  1919. 
32  MFA 
,  1919,  A15NI  10,  File  Asia  Minor,  no  7077,  Canellopoulos  to  Calthorpe,  20  July  1919. 103 
The  first  signs  of  tension  became  evident  with  the  minor  incidents  between 
Greek  and  Italian  troops  in  Asia  Minor.  33  Soon,  the  tension  spread  to  Paris  and  the 
quarrel  continued  in  the  meetings  of  the  Council  of  Four.  The  Greek  forces,  after  the 
initial  landing  on  15  May  1919  had  started  to  push  east,  along  the  railways  as  far  as 
Alashehr  and  Nazizli,  both  occupied  in  June,  then  towards  Aivali,  Vourla  and  Chesme 
to  the  west  of  Smyrna  which  were  immediately  occupied  with  small  detachments.  To 
the  north,  the  Greeks  extended  their  control  up  to  Menemen  and  Pergamus.  34  The 
Italians  were  no  less  ambitious.  They  were  the  ones  who,  without  Allied  permission, 
had  in  April  first  landed  troops  on  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor.  The  Greek  High 
Commissioner  at  Smyrna,  Aristidis  Stergiadis,  reported  to  Athens  that  Italian 
propaganda  manipulated  the  local  Turkish  officials  at  Smyrna  with  the  result  that  many 
demonstrations  and  upheavals  took  place.  This  was  done  in  an  attempt  to  persuade  the 
British  that  these  Turkish  upheavals  were  representative  of  overall  resentment  against 
any  further  Greek  advance  and  that  'if  Greeks  confined  themselves  in  the  Sandjak  of 
Smyrna  order  would  preside  over  the  rest  of  the  vilayet.  '  'It  is  obvious,  '  concluded 
Stergiadis,  'that  they  do  not  agree  with  England's  decision  over  Greek  freedom  of 
movement  in  the  confines  of  the  sandjak  of  Smyrna.  '  35 
By  June  1919,  both  Greeks  and  Italians  were  well  established  in  the  areas 
designated  by  their  lines  of  command.  However,  intervals  of  friction  between 
themselves  and  the  Turks  recurred.  According  to  Admiralty  estimations,  the  Greeks 
would  accept  no  limitation  imposed  by  the  Supreme  Council,  while  the  Turkish 
33  Italy  was  Greece's  adversary  at  Paris  with  Italian  interests  stretching  from  Northern  Epirus  to  the 
Dodecanese  but  more  importantly  Smyrna.  Italy's  handling  of  affairs  had  given  Greece  the  opportunity  to 
land  having  the  consent  of  the  Allies.  In  April  1919  the  Italians  had  landed  at  Adalia  in  order  to  push  for  a 
fait  accompli  regarding  their  presence  there. 
34  PRO,  FO  899/15/13,  Enclosure  in  a  telegram  Curzon  to  Balfour,  20  June  1919.  See  Appendix  11  Maps. 
2.  Western  Asia  Minor. 
35  MFA,  1919,  A/AAK  File  Smyrna  June-July  1919,  no  6301,  Stergiadis  to  Athens,  June  1919. 104 
resistance  was  also  becoming  overt.  36  In  Paris,  the  representatives  of  the  Supreme 
Council,  and  especially  the  British  side,  were  still  unclear  as  to  whether  the  Supreme 
Council  sanctioned  the  Greek  planing  for  an  extension  of  their  occupation.  An  example 
of  this  blurred  picture  is  the  following  telegram  from  Balfour  to  the  Foreign  Office: 
Venizelos  has  informed  President  of  the  Peace  Conference 
on  18  June,  that  the  Turks  are  advancing  against  Greek  zone 
from  ME  to  S.  E.  in  view  of  the  danger  to  Greek  troops  and 
to  the  population  he  has  therefore  instructed  the  Greek  High 
Commissioner  at  Smyrna  to  inform  you  that  on  his  own 
responsibility  and  without  waiting  authorisation  of  Council 
of  Four  he  has  thought  it  is  his  duty  to  advance  and  take 
necessary  action  to  stop  enemy  advance  and  prevent 
concentration  of  Turkish  troopS.  37 
There  was  no  mention  whatsoever  that  the  Supreme  Council  denied  or objected  to  this 
intended  move,  authorised  by  Venizelos.  However,  when  the  Greek  Army  had  gone 
further  than  was  expected  and,  as  usually  happens  in  a  state  of  war,  casualties  and 
disorder  ensued  as  a  result  of  the  Greek  advances  in  certain  areas,  the  Supreme  Council, 
alarmed  by  the  reports,  called  Venizelos,  on  various  occasions,  to  remind  him  that  there 
were  not  yet  any  definite  decisions  regarding  the  fate  of  the  region.  The  impression  that 
was  given,  though,  especially  to  the  Turks  and  as  a  result  boosted  the  Nationalist 
Movement,  was  that  the  Greeks  were  following  their  own  expansionist  plans  and  had  no 
authority  from  the  Supreme  Council. 
Crowe,  in  Paris,  was  urging  prudence  and  the  need  to  impose  some  restraint 
upon  the  Greeks.  Philip  Kerr,  Lloyd  George's  private  secretary  had  outlined  the 
following  on  the  Greek  presence  in  Smyrna  and  the  question  of  whether  or  not  they 
should  allow  them  to  advance  further: 
There  is  much  to  be  said  against  the  policy  of  occupying 
Smyrna  but  the  responsibility  for  that  decision  rests  with 
the  Council  of  Four  and  not  with  M.  Venizelos.  He 
36  PRO,  ADM  137/1761,  no  number,  7  July  1919. 
37  PRO,  FO  371/4219-95406,  Balfour  to  F.  0,30  June  1919. 105 
welcomed  it,  but  he  did  not  ask  for  it.  I  think,  that  our 
policy  ought  to  be  to  permit  M.  Venizelos  to  take  up  a  line 
without  prejudice  to  the  ultimate  settlement,  which  will 
give  strategic  security  to  the  Smyrna  territory.  Personally, 
I  would  allow  them  to  occupy  Soma,  Akhissar;  a  point 
beyond  Kassaba,  possibly  Sahihli,  and  a  point  between 
Aidin  and  Nazli,  say  Akche,  thence  running  down  the 
Meander  to  Aya-Soulouk.  After  all  the  Turks  are  our 
enemies.  38 
By  August  1919,  information  had  reached  the  Conference  to  the  effect  that  the  Greeks 
had  taken  over  control  of  the  shipping  and  customs  at  Smyrna,  actions  which  were 
resented  by  the  representatives  of  the  Allies  in  Smyrna.  39 
Half  measures  were  what  characterised  Allied  policy  during  the  formative 
summer  of  1919.  And  it  was  formative  not  only  because  Greece  was  struggling  to 
establish  itself  firmly  on  administrative  and  military  levels  but  also  because  the 
Nationalist  movement  in  Turkey  was  beginning  to  gain  influence  . 
40  In  November  1919 
Venizelos  had  telegraphed  to  Crowe: 
When  Mr.  L.  G.  spoke  to  me  first  of  the  decision  regarding  the 
occupation,  he  made  no  mention  whatsoever  of  its  temporary 
character...  I  do  not,  of  course,  infer  that  the  occupation 
entrusted  to  Greece  is  equal  to  a  definite  recognition  of  her 
sovereignty  over  the  occupied  area.  But  I  desire  to  state  that 
when  Greece  was  asked  to  proceed  to  this  occupation,  not  only 
was  there  no  mention  made  to  me  of  its  being  temporary,  but  on 
the  contrary,  the  very  decision  implied  -  though  not  tacitly  - 
that  this  occupation  was  the  first  step  towards  giving  Greece  part 
of  Western  Asia  Minor.  41 
38  PRO,  FO  371/4222-151132,  Kerr  memorandurn,  12  November  1919.  Of  interest  is  the  Foreign  Office 
expert's  minutes  (Kidston):  'The  appendices  by  Kerr  are  concerned  with  proving  that  the  Greeks  did  their 
best  in  the  circumstances  as  regards  their  movement  east  of  Smyrna.  The  real  question  Is  not  what  the 
Greeks  did  when  they  got  to  Anatolia  but  whether  it  was  wise  or  right  to  send  them  there  at  all.  Fear 
of  massacre  of  Christians  and  fear  of  the  Italians  going  to  Smyrna  indefinitely.  It  will  be  for  the 
historian  of  the  future  to  ascertain  or  conjecture  which  Was  the  fundamental  motive.  ' 
39  An  example  is  a  letter  from  the  French  minister  in  London  to  the  Foreign  Office  in  PRO,  FO  371/4220- 
108109,26  July  1919  asking  'que  le  Gouvernement  Hellenique  devait  Etre  prie  de  retirer  imm6diatement 
les  prohibitions  edict6es  par  les  autorit6s  rnilitaires  grecques.  ' 
40  Intelligence  reports,  both  British  and  Greek,  talked  about  a  considerable  Turkish  resistance  movement. 
By  the  end  of  June  1919  the  Turkish  Nationalist  movement  was  organised  and  led  by  Mustafa  Kemal. 
The  Nationalists  held  all  real  power  in  the  provinces  of  Anatolia.  See  this  chapter:  'The  shift  in  the 
military  situation  in  Anatolia  and  the  Bolshevik  factor  in  British  thinking.  '  p.  134. 
41  PRO,  FO  286n46,  Greek  Territorial  Expansion,  Crowe  to  Curzon,  enclosure  Venizelos  to  Crowe  dated 
20  November  1919,26  November  1919. 106 
THE  SPECTRUM  OF  ALLIED  DIPLOMATIC  ACTIVITY  UP  TO  SPRING  1920. 
The  discussions  for  the  Turkish  treaty  dragged  on  in  a  series  of  negotiations  and 
meetings  in  winter  and  spring  1919-1920.  It  was  proving  to  be  far  more  complicated 
than  setting  the  peace  with  Germany.  In  the  end,  the  competitors  for  the  control  of 
Ottoman  territories  proved  too  many  for  the  disputed  areas  of  a  country  which  was  still 
offering  resistance.  Reports  coming  from  Anatolia  were  now  suggesting  that  the 
nationalist  forces  were  gradually  acquiring  the  impetus  needed  to  sustain  them  and  to 
oppose  the  Greeks.  The  Greek  army  alone  did  not  seem  able  to  destroy  the  forces  that 
Kemal  was  gradually  concentrating.  Venizelos  needed  Allied,  if  not  British  backing. 
Up  until  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  S6vres,  in  August  1920,  Greek  claims,  and 
especially  the  Smyrna  Question,  were  extensively  debated  in  Allied  conferences.  42  The 
three  conferences  were  the  London  Conference,  held  between  12  and  23  February  1920, 
the  San  Remo  Conference  in  April  where  the  Treaty  of  Sevres  was  drawn  and  the 
Second  Lympne  Conference  in  June  of  the  same  year,  where  the  Allied  order  for  the 
Greek  advance  in  Anatolia  was  given. 
On  the  Paris  front  in  the  summer  of  1919,  the  United  States  Government  was 
still  not  in  a  position  to  state  whether  they  could  undertake  a  mandate  for  any  part  of 
Turkey.  43  On  25  and  26  June,  at  the  Supreme  Council's  meetings  Lloyd  George  and 
Wilson  had  agreed  that  the  Turks  should  at  that  point  be  told  that  certain  areas  were  to 
be  taken  from  Turkish  control  and  administered  by  the  Allies.  On  27  June  1919,  the 
Conference  decided  that  the  treaty  of  Peace  with  Turkey  should  be  suspended  until  the 
United  States  government  could  decide  on  whether  or  not  to  undertake  a  mandate  for 
42  The  conferences  took  place  after  the  official  end  of  the  Paris  Peace  Conference,  on  21  January  1920. 
43  The  first  scheme  was  a  memorandum,  by  Nicolson,  of  15  March  1919  in  PRO,  FO  608/37  -  4392.  On 
20  May  1919  the  Greeks  had  submitted  a  plan  in  many  ways  similar  to  the  one  submitted  by  Nicolson  in 
PRO,  FO  608/89-10460  and  20786.  Another  plan  was  proposed  by  Henry  Morgenthau,  former 
ambassador  of  the  United  States  in  Constantinople,  suggesting  that  the  United  States  should  undertake  a 
mandate  over  Constantinople,  Anatolia  and  Armenia.  In  PRO,  FO  608/111-11395. 107 
any  part  of  Turkey.  44  The  British  Government  continued  to  hope  that  America  would 
ultimately  undertake  the  task.  Balfour,  in  a  letter  to  Winston  Churchill,  had  underlined 
the  importance  of  the  American  decision.  Nothing  could  be  discussed  on  the  issue  of 
Turkey  'until  the  result  of  the  President's  campaign  in  America,  and  the  Debate  in  the 
Senate.  A5 
The  issue  of  America  undertaking  mandates  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  was 
controversial.  The  military  establishment  in  Britain  in  particular  opposed  such  a 
solution,  especially  for  the  sensitive  area  of  Constantinople  and  the  Straits.  The  three 
Service  Staffs,  with  the  Admiralty  being  in  the  lead  of  the  opposition,  argued  that  such  a 
scheme  would  allow  the  Americans  to  challenge  British  supremacy  in  the 
Mediterranean,  'a  danger  which,  from  a  strategical  point  of  view,  must  at  all  costs  be 
avoided.  946  The  Foreign  Office  favoured  the  idea  of  America  stepping  in  and  found 
allies  that  promoted  the  scheme  in  Lloyd  George  and  Balfour.  The  United  States 
declined  however  to  ratify  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  let  alone  undertake  any  mandates. 
But  before  the  American  decision  the  Allies  had  to  wait  for  the  results  of  the  American 
presidential  campaign  and  the  decision  of  the  American  Senate.  This  delay  added 
further  obstacles  to  the  conclusion  of  a  quick  peace  with  Turkey.  Time  was  working  on 
behalf  of  the  Turkish  Nationalists  and  in  expense  of  the  Greek  presence  in  the  area. 
In  the  meantime,  the  Greek  Prime  Minister  had  to  respond  on  two  fronts.  On  the 
one  hand,  the  reports  on  the  landing  incidents  had  already  reached  the  Supreme  Council, 
while  his  deputies  and  General  Staff  were  stressing  the  need  for  advances  to  consolidate 
their  position.  In  late  June,  early  July  1919  the  Greek  Prime  Minister  was  asking  the 
Council's  permission  to  occupy  a  zone  'delimited  by  the  Adramyti  -  Balikesser  road,  the 
44  DBFP,  vol.  IV,  no  430,  Notes  of  a  meeting  held  at  President  Wilson's  House  in  the  Place  des  Etats- 
Unis,  27  June  1919,  p.  652. 
45  A.  J.  Balfour  to  Churchill,  17  August  1919,  in  Gilbert,  Churchill,  Vol.  IV,  Companion  -  Part  11,  pp. 
808-9. 108 
Balikesser  -  Kirkagath  -  Akhissar  -  Magnesia  railway,  the  Magnesia  -  Kassaba  Railway 
as  far  as  Alashehir'  due  to  a  large  Turkish  presence.  47  All  of  the  above  mentioned  spots 
were  strategic  positions,  where  the  existence  of  Turkish  nationalist  groups  had  been 
reported.  When  the  British  representatives  on  the  spot  were  asked  by  the  Conference 
whether  the  Greek  advance  was  considered  necessary  they  replied  in  the  negative. 
Special  attention  was  given  to  the  economic  effects  of  the  ftiction  between  the 
Turkish  Nationalists  and  the  Greeks.  Passions  were  running  high  already  and  the  eyes  of 
both  Greeks  and  Turks  were  set  on  Britain  to  settle  the  situation.  'A  very  early  peace,  ' 
this  was  the  remedy  and  was  communicated  both  to  London  and  Paris.  48  Calthorpe's 
answer  to  Balfour  regarding  Venizelos'  suggestion  for  new  extended  limits  of 
occupation  was  thus  negative.  Nevertheless,  he  urged  the  adoption  of  a  definite  line  of 
occupation  which  would  allow  Greek  occupation  of  strategic  points  -  such  as  the  towns 
of  Magnesia  and  Kassaba.  49  By  the  end  of  May  1919,15,000  troops  had  been 
disembarked.  However,  'the  Greeks,  '  stressed  a  report  from  Smyrna,  'do  not  regard 
their  occupation  as  merely  temporary.  50 
On  the  Smyrna  issue,  the  ffiction  between  Greeks  and  Italians,  the  Greek  and 
Italian  advances  and  the  encounters  between  Greek,  Italian  and  Turkish  forces  were 
continuously  present  on  the  agenda  of  the  meetings  of  the  Supreme  Council.  Curzon,  on 
the  advances  of  the  Greek  and  Italian  forces  had  cabled  to  Balfour  in  Paris,  on  20  June 
1919: 
The  further  these  advances,  whether  of  Greeks  or  of 
Italians  are  pushed,  the  greater  becomes  the  difficulty  of 
withdrawal,  and  the  more  inevitable  the  prospect  of  future 
46  PRO,  ADM  116/3239,  Turkey:  the  Future  of  Constantinople  and  the  Straits,  30  January  1919. 
47  Two  notes  submitted  by  Venizelos  in  PRO,  FO  608/89  -  13566  and  13568.  See  Appendix  11,  Maps. 
2.  Western  Asia  Minor. 
4'  DBFP,  voI.  IV,  no  433,  Admiral  Webb  to  Sir  R.  Graham,  28  June  1919,  pp.  654,  no  434,  Admiral 
Calthorpe  to  Curzon,  29  June  1919,  p.  657,  no  445,  Admiral  Calthorpe  to  Balfour,  8  July  1919,  p.  666-7, 
no  458,  Admiral  Calthorpe  to  Balfour,  16  July  1919,  p.  686. 
49  DBFP,  vol.  IV,  no  436,  Calthorpe  to  Balfour,  I  July  1919,  pp.  658-9. 
50  PRO,  FO  406/40,  no  57,  Curzon  to  Balfour,  Enclosure  Report  form  Smyrna,  20  June  1919. 109 
strife,  'if  not  of  serious  bloodshed.  In  the  various 
appreciations  that  reach  the  Foreign  Office  of  the  policy 
that  is  now  being  pursued  with  regard  to  Turkey,  I  cannot 
find  any  voice  that  welcomes  or  indeed  defends  these 
encroachments.  51 
On  21  July  1919,  a  line  of  division  was  adopted  and  the  British  officials  in  Asia 
Minor  were  infon-ned  of  it  in  a  communication  which  stressed  its  provisional 
character.  52  Venizelos  and  Tittoni  had  also  agreed  on  a  line  of  demarcation.  53  The  next 
day,  the  Supreme  Council  decided  that  General  Sir  George  Milne,  the  British  C-in-C  in 
Asiatic  Turkey,  would  be  responsible  for  directing  military  operations  in  the  region. 
Milne  was  the  person  responsible  for  determining  the  line  adopted  by  the  Supreme 
Council  on  the  Allied-Greek  advance.  The  undertaking  of  the  command  of  the  Greek 
operations  by  General  Milne  was  seen  as  a  blow  to  Greek  attempts.  For  Milne,  guerrilla 
warfare  would  continue  so  long  as  Greek  troops  remained  active,  while  any  further 
Greek  advance  would  create  greater  difficulties.  54  The  War  Office  held  the  opinion  that 
the  Greeks  should  be  called  back  and  confined  to  the  area  of  Smyrna.  A  Greek  report  of 
a  concentration  of  60,000  Turkish  irregulars  was  simply  an  exaggeration  for  the  War 
Office.  55 
However,  the  situation  was  blurred  in  Greek  eyes,  especially  since  their  presence 
was  nominally  put  under  Allied  control.  The  Greek  zone  was  to  be  placed  with  no  delay 
in  the  hands  of  an  interallied  commission.  In  the  meantime,  Milne's  reports  were 
continuous  and  touched  on  a  variety  of  parameters  respecting  the  situation.  An  issue 
51  PRO,  FO  899/15B,  Curzon  to  Balfour,  20  June  1919. 
52  DBFP,  vol.  IV,  no  461,  Balfour  to  Calthorpe,  21  July  1919,  pp.  691-2. 
53  Venizelos  and  the  Italian  Foreign  Minister  had  concluded  a  secret  agreement  on  29  July  1919.  Italy  was 
to  support  Greek  claims  in  Thrace,  Northern  Epirus,  and  the  Aegean  islands  while  Greece  would  support 
Italian  claims  over  Albania.  It  was  not  a  permanent  settlement  but  it  was a  relief  for  Venizelos  at  the  time. 
54  PRO,  FO  608/91-18665,  Milne's  Report  on  Situation  in  Turco-Greek  front  at  Smyrna,  5  September 
1919. 
55  PRO,  FO  371/4219-103048,  WO  to  GHC,  Constantinople,  15  July  1919. 110 
which  was  mentioned  often  and  in  the  utmost  detail  was  the  economic  situation  in  the 
area  of  Smyrna: 
The  economic  situation  in  Smyrna  sandjak  is  very  bad 
owing  to  the  Turkish  agricultural  population  having  fled. 
From  the  Greeks  the  fault  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  local 
administration  is  wholly  in  the  hands  of  the  Greek 
Governor  [Stergiadis]  and  that  the  power  of  local 
administration  is  practically  nil.  The  Greek  Governor  is 
practically  autocratic.  56 
For  Milne,  the  Civil  Administration  should  have  been  placed  in  the  hands  of  an  inter- 
allied  commission.  57  The  Milne  line  was  finally  accepted  and  adopted  by  the  Supreme 
Council  on  7  October  1919.  Despite  the  fact  that  Greece  and  Turkey  were  at  that  point 
engaged  in  warfare,  the  Supreme  Council  decided  to  adopt  this  line,  which  had  certainly 
an  effect  on  Greek  morale  and  expectations.  "  Indicative  of  the  climate  in  Paris  were  the 
words  of  Robert  Vansittart,  who  later  became  private  secretary  of  Curzon  at  the  Foreign 
Office.  Vansittart  stressed  that  the  prospects  of  an  early  peace  in  Turkey  were  minimal, 
underlining  the  different  views  expressed  in  Paris.  59 
On  8  November  1919,  at  the  meeting  of  the  Heads  of  Delegations  of  the  Powers, 
at  the  Quai  d'  Orsay  the  discussion  soon  focused  upon  the  crucial  issue  of  the  Greek 
occupation.  Crowe  and  Clemenceau  admitted  the  necessity  of  keeping  the  Greek  army 
in  the  region,  since  there  was  no  one  to  replace  it.  In  that  meeting  it  was  observed  that 
the  Nationalist  movement  was  'a  serious  matter'  and  it  would  arrest  all  military  progress 
in  Asia  Minor  'unless  an  operation  on  a  large  scale  should  be  decided  upon.  960 
Clemenceau  then  asked  Venizelos  about  Greek  capabilities  to  carry  out  the  task  of 
56  PRO,  FO  371/4220-119182,  Milne  to  War  Office,  22  August  1919. 
57  Ibid. 
'8  '.  ..  troops  are  losing  their  morale  in  not  being  allowed  to  ever  take  the  offensive.  '  PRO,  ADM 
116/2034,  From  the  British  Naval  Representative  Smyrna  to  Commodore  Commanding  Aegean  Squadron 
H.  M.  S.  Centaur,  17  October  1919. 
59  DBFP,  vol.  IV,  no  515,  Letter  from  Vansittart  to  Sir  Tilley,  20  September  1919,  pp.  771-2. 
60  FRUS,  PPC,  1919,  vol.  IY,  Notes  of  a  Meeting  of  the  Heads  of  the  Delegations  at  the  Quai  d'  Orsay,  8 
November  1919,  p.  43. III 
suppressing  the  Nationalist  movement  on  behalf  of  the  Allies,  without  any  help  from 
Allied  troops.  The  Greek  Prime  Minister  was  positive,  mentioning  however,  the  issue  of 
time,  since  Greece  would  not  be  able  to  finance  its  presence  in  Anatolia  for  too  long.  61 
ALLIED  POLICIES:  THE  FATE  OF  THE  STRAITS  AND  CONSTANTINOPLE 
During  the  Anglo-French  meetings  that  preceded  the  Conference  of  London, 
which  took  place  from  12  to  23  February  1920,  the  British  side  had  admitted  that  the 
Supreme  Council  had  been  committed  to  the  continuance  of  the  Greek  presence.  The 
possible  political  repercussions  had  to  be  taken  into  account  in  any  decision.  Not  to  cede 
the  zone  to  Greece  could  well  mean  that  the  Greek  Government  would  suffer  the 
consequences  at  home,  while  the  Nationalist  Movement  would  be  reinforced.  The 
scheme  which  the  British  side  had  decided  upon  was  a  kind  of  compromise  which 
would  include  the  cession  of  European  Turkish  territories  up  to  the  Enos-Midia  line  to 
Greece  while  leaving  the  Smyrna  area  under  nominal  Turkish  sovereignty.  62  For 
France,  the  situation  was  clear-cut,  and  was  presented  as  such  by  the  French 
representatives  in  meetings  with  their  British  counterparts.  During  Clemenceau's  visit  to 
London  in  December  1919,  the  French  had  advocated  the  principle  of  non-partition  for 
Turkey  and  the  territories  where  it  held  the  majority  of  the  population.  Further  back,  in 
December  1918,  the  French  Prime  Minister  had  agreed  to  detach  Mosul  from  Syria, 
under  French  control,  and  give  it  to  Britain.  In  return,  the  British  had  recognised  French 
supremacy  in  Syria,  Cilicia  and  Lebanon  and  share  in  the  alleged  oil  of  Mosul. 
61  'The  longer  the  question  was  dragged  out  the  more  financial  difficulties  would  increase  for  a  small 
country  such  as  Greece.  She  had  an  army  of  12  divisions  of  325,000  men;  an  army  stronger  than  it  was  at 
the  time  of  the  Armistice.  He  felt  assured  that  if  the  Conference  should  charge  Greece  with  the  task  of 
defeating  Turkey  she  would  be  able  to  do  so.  '  Ibid.,  p.  43. 
62  PRO,  FO  899/1513,  Anglo-French  Conference  on  the  Turkish  settlement,  31  December  1919.  'Smyma 
would  have  to  be  made  a  free  port;  nominal  Turkish  sovereignty  remained  over  Smyrna  and  the  area 
around.  ' 112 
Clemenceau  had  already  shown  signs  of  withdrawing  the  French  support  for  the 
Greek  presence  in  Anatolia  while  still  in  Paris,  during  the  discussions  of  the  inter-allied 
investigation  regarding  the  landing  incidents.  63  Phillipe  Berthelot,  the  Permanent  Head 
of  the  French  Foreign  Office,  and  Curzon,  when  they  met  in  London  prior  to  the 
London  Conference,  had  agreed  on  two  important  points;  the  plan  to  create  an 
independent  state  of  Armenia  and  that  Turkey  should  not  retain  Constantinople  and  the 
Straits  any  more.  On  the  issue  of  Smyrna,  the  two  had  agreed  on  a  plan  which  would 
take  the  Greeks  out  of  the  area  giving  them  compensation  in  Thrace. 
The  British  Prime  Minister  agreed  with  Curzon  on  the  fate  of  Constantinople 
and  the  Straits  but  was  adamant  on  giving  Smyrna  to  the  Greeks.  In  the  Cabinet 
meetings  before  the  Conference,  in  January  1920,  three  different  views  had  emerged. 
The  War  Office  and  the  India  Office  categorically  disapproved  of  depriving  Turkey  of 
its  capital  and  both  departments  agreed  on  notgranting  Smyrna  to  Greece.  On  the  other 
hand,  Lloyd  George  was  anxious  to  sanction  the  Greek  presence  in  Anatolia,  a  view 
shared  neither  by  the  War  and  India  Offices  nor  by  Curzon.  The  first  two  government 
agencies  had  continuously  underlined  the  importance  of  keeping  Turkey  intact  in  Asia 
Minor.  Curzon  and  Lloyd  George  agreed  on  one  point,  taking  control  of  Constantinople 
from  the  Turks.  64 
Constantinople  and  the  Straits  had  always  been  the  focus  of  attention  and  were 
of  great  strategic  importance.  During  the  War,  the  Gallipoli  Campaign  which  had  cost 
so  many  lives  was  pursued  with  one  supreme  aim:  to  expel  the  Ottomans  from  the  area. 
The  Entente  had  been  determined  to  preserve  the  freedom  of  the  Straits.  When  the  War 
was  over,  one  of  the  immediate  British  aims  was  to  establish  Allied  control  over  the  city 
and  the  adjacent  area.  Although  Britain  and  France  in  the  preliminary  discussions  of 
63  FRUS,  PPC,  1919,  vol.  IX,  Notes  of  a  Meeting  of  the  Heads  of  the  Delegations,  8  November  1919, 
pp.  35-73. 113 
December  1919  had  agreed  on  taking  Constantinople  from  the  Turks,  Lloyd  George  and 
the  Foreign  Office  had  to  face  an  internal  'riot.  '  The  War  Office  had,  long  before  the 
January  Cabinet  discussions,  expressed  doubts  about  the  plan  to  expel  the  Turks  from 
Constantinople.  Churchill  in  August  1919  had  raised  issues  of  logistics  and  manpower: 
[ 
... 
]  how  long  are  we  expected  to  maintain  an  Army  at 
Constantinople?  We  have  maintained  a  force  of  some  40,000  in 
Constantinople  and  on  the  Black  Sea  shores  ever  since  the  I  11h 
of  November  [1918].  The  strain  of  this  upon  our  melting 
military  resources  is  becoming  insupportable.  [ 
... 
]  it  must  be 
costing  at  least  E50,000  a  day.  [...  65 
The  Cýbinet  meetings  on  the  course  of  action  regarding  Constantinople  and  the  Straits 
were  dramatic  and  full  of  tension.  Two  participants  contributed  greatly  to  the  dramatic 
climate:  Edwin  Montagu  and  the  General  Staff.  The  threat  of  a  blow  to  the  Muslim 
populations  of  the  Empire  was  a  good  card  to  play:  '[  ... 
]  the  expulsion  of  the  Turks  and 
the  Caliph  from  Constantinople  would  strike  a  last  fatal  blow  at  [their]  diminishing 
loyalties.  966  The  Secretary  of  State  for  India  did  not  omit  to  use  all  the  weapons  in  his 
depot:  'Secret  information  had  been  received  to  the  effect  that,  from  the  moment  this 
treaty  was  signed,  we  should  have  for  the  first  time  a  movement,  comparable  to  the  Sinn 
Fein  movement,  breaking  out  in  India,  in  favour  of  complete  separation  from  England,  ' 
threatened  Montagu.  67  The  last  strike  of  Montagu  centred  upon  the  future  Turkish 
actions:  '[The  Turkish]  will  join  the  forces  of  disorder  in  the  world,  link  up  with  the 
Bolsheviks,  and  make  trouble  for  us  in  Mesopotamia,  Syria,  Palestine  and  North 
Asia.  68 
The  General  Staff  was  no  less  dramatic  in  its  contribution,  presenting  the  various 
intelligence  reports  arriving  from  the  area.  They  had  chosen  to  play  the  Bolshevik  card: 
64PRO,  CAB  23/20,6  January  1920. 
65  Gilbert,  Churchill,  Vol.  IV,  p.  473. 
66  PRO,  CAB  23/20,6  January  1920. 
67  PRO,  CAB  23/20,  Appendix  1,6  January  1920. 114 
they  reported  that  their  intelligence  indicated  possible  connections  between  the 
Bolsheviks  and  the  Turkish  Nationalist  movement.  The  Admiralty,  in  its  appreciation 
had  underlined  the  importance  of  keeping  the  Ottoman  capital  as  a  safe  naval  base  and 
both  shores  of  the  Bosphorus  occupied  by  Allied  forces.  69  Lloyd  George  and  Curzon 
had  found  themselves  isolated  in  their  view  that  turning  the  Turks  out  of  Constantinople 
was  a  feasible  plan.  The  Cabinet  had  placed  itself  on  the  side  of  Montagu  and  the 
General  Staff.  France  and  the  French  opinion  also  lurked  in  the  background  of  the 
decision-making  process.  Berthelot  and  Curzon  had  agreed  on  the  plan;  however,  the 
French  had  their  misgivings,  primarily  due  to  their  precarious  position  in  Syria.  70 
The  initial  plan  to  expel  the  Turks  from  Constantinople,  a  plan  pursued  even 
during  the  War  with  the  Gallipoli  Campaign,  was  rejected.  The  united  forces  of  the 
India  and  War  Offices  had  prevailed.  Curzon  explicitly  stated  his  disagreement  with  the 
decision  of  the  Cabinet: 
I  regret  that  the  main  object  for  which  the  war  was  fought,  and 
the  sacrifices  at  Gallipoli  endured  -  namely  the  liberation  of 
Europe  from  the  Ottoman  Turk  -  has  after  an  almost  incredible 
expenditure  of  life  and  treasure  been  thrown  away  in  the  very 
hour  it  has  been  obtained.  71 
THE  LONDON  CONFERENCE  OF  FEBRUARY  1920. 
The  London  Conference  of  February  1920  was  the  occasion  of  the  first  formal 
Allied  discussions  regarding  the  fate  of  Turkey.  72  Alexandre  Millerand  had  replaced 
Georges  Clemenceau  and  Francesco  Nitti  was  now  the  Italian  representative  in  the  place 
of  Vittorio  Orlando.  The  Turks  were  allowed  to  retain  Constantinople  and  having  settled 
that  issue,  discussions  then  focused  on  the  fate  of  Armenia,  the  zones  of  influence  and 
68  Ibid. 
69  HLRO,  Lloyd  George  Papers,  F/206/4/9,  Naval  Appreciation  of  Turkish  situation,  6  January  1920. 
7'  See  this  Chapter:  'The  San  Remo  Conference  and  the  unleashing  of  Greek  designs  in  Asia  Minor:  The 
British  sanction  of  June  1920  and  the  Greek  advance.  '  p.  126. 
71  PRO,  CAB  24/96,  C.  P  407,  The  Peace  with  Turkey,  Memo  by  Curzon,  7  January  1920. 115 
financial  control  of  Turkey.  On  the  Straits,  the  Conference  had  decided  that  they  should 
be  administered  by  a  Commission  represented  by  Britain,  France,  Italy,  Greece, 
Romania  and  Japan.  The  French  objected  to  the  extension  of  Greek  presence  in  Smyrna. 
However,  the  Conference  decided  that  the  Smyrna  zone  was  to  be  given  to  Greece, 
while  the  Turks  would  keep  nominal  sovereignty.  It  was  what  the  British  had  suggested 
before  the  Conference.  The  French  disagreements  had  disappeared  since  they  had 
achieved  their  desired  result;  to  retain  their  considerable  financial  interests  in  Turkey.  73 
The  Greek  Prime  Minister,  up  until  the  London  Conference,  had  advocated  a 
policy  of  straight  annexation  regarding  Smyrna.  For  him  a  Turkish  nominal  sovereignty 
would  cause  trouble  in  the  future.  74  The  French  and  Italian  opposition  to  straight 
annexation  however,  had  to  be  taken  into  consideration.  In  various  instances,  both  in  the 
course  of  the  discussions  as  well  as  in  private  conversations,  the  representatives  of  both 
countries  had  expressed  their  opposition  whether  it  had  to  do  with  how  extensive  the 
area  of  occupation  would  be  or  with  the  form  of  the  Greek  administration.  75  Venizelos 
was  asked  to  consider  a  five-point  plan  drawn  up  by  Curzon  in  an  attempt  to  reach  a 
solution  which  would  satisfy  all  parties.  Curzon's  proposals  included  the  following: 
(i)  Turkish  flag  as  sole  evidence  of  Turkish  suzerainty,  (ii) 
Greek  administration,  (iii)  Greek  garrison,  (iv)  Local  parliament 
(Greeks  and  Turks),  (v)  After  two  years,  the  local  parliament  to 
have  the  right  to  apply  to  the  League  on  Nations  for 
incorporation  in  Greece.  [ 
... 
]76 
The  Italians,  on  the  other  hand,  had  themselves  understood  that  their  presence  in 
Anatolia  was  too  costly  a  venture.  It  seemed  that  Greece's  substantial  rival,  Italy,  was 
content  to  renounce  its  claims  to  any  areas  provided  that  its  economic  demands  were 
72  The  proceedings  in  DBFP,  vol.  VII,  Chapter  1,  Proceedings  of  the  First  Conference  of  London,  12 
February  to  10  March  1920. 
73  For  an  interesting  account  of  Anglo-French  relations  on  the  Middle  East  see  E.  Monroe,  Britain's 
moment  in  the  Middle  East  (London,  1963). 
74  DBFP,  vol.  VII,  no  8,  Meeting  of  Allied  representatives,  16  February  1920,  pp.  60-9. 
75  DBFP,  vol.  VII,  no  20,  Meeting  of  Allied  representatives,  21  February  1920,  pp.  186-7. 116 
satisfied.  This  could  be  easily  achieved:  the  Italians  had  already  established  a  form  of 
understanding  with  Kemal  and  they  could  well  work  out  their  future  economic  benefits 
in  the  fora  of  the  international  conferences.  Greece  could  not,  even  under  the  most 
favourable  terms,  abandon  the  dream  of  a  Greater  Greece  stretching  to  both  shores  of 
the  Aegean.  For  them,  it  was  more  than  a  matter  of  economic  benefits  since  substantial 
Greek  populations  resided  in  the  area.  However,  French  and  Italian  'retreat'  did  not 
mean  that  there  were  no  more  points  of  friction  left  and  above  all,  there  was  no 
reassurance  that  these  two  would  not  try  and  undermine  the  Greek  position.  France  and 
Italy  left  the  Conference  with  economic  compensations  that  balanced  their  original 
demands:  France  was  assigned  Cilicia,  while  Italy  got  south-westem  and  western 
Turkey  -  with  the  exception  of  Smyrna.  The  details  were  to  be  finalised  by  a  number  of 
special  committees.  77 
Lloyd  George  had  pointed  out  the  importance  of  having  a  bridgehead  at  Smyrna 
'in  the  hands  of  a  power  which  had  the  same  interests  as  the  Entente  Powers 
. 
'78 
According  to  a  draft  synopsis  concerning  Smyrna  the  following  were  roughly  agreed: 
Turkey  to  recognise  that  the  administrators  of  Smyrna  and 
the  surrounding  area  shall  be  in  the  hands  of  a  Greek 
administrator  nominated  by  the  Greek  Government.  The 
local  population  of  this  area  shall  be  allowed  to  send  deputies 
to  the  Greek  Chamber  and  recruits  in  the  Greek  Army.  The 
extent  and  limits  of  this  area  are  only  under  consideration  by 
a  commission  set  up  by  the  Supreme  Council.  79 
For  Lloyd  George  to  grant  to  Smyrna  a  Greek  administration,  the  powers  were  'merely 
carrying  out  the  principle  of  self-detennination.  '80  The  recommendations  of  the  Smyrna 
76DBFP,  vol.  VII,  no  25,  Meeting  of  Allied  representatives,  24  February  1920,  pp.  229-237. 
77  DBFP,  vol.  VII,  no  12,17  February  1920,  pp.  99-112.  no  18,20  February  1920,  pp.  153-162.  no  19,20 
February  1920,  pp.  163-173.  no  20,21  February  1920,  pp.  173-189.  no  29,26  February  1920,  pp.  256-262. 
no  37,28  February  1920,  pp.  297-299.  no  38,28  February  1920,  pp.  300-6.  78 
DBFP,  vol.  VII,  no  7,  Meeting  of  Allied  representatives,  14  February  1920,  p.  56.  79 
Ibid. 
80  DBFP,  vol.  VII,  no  25,  Meeting  of  Allied  representatives,  24  February  1920,  p.  232. 117 
Committee  combined  the  boundary  of  Greek  zone,  as  recommended  by  the  British  and 
French  delegations  in  the  Report  of  the  Committee  on  Greek  territorial  claims  on  6 
March  1919,  and  the  line  of  demarcation  proposed  by  General  Milne  in  September 
1919.81  However,  opposition  to  the  British  Prime  Minister's  designs  was  becoming 
intense  at  that  point.  In  the  midst  of  the  London  Conference,  a  considerable  section  of 
the  British  press  had  sided  with  those  members  of  the  Cabinet  that  had  suggested  that 
Britain,  by  supporting  Greece,  was  threatening  its  prestige  and  position  in  the  Moslem 
world.  82 
The  Supreme  Council  had  also  decided  that  Constantinople  ought  to  be  occupied 
by  Allied  forces  and  that  the  Turkish  Government  should  dismiss  the  Nationalist 
Movement  led  by  Mustapha  Kemal.  The  military  occupation  of  Constantinople  would 
mean  that  the  Turkish  War  Office  was  also  to  be  occupied,  along  with  the  control  and 
censorship  of  all  military  orders  or  despatches.  83  The  decision  to  leave  Constantinople 
to  the  Turks  received  a  cool-reception  in  Greece.  The  press  had  commented  upon  the 
decision  with  disappointment.  Reports  from  the  British  Embassy  in  Athens  stressed  that 
there  was  fear  that  'alleged  failure  of  Venizelos  to  pluck  the  ripened  fruit  is  certain  to  be 
employed  against  him  at  the  coming  elections.  84 
At  the  time  of  the  London  Conference,  the  composition  of  Allied  troops  in 
Turkey  was  as  follows:  Greece  had  landed  around  90,000;  British  troops  excluding 
those  in  Palestine  were  about  12,000,  France  in  Cilicia  18,000  to  22,000  and  around 
8,000  in  Constantinople;  the  Italians  had  approximately  10,000  troopS.  85  The  occupation 
of  Constantinople  and  the  Ottoman  War  Ministry  was  seen  as  a  means  to  prevent  future 
81  For  the  report  on  Greek  Territorial  claims  of  March  1919,  see  Chapter  Two:  'The  Greek  case  in  the 
negotiations  in  Paris.  '  p.  77  and  DBFP,  vol.  VII,  pp.  244-7. 
92  See  various  articles  in  Manchester  Guardian,  Daily  Express  and  The  Times  during  February  1920. 
83  DBFP,  vol.  VII,  no  50,  Meeting  of  Allied  representatives,  5  March  1920,  Appendix  1,  p.  422.  For  the 
Allied  occupation  of  the  Ottoman  War  Ministry  see  PRO,  WO  158/772,  Reports  on  the  administration, 
suspension  and  control  of  the  Ottoman  War  Ministry  by  the  Allies. 118 
massacres  and  ensure  the  acceptance  of  the  terms  of  peace  and  their  execution. 
However,  the  Turks  were  'ready  for  a  trial  of  strength  throughout  Anatolia  and  possibly 
Constantinople,  '  cabled  the  Commander  in  Chief  to  the  Admiralty  early  in  February 
1920.86  British  Intelligence  in  Constantinople  continuously  supplied  London  with  all 
Greek  activities  both  in  Constantinople  and  Smyrna.  At  the  end  of  January  1920, 
Fitzmaurice  had  reported  that  Venizelos  himself  had  met  the  Greek  representatives  at 
Smyrna  on  the  island  of  Chios,  off  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor.  There  the  Greek  Prime 
Minister  was  reported  to  have  declared  that  Greece  could  rely  implicitly  on  the  support 
of  Great  Britain  and  the  Dodecanese  (except  Rhodes)  was  to  be  ceded  to  Greece. 
Further,  he  was  reported  as  saying  that  nothing  was  known  as  to  the  final  fate  of  Asia 
Minor.  The  report  concluded  that  a  new  division  was  to  be  sent  to  Anatolia.  87 
Venizelos,  back  in  London  in  spring  1920,  was  working  on  the  details  of  the 
clauses  connected  with  the  Greek  desiderata  and  had  the  opportunity  to  meet  Churchill, 
General  Wilson  and  Curzon.  All  three  expressed  their  diametrically  opposing  views 
regarding  the  Greek  presence  in  Anatolia  to  the  Greek  Prime  Minister.  In  a  meeting, 
held  at  10  Downing  Street,  in  March,  with  Churchill,  Venizelos  outlined  the  danger  of 
Kemalist  forces  and  asked  for  the  permission  to  attack.  After  the  attack,  Venizelos 
suggested  that  the  Greek  troops  could  retire  again  to  their  position.  Churchill,  strong  in 
his  belief  that  Kemal  was  now  the  real  power  of  resistance  in  Turkey,  objected  to 
Venizelos'  proposal  disregarding  the  figures  that  the  Greek  Prime  Minister  had 
94  PRO,  FO  286/73  1,  R.  S.  Hudsor  (Athens)  to  Curzon,  2  February  1920. 
85  DBFP,  vol.  VII,  no  50,  Meeting  of  Allied  representatives,  5  March  1920,  p.  416. 
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87  PRO,  ADM  116/2034,  Smyma-Letters  of  Proceedings.  February  1920  '[  ... 
]The  news  of  this 
mysterious  conference  spread  and  was  immediately  followed  by  the  rumour  that  Vcnizelos  had  directed 
that  in  the  event  of  the  Greeks  not  being  confirmed  in  their  title  to  the  territory  already  occupied  by  them 
in  Anatolia,  Stergiadis  was  to  imitate  D'Annunzio  at  Fiume  and  proceed  to  annex  the  territory  to  Greece. 
In  view  of  this  and  other  rumours  Brigadier  General  I-lanburg  visited  General  Miliotis  on  3  1"  January  and 
asked  if  any  important  decisions  had  been  come  to  at  that  meeting  with  Venizelos.  ' 119 
presented  regarding  the  Nationalist  forceS.  88  Wilson,  in  the  meeting  he  had  with 
Churchill  and  Venizelos,  on  19  March  1920,  had  noted  down  in  his  diary: 
We  made  it  clear  to  him  that  neither  in  men  nor  in  money, 
neither  in  Thrace  nor  in  Smyrna,  would  we  help  the 
Greeks,  as  we  already  had  taken  on  more  than  our  small 
army  could  do.  I  told  him  that  he  was  going  to  ruin  his 
country,  that  he  would  be  at  war  for  years  with  Turkey 
and  Bulgaria,  and  that  the  drain  in  men  and  money  would 
be  far  too  much  for  Greece.  He  said  that  he  did  not  agree 
89  with  a  word  I  said. 
Churchill  had  made  it  quite  clear  to  Venizelos  that  England  'could  not  help  with  troops, 
either  in  Thrace  or  in  Asia  Minor'  but  would  be  willing  'to  render  such  assistance  as  she 
could  in  arms  and  munitions.  '90 
GREEK  CAPABILITIES  AND  WEAKNESSES  IN  1919  -  EARLY  1920. 
The  Greek  Premier  had  put  forth  his  country's  plan  for  its  presence  in  Anatolia 
well;  however,  he  had  failed  to  take  into  account  the  gravity  and  the  diversity  of  Allied 
desiderata.  As  early  as  autumn  1919  it  was  clear  that  the  complexity  of  the  local 
situation  in  almost  all  areas  would  be  worsened  by  the  multiple  agreements  regarding 
the  territories  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Time  was  not  on  Greece's  side  while  it  was 
working  only  on  behalf  of  the  Nationalist  movement.  The  Greek  Prime  Minister  had 
failed  to  see  what  was  lurking  in  the  background.  Britain,  the  only  one  of  the  Allies  that 
had  shown  an  interest  in  the  Greek  presence  in  Anatolia  had  stressed  that  it  expected 
America's  answer  before,  while  leading  British  ministers  had  excluded  any  practical 
help  on  the  battleground.  That,  by  definition,  was  a  delay  factor.  A  state's  bargaining 
88  DBFP,  vol.  VII,  no  55,  Meeting  of  Allied  Representatives,  10  March  1920,  pp.  4524. 
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Smyrna  and  Thrace,  19  March  1920. 120 
power  is  largely  determined  by  the  availability  of  alternatives  and  Greece  had  neither 
the  economic  nor  the  military  resources  to  continue  fighting  forever.  On  the  limited 
financial  resources,  a  revealing  communiqu6  between  the  Treasury  and  the  Foreign 
Office  pointed  out  that  the  total  credits  made  to  the  Greek  Government  up  to  March 
1919  were  approximately  E14,000,000.91 
It  seems  that  Venizelos  was  following  the  Rankean  tradition  of  the  primacy  of 
foreign  policy.  However,  focused  on  that,  he  had  failed  to  see  or  had  not  been  able  to 
respond  to  the  needs  of  his  people,  a  people  that  had  been  in  a  state  of  war  continuously 
since  the  Balkan  Wars  of  1911-12.  On  18  November  1919,  Venizelos  returned  to 
Greece  via  Rome.  The  situation  did  not  allow  for  great  hopes  or  expectations.  The  first 
clouds  above  Paris  had  brought  the  first  storms;  Britain  and  France  had  entered  a  phase 
of  evident  antagonism.  Clemenceau  was  no  longer  the  leader  of  France.  From  the  long 
list  of  Greek  desiderata,  in  the  autumn  of  1919  only  two  had  been  settled.  Of  course, 
there  was  an  evident  spirit  of  reconciliation  with  the  Italians  with  the  conclusion  of 
Venizelos  -  Tittoni  agreement  and  with  the  treaty  of  Neuilly,  Bulgaria  renounced  any 
claims  to  Western  Thrace.  However,  Anglo-French  antagonism  and  the  new  spirit  of  the 
French  government  were  forcing  Venizelos  to  lean  even  more  upon  the  British  side.  The 
pending  issues  were  still  Western  Asia  Minor,  the  Dodecanese,  N.  Epirus  and  Eastern 
Thrace. 
A  day  after  his  arrival  in  Athens,  in  November  1919,  Venizelos  addressed  the 
Greek  people  in  Syntagma  Square,  presenting  an  account  of  his  time  in  Paris.  The  Prime 
Minister  had  returned  with  the  Treaty  of  Neuilly,  which  excluded  Bulgaria,  a  traditional 
enemy  of  Greece  from  the  Aegean  and  granted  Western  Thrace  to  Greece.  He  attempted 
to  renew  the  hopes  of  the  Greek  people  about  Asia  Minor: 
91  PRO,  T12/43,  Treasury  to  Foreign  Office,  21  March  1919.  '[  ...  ]Their  existence  [the  total  credits  of 
L14,000,000]  emphasises  the  importance  of  proper  control  over  Greek  finances  and  especially  the 121 
The  Supreme  Council  would  not  have  called  us  to  occupy  the 
territory  if  in  its  conscience  it  had  not  already  decided  that 
Greece  would  finally  be  granted  with  it.  In  consequence,  I 
strongly  believe  that  the  Greek  military  occupation  is  the 
preamble  of  the  final  ratification  of  the  area  to  Greece.  92 
On  the  logistical  side,  Greece  was  financing  its  presence  in  Asia  Minor  by  loans 
that  originated  from  two  sources:  either  through  public  conscription  at  home  or  loans 
from  abroad.  93  In  the  country's  budget  of  1918-9  more  than  half  of  the  revenues  were 
derived  from  loans,  while  the  budget  estimated  for  1919-20  suggested  that  'two  thirds  of 
the  total  revenues  were  expected  to  come  from  borrowing.  94  Greece's  financial 
situation  did  not  allow  for  a  prolonged  presence  in  Anatolia  by  its  own  means,  a  fact 
that  had  been  stressed  by  Venizelos  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference  in  October  1919. 
An  interesting  early  appraisal  of  the  situation  which  was  shaping  up  for  Greece 
was  supplied  by  the  American  Consul  in  Smyrna,  George  Horton,  in  mid  summer  1919: 
If  the  occupation  of  this  portion  of  Asia  Minor  is  to 
degenerate  into  a  war  between  Greece  and  Turkey,  Greece 
will  be  obliged  to  keep  here  for  years  a  large  standing  army; 
a  state  of  devastating  fire  and  blood  will  prevail  and  Greece 
will  be  finally  ruined  financially.  Asia  Minor  will  be  the 
tomb  of  Greece.  In  Smyrna,  Athens  will  find  a  second 
Syracusan  Expedition  from  which  she  will  never  recover.  95 
British  officials  also  supplied  London  with  reports  which  revealed  a  certain  change  of 
attitude  on  the  part  of  the  people  of  Greece.  On  31  May  1919,  Venizelos,  back  in 
Greece,  had  asked  the  chamber  to  permit  reestablishment  of  martial  law  for  so  long  as 
the  country  continued  to  be  in  a  state  of  war  with  Turkey  and  the  peace  treaty  remained 
preponderating  interest  of  this  country  and  France  in  such  control.  ' 
2  Venizelos'  speech  in  Syntagma  Square,  in  the  Greek  paper  Eleftheros  Tjpos  -  V60Epoq  Uiroq,  19 
November  1919. 
93  For  a  detailed  account  of  Greece's  financial  situation  during  this  period  see  Mark  Mazower,  Greece 
and  the  Inter-  War  Economic  Crisis  (Oxford,  199  1),  Part  Il,  The  Development  of  the  Greek  Economy 
1912-1929. 
94  Mark  Mazower,  Greece  and  the  Inter-war  Economic  Crisis,  p.  63. 122 
unsigned.  As  early  as  October  1919  a  change  of  opinion  had  been  observed;  one 
example  is  a  discussion  between  a  British  naval  officer  and  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Marouthas,  Chief  of  the  Secret  Police  in  Athens,  during  the  latter's  visit  in  Smyrna.  The 
Lieutenant  Colonel  was  'a  staunch  Venizelist,  '  according  to  the  British  officer; 
however,  he  did  not  hesitate  to  express  his  estimation  that  if  elections  were  to  take 
96 
place,  Venizelos  would  not  have  a  chance  of  winning.  In  June  1920,  Earl  Granville, 
the  British  Minister  in  Athens,  sent  an  alarming  account  regarding  the  position  of  the 
Liberal  Party.  Judging  from  information  that  had  reached  him  from  various  sources,  he 
reported  that  there  was  'a  strong  feeling  in  the  country  against  him  [Venizelos].  997 
Venizelos'  deputies  had  allowed  the  legal  system  to  become  oppressively  Draconian  in 
a  way  in  which  it  appeared  to  Granville  as  'a  fear  that  the  opposition  were  gaining 
ground.  98  However,  the  Greek  Prime  Minister,  when  asked,  had  expressed  to  Granville 
his  belief  that  a  'crushing  majority'  would  be  in  his  favour  in  the  event  of  an  election 
while  he  had  explained  the  harsh  measures  as  necessary  in  order  to  maintain  order  due 
to  his  extended  absences.  99  In  the  meantime,  De  Robeck  reported  to  Granville  that  he 
himself  had  infon-nation  which  suggested  that  feeling  against  Venizelos  was  growing 
fast  in  Greece.  100 
95  PRO,  FO  608/91-17424,  Buckler  (American  Delegation)  to  Vansittart  (FO)  submitting  a  Report  by  the 
American  Commissioner  in  Smyrna,  George  Horton,  dated  July  19,1919,8  August  1919. 
96  PRO,  ADM  116/2034,  From  the  British  Naval  Representative  Smyrna  to  Commodore  Commanding 
Aegean  Squadron  H.  M.  S.  Centaur,  17  October  1919.  Some  further  points  raised  in  the  discussion 
included  the  following:  '[  ...  ]no  help  being  given  to  Greece  by  the  Allies  weakens  Greece's  position 
financiallyj 
... 
]  the  Royalists  having  a  great  deal  to  gain  by  the  King's  return  are  making  the  most  of  the 
present  situation  to  stir  up  trouble  and  the  Royalist  newspapers  are  writing  freely  against  the  Allies 
showing  how  the  King  was  right  in  his  attitude  of  remaining  strictly  neutral.  '  The  British  officer 
concluded:  'I  am  told  on  good  authority  that  the  Greeks  of  Smyrna  are  losing  their  enthusiasm  for  the 
Venizelist  cause  and  that  if  it  were  put  to  the  voter  as  to  whom  they  would  prefer  occupying  Turkey  in 
Asia  70%  would  vote  America  and  Great  Britain.  ' 
97  PRO,  FO  421/298-86,  Earl  Granville  to  Curzon,  I  June  1920. 
98  Ibid. 
99  For  an  analysis  of  the  Greek  elections  of  November  1920  and  the  defeat  of  Venizelos  see  Chapter  Four: 
'The  November  1920  Greek  elections  and  the  defeat  of  Venizelos.  '  p.  156. 
100  PRO,  FO  286/747,  Admiral  de  Robeck  to  Granville,  II  June  1920. 123 
In  public,  Venizelos  insisted  that  Greece  was  capable  of  doing  the  job  of 
establishing  order  and  a  Greek  administration  in  Western  Asia  Minor,  based  on  its  own 
resources.  In  private,  he  had  expressed  concerns  about  the  course  of  the  venture.  In  spite 
of  his  doubts,  however,  he  chose  to  proceed.  In  the  summer  of  1919,  Venizelos 
complained  about  the  slow  pace  of  Turkish  demobilisation,  a  task  which  had  to  be 
carried  out  by  the  Allies.  He  reported  that  there  were  links  between  the  Turkish  Ministry 
of  War  and  resistance  movements  and  underlined  that  it  was:  '[  ... 
]  probable  that  a  total 
force  of  300,000  men  will  soon  be  on  a  war  footing,  '  and  that  they  would  'have  at  their 
disposal  material  and  munitions  in  sufficient  quantity  for  such  an  army.  "O' 
This  picture  was  quite  opposed  to  the  generally  optimistic  one  that  he  presented 
to  the  Councils  and  the  Greek  people.  One  could  say  that  he  was  trying  to  attract  the 
attention  of  the  Allies  and  to  reach  some  kind  of  conclusion.  He  was  aware  that  the 
Allies,  or  at  least  France  and  Italy  and  certainly  important  personalities  in  the  British 
government,  did  not  support  the  Greek  presence  in  Asia  Minor  and  that  it  would  be 
nSfve  to  expect  any  help.  From  the  Archives  of  the  Greek  Foreign  Ministry,  Venizelos 
reported  to  his  Cabinet  at  home  the  objections  expressed  by  Churchill  and  Wilson, 
underlining  however  that  '[they]  do  not  share  the  British  Prime  Minister's  radical 
perceptions.  '  102  It  was  evident  that  he  had  pinned  too  many  hopes  on  Lloyd  George. 
THE  INTERDEPARTMENTAL  DISCUSSIONS  IN  SPRING  1920  -  TURKEY:  'THE  POTENTIAL 
BARRIER  TO  OUR  INTERESTS.  ' 
In  Turkey,  the  situation  on  all  fronts  was  characterised  by  unrest,  even  now  that 
the  peace  treaty  was  finally  so  close.  The  British  officials  at  Constantinople  were 
speculating  on  the  possibilities  of  creating  new  policies  regarding  Turkey.  In  early 
February,  Andrew  Ryan,  serving  in  Constantinople  as  Chief  Dragoman,  interpreter,  had 
101  FRUS,  PPC,  1919,  Vol.  VII,  Notes  of  the  Heads  of  Delegations  held  at  the  Quai  d'  Orsay,  15  July 124 
underlined  the  immediate  necessity  of  dealing  with  the  threat  of  fanaticism  in  the 
Middle  East,  driven  by  the  Turkish  Nationalists  and  fuelled  by  the  Bolsheviks.  'The 
Allies  have  not  fought  Bolshevism  with  their  whole  heart  and  they  have  not  fought  the 
Turkish  national  movement  at  all,  '  stressed  Ryan.  103  The  remedy,  according  to  the 
British  official,  was  to  examine  the  problem  and  try  to  eliminate  the  reasons  that  had  led 
to  the  outburst  of  Turkish  nationalism,  the  reasons  being:  'the  retention  of 
Constantinople  as  capital,  the  expulsion  of  Greeks  from  Smyrna  and  the  avoidance  of 
too  great  a  curtailment  of  Turkish  territory  on  the  side  of  Armenia  and  Kurdistan.  '  104 
The  British  officials  were  complaining  that  they  could  no  longer  hold  the  Turks 
back.  And  if  that  was  the  situation  in  Constantinople,  a  city  full  of  Allied  officers,  there 
was  sure  to  be  a  profounder  problem  in  the  provinces.  Incidents  of  civil  unrest  and 
armed  conflict  were  many  and  all  were  related,  in  one  way  or  another,  to  the 
strengthening  of  the  Nationalist  movement.  For  exampl6,  early  in  February  1920,  the 
Nationalist  forces  had  attacked  the  barracks  in  Gallipoli,  where  the  Allies  kept  rifles, 
arms  and  munitions,  according  to  the  armistice  terms.  105  However,  Curzon,  on  24 
February  1920  had  asked  Venizelos  to  try  to  maintain  the  military  status  quo  during  the 
negotiations,  after  the  Gallipoli  incident.  106 
In  the  meantime,  the  reports  from  Smyrna  did  not  foster  support  for  the  Greek 
presence.  They  made  the  assumption  that  to  grant  Smyrna  to  Greece  would  mean  that 
the  Allies  would  run  counter  to  the  principle  of  self-determination,  while  Greece  would 
certainly  require  assistance.  'Turkey's  friendship  is  possibly  as  valuable,  and  even  more 
valuable,  to  us,  than  the  friendship  of  Greece,  '  concluded  Admiral  de  Robeck,  the 
1919,  Appendix  H,  Venizelos  to  Clemenceau,  10  July  1919,  p.  153. 
02  MFA,  1921,  File  163,  no  number,  Copy  of  decrypted  message,  Venizelos  to  MFA,  4  June  1920.  : 
03  PRO,  FO  371/5041-E704/3/44,  Webb  to  Curzon,  enclosed  Memorandum  submitted  by  Ryan, 
2.2.1920,28  February  1920. 
'04  Ibid. 125 
British  High  Commissioner.  Further,  the  dangers  from  the  active  hostility  of  Turks  to 
the  British  Empire  were  once  more  stressed,  the  fear  that  they  would  ally  themselves  to 
the  Bolsheviks  being  the  primary  one.  'A  solid  conservative  people  such  as  the  Turks 
should  prove  a  valuable  buffer  against  the  ferment  of  Bolshevism  in  the  Middle  East,  ' 
concluded  the  report.  107  The  greatest  objection  to  the  treaty  that  the  Allies  promoted, 
however,  centred  on  the  conviction  of  all  military  men,  both  on  the  spot  and  at  home, 
that  the  terms  had  to  be  imposed  by  force.  And  the  truth  was  that  neither  Britain,  nor  its 
Allies  -  France,  Italy  or  the  United  States,  were  willing  to  entangle  themselves  in  yet 
another  war. 
In  March  1920,  the  War  Office  supplied  the  Foreign  Office  with  a  memorandum 
on  the  situation  in  Turkey.  One  thing  was  certain,  that  the  military  did  not  believe  that 
the  occupation  by  the  Allies  of  the  Ottoman  War  Office  at  Constantinople  could  have 
any  effect  from  the  point  of  view  of  military  control,  '[ 
... 
]  the  Nationalist  organisation 
will  soon  be,  if  it  is  not  already,  sufficiently  complete  to  function  independently,  ' 
concluded  the  report.  The  points  raised  and  analysed  touched  upon  the  following  issues. 
First,  on  the  extent  of  the  Nationalist  movement,  the  conclusion  of  the  military  was  that 
its  resistance  would  only  increase  if  the  occupation  were  to  be  further  extended  in  the 
interior.  On  the  situation  in  the  vilayet  of  Aidin,  the  British  War  Office  admitted  that  the 
current  Greek  position  had  been  neither  tactically  nor  strategically  good.  They 
underlined  that  the  Greek  methods  of  occupation  by  being  too  harsh  had  had  quite  an 
effect  on  the  recruitment  of  nationalists.  'Passive  resistance  combined  with  guerrilla 
tactics,  '  was  what  Kemal  would  adopt,  according  to  this  memorandum.  Time  was  on  the 
side  of  the  Turks.  For  the  War  Office,  there  was  no  choice  to  be  made  regarding  the 
105  DBFP,  vol.  Xill,  no  1,  De  Robeck  to  Curzon,  12  February  1920,  p.  I  and  no  2,  De  Robeck  to  Curzon, 
13  February  1920,  pp.  1-2. 
106  DBFP,  vol.  Xill,  no  7,  Letter  from  Earl  Curzon  to  Venizelos,  24  February  1920,  p.  8. 126 
course  of  action:  political  measures  were  the  only  option.  Anything  else  would  be  too 
costly.  'The  military  assets  of  England  are  barely  sufficient,  '  underlined  the,  report. 
There  was  no  recommendation  for  renewal  of  military  operations  in  Asia  Minor. 
The  military  had  warned  the  politicians  on  the  gravity  of  the  situation.  The 
importance  of  keeping  Turkey  as  'a  benevolent  buffer  state,  '  controlled  by  Britain  was 
once  again  the  central  issue.  108  A  treaty  of  peace  with  Turkey  should  be  a  treaty  that  the 
Allies  would  be  prepared  to  enforce.  If  the  tenns  were  too  harsh,  as  had  been  suggested, 
'highly  organised  and  costly  operations'  would  be  required.  Otherwise,  the  Allies  would 
have  to  seek  political  solutions.  The  War  Office  was  simply  not  in  a  position  to  shoulder 
this  task.  In  another  General  Staff  memorandum  on  the  Turkish  peace  treaty,  dated 
April  1,1920,  the  attack  on  the  advocates  of  a  harsh  treaty  upon  Turkey  was  further 
connected  with  the  Russian  factor,  a  recurring.  theme  among  those  who  supported  the 
reconstituted  Turkey'  solution 
[ 
... 
]  there  is  nothing  to  show  that  Russia  has  ceased  to 
consider  the  march  on  Constantinople  which  may  be 
renewed  while  Turkey  is  exhausted  and  is  without  the 
support  of  Germany.  We  must  either  be  prepared  for 
Russian  supremacy  at  Constantinople  or  take  hold  of 
Turkey  before  it  is  too  late  and  rebuild  her  as  a  potential 
barrier  in  our  interests.  [ 
... 
]109 
THE  SAN  REMO  CONFERENCE  AND  THE  UNLEASHING  OF  GREEK  DESIGNS  IN  ASIA  MINOR: 
THE  BRITISH  SANCTION  OF  JUNE  1920  AND  THE  GREEK  ADVANCE. 
The  next  Allied  conference  to  deal  with  the  Near  Eastern  settlement  took  place 
at  San  Remo  in  April.  It  was  there  that  the  terms  of  the  treaty  with  Turkey  were  set.  Of 
central  importance,  especially  for  Greece,  was  the  discussion  of  the  military  means  of 
enforcing  the  treaty.  It  was  believed  that  the  military  and  naval  advisers  would  be  ready 
107  PRO,  FO  404/43,  no  190,  De  Robeck  to  Curzon,  submitting  a  Memorandum  by  the  Political  Officer  of 
the  Staff,  Commander  Luke,  7  April  1920. 
108  PRO,  WO  106/64,  'The  Strategic  importance  of  Constantinople  to  the  British  Empire,  '  22  December 
1919. 
109  PRO,  WO  33/1004,  General  Staff  Memo  on  Turkish  Peace  Treaty,  I  April  1920. 127 
to  discuss  the  maximum  resistance  which  might  be  encountered,  and  the  means  to  meet 
such  an  event.  Only  nineteen  Allied  divisions  were  at  the  time  available,  while  the  Head 
of  the  Committee  of  Military  and  Naval  experts,  Marshal  Foch,  had  concluded  that  to 
enforce  the  treaty  in  the  case  that  Turkey  resisted  would  require  at  least  twenty-seven 
divisions.  110  Foch  at  San  Remo  had  stressed  the  fact  that  the  Turks  had  in  their 
possession  great  quantities  of  arms  in  the  interior  and  that  they  would  give  the  Allies  'an 
enormous  amount  of  trouble.  '  Foch's  appraisal  of  the  Greek  military  presence  and 
standing  in  the  area  of  Smyrna  was  that  they  were  'fully  competent  to  withstand  any 
Turkish  attacks  so  long  as  they  were  not  required  to  undertake  expeditions  into  the 
interior.  '  Wilson  was  in  accordance  with  Foch's  report  and  had  made  that  explicit  to 
Lloyd  George  in  one  of  their  private  meetings  in  April:  'I  told  him  that  I  could  not 
change  my  paper,  which  agreed  with  Foch's  and  worked  out  25-30  divisions  to  enforce 
the  Treaty,  of  which  we  had  some  15-20  there  already.  ""  However,  at  the  San  Remo 
Conference,  the  Allies  agreed  on  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  peace  with  Turkey  and  these 
terms  were  certainly  not  what  the  military  had  in  mind. 
During  negotiations,  the  French  were  given  the  mandate  over  Syria,  Cilicia  and 
Lebanon.  From  spring  1920,  France  had  adopted  a  new  policy  regarding  the 
safeguarding  of  interests  in  the  Near  and  Middle  East.  A  change  in  French  policy  had 
become  evident  with  the  change  in  government.  In  January  1919,  Clemenceau  was 
replaced  by  Alexandre  Millerand  and  Andre  Lefevre  took  over  the  Ministry  of  War. 
Millerand  made  himself  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  Clemenceau  had  never  been  a 
ffiend  of  the  so-called  'colonial  party,  '  which  had  always  been  strong  in  France, 
whereas  the  new  government  based  its  power  exactly  upon  this  party.  112  As  early  as  in 
110  DBFP,  vol.  VIII,  Proceedings  of  the  Conference  of  San  Remo,  April  18-26  1920,  no  7,20  April  1920, 
pp.  54-67. 
Callwell,  Field  Marshall  Sir  Henry  Wilson,  p.  233. 
Christopher  Andrew  and  A.  S.  Kanya-Forstner,  France  overseas  (London,  198  1),  p.  137. 128 
December  1919,  the  French  had  established  contact  with  Kemal  at  Sivas,  assuring  him 
'unofficially  that,  French  troops  would  eventually  be  withdrawn  from  Cilicia  provided 
France  received  a  monopoly  of  all  economic  concessions  there.  '  113  However,  no 
agreement  was  reached  and  the  French  found  themselves  in  a  difficult  position,  trying  to 
put  a  stop  to  Kemalist  attacks  in  Cilicia.  They  had  started  to  entertain  the  idea  of 
accommodating  Kemal.  In  May  1920,  a  French  delegation  arrived  in  Ankara  for  talks 
with  Kemal.  A  temporary  armistice  was  concluded  among  the  two  sides  in  Cilicia.  114 
When  in  October  1920  the  French  Premier's  office  again  changed  hands  and  Georges 
Leygues  took  over,  the  advocates  of  the  safeguarding  of  French  imperial  interests  in  the 
region  started  pressing  further  for  reconciliation  with  the  Nationalist  Turks.  "  5  The 
perfect  excuse  for  abandoning  Greece  was  given  to  the  French  with  the  elections  of 
November  1920  in  Greece,  the  defeat  of  Venizelos  and  the  return  of  King  Constantine  - 
the  b6te  noire  for  the  French  since  the  times  of  the  Great  War.  116 
The  changes  discussed  and  enforced  at  San  Remo  regarding  the  Smyrna 
Question  were  related  to  the  political  aspect  of  the  future  administration  of  the  area. 
Venizelos  had  welcomed  the  results  of  the  Conference.  In  a  letter  to  Lloyd  George,  the 
Greek  Prime  Minister  had  expressed  his  gratitude  for  the  British  Prime  Minister's 
support  and  good  Will.  117 
On  II  May  1920,  the  Turkish  Delegation  was  given  the  text  of  the  treaty.  The 
actual  signing  of  the  shortest-lived  of  the  peace  treaties  was  to  take  place  three  months 
later  at  Sývres.  The  treaty,  although  it  retained  the  Sultan  at  Constantinople,  deprived 
Turkey  of  territories  in  Asia  Minor  and  Europe,  while  it  established  international  control 
113  Millerand,  Notes  of  a  conversation  with  Picot,  10  February  1920.  Cited  by  I  leinireich,  From  Paris  to 
S&res,  pp.  1834.  See  also  Andrew  and  Kanya-Forstner,  France  overseas,  p.  215. 
114  Andrew  and  Kanya-Forstner,  France  overseas,  pp.  218-9 
115  Georges  Leygues  was  an  ardent  supporter  of  colonial  policy,  Honorary  President  of  the  Comitj 
France-Orient,  Association  Nationale  pour  la  diveloppement  dupristige,  de  Vinfluence  et  des  int&its 
francais  dans  les  pays  orientaux. 129 
over  the  Straits.  '  18  The  terms  were  harsh  and  the  use  of  arms  was  required  to  implement 
them  and  secure  their  immediate  execution.  They  were  destined  to  keep  Turkey  weak,  a 
course  of  action  strongly  supported  by  the  British  Prime  Minister  as  being  part  of  the 
plan  that  required  Greece  taking  over  the  role  of  the  Turks  in  the  region  as  Britain's 
guarantor  of  interests.  However,  Lloyd  George,  the  main  exponent  of  the  pro-Greek 
policy  among  the  British  policy-makers  was  not  supported  by  prominent  members  of 
his  Cabinet.  In  addition,  France  and  Italy  had  already  tried  to  approach  the  Turkish 
Nationalists.  The  peace  terms  required  arms  and  men  that  neither  Britain  nor  the  Allies 
could  spare,  the  former  facing  a  'drain  in  men  and  money,  '  and  under  no  real  strategic 
threat  in  the  region,  the  latter  being  unwilling  to  support  British  strategic  interests.  Thus, 
the  treaty  was  doomed  from  the  beginning.  The  bulk  of  the  Allied  detachments  had 
started  to  withdraw  from  the  interior  even  before  the  announcement  of  the  terms. 
The  next  venue  for  the  meetings  of  the  Allies,  prior  to  the  signing  of  the  treaty  of 
Rvres  was.  at  Hythe  in  June.  Once  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  became  known  to  the 
Nationalist  Turks,  they  launched  a  barrage  of  attacks.  In  March,  the  War  Office  had 
withdrawn  British  forces  stationed  at  Eski-Sehr,  a  city  which  was  a  vital  railway  centre 
and  a  bastion  for  the  inland  of  Anatolia,  the  hub  of  Kemal's  forces.  The  Nationalists 
immediately  attacked  and  occupied  the  city.  By  June,  their  forces  had  taken  over  the 
cities  of  Brusa  and  Panderma.  Soon  they  would  be  able  to  threaten  Constantinople  and 
the  Straits. 
The  British  forces  that  were  withdrawn  from  Eski-Sehr  had  moved  to  the  city  of 
Ismid  and  were  responsible  for  the  defence  of  the  city  and  of  the  roads  and  railway 
passing  through  it.  Supplies  and  stores  were  also  held  there  as  well  as  'some  14,600  tons 
116  See  Chapter  Four:  'The  November  1920  Greek  elections  and  the  defeat  of  Venizelos.  '  p.  156. 
117  HLRO,  Lloyd  George  Papers,  F55/1/28  Venizelos  to  Lloyd  George,  26  April  1920. 
"3  The  ftill  text  Great  Britain,  Treaty  Series  -  Treaty  ofSjvres,  August  1920,  Cmd  984  (London,  1920). 130 
of  surrendered  Turkish  ammunition  under  British  guard.  "19  The  city  had  also  become 
the  base  of  anti-Nationalist  activities  organised  by  the  Sultan  at  Constantinople  with  the 
approval  of  the  Allies.  However,  the  anti-Nationalist  forces  were  unsuccessful  and 
began  retreating  under  continuous  Nationalist  attacks.  On  15  June  1920,  the  Nationalists 
surrounded  and  attacked  the  British  forces.  120  De  Robeck  reported  to  London  that:  'We 
are  actively  engaged  with  the  Nationalists  at  the  Gulf  of  Ismid.  02  1  The  military  situation 
was  described  'unsatisfactory,  "  however  further  retirement  of  the  British  forces  was  not 
recommended  as  this  would  make  the  situation  more  difficult.  De  Robeck  underlined 
122  that  in  order  to  retain  control  strong  reinforcements  were  immediately  required. 
For  this  reason,  and  in  the  light  of  the  inadequacy  of  Allied  forces,  the  Supreme 
Council,  led  by  Lloyd  George,  gave  its  permission  to  Venizelos  to  order  the  advance  of 
the  Greek  Army  in  Asia  Minor.  On  17  June  1920,  the  decision  of  the  British  Cabinet 
was:  'that  having  regard  to  the  very  strong  and  even  dramatic  line  of  policy  taken  by  the 
British  plenipotentiaries  in  regard  to  the  treaty  of  peace  with  Turkey,  to  retire  from 
Constantinople  before  a  bandit  like  Mustafa  Kemal  would  deal  a  shuttering  blow  to  our 
prestige  in  the  East'.  123  The  Greek  forces  occupied  the  Pandenna  line,  a  railway  line  that 
ran  northwards  from  the  Smyrna  district  to  Panderma-  while  one  of  the  Greek  divisions 
in  Western  Thrace  was  placed  under  Milne's  orders  for  the  defence  of  the  Dardanelles. 
On  22  June  1920,  the  Greeks  launched  the  first  Greek  offensive  with  Allied 
sanction  with  the  object  to  occupy  Magnesia,  Soma,  Balikersi,  and  the  Panderma 
railway  line.  The  Greek  forces  numbered  in  total  90,000  officers  and  men.  The  object 
was  to  surround  the  Nationalist  forces  reported  to  be  concentrated  in  the  above 
119  W.  E.  Van  Cutsern,  'Anatolia  1920,  '  Army  Quarterly,  92,1966,  p.  175. 
120  At  the  time  the  British  forces  at  Ismid  consisted  of  the  242  nd  Infantry  Brigade  with  51"  (4.5-inch 
Howitzer)  Battery  R.  F.  A.,  26th  Field  Company  R.  E.,  Signal  Section,  Section  of  a  machine-gun  company 
and  a  field  ambulance,  placed  under  the  28'h  Division  which  lay  in  the  area  east  of  the  Bosphorus  with 
headquarters  at  Scutari.  Naval  support  was  offered  by  the  destroyer  H.  M.  S.  Sepoy.  Ibid.  p.  178. 
121  PRO,  WO  106/1505,  Turkey-  Nationalist  Operations,  Summary  of  Events  at  Ismid,  15  June  1920. 131 
mentioned  areas  and  with  the  ultimate  aim  to  occupy  the  Panderma  railway  line.  124  By 
July,  they  had  attained  their  objectives. 
On  the  Ottoman  front,  the  Constantinople  Government  was,  in  the  eyes  of  the 
Turkish  people  the  puppets  of  the  Allies;  Kemal  was  the  leader  of  the  movement  that 
would  take  Turkey  out  of  the  crisis.  By  May,  it  was  obvious  that  the  treaty  could  not 
have  been  enforced  easily,  the  opposition  was  too  evident.  The  first  real  trouble  that  the 
British  faced  due  to  Kemal's  actions  in  Constantinople  was  the  Ismid  Peninsula  attack 
on  British  forces,  the  incident  which  gave  the  impetus  for  Greece  to  offer  its  troops  to 
stop  any  further  nationalist  advances. 
THE  DILEMMA  OF  GREEK  SANCTION  AND  THE  BRITISH  CABIN  ET'S  'SILENT'ACQUI  ESCENCE. 
The  Lloyd  George  Cabinet,  in  the  summer  of  1920,  had  too  many  fronts  open: 
financial  difficulties,  pressure  for  demobilisation,  increasing  demands  for  troops  in 
places  like  Egypt  and  Ireland.  However,  the  attack  at  Ismid  had  brought  the  Cabinet  into 
the  following  dilemma:  they  must  decide  between  either  despatching  a  larger  force  to 
Constantinople,  one  which  would  allow  the  unquestionable  control  over  the  Straits,  or 
to  simply  continue  existing  British  presence,  under  the  constant  fear  of  the  growing 
Nationalist  movement.  An  alternative  to  the  first  option  was  the  use  of  the  Greek  forces 
that  had  already  flooded  into  the  area  of  Smyrna.  The  use  of  the  Greek  forces  meant,  for 
the  British,  protection  on  the  cheap  for  their  interests.  However,  this  would  mean  that 
the  Greeks  would  need  to  be  authorised  to  extend  their  area  of  occupation,  a  necessity 
which  was  not  welcomed  by  prominent  members  of  the  government. 
The  question  was  debated  in  two  ministerial  meetings  on  17  and  18  June  and 
Churchill  had  dominated  the  discussion  with  the  exposure  of  the  critical  situation  of  the 
122  Ibid. 
123  PRO,  CAB  23/2  1,  Appendix  11,17  June  1920. 
124  PRO,  ADM  116/2034,  Letters  of  Proceedings  from  Smyrna,  25  June  1920. 132 
British  military  presence  in  the  area.  125  The  apparently  obvious  alternative  of 
abandoning  Constantinople  and  the  Straits  was  never  considered  at  all  by  the  British 
Government.  Instead,  it  was  decided  to  reinforce  the  British  forces  at  Constantinople, 
with  troops  that  were  to  be  transferred  from  Palestine.  However,  Venizelos  then  made 
the  offer  of  Greek  forces  to  'secure'  the  area  by  means  of  an  advance,  which  was 
eagerly  accepted  by  the  British  government.  It  was,  in  a  sense,  the  British  sanctioning 
that  Greece  had  sought  from  the  beginning  of  its  presence  in  the  region  of  Western  Asia 
Minor.  Lloyd  George  in  Hythe,  along  with  the  rest  of  the  Allies,  further  secured  Allied 
nominal  consent.  Greece  was  unleashed  in  Anatolia.  Lloyd  George,  in  the  House  of 
Commons,  defended  the  decision: 
[  ...  ]  after  going  into  the  matter  [with  Venizelos]very  closely,  the 
British  government  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  best  thing  to 
do  would  be  W  use  the  force  at  the  disposal  of  the  Greek 
Government  for  the  purpose  of  clearing  up  the 
situation  ...  Mustafa  Kemal  was  supposed  to  be  marching  with 
great  forces  to  drive  the  Allies  out..  of  Asia  Minor,  and  even 
Constantinople  was  supposed  to  be  in  peril  ...  M.  Venizelos 
expressed  the  opinion  that.  he  would  be  able  to  clear  up  the 
whole  neighbourhood  between  Smyrna  and  the  Dardanelles  in 
the  course  of  fifteen  days.  126 
The  reaction  of  the  officials  at  the  Foreign  and  War  Offices  was  initially  one  of 
relief  but  soon  the  complications  of  such  an  acceptance  came  to  the  surface.  According 
to  a  General  Staff  report  on  the  military  liabilities  of  the  Empire: 
[ 
... 
]  it  is  impossible  to  foresee  to  what  extent  the  situation 
will  make  increasing  demands  on  our  military  resources. 
The  opposition  of  the  Greek  Army  may  at  its  best  lead  to 
the  defeat  of  Mustafa  Kemal,  but  even  so  the 
reestablishment  of  the  authority  of  the  Turkish 
government  in  the  interior  will  be  a  necessary  antecedent 
to  any  reduction  of  Allied  cffcctives,  and  will  take  time.  It 
is  quite  probable  that  the  Greek  operations  may  not  prove 
a  knock-out  blow,  in  which  case  the  present  unsatisfactory 
125  PRO,  CAB  23/21,17  June  1920  and  18  June  1920. 
126  PD.  C,  vol.  132,  c.  477-8,21  July  192  1. 133 
situation  may  be  prolonged  indefinitely,  with  a 
corresponding  drain  in  men  and  money.  127 
ections  had  been  only  temporarily  put  aside,  s  nce  the  ultimate  aim  was  to 
continue  the  British  presence  in  the  region  of  the  Straits  with  the  least  possible  cost. 
Furthermore,  the  British  officials  on  the  spot  had  reported  a  change  in  the  attitude  of  the 
Greeks.  Fitzmaurice,  the  Admiralty's  representative  was  reporting  that  he  had  detected 
that  the  Greeks  were  becoming  'decidedly  arrogant.  '  128  For  him,  it  was  not  improbable 
that  'the  near  future  will  produce  incidents  necessitating  a  reminder  that  Greece  is  not  in 
a  position  to  throw  off  the  leading  strings  of  her  larger  Allies.  '  However,  he  could  not 
but  report  to  his  superiors  'that  the  inhabitants  of  the  occupied  zone  have  in  most  cases 
undoubtedly  preferred  it  [the  Greek  presence]  to  the  Nationalists  regime  which  seems  to 
have  been  founded  on  terrorism.  The  Hellenic  High  Commissioner  M.  Stergiadis  wisely 
continues  his  policy  of  endeavouring  to  placate  Turkish  popular  feeling  even  at  the 
expense  of  Greek  civil  interests.  '  129.  The  British  had  sanctioned  a  Greek  advance  in  June 
1920  but  this  did  not  mean  that  they  were  willing  to  allow  the  Greeks  further  operations. 
Such  a  prospect  was  never  discussed  by  the  British  Cabinet.  Further  military  operations 
were  however  necessary,  according  to  the  Greek  General  Staff,  in  order  to  consolidate 
Greek  position  in  Asia  Minor.  With  the  treaty  of  peace  with  Turkey  already  decided, 
Venizelos  hoped  for  British  material  and  military  backing  in  order  to  enforce  its  terms. 
However,  his  expectations  were  crushed.  Once  the  crisis  had  faded  away,  after  the 
Greek  forces  had  successfully  intervened,  British  military  thinkers  immediately  returned 
to  their  old  view:  no  further  Greek  backing  was  required,  let  alone  British  help. 
127  PRO,  WO  33/1004-CID  255-B,  General  Staff,  War  Office,  20  July  1920. 
128  PRO,  ADM  116/2034,  Smyrna  -Letter  of  Proceedings,  20  July  1920.  'Before  the  advance  took  place 
Greece  was  the  humble  and  admiring  ally  of  her  powerful  friend  Great  Britain,  nowadays,  she  is  the  Great 
Power  of  the  Middle  East  whose  aid  Great  Britain  and  France  solicited  for  the  performance  of  a  piece  of 
work  which  they  were  unable  or  unwilling  to  do  themselves.  ' 
129  PRO,  ADM  116/2034,  Smyrna  -  Letter  of  Proceedings,  7  July  1920. 134 
THE  SHIFT  IN  THE  MILITARY  SITUATION  IN  ANATOLIA  AND  THE  BOLSHEVIK  FACTOR  IN 
BRITISH  THINKINQ 
For  six  months  after  the  conclusion  of  the  Armistice  of  Mudros,  in 
Constantinople,  under  the  eyes  of  the  Allied  officers  who  had  flooded  the  city, 
nationalist  forces  were  grouping  together  and  finally  reached  a  unanimous  decision  to 
launch  a  resistance  movement  in  Anatolia.  However,  it  was  not  until  early  spring  of 
1919,  that  the  first  alarming  reports  reached  London  and  Paris,  where  their  importance 
was  fatally  underestimatcd.  130  In  April  1919,  Admiral  Webb  had  given  the  first  signs 
that  the  Committee  of  Union  and  Progress  and  other  Turkish  elements  'have  had 
breathing  time  and  opportunity  of  reorganising  secretly  with  utmost  energy.  "31  General 
Milne  in  the  summer  of  1919  reported  that: 
The  greater  portion  of  the  Turkish  forces  is  composed  of 
organised  bands  of  brigands  reinforced  by  armed  peasants 
driven  from  their  villages  by  the  Greeks  and  determined  to 
prevent  further  advance  of  the  Greeks.  These  armed  forces 
which  are  secretly  receiving  reinforcements  from  the  regular 
132  units  are  in  considerable  strength. 
The  Allied  officers  at  Constantinople  had  also  their  share  in  igniting  the  reaction 
of  the  Nationalist  forces.  By  autumn  1919,  less  than  a  year  after  the  conclusion  of  the 
Armistice  of  Mudros,  control  of  Central  Anatolia  had  passed  to  Kemal  and  his 
Nationalist  forces.  During  the  first  months  of  1920  there  were  arrests  of  prominent 
Turkish  politicians,  government  officials  and  intellectuals,  on  charges  ranging  from 
maltreatment  of  prisoners  of  war  to  failure  to  comply  with  the  armistice  terms.  British 
officials  were  the  ones  who  managed  the  lists  and  as  time  went  by  the  Sultan's 
government  at  Constantinople  added  the  names  of  those  whom  they  wished  to  have 
'3*  It  is  amazing  that  in  a  comrnuniqu6  dated  23  June  1919  with  a  FO  minute  by  Kidston,  on  24  June,  in 
FO  371/4277  the  above  mentioned  official  comment  run  as  follows:  "I  know  nothing  of  Mustapha 
Kemal...,  -  cited  in  Busch.  From  Aludros  to  Lausanne,  p.  168-9. 
"'  PRO,  FO  371/4157-56556,  Webb  to  Foreign  Office,  I  April  1919. 135 
removed  from  the  city,  thus  having  the  British  satisfy,  in  a  sense,  Turkish  favours.  The 
vast  majority  of  the  arrested  were  transferred  to  Malta.  133 
Thus,  nationalist  feeling  in  the  capital  was  stirring  already.  The  Greek  landing  at 
Smyrna  was  not  the  only  factor  that  fired  the  Turkish  nationalist  feeling  and  in 
consequence  the  Nationalist  movement.  It  was  far  more  complicated  and  indications 
were  already  there,  at  Constantinople.  The  occupation  of  Constantinople  by  the  Allies, 
the  arrests  of  prominent  Turkish  politicians,  the  occupation  of  the  Ottoman  Ministry  of 
War  had  also  contributed  to  the  situation.  This  is  not  to  suggest  that  the  Greek  landing 
Was  unimportant,  but  it  was  rather  one  spark  in  a  series.  134  It  was  bad  tactics.  135  The 
Greek  landing  was,  however,  a  decisive  negative  factor,  primarily  because  of  the  long- 
lasting  animosity  between  the  two  peoples,  the  failures  in  the  handling  of  the  situation 
both  by  Vcnizelos  in  Paris  and  his  officers  in  charge  of  the  landing  and  last,  but  not 
least,  due  to  Allied  unwillingness  to  lend  the  necessary  support  to  the  Greek  action. 
The  careless  and  amateur  handling  of  the  landing  -  on  behalf  of  the  Greeks  - 
certainly  had  an  effect.  It  was  to  be  expected  that  what  had  taken  place  in  Smyrna  would 
132  PRO,  WO  33/10(4,  Report  "I"he  Nationalist  Movement  in  Turkey,  '  by  Sir  George  Milne,  18 
November  1919. 
133  Lists  of  the  arrested  can  be  found  in  PRO,  FO 37114173  and  in  FO  371/4174. 
134  Tile  view  that  the  Greek  landing  was  the  decisive  factor  in  the  formation  of  the  Nationalist  movement 
was  supported  by  the  British  Commissioner  at  Constantinople,  De  Robeck--  'The  Greek  occupation  of 
Smyrna  stimulated  a  Turkish  patriotism  probably  more  real  than  any  which  the  war  was  able  to  evoke.  ' 
Cited  by  Smith,  Ionian  Vision,  p.  107.  Smith  tends  to  support  this  view  as  well.  In  addition,  Sachar  points 
Out  that:  'The  Greek  occupation  [of  Smyrna]  had  lashed  a  wasted,  dispirited  nation,  sernicomatose  within 
its  ring,  Of  enemy  bayonctsý  into  a  state  of  outraged  wakefulness.  '  Sachar,  The  emergence  ofthe  Middle 
East.  p.  318.  Finally,  Lowe  and  Dockrill  believe  that:  'T'he  root  of  the  trouble  was  the  light-hearted 
decision  of  the  Council  of  Four  in  May  1919  to  encourage  the  Greeks  to  seize  Smyrna,  in  order  to 
forestall  the  Italians  to  whom  it  had  been  promised  by  the  1917  agreement.  '  Lowe  and  Dockrill,  The 
Mirage  OfPowrr.  pp.  366-7.  See  PRO,  WO  1581768,  June  1920.  Reports  regarding  the  problems  and 
friction  arising  from  the  Allied  control  of  the  Ottoman  Ministry  of  War. 
135  Many  conservative  MPs  and  supporters  of  a  pro-Turk  policy  were  opposed  to  the  occupation  of 
Constantinople,  especially  since  this  was  only  nominally  Allied  but  in  practice  a  British  occupation. 
Charles  To%%mshend  believed  that:  'It  created,  strengthened  and  cemented  the  Turkish  Nationalist  party 
and  took  from  the  puppet  administration  in  Constantinople  whatever  claim  it  might  have  had  to  be 
'representative  of  Turkish  opinion.  Where  was  the  need  to  occupy  Constantinople  with  British  war-ships 
sil  hundred  yards  from  the  Sultan's  palace?  What  else  could  be  the  result  of  this  insulting  demonstration 
-  the  sight  of  foreign  troops  pacing  the  streets  of  the  capital  of  Islam-  than  to  send  every  patriotic  Turk 
into  the  arms  of  the  first  strong  man  who  was  ready  to  take  the  lead  in  the  defence  of  the  national  honour 
and  integrity.,  M.  G.  Sir  Charles  Townshend,  'Great  Britain  and  the  Turks,  'Asia,  22,1922,  p.  949. 136 
have  become  known  elsewhere,  not  only  within  the  confines  of  the  Empire,  and  would 
be  distorted  or  ovff-exaggerated  by  Greece's  detractors.  The  eyes  of  the  public  were 
upon  Greece;  its  prestige  and  prospects  were  in  question.  However,  Kemal,  the  would- 
be  leader  of  the  Nationalist  movement,  had  already  attained  his  position  of  power  and 
put  in  action  the  plan  for  organising  resistance  throughout  the  Empire.  British  military 
representatives  in  Smyrna,  for  example,  had  information  that  secret  instructions  to 
expect  renewal  of  war  were  sent  to  members  of  the  Committee  of  Union  and  Progress  at 
the  end  of  February  1919.136  In  March,  there  were  intelligence  reports,  from 
Constantinople  to  London,  of  distribution  of  arms  to  irregular  Turkish  units  'for 
opposing  any  closer  occupation  of  the  interior.  '  137 
The  Greek  military  and  civil  authorities  were  alarmed  by  the  information  they 
were  gathering  on  the  issue  of  the  Nationalist  movement.  One  such  alarming  report 
from  General  Paraskevopoulos,  stationed  at  Salonica,  to  Venizelos  in  Paris  in  late  June 
1919,  informed  the  Greek  Prime  Minister  of  intelligence  regarding  the  organisation  of 
the  Turkish  corps  'with  the  aim  to  attack  our  army  in  Asia  Minor,  officers  of  every  rank 
are  sent  continuously,  munitions  and  arms  as  well.  '  'The  base  of  this  Turkish 
concentration,  '  concluded  the  Greek  General,  'is  the  zone  between  Balikesser  and 
Panormos.  '138  The  Nationalist  movement  needed  time  to  organise  and  increase  its 
strength  and  the  Supreme  Council  definitely  conceded  that  by  delaying  tackling  the 
issue  of  the  Turkish  treaty  and  by  leaving  Greece  without  cover  or  backing  in  its 
military  presence  in  Anatolia,  during  Greek  attempts  to  establish  their  authority  both  on 
administrative  and  military  levels. 
136  PRO,  WO  33/965-3652,  General  Staff,  Constantinople  enclosing  a  report  from  Smyrna  to  Director  of 
, 
Military  Intelligence,  21  February  1919. 
37  Busch.  AWros  to  Ldzusanne,  p.  167. 
138  MFA,  1919.  AIAAK  5,  File  Smyrna,  June  -July  1919,  no  6408,  Paraskevopoulos  to  Venizelos,  29  June 
1919. 137 
Intelligence  reports  in  the  summer  of  1919  from  various  parts  of  the  Empire 
talked  about  a  moderate  irregular  force,  with  strong  links  to  the  local  population  which 
was  armed.  Greek  estimations  and  reports  which  presented  Turkish  numbers  as  reaching 
60,000  troops  were  considered  by  British  officials  mere  'exaggerations.  '  139  However, 
the  main  conclusion  drawn  by  General  Milne,  the  Commander  of  the  British  forces  in 
Turkey,  in  November  1919,  left  no  room  for  doubts,  being  quite  alarming  on  the  subject 
of  the  broadness  of  the  movement.  The  Nationalist  movement  had  already  consolidated 
public  opinion,  the  population  of  the  Empire  armed  and  for  the  first  time  united,  made 
the  situation  look  alarming  even  in  the  eyes  of  the  British  officials.  140  The  Foreign 
Office  was  aware  of  the  reports  which  referred  to  the  gradual  strengthening  of  a 
resistance  movement.  Forbes  Adam  and  Robert  Vansittart,  in  London,  had  admitted  for 
the  first  time  that  Vcnizelos'  reports  were  accurate  but  above  all  that  the  Turkish 
government  at  Constantinople  could  not  control  it.  It  was  'a  strong  organised 
movement,  according  to  Turkish  officials,  '  minuted  the  British  Foreign  Office 
officials.  '  41  It  was  towards  the  end  of  June  1919  that  the  actual  organisation  and 
extension  of  the  resistance  had  begun,  primarily  because  of  the  cfforts  of  the  Corps  of 
Officers  and  the  partisans  of  the  Committee  of  Union  and  Progress  along  with  other 
Prominent  nationalist  groups.  142  By  the  end  of  1919,  it  was  admitted  by  the  British 
139  A  number  of  reports  by  the  Greek  High  Commissioner  at  Constantinople  in  the  MFA  files  and  DBFP, 
vol.  IV,  no  453,  pp  680-2.  Also  a  letter  by  Venizelos  dated  11.7.1919  with  minutes  by  Adam  (Military 
Section  of  the  Foreign  Office)  in  PRO,  1701608/9-15056,  Venizelos  to  FO,  II  July  1919.  'We  have 
evidence  that  Turkish  officers  and  troops  are  concentrating  at  Erzerum...  it  is  probable  that  considerably 
more  than  these  have  arms  and  could  be  organised  by  Turkish  officers  in  parts  of  unoccupied  Turkey, 
letter  exaggerated  the  danger.  '  The  Foreign  Office  expert  referred  to  the  letter  Venizelos  had  sent  to  the 
Foreign  office  on  II  July  19  19. 
140  A  Report  on  the  Nationalist  Movement  in  Turkey,  dated  18  November  1919,  by  General  Milne  in 
PRO,  WO  33/1004,  General  Milne  to  WO,  18  November  1919. 
141  PRO,  FO  608M-14992,  Report  from  British  High  Commissioner,  Constantinople,  Minutes  by  Forbes 
Adam  and  V&nsittart.  II  June  19  19. 
142  PRO,  FO  40614  1  .  100,  Webb  to  Curzon,  7  September  1919. 138 
representatives  on  the  spot  that  all  real  power  in  the  provinces  was  in  the  hands  of  the 
Nationalists.  143 
Kemal,  in  July,  had  organised  the  first  nationalist  congress  at  Erzerum,  where  he 
made  his  first  appearance  as  the  leader  of  the  Nationalist  movement.  There  he  had 
accepted  in  his  speech  the  loss  of  Mesopotamia,  Palestine  and  Syria  but  declared  that 
the  rest  of  the  territories  would  not  be  surrendered  without  a  fight.  In  November,  a 
second  congress  took  place  at  Sivas,  for  the  discussion  of  the  general  principles  and  the 
aims  of  the  movement.  144  At  Sivas,  Kemal  proposed  that  Turkey  should  seek  assistance 
from  outside  in  order  to  attain  its  objectives.  145  He  separated  the  existence  of  the 
Nationalist  movement  from  the  Ottoman  Government  at  Constantinople,  demanding  the 
election  of  a  new  Assembly.  Overall,  all  reports  reaching  the  War  Office  from  its 
officials  stationed  in  Anatolia  referred  to  the  continuous  Bolshevik  propaganda  among 
the  Turks.  The  large  majority  of  these  reports  further  underlined  the  conclusion  that  as 
long.  as  the  - 
Greek  forces  were  victorious  by  their  own  means  it  was  a  'satisfactory 
situation.  '  146 
The  Greek  High  Commissioner  at  Constantinople,  Canellopoulos,  had  cabled 
information  from  secret  sources  regarding  the  formulation  of  the  Ottoman 
Government's  policy  regarding  Kemal  to  Athens.  According  to  his  sources,  three 
differcnt  opinions  regarding  the  course  of  action  at  the  palace  were  expressed  at  the 
meetings  undcr  the  presidency  of  the  Sultan  and  the  Crown  Prince.  Damad  Ferid,  a 
prominent  member  of  the  Sultan's  government,  believed  that  the  Sultan  should  continue 
to  oppose  Kemal,  in  order  not  to  lose  the  trust  of  the  British.  Given  the  fact  that  the 
Ottoman  Government  itself  was  not  in  a  position  to  suppress  the  Nationalist  movement, 
41  PRO,  FO  406143,  De  Robeck  to  Curzon,  23  December  1919. 
"  For  die  full  text  of  the  Declaration  at  Sivas  see  E.  G.  Mears,  Modern  Turkey  (New  York,  1924),  pp. 
627-8. 
145  Hal"be  Edj'b,  The  Turfish  Ordeal  (New  York,  1928),  p.  16. 139 
the  job  could  be  left  to  the  Greek  Army.  The  second  opinion  was  supplied  by  the 
liberals,  who  insisted  on  the  need  to  suppress  Kemal  by  their  own  means.  They  believed 
that  the  passive  attitude  that  the  government  so  far  had  adopted  made  it  look  suspicious 
towards  the  British,  while  there  was  a  danger  if  the  job  was  left  to  the  Greeks  that  they 
would  ask  for  too  much  in  return.  The  third  opinion  which  was  expressed  in  that 
Ottoman  Cabinet  Council,  supported  by  the  Crown  Prince,  was  that  the  Government 
should  reach  an  agreement  with  Kemal  as  soon  as  possible.  147 
The  leaders  of  the  Nationalist  movement  during  this  period  targeted  the  Muslim 
countries  of  the  East  and  Soviet  Russia  primarily  for  support,  both  moral  and  material. 
However,  soon  Kemal  turned  to  the  West.  In  September  1919,  Kemal  had  even  received 
an  American  Military  Mission  under  General  James  Harbord.  148  In  addition,  the  Turksih 
Nationalist  leader  sent  a  representative  of  his  movement  to  Moscow,  to  establish 
contact,  'instructed  to  seek  material  assistance  and  to  persuade  the  Soviet  Government 
to  begin  a  joint  and  co-ordinated  military  operation  in  order  to  open  between  Moscow 
and  Turkish  nationalist  territory  the  direct  route  which  had  been  effectively  closed  since 
the  independence  of  Armenia.  "49  By  August  1920,  Kemal  had  concluded  an  initial 
agreement  for  the  establishment  of  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Soviets. 
The  ties  of  the  Kemalist  movement  with  Soviet  Russia  had  been  from  very  early 
on  a  matter  of  concern  for  the  British  in  Anatolia.  The  Bolshevik  influence  on  Muslims 
was  the  title  of  a  report  dated  25  December  19  19  written  by  the  Intelligence  Department 
of  the  High  Commissioner  of  Constantinople.  The  writers  of  the  report  underlined  the 
danger  of  the  Bolshevik  aim  of  turning  the  Muslim  world  against  the  British  Empire, 
146  RO,  WO  10611493.  Various  reports  can  be  found  in  this  file- 
147  MFA.  1919,  A.  9-2.  Attempts  of  reconciliation  between  Constantinople  and  Ankara,  no  113  10, 
CanellOPoulos  to  Politisý  29  February  1919. 
148  For  the  foreign  relations  of  the  Nationalist  movement  in  19  19  see  Sonyel,  Turkish  Diplomacy  1918- 
1923,  PpI  1  -30.  1"  1  larish  Kapur.  Soviet  Russia  and  Asia  (Geneva,  1966),  p-9  I. 140 
and  stressed  the  fact  that  the  despatch  of  the  Greek  army  of  occupation  to  the  Moslem 
province  of  Aidin  was  a  useful  argument  in  the  hands  of  the  Bolsheviks  in  their  attempts 
150  to  persuade  the  Muslims  that  Great  Britain  was  the  enemy  of  Islam.  The  despatches 
that  left  Anatolia  for  London  were  overall  alarming,  being  informative  on  the  close  links 
that  Kemal  was  gradually  establishing  with  the  Soviets.  151  The  Bolshevik  factor  relating 
to  the  issue  of  Turkey  had  become  an  issue  in  itself  and  was  treated  as  such  in  the 
negotiations  which  took  place  between  the  British  and  the  Soviets  in  May  1920  on  the 
establishment  of  trade  relations.  152 
The  British  military  establishment  had  before  the  San  Remo  Conference  stressed 
that  the  Allies  would  be  confronted  with  great  difficulties  if  they  tried  to  implement  a 
harsh  treaty  in  the  interior  of  Anatolia.  According  to  a  War  Office  appreciation  of  the 
situation,  the  nationalist  movement  in  Turkey  was  definitely  patriotic  and  not  religious. 
'The  more  nationalist  a  movement  is  the  less  weikht  therein  have  religious  and  quasi- 
religious  factors  and  the  more  weight  have  territorial  considerations,  '  stressed  the  War 
Office  rcporLI53  Churchill,  in  March  1920,  had  himself  underlined  the  fear  of  a 
Nationalist  attack  at  Constantinople  in  a  letter  to  Harington:  'We  are  running  a  great  risk 
of  having  this  city  cut  off  from  all  its  victualling  grounds  by  the  Nationalists.  '  154 
Another  official  that  had  from  the  beginning  underlined  the  fear  of  seeing  the 
Nationalists  join  hands  with  the  Bolsheviks  was  Admiral  John  De  Robeck,  British  High 
'so  PRO,  CAD  21/177,13olshevik  influence  on  Moslems,  written  by  the  Intelligence  Department  of  the 
High  Commissioner  of  Constantinople,  25  December  1919. 
151  For  examples  see  PRO,  FO  371/5042-E704/3/44,  pp.  23-6,  Webb  to  Curzon,  28  February  1920.  Also 
FO  371/5043,  de  Robeck  to  Curzon,  13  February  1920  and  FO  371/5046,  de  Robeck  to  Secretary  of  the 
Admiralty. 
152  'Lloyd  George  shared  the  view  of  the  labour  Movement  that  the  restoration  of  the  Russian  market  was 
vital  to  European  prosperity.  [ 
... 
]WIffle  not  emmoured  of  the  Bolshevik  regime  and  its  leaders,  Lloyd 
George  realised  that  the  Allies  would  have  to  coexist  with  the  Soviet  Empire  and  that  Britain  would  need, 
therefore.  to  conic  to  terms  with  the  Bolsheviks.  '  Cited  in  Bennett,  British  Foreign  Policy  during  the 
Curzon  Period,  p.  62. 
153  PRO,  WO  106tI  505,  Turkey  Nationalist  operations  -  Appreciation  of  the  Situation  in  Turkey,  9 
March  1920. 
154  Churchill  to  I  farington,  20  March  1920  in Gilbert,  Churchill,  vol.  IV,  Companion  -  Part  11,  p.  1053. 141 
Commissioner  at  Constantinople  until  November  1920.  De  Robeck,  in  his 
communications  to  the  First  Sea  Lord,  Lord  Beatty,  was  always  expressing  his  fears 
about  that  possibility.  In  July  1920  he  reported  that  Russian  officers  from 
Constantinople  were  joining  Kemal,  according  to  intelligence.  The  Admiral  was  of  the 
opinion  that  things  would  have  been  different  if  Britain  'had  accepted  the  fruits  of 
victory,  '  forming  a  treaty  with  'predominant  British  influence.  '  If  this  had  been  the  case, 
De  Robeck  was  sure  that  the  Bolsheviks  would  have  'never  dared  to  come  over  the 
Caucasus  or  have  sought  to  inflame  the  Persians,  Arabs  or  the  Turks  against  us.  "  55 
The  last  spark  in  the  ftirther  strengthening  of  Kemal's  nationalist  movement  was 
the  nominally  international,  but  in  reality,  British  occupation  of  the  Ottoman  capital.  In 
the  eyes  of  the  Turkish  people,  the  Sultan's  government  in  Constantinople  was  merely  a 
pawn  in  the  hands  of  the  Allies,  and  they  turned  their  hopes  to  the  Nationalist  movement 
led  by  Kemal.  Thus,  a  measure  taken  primarily  to  reinforce  Allied  presence  there  ftirther 
reinforced  the  nationalist  movement.  The  move  was  taken  after  the  realisation  that 
Kemal  had  support  in  the  Ottoman  capital  itself,  since  the  Chamber  of  the  Ottoman 
deputies  had  in  January  approved  the  Nationalist  Pact.  156 
THE  BRITISH  CASE:  THE  DEBATES  AINIONG  THE  BRITISH  OFFICIALS. 
The  question  for  all  those  formulating  British  policy  was  this:  how  to  ensure  the 
stability  of  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  in  order  to  secure  British  interests  and  safeguard 
Britain's  strategic  communications  with  its  Empire  in  the  East;  the  means  proposed  for 
achieving  this,  however,  differed.  Up  until  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War,  Great 
Britain's  foreign  policy  towards  the  Ottoman  Empire  was  conducted  through  the 
Foreign  Office  and  the  Diplomatic  Service.  During  the  War,  the  handling  of  policy 
155  CHURCHILL  COLLEGE  ARCHIVES,  De  Robeck  Papers,  DRBK  6/3  24  February  to  4  June  1921 
Correspondence  with  First  Sea  Lord,  De  Robeck  to  Beatty,  13  July  1920.  156  For  the  devclopnxnts  in  the  Nationalist  camp  see  S.  Sonyel,  Turkish  Diplomacy  (London,  1975). 142 
regarding  the  Ottoman  Empire,  which  had  sided  with  the  enemy,  had  passed  to  the  War 
Council.  When  the  war  was  over,  the  number  of  policy  designers  and  their  contradictory 
schemes  for  action  complicated  the  making  of  Britain's  foreign  policy  towards  the 
region.  157 
The  Prime  Minister  and  certain  Foreign  Office  Peace  Conference  officials 
considered  that  the  security  of  British  strategic  priorities  in  the  area  could  be  partly 
achieved  with  a  powerful  regional  ally  that  would  serve  as  the  guarantor  of  British 
interests.  It  was  also  essential  that  this  ally  would  never  be  strong  enough  to  challenge 
British  predominance  in  the  region.  The  Prime  Minister  and  this  'policy-making  arm'  158 
of  the  government  in  Paris  thought  that  Greece  could  be  Britain's  proxy  in  the  region. 
Greece  met  the  prerequisites.  Geopolitically  it  was  the  ideal  candidate.  159  Curzon,  the 
head  of  the  Foreign  Office  since  October  1919,  held  the  view  that  they  ought  to  turn  the 
Turks  out  of  Europe  and  deprive  them  of  control  of  the  Straits,  giving  them  sovereignty 
over  Asia  Minor  in  compensation  thereby  satisfying  their  national  aspirations.  160  The 
Foreign  Secretary  did  not  see  a  role  for  Greece  in  that  settlement.  Along  these  lines, 
Montagu,  at  the  India  Office,  opposed  a  partition  of  Ottoman  territories,  asking  for  the 
retention  of  an  independent  Turkish  state,  which  would  include  Asia  Minor, 
Constantinople  and  Thrace,  thus  keeping  the  Turks  in  Europe.  161  The  military,  always 
supporting  the  traditional  British  policy  regarding  the  region  -  support  of  a  weak 
Ottoman  Empire  -  believed  that  the  safeguarding  of  British  interests  could  be  achieved 
157  Chapter  One:  'I"he  framework  of  British  decision-making  -  The  'management'  of  the  Near 
Eastern  Question.  'p.  25.  For  an  account  of  Britain's  foreign  policy  regarding  the  Ottoman  Empire  before 
the  Great  War  see  Joseph  Heller,  British  Policy  Towards  the  Ottoman  Empire,  1909-1914  (London, 
1983).  For  British  policy  during  the  War  see  F.  H.  Hinsley,  ed.,  British  Foreign  Policy  under  Sir  Edward 
Grey  (Cambridge,  1977). 
's'  M.  Kent,  'Great  Britain  and  the  End  of  the  Ottoman  Empire',  ed.  by  M.  Kent,  Yhe  Great  Powers  and 
the  End  ofthe  Ottoman  Empire,  p.  190 
I"  See  Chapter  Two.  -  'The  Allied  decision  for  the  Greek  landing  at  Smyma,  'p.  88. 
160  MaiseL  The  Foreign  OVice  and  Foreign  Policy,  p.  36 
161  Curzon  and  Montagu  were  opposed  to  partition.  See  PRO,  CAB  29/28/1,  Paris  Meeting,  19  May 
1919. 143 
through  the  support  of  an  undermined,  limited  and  passive  Turkish  state,  as  had  been  the 
case  since  the  last  century.  Staunch  supporters  of  this  view  were  first  Field  Marshal  Sir 
Henry  Wilson  and,  from  middle  1919,  Winston  Churchill. 
Allen  Leeper,  Harold  Nicolson,  Eric  Forbes  Adam  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  Arnold 
Toynbee,  were  the  Foreign  Office  officials  that  showed  certain  pro-Greek  feelings  in 
Paris.  162  This  was  partly  translated  to  supporting  Greece's  desiderata  as  these  were 
expressed  in  the  venue  of  the  Peace  Conference.  The  first  three  kept  this  line,  while 
Toynbee  disassociated  himself  from  this  position  soon  after  Paris.  Sir  Eyre  Crowe,  the 
assistant  under  secretary  of  state,  also  in  Paris,  had  shown  -  up  to  a  certain  extent  -a 
pro-Greek  attitude.  Crowe  believed  that  it  was  in  British  interest  to  maintain  and  support 
a  fiiendly  Greece.  Settled  on  his  belief  in  Anglo-French  co-operation,  he  took  as  a 
precondition  that  in  order  to  support  Greece,  Britain  had  first  to  secure  French  co- 
operation.  Crowe  was  in  favour  of  'splitting  Asia  Minor  among  the  Powers  -  setting  up 
a  Great  Greece  in  Europe  and  Asia  Minor,  which  would  protect  the  freedom  of  the 
Straits  and  replace  Turkey  as  Britain's  ally  in  the  region.  '  163  Balfour,  himself  in  Paris, 
initially  backed  the  Greeks,  especially  since  their  attempts  targeted  Italian  movements. 
In  July  1919,  however,  he  stressed  the  need  to  draw  a  definite  line  which  both  Greeks 
and  Turks  would  respect.  164  Only  the  British  Delegation  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference 
showed  signs  of  support  towards  the  Greeks.  However,  their  recommendations  were  too 
cautious  to  make  any  impact. 
In  a  report,  prepared  by  the  Political  Section  of  the  Foreign  Off-ice  in  May  1919, 
the  authors  seem  convinced  that  the  entire  dismemberment  of  Turkey  was  no  longer  'a 
162 
Allen  Leeper  (1887-1935)  was  a  member  of  the  Political  intelligence  Department.  Harold  Nicolson 
(1886-1968).  member  of  the  Diplomatic  Service,  had  served  at  Constantinople  before  Paris,  after  January 
1920  joined  the  Central  European  Deparunent.  Eric  Forbes  Adam  belonged  to  the  Eastern  Department. 
Arnold  Toynbee  (1886-1975)  had  served  in  various  propaganda  offices  before  joining  the  Political 
lnlclllgcnce  Department,  despite  his  initial  warm  support  had  started  to  warn  that  if  Greece's  acquiring  a 
role  in  Anatolia  would  cause  problems. 144 
question  of  practical  politics'  unless  Britain  was  ready  to  undertake  military  operations 
on  a  larger  scale.  165  Back  in  London,  at  the  headquarters  of  the  Foreign  Office,  nobody 
had  welcomed  the  news  of  the  Greek  landing  at  Smyrna.  166  Curzon,  acting  Foreign 
Secretary  from  January  1919  and  Foreign  Secretary  proper  from  October,  had  his  own 
approach  to  the  issue  of  the  fate  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  He  was  in  favour  of  a  plan 
which  included  the  creation  of  a  line  of  independent  buffer  states  in  the  Caucasus, 
Trans-Caspia,  Persia  and  Mesopotamia.  In  his  famous  and  over-cited  memoranda,  the 
Turks  were  to  be  left  out  of  Europe,  confined  to  the  places  where  they  were  allegedly  a 
majority,  thus  leaving  them  with  sovereignty  over  Asia  Minor.  There  was  not  to  be  a 
partition  of  this  Turkish  territory,  thus  leaving  the  Greeks  out  of  the  region  while 
Constantinople  and  the  Straits  were  to  be  administered  by  an  international  regime.  167 
Prominent  in  the  ranks  which  opposed  the  backing  of  the  Greeks  as  Britain's 
proxy  in  the  area,  was  the  India  Office  -  also  involved  actively  in  Ottoman  affairs  prior 
to  the  War  -  and  in  particular  its  head,  Edwin  Montagu.  Montagu's  opinion  on  the 
policy  regarding  Turkey  was  guided  by  his  intense  concern  regarding  Muslim  opinion. 
'Moslem  discontent,  '  was  his  primary  fear  and  wielding  this  weapon  used  to  write  to 
David  Lloyd  George,  urging  for  a  settlement  that  would  satisfy  Moslem  feelings.  168  In  a 
memorandum,  submitted  by  the  Indian  Delegation,  it  is  more  than  clear  that  Montagu 
'"  Maisel,  77,  e  Foreign  19jr1ce  and  Foreign  Policy,  p-53  164  PRO,  FO  60&190-1284  .,  Balfour  to  Admiral  Calthorpe.  II  July  1919- 
165  PRO,  FO  371/4156-74967,  Report  of  the  Political  Intelligence  Department,  17  May  1919.  With  this 
report  the  authors  had  triedto  prove  the  impracticability  of  putting  Greece  in  Constantinople  on  the 
grounds  that:  'it  would  be  far  more  provocative  to  the  Turks  than  the  policy  of  creating  a  neutral  state', 
and  that  'it  would  lead  to  the  strongest  Italian  opposition  increasing  Italian  demands  in  Anatolia  to 
Innse  Smyrna  and  AidirLI 
PRO.  FO  371/4218-9406  1,  Admiralty  to  F.  0,  Enclosure  of  a  Report  on  the  Greek  occupation  of 
Smyrna.  May  1919  submitted  by  the  British  C-in-C  Mediterranean  dated  20  May  1919,4  June  1919.  The 
Foreign  OfrIce  was  only  informed  on  various  occasions  regarding  decisions  in  Paris,  after  the  last  were 
takm  Harold  Nicolson  in  his  Diary  of  the  Conference  'complains'  several  times  for  that,  see  Harold 
NiColson.  peacemaking  1919  (London,  1964). 
167  PRO,  FO  371/4179-46887/2863.  Memorandum  by  Earl  Curzon,  'A  Note  of  Warning  about  the  Middle 
East.  '  25  March  1919.  Also,  Darwin,  Britain,  Egypt  and  the  Middle  East,  pp.  150-1  and  159-60. 
1"  1  ILRO,  Lloyd  George  Papers,  F/40/2/49,  Montagu  to  P.  M,  16  April  1919  and  F/40/2/64,  Montagu  to 
PAI,  13  December  1919. 145 
had  objected  from  the  beginning  to  the  granting  of  Smyrna  to  Greece.  The  Secretary  for 
India  provided  economic  and  ethnological  reasons  and  stressed  that  'the  feeling  on  the 
future  of  Turkey  is  growing  apace  in  India'  while  'the  British  Empire  is  embarking  on  a 
campaign  which  is  not  merely  anti-Turkish  but  anti-Mohammedan.  '  His  opposition  to 
seeing  Greece  established  in  the  region  surrounding  Turkey  'reflected  his  intense 
preoccupation  with  the  conciliation  especially  of  Indian  Muslims  whose  hostility 
appeared  the  greatest  barrier  to  success  in  India.  '  169  Montagu  used  to  bombard  not  only 
the  Prime  Minister  but  the  Foreign  Office  and  Curzon  with  letters,  expressing  his 
concern  over  the  possible  backing  of  Greek  troops  by  British.  170  Lloyd  George  was  in 
various  instances  annoyed  by  the  attitude  of  his  Minister  and  had  warned  him  to  behave 
in  a  manner  appropriate  to  his  position.  Montagu's  behaviour  during  the  San  Remo 
Conference  had  forced  Lloyd  George  to  write  him  a  letter  refusing  Montagu's  claims  to 
a  right  to  send  memoranda  direct  to  the  Paris  Conference.  171 
Winston  Churchill,  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War  and  Air,  from  1919  to  1921 
and  as  Colonial  Secretary  thereafter,  was  prominent  in  the  making  of  policy  for  the  area. 
He  was  gravely  preoccupied  with  a  'private  war'  that  was  directly  connected  in  his  mind 
with  the  Turkish  question.  Bolshevism  and  the  fear  of  its  spread  outside  the  Russian 
borders  troubled  the  War  Secretary.  The  Middle  East  was  an  area  which  Churchill 
believed  that  Bolsheviks  would  try  to  penetrate.  172  From  his  position,  the  Secretary  was 
aware  of  the  intelligence  coming  from  Constantinople  and  other  theatres  of  the  Middle 
East  that  connected  the  Turkish  Nationalist  forces  with  Bolshevism.  That  alone  was  a 
sound  reason  for  Churchill  to  oppose  any  solution  which  would  force  the  Nationalist 
1"  Darwin.  Britain.  EýDpt  and  the  Middle  East,  p.  22. 
170  PRO,  ADxj  11613237,  Memorandum  by  Indian  Delegation,  8  April  1919.  An  example  of  Montagu's 
correspondence  with  Curzon  in  PRO,  FO  371/4220-108984,  Montagu  to  Curzon,  29  July  1919.  Further, 
on  Montagu's  views  see  HLRO,  Lloyd  George  Papers,  F/40/2158,  Montagu  to  Curzon,  14  August  1919, 
and  PRO,  CAB  23/20,  Appendix  1.5  January  1920. 
171  IILRO,  Lloyd  George  Papers,  F/40/3/5,  David  Lloyd  George  to  Montagu,  25  April  1920. 146 
forces  into  the  arms  of  Russia.  173  And  by  promoting  Greek  interests  in  Anatolia, 
Churchill  believed  that  the  Nationalists  would  be  forced  to  lean  on  the  Bolsheviks  for 
help. 
By  the  summer  of  1919,  the  Secretary  for  War  was  convinced  that  Britain  must 
make  peace  with  Turkey  as  soon  as  possible,  seeing  no  worth  in  supporting  the 
Grceks.  174  He  bombarded  the  Cabinet  with  detailed  memoranda.  He  was  opposed  to  the 
Lloyd  Georgian  scheme  of  establishing  the  Greeks  in  Anatolia.  'Venizelos  and  the 
Greece  be  represents  (in  whose  future  we  have  so  great  an  interest)  may  well  be  ruined 
as  a  result  of  their  immense  military  commitments  in  the  Smyrna  province.  '  175  Churchill 
did  not  believe  that  the  Greeks  would  be  strong  enough  to  oppose  a  Bolshevik  descent 
upon  the  Straits  and  Constantinople.  He  was  convinced  that  in  order  to  halt  any 
Bolshevik  plans  for  expansion  it  was  necessary  to  let  the  Turks  remain  at 
Constantinople. 
I  expect'to  see  a  united  militarist  Russia  in  the  near  future...  If 
the  Turk  is  in  Constantinople  the  manhood  of  the  Turkish 
Empire  can  be  used  to  prevent  the  forcible  acquisition  by  Russia 
of  Constantinople  and  the  Straits.  If  the  Turk  is  gone  there  will 
be  nob?  ýV  to  defend  Constantinople  except  the  international 
force... 
His  initial  suggestion  was  the  overall  abandonment  of  the  plan  to  partition  the 
Empire.  He  had  proposed  that  'Greeks  should  quit  Smyrna,  the  French  should  give  up 
SYria,  we  should  give  up  Palestine  and  Mesopotamia  and  the  Italians  should  give  up 
their  sphere.  '  His  suggestion  was  to  preserve  the  Ottoman  Empire  intact  and  exercise 
1'12  Churchill  was  diametrically  opposed  to  the  Cabinet's  decision  to  stop  the  aid  to  the  anti-Bolshevik 
elements.  PRO,  CAD  23/20,29  January  1920. 
173  See  this  Chapter  for  an  analysis  of  the  Bolshevik  factor  'The  shift  in  the  military  situation  and  the 
Bolshevik  factor  in  British  thinking.  '  p.  134. 
1  74  Gilbert.  Churchill,  vol.  IV,  Companion,  Part  11,  Churchill  to  A.  J.  Balfour,  12  August  1919,  pp.  797, 
fps-  1054-5.  pp.  1114-6,  pp.  1198-1200. 
,.  6 
Mcmorandum.  War  Office,  25  October  1919,  cited  in  Gilbert,  Churchill,  vol.  IV,  pp.  937-9. 
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upon  it  only  'a  strict  form  of  international  control.  '  Churchill  had  made  it  explicit  to 
Venizelos  that  there  was  no  possibility  for  Britain  to  furnish  the  Greek  Army  with 
troops.  Ile  only  help  that  could  be  expected  from  Britain  came  in  the  shape  of  arms  and 
munitions.  There  was  even  an  attempt  to  discourage  further  the  Greek  Prime  Minister. 
'The  Greeks  would  be  engaged  for  10  or  15  years  in  hostilities  with  the  Turks  and  that 
although  the  Greeks  had  ample  troops  the  cost  in  money  might  become  prohibitive.  '  177 
For  the  War  Secretary,  the  Greeks  had  'been  authorised  to  begin  a  new  war  with  the 
Turks.  '  178  By  June  1920  Churchill  remained  strong  in  his  conviction  that  the  Bolsheviks 
were  after  a  revival  of  Russian  imperial  interests.  179 
The  General  Staff  under  its  Chief,  Sir  Henry  Wilson,  shared  Churchill's  ideas; 
both  were  voices  of  dissent  with  respect  to  Lloyd  George's  policy.  The  idea  of  General 
Field  Marshal  Henry  Wilson  regarding  British  policy  in  the  region  after  the  armistice  of 
Mudros  was  that  'the  Turkish  people  should  not  be  unnecessarily  oriented  against  Great 
Britain.,  180  Anatolia,  for  Wilson,  was-to  remain  independent  as  a  military  security 
requirement  for  Britain.  In  the  view  of  the  War  Office,  Turkey  should  continue  to  be  the 
buffer  between  the  East  and  the  West.  Wilson  had  stressed  his  wish  for  non  interference, 
in  a  military  sense,  'in  the  chaos  and  welter,  which  is  coming  in  Central  Europe,  the 
Balkans  and  Turkey.  '  Wilson,  addressing  the  Prime  Minister  had  repeatedly  outlined  the 
danger  for  Greece,  if  the  latter  were  encouraged  to  extend  their  forces  in  Anatolia  and 
Thrace.  The  factor  of  rapid  demobilisation  of  British  troops,  already  on  its  way,  did  not 
leave  much  space  for  Britain  to  enforce  any  decisions  by  military  force.  The  War  Office 
repeatedly  in  its  communications  to  the  General  Staff  Headquarters  at  Constantinople 
1771ILRO,  Lloyd  George  Papers,  F/19919/2,  Notes  of  a  Conversation  at  the  War  Office  between 
Vcnizel0s.  Secretary  of  State  for  War,  and  the  Conunander-in-Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  Greek  Military 
, 
Vlrations  in  Smyrna  and  Thrace,  19  March  1920. 
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had  outlined  the  need  'to  order  the  Greeks  back.  "  81  Admiral  De  Robeck,  Commander  in 
Chief  of  the  Mediterranean  Fleet  and  acting  British  High  Commissioner  at 
Constantinople  until  1921,  was  also  of  the  opinion  that  a  treaty  that  would  embody  the 
cession  of  all  Thrace  and  Smyrna  to  Greece  would  simply  'drive  the  Turks  into  the  arms 
of  the  Bolsheviks.  '  182  The  Bolshevik  factor  was  a  common  and  recurring  theme  among 
the  military  men  and  Churchill's  argumentation.  183 
The  government  of  Lloyd  George  was  a  coalition  government.  The 
Conservatives  were  commanding  the  majority  in  the  Coalition  government  of  Lloyd 
George.  What  was  the  position  of  the  Conservative  Party  regarding  the  fate  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire?  Lloyd  George  had  from  very  early  on  sided  with  the  idea  of 
nominating  Greece  as  Britain's  ally  in  the  region.  The  conservative  circles  had  initially 
accepted  the  decision,  primarily  because  of  the  presence  of  Eleftherios  Venizelos,  'the 
most  reliable  pillar  of  the  Entente  in  the  Near  East.  '  184  Traditional  conservative  policies 
and  the  practice  of  many  years  did  not  leave  room  to  accept  and  consequently  to  support 
such  radical  innovations  as  the  one  that  Lloyd  George  was  determined  to  introduce.  185 
The  defeat  of  Venizelos  had  deprived  the  Conservatives  who  viewed  Venizelos  as  the 
Pillar  of  the  Entente,  of  the  one  element  of  Lloyd  George's  policy  which  they  agreed 
179  At  the  time  there  was  the  Russo-Polish  War  and  the  reports  coming  from  the  Middle  East  on  the 
Kemalist  ties  with  the  Bolsheviks  reinforced  his  beliefs.  See  also  this  chapter:  'The  shift  in  the  military 
situation  and  the  Bolshevik  factor  in  British  thinking.  '  p.  134. 
1"  PRO,  WO  33/10(9,  no  number,  Memo  by  Henry  Wilson,  19  February  1919. 
181  PRO,  FO  6081161-6590,  Situation  in  the  Near  East  -  Paper  and  Map  with  Minutes  by  the  General  Staff 
to  the  Prime  Minister,  7  April  1919,  the  danger  to  Greece  is  apparent  if  she  is  encouraged  to  fin-ther 
extend  her  forces  in  Anatolia  and  Tbrace.  M.  Venizclos  has  given  orders  for  remobilization  to  commence 
but  he  is  believed  to  be  actuated  more  by  territorial  aspirations  than  by  the  realities  of  the  military 
Situation.  ' 
182  CHURCHILL  COLLEGE  ARCHIVES,  De  Robeck  Papers,  DRBK  6/1,  De  Robeck  to  Curzon,  March 
1920. 
I'"  See  this  Chapter'The  shift  in  the  military  situation  in  Anatolia  and  the  Bolshevik  factor  in  British 
thinking-'p.  138. 
1"  National  Review,  December  1920,  p.  445,  cited  by  Rose  Inbal,  Conservatism  andforeign  policy  during 
the  Lloyd  George  coalition.  1918-1922  (London,  1999),  p.  229. 
its  'Me  history  of  the  Conservative  policy  is  the  history  of  an  institution  that  has  placed  a  high  value  on 
avoiding  controversial  initiatives  and  maintaining  unity.  '  E.  Green,  The  Crisis  of  Conservatism,  1880- 
1914  (London,  1995ý  p3 149 
with.  186  The  Conservative  Party  had  nurtured  a  pro-Turk  policy  since  the  days  of 
Disraeli.  Now  that  the  War  was  over,  old  party  politics  had  begun  to  surface  again. 
The  most  prominent  members  of  the  Conservative  group  who  opposed  replacing 
Turkey  with  Greece  were,  among  others,  Sir  Charles  Townshend,  Sir  Aubrey  Herbert 
and  Lord  Lamington.  They  frequently  bombarded  the  House  of  Commons  and  the 
Government  with  questions  regarding  British  help  to  Greece.  '  87  As  time  went  by,  the 
critique  of  these  conservative  backbenchers  was  fast  gaining  ground  and  it  was  usually 
supplemented  with  articles  in  conservative  papers,  like  Yhe  Times  and  the  Morning 
POSI.  188 
BRITISH  POLICY  MAKING  OVER  THE  NEAR  EAST  FROM  MAY  1919  TO  AUGUST  1920. 
It  would  be  impossible  to  sustain  any  argument  that  there  was  no  opposition 
from  May  1919  to  August  1920  to  the  plan  supported  by  Lloyd  George  and  certain 
elements  of  the  Foreign  Office  to  see  the  Greeks  establ  shed  in  Western  Asia  Minor. 
Some  of  the  most  prominent  members  of  the  Coalition  Government,  Churchill  and 
Montagu,  backed  by  their  Offices,  staunchly  criticised  the  Greek  option.  However, 
although  their  objections  were  clearly  stated,  policy  was  decided  during  the 
international  conferences,  where  Lloyd  George  and  the  Foreign  Office  predominated.  In 
addition,  the  objections  of  these  elements  of  the  British  foreign  policy-making  elite 
were  not  backed  adequately  since  the  developments  in  the  area  had  not  yet  proved  them 
For  the  Greek  elections  of  November  1920  and  the  defeat  of  Venizelos  see  Chapter  Four.  'The 
20  Greek  elections  and  the  defeat  of  Venizelos.  '  p.  156. 
1  r  0ýýe 
arle9numerous  questions  in  the  House  of  Commons  Debates,  see  for  example,  Aubrey  Herbert's 
question  regarding  the  Smyrna  incidents  of  May  1919  and  the  'afleged'  British  Government's  wish  not  to 
publish  the  results,  although  this  was  a  unanimous  Allied  decision  in PD.  C,  v.  126,  c.  1805-6,15  March 
1920. 
'"  See  for  eumple  the  reaction  on  the  Greek  landing  at  Smyrna  in  The  Times,  27  August  1919.  For  a 
discussion  of  Conservative  views  on  the  Bolshevik  factor  see  Chapter  Four.  'The  Bolshevik  Connection.  ' 
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right  over  the  inability  of  the  Greek  forces  to  establish  themselves  firmly  in  the 
region.  189 
Both  Lloyd  George  and  Curzon  during  this  period  appeared  determined  to 
pursue  plans  to  contain  Turkey  and  Britain's  wartime  Allies.  The  Foreign  Office 
worked  feverishly  to  set  up  a  treaty  to  safeguard  British  interests  in  the  region:  the  result 
was  the  Treaty  of  S6vrcs.  190  Lloyd  George  and  Curzon  had  worked  side  by  side  during 
the  first  half  of  1920  and  had  managed  to  maintain  control  over  Britain's  policy 
regarding  the  Near  East  and  the  Greek-Turkish  issue. 
The  Bolshevik  factor,  translated  into  a  potential  alliance  between  the  Soviets  and 
the  Turkish  Nationalist  forces,  was  a  good  card  in  the  hands  of  those,  primarily  in  the 
War  Office,  who  longed  for  a  return  to  the  old  pro-Turkish  policy.  The  fear  that  Russia 
would  allempt  to  contain  British  supremacy  in  the  region  was  present.  However,  the 
BoIshevik-Turkish  Nationalist  link  had  not  yet  gained  the  necessary  impetus  to  strike  a 
decisive  blow  to  the  British  pro-Greek  policy.  Although,  Conservative  circles  and 
Churchill  shared  the  idea  that  Bolshevism  was  indeed  a  major  threat,  military 
intelligence  had  not  yet  provided  any  hard  evidence  to  prove  a  direct  link  between 
Kemal  and  Russia. 
Most  striking  of  all,  the  Greek  military  'inability'  to  protect  Allied  and  British 
interests  in  the  area,  the  argument  that  the  British  military  had  advocated,  was  simply 
anon  CXistent'  during  this  period.  The  War  Office's  worst  fear  had  been  from  the 
beginning  of  the  Greek  entanglement  in  Asia  Minor  that  British  forces  might  be  forced 
to  fight  in  Asia  there,  assisting  the  Greeks.  On  the  contrary,  in  June  1920,  the  Greek 
forces  were  called  to  assist  the  British  forces  in  the  area  adjacent  to  the  Straits.  Despite 
The  Greek  forces  had  advanced  beyond  the  Smyrna  area  without  Allied  help.  In  the  meantime,  the 
Nationalist  forces  of  Kemal  had  not  yet  proved  strong  enough  to  block  the  Greek  advances  in  the  summer 
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the  British  Government's  reassurances  in  the  House  of  Commons  that  the  Greek 
advance  was  'merely  part  of  the  Allied  operations  to  resist  the  aggression  of  the  rebel 
Nationalists  directed  against  the  execution  of  the  Peace  Treaty,  '  it  was  not  simply 
that.  191  By  August  1920  British  interests  required  military  backing  in  the  area  of 
Western  Asia  Minor  primarily  for  the  Straits,  and  the  Greek  Army  provided  this  backing 
to  the  best  of  its  capacity.  192 
Allied  positions  in  Constantinople  and  the  Straits  had  been  secured  from 
Nationalist  attacks  after  the  Greek  advance.  However,  the  endurance  of  the  Treaty  of 
S6vres  depended  upon  the  Greek  Army  continuing  to  provide  military  support  for  its 
clauses.  Overall,  it  seems  that  neither  the  combined  pressure  of  the  War  and  India 
Offices,  coupled  with  the  expressed  anxieties  of  Conservative  circles,  nor  the  frosty 
reception  of  the  Greek  presence  at  Smyrna  by  the  British  local  element  of  the  city  and 
Britain's  allies,  France  and  Italy,  had  served  to  alter  British  policy  regarding  Greece 
during  this  period.  Obviously,  the  decision  to  carry  on  with  the  Greek  option  was  taken 
by  the  British  policy  makers  in  the  light  of  the  required  Greek  military  presence  in  the 
area  of  the  Straits  and  Constantinople.  Once  the  danger  for  an  advance  of  the  Nationalist 
forces  to  the  Straits  faded  away,  the  British  General  Staff,  along  with  the  rest  of  the 
advocates  for  a  revision  of  the  Treaty  of  S6vres,  resumed  immediately  their  old  position: 
the  withdrawal  of  British  support  to  the  Greek  presence  in  Western  Asia  Minor. 
190  See  this  Chapter.  'Ile  San  Remo  Conference  and  the  unleashing  of  Greek  designs  in  Asia  Minor:  The 
British  sanction  of  June  1920  and  the  Greek  advance.  'p.  126. 
191  PD.  Cý  v.  13  1,  c.  1954,12  July  1920. 
I"  See  this  Chapter  "ne  dilerrinia.  of  Greek  sanction  and  the  British  Cabinet's  "silent"  acquiescence.  '  p. 
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Chapter  Four 
The  'inextricable  Turkish  situation'  and  the  summer  Greek 
Offensive  of  1921. 
THE'VENIZELIST'PARANIETEPL 
The  Greek  Prime  Minister,  Eleftherios  Venizelos,  had  been,  for  friends  and  foes 
alike,  a  charismatic  leader.  '  For  a  long  time  he  had  been  the  politician  who  had 
managed  to  give  meaning  to  the  long  lived  dreams  of  an  entire  nation.  He  had  won  the 
1910,1914,1916  elections  and  he  was  only  temporarily  out  of  office  during  the  Great 
War.  2  The  majority  of  the  Greek  electoral  body  had  backed  Venizelos  up  in  various 
instances  as  he  had  realised  a  considerable  part  of  Greece's  long  standing  dreams  and 
the  Afegali  Idea  was  finally  taking  full  form.  Under  his  leadership  Greece  had  been 
victorious  during  the  Balkan  Wars.  It  was  through  his  initiative  and  effort  that  Greece 
had  joined  the  Entente  Powers  and  had  the  chance  of  a  good  hearing  at  Versailles. 
Greece  after  the  Balkan  Wars  had  increased  its  territories  by  68  per  cent  and  its 
population  had  almost  doubled?  During  the  negotiations  in  Paris  the  Allies  had  only 
praise  for  the  Balkan  leader  who  had  managed  to  bring  his  nation  onto  their  side  in  the 
face  of  a  forceful  opposition. 
However,  things  were  gradually  changing  for  Vcnizelos  in  Greece.  In  a  British 
intelligence  report  from  Constantinople  on  the  public  opinion  at  Smyrna,  a  turn  of  tide 
1  In  an  obituary  for  Venizclos  by  one  his  staunchest  critics,  the  editor  of  the  paper  Kathimerini,  Georgios 
Vlachos,  we  read:  'Vcnizclos  was  not  a  man  like  all,  a  common  organism,  good  or  bad,  small  or great, 
coward  or  brave,  upright  or perverted.  He  was  something  in  addition  to  all  this,  and  all  this  together. 
Eleftherios  Venizelos  was,  lived4  died,  and  will  remain  a  problem,  a  mystery,  a  myth,  a  nightmare,  a 
terrible  blend  of  a  small and  a  great  man  who  willed,  acted,  moved,  and  did  not  feel,  did  not  believe,  did 
not  rest.  Kathimerini,  19  March  1936  cited  by  G.  Mavrogordatos,  Stillborn  Republic,  Social  Conditions 
and  Party  Strategies  in  Greece,  1922-1936  (Berkeley,  California,  1983),  p.  56. 
2  See  Chapter  Two:  'The  Great  War  and  the  Dardanelles  -  Greece  enters  the  War  on  the  side  of  the 
Allies.  'p.  54. 
3  Territory  from  25,014  to  41,014  square  mdes  while  the  population  had  increased  from  2,700,000  to 
4,800,000.  Figures  quoted  from  D.  Dakin,  The  Unification  of  Greece  1770-1923  (London,  1972),  p.  20  1. 133 
had  been  observed  regarding  his  popularity  as  early  as  the  end  of  1919.  Signs  of 
discontent  were  reported  among  certain  sections  of  the  Army  in  Smyrna.  This  was 
attributed  to  'the  only  fault  of  a  great  man'  as  Venizelos  was  'too  partial  with  his 
friends.  0  Regarding  the  opinion  of  the  local  Greek  population,  it  was  underlined  that 
4nearly  all  were  Venizelist  in  sympathy,  '  however,  a  number  of  practical  problems  were 
putting  strains  on  their  enthusiasm.  5 
In  January  1920,  Venizelos  had  returned  to  Athens  for  a  few  days,  for  the 
opening  of  the  Chamber  for  the  New  Year.  He  announced  the  prolongation  of  life  of  the 
present  ministry  and  chamber  for  another  four  months  until  the  treaty  was  settled,  so 
that  the  nation  would  judge  his  whole  work.  6  However,  he  refused  to  remove  censorship 
or  martial  law  or  to  give  amnesty  for  political  offences.  7  The  Opposition  reacted.  While 
the  Greek  Prime  Minister  was  again  away  at  San  Remo,  sixteen  Opposition  leaders 
united  and  with  a  joint  declaration  on  31  March  demanded  immediate  elections.  They 
were  clearly  expressing  their  opposition  to  Venizelos'  plea  for  patience  until  the  signing 
of  the  peace  treaty  with  Turkey.  They  believed  that  his  government  was  a  'true 
dictatorship'  and  they  were  no  longer  willing  to  wait,  not  even  for  the  sake  of  the 
national  interest.  Vcnizelos  was  informed  about  the  manifesto  and  gave  his  answer 
through  the  means  of  an  interview  to  a  Greek  newspaper:  'They  accuse  me  of 
prolonging  the  life  of  the  parliament.  They  do  not  say  that  England  did  the  same  for  3 
years  and  France  for  18  months.  's 
After  the  San  Remo  Conference  there  was  another  brief  return  to  Athens  for  the 
Prime  Minister.  This  time  he  returned  with  Eastern  Thrace  and  Western  Asia  Minor  to 
4  PRO,  FO  371/4223-165328,  Public  opinion  in  Smyrna,  WO  Paper,  General  intelligence-Constantinople, 
29  December  1919. 
5  Ibid. 
6  The  Chamber  of  1920  had  been  actually  the  one  elected  in  May  1915,  of  the  elections  that  Venizelos 
had  won  but  Constantine  had  forced  him  out  of  office.  This  chamber  Venizelos  called  back  in  1917  when 
he  returned  to  office. 154 
offer.  On  the  internal  scene,  however,  Venizelos  still  kept  the  country  on  a  military 
footing  and  had  no  intention  of  cancelling  martial  law.  On  the  issue  of  the  elections  he 
suggested  that  it  would  be  better  to  wait  for  the  signing  of  the  treaty  and  allow  the 
people  from  the  new  territories  to  take  part  in  the  election  process  as  well.  On  28  April 
1920,  the  Supreme  Council  called  the  representatives  of  Turkey  and  officially 
announced  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  peace.  Venizelos  announced  to  the  Greek 
Parliament  the  terms  and  concluded  with  the  following:  'We  are  about  to  establish  the 
basis  of  the  Greater  Greece.  The  task  is  huge  but  we  have  the  strength.  The  Greek 
people  have  the  power  to  fulfill  this  task  as  well.  '9 
The  Greek  Prime  Minister  had  achieved  a  great  victory  with  the  signing  of  the 
Peace  Treaty  on  10  August  1920,  although  it  existed  only  on  paper.  At  first,  he  appeared 
as  confident  as  he  had  been  in  the  initial  stages  of  the  Paris  Peace  Conference.  He  had 
created  the  Greece  of  'the  two  continents  and  five  seas.  '  However,  the  treaty  had  only 
prolonged  the  war  for  the  Greek  people.  None  of  the  Allies  were  willing  to  offer  the 
support  that  Greece  needed  to  keep  hold  of  its  spoils.  Venizelos'  General  Staff  had 
warned  him  about  the  practicalities:  the  need  to  secure  firmer  borders  and  crush  the 
Nationalists.  General  Paraskevopoulos,  the  Commander  of  the  Greek  forces  in  Asia 
Minor,  believed  that  the  Nationalists  would  never  accept  the  treaty.  10  The  General  was 
proved  right,  as  the  Greek  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  received  piles  of  reports  from 
Constantinople  and  Smyrna  on  the  force  of  the  Nationalists,  on  their  relations  with  the 
Bolsheviks  and  their  rapprochement  with  the  Italians.  VcnizelOs  had  been  warned  on  the 
7  PRO,  WO  106/349,  no  number,  Summary  of  Intelligence  -  Greece,  13  January  1920. 
'  Interview  to  the  Greek  newspaper  Eleftheros  7:,  )pos,  20  April  1920. 
9  Session  of  23  April  1920,  Greece,  House  ofParliament  Debates  -  E(pquepic  rwv  m)CJ7zýo-cwvr,  7c  BovA4q 
(Athens,  1920). 
10  Greek  General  Staff,  The  Expedition  in  Asia  Minor  -H  EkoTparria  efc  rjv  AfiKpdv  Aafav  (Athens, 
1957).  Vol.  11,  Appendix  27. 155 
situation  which  was  facing  the  Greek  forces.  "  At  the  end  of  August,  Paraskevopoulos 
had  compiled  a  long  report  in  which  he  outlined  the  dangers  and  urged  action  in  order  to 
secure  a  better  position  and  crush  the  Kemalist  forces.  The  'remedy'  was  a  general 
offensive,  first  to  capture  Eski-Sehr  and  Afion  Karahissar,  and  then  march  towards 
Angora.  12 
The  first  signs  of  Venizelos'  anxiety,  clearly  prompted  by  the  proposals  of  his 
Staff,  followed  later  than  one  would  expect.  In  a  long  telegram  to  David  Lloyd  George, 
on  5  October  1920,  the  Greek  Prime  Minister  presented  the  Greek  situation  in  realistic 
terms,  departing  radically  from  his  past  efforts  to  present  the  country  as  always  willing 
to  take  up  the  burden  on  its  own.  Military  operations  were  absolutely  necessary, 
underlined  Venizelos,  and  the  latter  would  have  to  be  backed  up  by  Britain,  this  time 
not  only  financially  but  with  real  help  on  the  battleground.  If  Greece  did  not  receive 
help  before  the  winter  the  Greek  Prime  Minister  announced  to  Lloyd  George,  he  would 
be  forced  to  order  the  demobilisation  of  the  Greek  Army  'in  view  of  political  and 
financial  considerations.  '  'The  only  radical  remedy,  '  stressed  Venizelos,  'would  be  a 
new  campaign.  '  13 
The  signing  of  the  treaty  had  forced  the  Greek  Prime  Minister  to  see  the  real 
picture  and  his  General  Staff  urged  him  to  action;  this  further  action,  however,  could  not 
be  achieved  by  Greece's  own  means,  especially  due  to  the  expected  upsurge  of  the 
Turkish  Nationalists.  Venizelos  believed  that  by  presenting  the  facts,  he  could  prompt  a 
11  MFA,  1920/10.1  File  Turkey  (January  -July  1920),  no  566,  Secret  -Constantinople,  Information 
regarding  guns  and  munitions  for  the  Turkish  Nationalists,  I  June  1920.  MFA,  1920/14.2  File  Relations 
between  Kemal  and  the  Bolsheviks.  No.  9890,  Canellopoulos  to  MFA,  31  July  1920.  Reporting 
communications  between  the  Nationalists  and  the  Bolsheviks.  MFA,  1920/14.4  File  Relations  between 
Kemal  and  the  Italians.  No  11893,  Canellopoulos  to  MFA,  9  September  1920,  Reporting  on  Kemal's  trip 
to  Adalia  from  where  he  went,  aboard  the  Italian  ship  Galicia  to  Rhodes  where  he  had  meetings  with  the 
Italian  representative  on  the  island.  In  the  same  report  there  is  information  regarding  the  state  of  relations 
between  Kemal  and  the  Sultan's  government.  The  file  contains  exclusively  intelligence  on  Kemal  and  the 
Bolsheviks. 
12  Greek  General  Staff,  The  Expedition  in  Asia  Minor,  Vol.  11,  Appendix  27. 
13  DBFP,  vol.  XIII,  no  152,  Telegram  from  Venizelos  to  Lloyd  George-Secret,  5  October  1920,  pp.  157-8. 156 
British  response;  his  calculations,  however,  obviously  did  not  take  the  British  situation 
into  consideration. 
With  his  letter,  the  Greek  Prime  Minister  was,  above  all  other  issues,  trying  to 
draw  Lloyd  George's  attention  to  'the  Allies's  inaction  [which]  would  embolden  Kemal, 
and  leave  a  free  hand  to  the  intrigues  of  certain  powers  desirous  of  using  Kemal  and 
Bolshevism  in  order  to  hinder  the  pacification  of  the  East.  '  14  It  soon  became  apparent, 
however,  that  no  matter  how  firm  Venizelos'  grip  on  his  country  had  been  in  the  past, 
events  were  slipping  out  of  his  control.  When  the  Greeks  had  landed  at  Smyrna  in  May 
1919,  strategically  they  had  had  the  cover  of  the  Italian  presence  at  Adalia  and  of  the 
French  at  Cilicia.  Gradually  the  situation  was  changing:  the  Italians  had  already  started 
their  retreat,  the  French  were  planning  to  do  the  same  in  Cilicia  and  the  British  did  not 
respond  to  his  plea  for  help. 
THE  NOVEMBER  1920  GREEK  ELECTIONS  AND  THE  DEFEAT  OF VENIZELOS. 
On  7  September  1920,  Venizelos  presented  the  Treaty  of  S6vres  to  the  Greek 
people  and  announced  a  general  election  for  November.  This  had  followed  an  attempt 
on  his  life  at  the  Gare  de  Lyon  on  12  August  1920,  as  he  was  leaving  France  for  Greece. 
The  Greek  Prime  Minister  was  hit  on  the  head  and  slightly  wounded.  The  attackers  were 
two  Royalists  ex-officers  of  the  Greek  Army,  Lieutenant  Apostolos  Tserepis  and  First 
Lieutenant  George  Kyriakis.  According  to  The  Tinies  report,  the  two  ex-officers  had 
'confessed  that  they  had  committed  this  outrage  to  free  their  country  of  a  tyrant  who  had 
brought  misery  upon  it.  The  people  in  consequence  of  his  administration  are  in 
deplorable  condition  and  cry  for  peace  which  he  will  not  grant.  '  15 
14 
Ibid. 
15  The  Times,  13  August  1920. 157 
Back  home,  events  further  contributed  to  an  already  bad  climate  for  Venizelos. 
On  30  September  1920,  a  pet  monkey  bit  King  Alexander.  16  His  condition  deteriorated 
rapidly  as  his  blood  had  been  poisoned.  Venizelos  during  the  King's  struggle  for  life 
had  refused  to  discuss  his  government's  course  of  action  in  the  case  that  Prince  Paul,  the 
younger  brother  of  Alexander  and  next  for  the  succession,  declined  the  throne.  Prince 
George,  Constantine's  elder  son,  had  been  excluded  as  an  option  right  after 
Constantine's  dethronement.  "  King  Alexander's  death  had  caused  the  reopening  of  the 
question  of  Constantine's  return.  King  Constantine  of  Greece  had  been  deposed  in  1917, 
after  the  return  of  Venizelos  from  Salonica  and  his  provisional  government  there, 
following  the  events  that  had  led  to  Greece's  joining  the  Allied  cause.,  8  The  French 
were  particularly  resentful  against  Constantine,  since  it  was  under  his  orders  that  French 
troops  as  members  of  an  allied  force,  under  the  command  of  the  French  Admiral  de 
Fournet,  had  been  killed  in  fighting  Greek  Royalist  troops  in  December  1916,  prior  to 
Greece's  joining  the  Allies.  Alexander  died,  leaving  the  throne  of  Greece  vacant  and 
from  then  onwards  the  road  was  open  for  the  return  of  Constantine.  For  the  Venizelists, 
the  return  of  the  Royalists  to  power  and  of  Constantine  to  Greece  had  damaged  Greece's 
ties  with  the  Allies. 
The  general  elections  were  held  in  Greece  on  14  November  1920,  with  two 
issues  still  unresolved:  the  issue  of  the  succession  and  the  British  unwillingness  to 
respond  to  the  latest  plea  for  help  to  launch  a  general  offensive  in  Asia  Minor.  The  two 
main  opposing  parties  were  the  governing  Liberal  Party,  led  by  Venizelos,  and  the 
16  Alexander  was  the  second  son  of  King  Constantine.  Ile  had  succeeded  his  father  after  Prince  George, 
the  eldest  son  and  first  in  the  line  of  succession  had  followed  his  father  in  exile. 
"  DBFP,  vol.  XII,  no  420,  Mr.  Russel  to  Curzon,  25  October  1920,  p.  497. 
18  See  especially  Leon,  Greece  and  the  Great  Powers  1914-  1917,  Chapters  XIV  and  XV.  An  Allied 
conference  that  was  held  in  London  from  April  28  to  9  May  1917  had  dealt  with  the  Greek  Question  and 
had  concluded  that  it  was  'essential  for  the  safety  of  the  Allied  force  at  Salonica  that  King  Constantine 
should  cease  to  reign  in  Athens  and  that  this  object  should,  if  possible,  be  accomplished  without  war  with 
Greece  or  other  additional  strain  on  our  shipping  resources.  '  Leon,  Greece  and  the  Great  Powers,  p.  483. 158 
United  Opposition  under  the  leadership  of  Dimitrios  Gounaris,  the  leader  of  the 
Republican  Party.  The  main  points  of  the  electoral  campaign  of  the  Liberal  Party 
centred  around  two  issues:  First,  that  Greece  had  finally  realised  its  long-lived  dream, 
settling  the  national  question.  Second,  the  hardships  which  the  people  had  had  to  endure 
were  due  to  the  struggle  for  the  settlement  of  the  national  question.  As  the  national 
question  had  been  finally  settled  the  road  was  now  open  for  the  internal  development  of 
the  country.  On  the  other  side  of  the  spectrum,  the  opposition  parties  had  formed  one 
front,  also  focusing  on  two  issues:  the  'tyranny'  of  the  Venizelist  regime  and  the  return 
of  King  Constantine.  19 
The  campaign  of  the  Opposition  eloquently  negated  the  trump  card  of  the 
Liberals,  the  foreign  policy  factor.  However,  they  put  all  their  efforts  into  raising  the 
issue  of  Constantine,  a  forbidden  issue  of  discussion  before,  due  to  the  existence  of  the 
martial  law  and  press  censorship,  both  lifted  with  the  beginning  of  the  electoral 
campaign.  However,  it  was  not  the  case  that  the  Opposition  had  no  clear  ideas  about  the 
issue  of  foreign  policy.  On  the  contrary,  they  had  done  their  best  to  assure  the  Allies  that 
they,  too,  would  follow  the  same  line,  stating  the  'unity  of  the  Greek  nation'  and  'the 
unchangeable  sentiments  of  friendship  and  interdependence  which  the  Greek  people  feel 
for  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers.  20 
Dimitrios  Gounaris,  the  leader  of  the  United  Opposition,  on  25  October  1920,  in 
the  speech  which  concluded  his  campaign,  had  presented  a  gloomy  picture  of  Greece  of 
The  King  and  the  Royal  family  left  the  country  on  June  1917.  Constantine  had  abdicated  in  favour  of  his 
second  son  Alexander.  Admittedly,  Alexander  got  on  well with  Venizelos. 
19  PRO,  FO  421/299,  no  139,  Buchanan  to  Curzon,  Report  of  a  conversation  with  Coromilas,  Greek 
Minister  in  Rome,  21  December  1920.  During  Venizelos'  absence  his  subordinates  had  a  free  hand  in 
running  the  country.  There  was  martial  law  and  censorship  due  to  the  state  of  war  and  the  secret  police  or 
otherwise  called  the  'espionage  service,  '  that  'was  constantly  revealing  plots  which  were  often 
imaginary.  ' 
20  Official  Declaration  to  the  Ministers  of  the  Entente  Powers  in  Athens,  4  June  1920,  cited  by  Smith, 
Ionian  Vision,  p.  265. 159 
1917-1920 
.21 
According  to  Gounaris,  the  government  of  Venizelos  had  been  tyrannical. 
Foreign  policy,  the  ongoing  negotiations  which  had  proved  beneficial  to  Greece,  and  the 
signing  of  the  Treaty  of  S6vres  had  been  played  down  by  the  Opposition.  The  focus  had 
been  from  beginning  to  end  on  the  internal  situation.  The  leader  of  the  United 
Opposition  confined  his  speech  to  the  issue  of  the  succession  and  the  dictatorial 
tendencies  of  the  Venizelos'  government. 
The  Prime  Minister,  in  his  final  speech  in  the  Syntagma  Square,  chose  to  focus 
on  the  issues  which  due  to  his  absence  had  been  shelved.  He  talked  about  education, 
social  security  and  agrarian  policy,  in  an  attempt  to  persuade  the  electoral  body  that 
there  would  be  a  return  to  nonnality.  He  wanted  to  suggest  that  he  was  there  to  realise 
the  policies  that  he  had  envisaged  and  promised  during  the  years  of  his  predominance. 
Venizelos  was  offering  to  the  people  'the  Treaty  of  Rvres  as  compensation  for 
disappointment  and  hardship  at  home.  '  22  The  results  showed  that  the  Greek  people  were 
not  convinced. 
Venizelos  was  'hopelessly  beaten.  '  23  The  result  came  as  a  shock  to  the  British 
Govemment.  24  Of  the  746,946  votes  375,803  were  Venizelists  and  368,678  Royalists, 
but  with  the  existing  electoral  system  the  Royalists  were  the  victors  of  this  election. 
Venizelists  won  118  out  of  369  seats.  25  The  Liberal  Party  accepted  the  results  with  the 
following  announcement: 
21  Gounaris  was  the  leader  of  the  Republican  Party,  Prime  Minister  (February-March  1915).  lie  was 
exiled  to  Corsica  in  1917.  In  November  1918  he  was  in  Pisa,  Italy  and  from  there  he  started  again  his 
political  activity.  He  became  Prime  Minister  in  1921  and  held  office  until  1922.  Tried  and  executed  in 
November  1922  on  the  accusation  of  treason  regarding  the  Asia  Minor  disaster.  Earl  Granville  believed 
that  Gounaris  was  'the  type  of  the  provincial  politician,  clever  but  unprincipled,  one  of  the  bitterest  and 
most  uncompromising  opponents  of  Venizelos'  in  PRO,  F0286/732,  Memo  included  in  Lord  Granville's 
despatch  no  447  of  November  2P,  1920.  For  a  biography  of  Gounaris  see  D.  Chronopoulos,  Dimitrios 
Gounaris  -J?  ju4Tpioq  robvap?  7q  (Athens,  n.  d). 
22  Michael  Llewellyn  Smith,  The  Greek  Occupation  of  Western  Asia  Minor  of  1919-1922  and  the 
National  Schism,  (unpublished  doctoral  dissertation,  Oxford  University,  1971),  p.  249. 
23  DBFP,  Vol.  XII,  no  428,  Granville  to  Curzon,  15  November  1920,  p.  503 
24  Lloyd  George  was  'shocked  and  distressed  to  see  the  results  of  the  Greek  elections.  '  IILRO,  Lloyd 
George  Papers,  F/55/l/41,  David  Lloyd  George  to  Venizelos,  17  November  1920. 
25  For  a  complete  table  of  the  results  see  Appendix  I,  Tables.  1.  Results  of  Greek  Elections  1910-1923. 160 
It  is  evident  that  the  Government  was  mistaken  in  its  provisions, 
even  though  definite  results  are  not  yet  known  in  their  entirety. 
The  Government  is  waiting  for  these  final  results  in  order  that, 
faithful  to  its  constitutional  principles  it  may  abandon  its  powers 
to  those  who  have  been  designated,  by  the  majority  vote  without 
waiting  for  the  convocation  of  the  House.  26 
Mavrogordatos,  in  his  influential  study  Social  Coalitions  and  Party  Strategies  in 
Greece,  1922-1936,  notes  that  'Venizelism  had  lost  the  support  of  the  workers,  who 
massively  and  indistinctly  voted  for  the  Anti-Venizelists  and  for  the  Socialist 
(Communist)  ticket.  127  Although  labour  legislation  was  discussed  during  1911-1914 
dealing  with  important  issues  like  a  minimum  working  age,  Sunday  working,  hours  of 
28 
work,  laws  were  never  really  actively  enforced.  The  country's  efforts  were  very  soon 
focused  exclusively  on  foreign  policy. 
Venizelos  had  been  very  tentative  regarding  the  reconstruction  and  improvement 
of  the  armed  forces.  First,  he  introduced  the  compulsory  military  service  and  increased 
its  size  to  150,000  men.  Soon,  sums  of  money  were  allocated  to  the  purchase  of  military 
equipment  and  foreign  advisers  were  called  upon  to  offer  their  services  and  guidance. 
The  Greek  fleet  was  expanded  and  modernised.  However,  no  victory  is  won  without 
costs.  The  cost  for  Greece  had  been  enormous  for  a  small  state  which  lacked  surplus 
resources.  "  Mark  Mazower  notes  that  the  continuous  mobilisation  and  the  various 
operations  of  the  Great  War  on  the  Macedonian  front  had  added  more  strains  to  the 
country's  budgets.  Between  1916  and  1918,904  million  drachmae  were  spent  for 
military  purposes.  30  However,  during  this  period  Greece  was  in  a  position  to  meet  its 
26  The  official  announcement  of  Venizelos'  Government  cited  in  E.  Chivers  Davies,  'Election  Week  in 
Athens,  '  Balkan  Review,  4,  (1920),  pp.  336-345. 
27  Mavrogordatos,  Stillborn  Republic,  p.  143. 
28  A.  F.  Freris,  The  Greek  Economy  in  the  Twentieth  Century  (London,  1986),  p.  5  1. 
29  'Between  1905  and  1911  Greece  had  spent  on  her  armed  forces  the  sum  of  193,700,000  drachmae,  thus 
diverting  expenditure  from  internal  development.  The  cost  of  the  war  [the  Balkan  Wars],  including 
expenditure  on  prisoners-of-war  and  refugees,  was  about  411  million  drachmae.  '  Freris,  The  Greek 
Economy,  p.  20. 
30  Mazower,  Greece  and  the  inter-war  economic  crisis,  p.  61. 161 
expenses  due  to  both  the  considerable  increases  in  the  cultivated  lands  that  it  had 
acquired  and  due  to  the  raising  of  external  loans  and  emergency  taxation. 
Nevertheless,  the  Great  War  had  been  devastating  for  all  the  nations  involved. 
While  Greece  was  not  part  of  it  initially,  it  had  suffered  as  well  the  consequences  and 
the  turmoil  with  the  disruption  of  all  normal  economic  and  business  activities, 
especially  since  the  country  was  in  the  formative  period  for  its  development  in  all 
aspects  of  economic  activity.  Greece's  participation  in  the  Great  War  on  the 
Macedonian  front  called  for  heavier  borrowing,  especially  after  1916.31  It  was  in 
February  1918  that  Allied  financial  support  arrived  with  considerable  credits:  the  British 
gave  over  f  12  million,  the  French  300  million  francs,  and  the  Americans  $50  million.  " 
With  the  May  1919  landing  at  Smyrna,  military  expenditure  had  risen  sharply. 
Soon  it  was  no  longer  possible  to  finance  the  military  presence  from  regular  revenues, 
thus,  an  income  tax  and  some  indirect  taxes  were  introduced.  33  The  drachma  soon  began 
to  fall,  compared  to  the  pound;  in  November  1920  it  was  25  drachmae  for  one  pound. 
ýrorn  then  onwards  the  rate  against  the  sterling  fell  heavily.  34  Certainly  the  Greek 
people  could  not  have  been  completely  satisfied  with  the  situation.  The  country  had 
been  on  a  war  footing  continuously  since  1912  and  domestic  developments  were  at  a 
standstill.  Venizelos  had  promised  them,  apart  from  the  realisation  of  the  Megali  Idea, 
improvements  in  all  realms  of  life. 
While  the  Greek  Premier  was  in  Paris  and  London  for  the  negotiations  of  the 
Turkish  peace  treaty,  domestic  affairs  were  entirely  subordinated  to  foreign  affairs. 
Venizelos,  heavily  engaged  with  the  negotiations  in  Europe,  had  been  absent  from 
31  'Through  the  National  Bank  of  Greece  the  government  succeeded  in  raising  loans  abroad,  chiefly  in 
Paris,  to  liquidate  the  debts  it  had  incurred  in  the  course  of  the  fighting.  '  Mazower,  Greece  and  the  inter- 
war  economic  crisis,  p.  60. 
32  Ibid.,  p.  62. 
33  Ibid.,  p.  63. 162 
Greece  for  a  long  time.  This  meant  the  practical  suspension  of  parliamentary  life, 
something  that  had  created  a  rather  negative  climate  for  the  governing  party.  This, 
coupled  with  the  absence  of  a  competent  staff  which  could  have  taken  over  the  tasks  of 
the  government,  led  to  the  creation  of  a  mood  of  uncertainty  and  weariness  amongst  the 
Greek  population.  Since  the  summer  of  1917,  when  Venizelos  got  back  to  power,  the 
Venizelists  had  launched  a  'retaliation  campaign.  '  Supporters  of  Constantine  were  de- 
commissioned  from  the  Army  and  the  Civil  Service  and  prominent  politicians  of  the 
35 
opposing  camps  were  sent  to  exile  or  imprisoned.  Emmanuel  Repoulis,  acting  Prime 
Minister  while  Venizelos  was  abroad,  was  characterised  as  being  'a  weak,  emotional 
man,  of  the  type  that  makes  pigmy  dictators.  "' 
After  the  announcement  of  the  result,  despite  the  attempts  of  his  associates, 
Venizelos  submitted  his  resignation  to  the  regent  of  the  throne,  Pavlos  Koundouriotis, 
and  advised  him  to  call  Dimitrios  Rallis  to  form  a  government.  Indeed,  it  was  Rallis 
who  became  the  Prime  Minister  of  the  new  government  and  not  Gounaris,  who  confined 
himself  to  the  War  Ministry.  37  The  newly  elected  government  proceeded  with  the 
plebiscite  for  the  return  of  Constantine  on  22  November.  The  Liberal  Party  abstained, 
and  the  result  was  98%  for  the  return  of  Constantine. 
Immediately  after  the  announcement  of  the  result,  Granville  was  repeatedly 
asking  for  instructions  regarding  his  attitude  towards  the  new  government.  Although 
there  had  been  signs  of  a  change  in  the  attitude  of  the  Greek  people  towards  Venizelos, 
all  had  been  attributed  to  the  continuing  state  of  war  and  considered  understandable. 
34  See  Appendix  1.  Tables.  3.  The  cost  of  war  for  the  Greek  economy  1919-1923  and  the  relation  of 
drachma  to  pound. 
35  Among  those  sent  to  exile  in  Corsica  were  Venizelos'  leading  opponents  Dimitrios  Gounaris,  Victor 
Dousmanis,  and  loannis  Metaxas.  The  Royalists  had  conducted  a  similar  'purge'  during  November  1916  0 
against  Venizelists  following  Venizelos'  fleeing  to  Thessaliniki  and  the  creation  of  a  new  government 
there.  Mavrogordatos,  Stillborn  Republic,  p.  27. 
36  Alastos,  Venizelos,  p.  202. 163 
Despite  the  initial  shock  of  the  result  however,  he  immediately  proposed  a  course  of 
action  that  would,  according  to  his  estimation,  serve  British  interests. 
His  Majesty's  Government  must  seriously  consider 
whether  our  general  interests  in  Near  East  do  not  require 
us  to  swallow  our  pride,  accept  Constantine  and  continue 
our  support  to  Greece.  If  we  withdraw  our  support  there 
can  be  no  little  doubt  that  Kemal  will  take  Smyrna  or  at 
least  the  hinterland,  Bulgaria,  Thrace  and  Serbia,  Salonica 
which  will  put  our  whole  peace  settlement  back  in  the 
melting  pot;  value  of  drachma  will  drop  to  any  figure  and 
our  commercial  losses  will  be  very  heavy  indeed.  " 
Bulgaria  did  not  acquire  Thrace  nor  did  Serbia  take  Salonica.  Kemal,  however,  got  hold 
of  Smyrna  in  August  1922. 
Venizelos'  continual  absence  and  preoccupation  with  foreign  policy  questions 
meant  the  practical  suspension  of  parliamentary  life,  the  suspension  of  all  major 
developments,  projects  which  the  country  needed.  The  Cretan  politician,  in  a  letter  to 
Lloyd  George  commented  upon  the  result  with  the  following: 
One  must  not  condemn  the  Greek  people  who  were  clearly  war 
weary,  because  after  all,  it  is  a  fact  that  I  found  myself  in  the 
necessity  to  continue  mobilisation  for  two  years  after  the 
armistice  and  there  was  no  certain  sign  in  view  of  an  immediate 
demobilisation.  39 
The  British  Premier  had  expressed  his  feelings  being  'shocked  and  distressed  to  see  the 
result  of  the  Greek  elections.  140 
It  seemed  that  the  Opposition  had  had,  ample  time  to  organise  itself,  and  further 
focus  its  rhetoric  on  the  issues  which  most  annoyed  the  people,  the  continuous 
37  Granville's  comments  on  Rallis  were  that  'his  sentiments  [were]  very  pro-English,  he  [was]  in  no  sense 
German,  staunch  monarchist  and  determined  enemy  of  Venizelos.  '  In  PRO,  FO  286/732,  Memo  included 
in  Lord  Granville's  despatch  no  447  of  November  23d,  1920. 
3'  DBFP,  vol.  XII,  no  433,  Granville  to  Curzon,  17  November  1920,  pp.  506-7. 
39  Venizelos  to  Lloyd  George,  cited  in  Lloyd  George,  The  Truth  about  the  Peace  Treaties,  vol.  II,  p.  1346. 
4"  HLRO,  Lloyd  George  Papers,  F/55/1/41,  David  Lloyd  George  to  M.  Venizelos,  17  November  1920. 164 
mobilisation,  stagnation  in  all  other  issues  apart  from  the  domain  of  the  foreign  policy 
and  after  the  death  of  Alexander,  the  issue  of  succession.  Probably  the  choice  between 
Venizelos  and  Constantine  would  not  have  emerged,  had  King  Alexander's  death  not 
occurred  so  unexpectedly. 
The  British  policy-makers  who  had  supported  a  pro-Greek  policy  regarding 
Western  Asia  Minor  remained  cautious  and  relatively  cool-headed,  despite  the  election 
results.  They  remained  calm,  with  Lord  Curzon  being  the  first  to  advise  patience.  There 
was  of  course  a  period  of  uncertainty,  as  there  was  mistrust  towards  Constantine.  In  the 
meantime,  the  new  Greek  government  and  Constantine  hurried  to  reassure  Britain  on 
their  intention  to  continue  the  foreign  policy  of  Venizelos  regarding  Asia  Minor.  41  The 
British  policy-makers,  however,  chose  not  to  return  to  the  previous  state  of  affairs. 
Certainly,  the  alarming  reports,  which  military  intelligence  from  Constantinople  was 
transmitting  to  London,  on  the  gradual  strengthening  of  the  Nationalist  movement,  plus 
the  political  information  coming  from  the  British  on  the  spot  had  contributed  to  a  policy 
of  waiting  on  events. 
Lloyd  George  sought  the  advice  of  Philip  Kerr.  Kerr  did  not  consider  an 
embargo  on  'Tino's  return'  necessary.  He  was  of  the  opinion  that  they  would  have  to 
show  to  Greece  that  'the  Greek  elections  and  his  return  have  freed  us  from  all  obligation 
to  support  or  to  defend  the  settlement  of  the  Treaty  of  Sývres.  42  Most  probably  he  was 
influenced  by  the  stance  that  close  friends  and  associates  of  Venizelos  had  adopted  and 
expressed  to  the  British  Government.  From  a  letter  of  Sir  John  Stavridi,  consul  of 
Greece  in  London  and  close  friend  of  Lloyd  George  and  Venizelos,  one  sees  that  the 
41  The  Opposition  had  clarified  its  position  before  the  elections,  with  a  declaration  to  the  Allied  Ministers 
in  Athens  on  4  June  1920.  It  assured  the  Allies  of  the  'unity  of  the  Greek  nation  regarding  their 
sentiments  towards  the  Allies.  '  Cited  in  Xenophon,  Stratigos,  Greece  in  Asia  Minor  (Athens,  1994), 
p.  114-5. 
42  NAS,  Lothian  MSS,  GD  40/17/33,  Copy  minute  for  the  Prime  Minister  about  Turco-Greek  situation,  4 
February  1921. 165 
advice  of  the  Venizelist  circle  was  either  to  'put  pressure  and  secure  recognition  of 
Prince  George  [the  elder  son  of  Constantine]  but  if  impossible  -  recognise  Constantine 
on  terms  which  will  tie  him  down  to  effective  action  in  carrying  out  the  Treaty  of 
S6vres.  A3  This  advice  was  certainly  followed;  Greece,  from  that  point  onwards,  was  on 
its  own.  With  or  without  Venizelos,  it  seems  that  this  would  have  been  the  case. 
A  letter  of  De  Robeck  to  Curzon,  written  before  the  finalising  of  the  San  Remo 
terms  for  the  peace  of  Turkey  in  March  1920,  had  been  prophetic  both  for  the  Greek 
Prime  Minister  and  even  more  so  for  the  turbulent  crisis  that  Greece  was  to  face, 
starting  from  Venizelos's  defeat: 
To  maintain  Venizelos  in  power  in  Greece  for  what  cannot  be  in 
the  nature  of  things  be  more  than  a  few  years  at  the  outside 
cannot  help  wondering  if  the  game  is  worth  the  candle. 
Venizelos  is  not  immortal  but  ephemeral,  and  he  'is  not  only 
ephemeral,  but  as  regards  Greece  a  phenomenon.  By  that  I  mean 
that  he  has  no  successor  of  his  own  calibre.  In  other  words,  he  is 
44  not  Greece... 
THE  GREEK  CASE  RECONSIDERED  -THE  CHANGES  IN  TIIEARNIY-TIIE  INTERNAL  SITUATION. 
All  concerned  parties  anxiously  awaited  the  effect  of  the  change  of  regime  in 
Greece  on  the  Asia  Minor  front  and  in  effect  on  Greek  defensive  capabilities.  The 
British  had  expressed  their  fears,  since  they  themselves  were  aware  of  the  strong 
Venizclist  fcclings  of  the  Asia  Minor  army.  The  first  acid  test  was  made  by  the  means 
of  an  interview,  a  discussion  that  took  place  between  the  British  Vice-Consul  at  Smyrna 
and  the  Greek  High  Commissioner  Stergiadis.  The  British  official  recorded  that  on  the 
reaction  of  the  Asia  Minor  army,  Stergiadis  was  'far  from  sure.  45 
43  HLRO,  Lloyd  George  Papers,  F/55/1/43,  From  Sir  John  Stavridi  to  the  Prime  Minister,  n.  d. 
44  CHURCHILL  COLLEGE  ARCHIVES,  De  Robeck  Papers,  DRBK  6/1,9  November  1919  to 
November  1920,  Correspondence,  De  Robeck  to  Curzon,  March  1920. 
45  PRO,  FO  371/5136  -EI4494/106/44,  Rumbold  to  Curzon,  21  November  1920. 166 
The  military  reports  from  Smyrna  by  the  British  officials  as  time  progressed 
were  less  optimistic.  There  were  repeated  cases  of  insubordination  and  disaffection. 
However,  the  new  Greek  government  was  cautious.  They  were  well  aware  that  a 
persecution  of  the  Venizelists  'would  have  deprived  the  army  of  any  capacity  for  battle 
until  the  new  officers  could  become  familiar  with  their  tasks.  '460f  course,  there  were 
immediate  changes,  like  the  replacement  of  Commander  Paraskevopoulos  with  General 
Papoulas.  47  In  the  lower  ranks  no  major  changes  were  enforced  by  the  new  regime; 
some  150  officers,  however,  left  their  posts  or resigned.  Thus,  the  major  changes  were 
new  personnel  in  the  positions  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  three  army  corps 
commanders  and  seven  out  of  nine  divisional  commanders,  few  over  all  but  'they  were 
the  most  politically  active  and  had  the  highest  reputation  in  the  field.  A8  However,  the 
changes  did  not  have  an  overall  bad  effect  on  the  army.  49  There  was,  according  to 
Thanos  Veremis,  'relative  inexperience'  but  General  Papoulas  was  doing  his  best  to  act 
independently  of  political  convictions. 
Reports  coming  from  Smyrna  in  February  verified  that  the  Greek  Army  in  Asia 
Minor  was  willing  to  stay  and  fight,  despite  the  initial  British  worries  about  the  change 
of  regime.  The  Greeks  were  keeping  order  in  all  parts  of  their  zone  and  above  all:  'Their 
troops  inspired  respect  into  the  Turkish  troops  and  are  capable  of  and  willin  g  to 
,  50  continue  operations  against  them  [the  Turks].  Moreover,  the  army  appeared  to  be  far 
46  Thanos  Veremis,  The  Military  in  Greek  Politics  (London,  1997),  p.  65. 
47  CHURCHILL  COLLEGE  ARCHIVES,  De  Robeck  Papers,  DRBK  6/15,  Papers  about  Greek  forces, 
From  Kelly,  Vice  Admiral,  18  December  1920.  Papoulas  was  'a  very  patient,  kindly  and  somewhat 
philosophical  gentleman,  dependent  upon  his  staff,  more  concerned  to  do  justice  to  the  Army  which  he 
had  been  called  upon  to  command  than  his  personal  ambition'.  The  new  commander  however  was  also 
'an  opponent  of  Venizelos,  he  had  been  imprisoned  in  1918  for  deserting  his  post  and  organising  guerrilla 
warfare  against  the  Venizelist  government.  '  Veremis,  The  Military  in  Greek  politics,  p.  66. 
48  Vererrýis,  The  Military  in  Greek  politics,  p.  66. 
49  Ibid.,  p.  67. 
50  PRO,  FO  371/6469-E4941/l/44,  James  Morgan  to  High  Cornmissioner,  Constantinople,  27  April  1921. 167 
more  united,  especially  after  the  failure  of  the  Spring  Offensive  which  was  attributed  by 
51 
the  army  to  the  government's  mismanagement. 
The  Greek  Government  was  trying  to  persuade  public  opinion  at  home  that  the 
attitude  of  Britain,  regardless  of  the  fact  that  it  had  sided  with,  the  French  and  the 
Italians  in  suspending  payments  and  adopting  a  cautious  attitude,  would  continue  to 
remain  pro  Greek.  On  that,  the  Greek  Ambassador  in  London,  Rizo-Rangabe  was 
definitely  a  weak  link  in  the  chain  of  information  and  advice  to  his  government  in 
Athens.  His  poor  advice  is  verified  by  a  number  of  intercepted  messages  covering  the 
months  of  January  and  February  1921.52 
Rizo-Rangabe  was  trying  to  persuade  the  Greek  Government  that  he  had  entered 
into  negotiations  with  certain  British  financial  groups.  In  the  meantime,  he  assured 
Athens  that  he  expected  soon  recognition  of  King  Constantine  by  the  Allies.  In 
intercepted  Greek  communiqu6s  to  Athens,  Rangabe  mentioned  'an  English  friend,  '  a 
Sir  Louis  Jackson,  connected  with  the  Armstrong-Whitworth  Group,  who,  according  to 
the  Greek  Ambassador,  had  informed  him  that  Lloyd  George  had  expressed  a  wish  for 
Gounaris  to  come  to  London  for  the  upcoming  Conference.  The  Foreign  Office,  in  the 
first  instance,  had  declared  ignorance  as  to  whether  or  not  Sir  Louis  Jackson  was  indeed 
'in  touch  with  Downing  Street  or  whether  he  is  filling  M.  Rangabe  with  unfounded 
gossip.  '  53  Nicolson  had  a  discussion  with  Jackson  and  reported  that  there  was  no  such 
'advice.  '  However,  it  was  the  Foreign  Office's  evaluation  that  the  Greeks  were 
'receiving  advice  from  Downing  Street  which  rightly  or  wrongly  interpret  as  an 
51  Veremis,  The  Military  in  Greekpolitics,  p.  67. 
32  Especially  the  HW  12,  Government  Code  and  Cypher  School:  Diplomatic  Section  and  predecessors, 
Decrypts  of  intercepted  Diplomatic  Communication  (BJ  series),  files  cover  Turkey  and  the  Greek-Turkish 
War,  among  other  events.  The  series  contain  records  created  and  inherited  by  the  Government 
Communications  Headquarters  (GCHQ). 
53  PRO,  FO  371/6078  and  FO  371/6079.  These  files  contain  a  considerable  amount  of  intercepted 
messages  for  the  months  of  January  and  February.  The  message  that  refers  to  Sir  Louis  Jackson  is  in 
PRO,  FO  371/6078-C3168/20/19,  FO  minute  Nicolson,  14  February  1921. 168 
encouragement  to  military  action,  two  attitudes  mutually  contradictory,  '  underlined 
Nicolson.  54 
Regarding  the  reactions  of  the  British  on  the  spot  on  the  change  of  government 
in  Athens,  the  reports  of  the  Greek  High  Commissioner  at  Constantinople, 
Canellopoulos,  are  of  value.  Through  the  means  of  various  interviews,  the  Greek 
official  reported  to  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  that  the  British  High  Commissioner 
was  adamant  on  the  issue  of  Constantine:  'Le  Roi  doit  sacrifier  ou  sacrifier  son  pays.  55 
In  the  meantime,  all  heads  of  British  delegations  abroad  were  anxious  to  be  kept 
inforined  about  the  situation  in  Greece.  There  was  a  continuous  flow  of  reports  and 
press  reactions  from  the  principal  European  capitals  were  loaded  with  criticism  about 
56  Constantine.  In  the  House  of  Commons  there  was  an  outburst  of  questions  regarding 
the  British  position  on  what  was  taking  place  in  Greece,  coming  from  well  known 
Turcophile  Conservative  MPs.  57 
THE  ECONOMIC  AND  COMMERCIAL  EFFECTS  OF  THE  GREEK  OCCUPATION  IN  THE  SMYRNA 
REGION. 
The  commercial-economic  interests  of  Britain  in  the  area  of  the  Greek  zone  of 
occupation  in  Anatolia  continued  to  be  of  special  importance.  The  reports  and  the 
recommendations  coming  from  the  British  in  this  domain  were  not  at  all  encouraging, 
while  the  Greek  administration  was  accused  of  being  too  harsh  on  British  local 
commercial  interests,  the  trade  of  Constantinople  and  Smyrna  being  at  a  standstill  due  to 
54  PRO,  FO  371/6078-C3168/20/19,  FO  minute  Nicolson.  For  the  intercepted  messages  which  suggest 
that  the  Greeks  were  receiving  advice  from  Downing  Street  see  this  Chapter:  'The  impact  on  the  British 
Near  Eastern  policy  -The  British  -Greek  discussions  of  winter  192  L'p.  18  1. 
55  MFA,  1920,35.1  Governmental  Policy-  London  Conference  -  Constantine's  return,  no  15375, 
Canellopoulos  to  MFA,  27  November  1920. 
56  Examples  in  MFA,  1920,35.1. 
57  For  example  see  PD.  C,  vol.  136,  c.  1758-9,22  December  1920.  Austen  Chamberlain  was  called  to 
answer  over  whether  Britain  had  financed  Greece.  The  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  denied  the  allegation 
that  Britain  continued  to  pay  money  to  Greece:  '...  all  outstanding  Greek  claims  under  existing 169 
the  military  operations.  The  Greek  presence  was  the  proof  of  the  inevitability  of 
Smyrna's  commercial  decline.  "  Ward-Price  in  his  memoirs  had  described  the 
Westerners  residing  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  as  a  'commercial  aristocracy'  which  dealt 
with  'such  business  as  insurance,  the  coaling  of  ships,  banking,  and  public  services.  59 
The  British  more  specifically  had  formed  'mercantile  dynasties'  in  Constantinople  and 
at  Smyrna.  According  to  the  Daily  Mail  correspondent  who  had  served  long  in  the 
region: 
Families  like  the  Whitalls,  Lafontaines,  and  Reeses  handed  on 
their  profitable  trading  positions  from  one  generation  to  another. 
They  resented  being  included  with  native-born  Greeks, 
Armenians  and  Jews  under  the  patronising  term  of 
'Levantines.  '  60 
A  list  from  a  Foreign  Office  file  names  some  of  the  most  prominent  English  Houses  in 
Smyrna,  among  them:  The  Imperial  Ottoman  Bank,  The  National  Bank  of  Turkey,  C.  C. 
Whitall  and  Co.,  General  Importers  and  Exporters,  Paterson  and  Co.,  Bankers,  J. 
Hadkinson  and  Sons,  Insurance  Company,  F.  S.  McVittie,  Importer  of  Office  Furniture 
and  General  Merchandise,  R.  E.  Turrell  and  Co.,  General  Importers  and  Exporters.  61 
One  source  of  information  on  the  desiderata  of  the  British  local  element  in 
Smyrna  continued  to  be  James  Morgan,  the  British  Consul.  The  central  focus  had 
always  been  the  system  of  capitulations:  with  the  Treaty  of  Rvres  giving  the 
administration  of  the  vilayet  to  Greece  the  question  was  not  abandoned.  'As  it  is,  ' 
agreements  are  in  abeyance.  The  cash  advances  to  the  Greek  Government  since  1914  amount  to 
L15,860,000.  ' 
58  PRO,  FO  371/  6538-E2293/196/44,  Report  covering  the  period  from  November  2  to  December  15, 
1920,21  February  192  1.  Of  importance  are  the  frequent  reports  of  Alwyn  Parker,  diplomat  and  director 
of  the  Smyrna-Aidin  Railway  of  British  interests. 
59  'On  the  outbreak  of  the  First  World  War,  British  interests  in  Constantinople,  controlled  46  per  cent  of 
the  international  shipping  trade  with  Turkey.  Half  the  quays  and  docks  of  Constantinople  were  owned  by 
British  firms,  the  other  half  being  French.  About  90  per  cent  of  Turkey's  export  trade  was  financed 
through  London 
... 
The  Smyrria-Aidin  Railway  in  Anatolia  was  British  owned,  as  was  also  the  Turkish 
Telegraphic  Company.  '  G.  Ward  Price,  Extra  -special  correspondent  (London,  1957),  p.  43. 
60  Ward-Price,  Extra-special  correspondent,  p.  43. 
61  PRO,  FO  406/46,  April-June  1920,  no  4,  Despatch  of  Overseas  Trade  to  FO,  2  April  1920. 170 
insisted  Morgan,  'the  British  community  feel  that  they  are  worse  off  than  under  the 
Turkish  regime  and  to  deprive  them  of  the  capitulations  would  be  to  make  British 
subjects  here  feel  that  when  the  Greeks  conquered  the  Turks  in  Asia  Minor  last  year, 
they  conquered  the  British  colony  as  well.  962  This  harsh  phraseology  was  persistently 
repeated  in  the  British  consul's  communiqu6s.  63  The  Foreign  Office  minute  that 
accompanied  the  telegram,  commenting  on  Morgan's  report,  is  equally  interesting: 
'Morgan  though  he  is  far  from  being  under  the  glamour  of  Hellenism  is  not  unfriendly 
and  his  conclusion  is  that  so  far  the  Greeks  have  made  good.  '  However,  neither 
Morgan's  evident  resentment  for  the  Greek  presence  in  Smyrna  nor  the  encouraging 
Foreign  Office  minutes  could  improve  the  continuous  reports  which  depicted  a 
disastrous  situation  in  the  commercial  domain  for  the  region.  The  signs  of  trade  decline 
were  numerous,  foreigners  and  especially  the  Jews,  as  was  underlined  in  one  of  these 
reports,  were  evacuating  the  town,  since  due  to  the  military  operations  'commercial 
intercourse  with  the  interior  was  cut  off  and  lands  remained  uncultivated.  Due  to 
restrictions  on  travelling,  'cheap  Turkish  labour'  could  not  be  found  as  easily  as 
before.  64 
Another  source  of  negative  comment  on  the  Greek  presence  were  the  reports  of 
the  British  Commercial  Secretary  at  Constantinople,  Captain  C.  H.  Courthope-Munroe, 
forwarded  to  the  Department  of  Overseas  Trade.  His  reports  included  harsh  comments: 
'conditions  of  slump'  had  prevailed  in  the  city,  the  hinterland  was  restricted,  the  Greeks 
were  'bad  administrators'  and  the  absence  of  legal  and  other  facilities  due  to  non- 
ratification  of  the  treaty  was  an  additional  source  of  problems  for  the  city.  In  another 
62  PRO,  F0371/6491-E1301/50/44,  Rumbold  to  FO,  Enclosure  James  Morgan's  report,  18  January  1921. 
63  However,  Morgan  had  mentioned  the  positive  effects  of  the  Greek  presence:  'They  have  maintained 
order  in  the  zones  they  have  occupied.  Travelling  in  the  country  is  more  secure;  towns  are  well  policed 
[...  ]  in  this  district  the  Greeks  have  made  good.  '  In  PRO,  FO  371/6491-EI301/50/44,  Rumbold  to  FO, 
Enclosure  James  Morgan's  report,  18  January  192  1. 
64  PRO,  FO  371/6491-E2005/50/44,  Rumbold  to  FO,  Enclosure  Morgan's  Report,  29  January  1921. 171 
report  in  March,  on  the  economic  condition  in  Smyrna,  the  import  and  export  trade  was 
described  in  one  phrase:  'complete  standstill.  65 
Despite  these  negative  reports,  there  was  a  series  of  refianns  enforced  in  the 
administration  of  the  city  by  the  Greek  authorities.  From  a  memo  compiled  by  the 
official  administration  of  Smyrna  and  communicated  to  the  Foreign  Office  by  the  Greek 
Charg6  d'  Affaires  in  London,  one  gets  a  good  grasp  of  the  changes.  It  was  emphasised 
that  in  the  staff  of  the  administration  there  were  a  considerable  number  of  Moslems, 
namely  the  Mayor,  the  Inspector  of  Local  Administration,  the  Prefect  of  Magnesia,  and 
of  course  a  number  of  administrative  staff.  The  Moslem  institutions  continued,  as  did 
the  education,  the  grants  to  Turkish  schools  and  colleges.  The  Greek  High  Commission 
was  organised  into  12  Departments  and  there  was  also  planning  and  provision  for  the 
establishment  of  the  University  of  Smyrna.  The  last  step  was  short  lived,  as  the  events 
did  not  allow  its  official  opening  and  operation.  66 
THE  BRITISH  REACTION  TO  THE  ELECTIONS  -  TIIE  VIEW  FROM  ATIIENS. 
Earl  Granville,  the  British  Minister  at  Athens,  was  continuously  in  support  of  the 
Greek  case.  For  him,  Britain  was  far  more  influential  in  Greece  than  it  was  in  Turkey, 
where  it  would  be  difficult  to  regain  lost  support.  The  result  of  the  election  was 
definitely  a  shock,  but  'after  all,  '  underlined  the  British  Minister,  'Turkey  was  our 
enemy  in  the  war  and  a  very  dangerous  one  and  Greece  was  our  ally.  '  67  The  reasons 
supplied  by  the  British  officials  in  Athens  were  both  commercial  and  strategic.  Britain 
was  Greece's  biggest  creditor  and  any  changes  on  a  political  level  would  have 
65  PRO,  FO  371/649  1  -E3931/50/44,  Department  of  Overseas  Trade  to  Foreign  Office  transmits  copy  of  a 
report  from  Commercial  Secretary  Con/ple,  I  April  192  1,  and  PRO,  FO  406/44,  no  4,  Department  of 
Overseas  Trade  to  FO,  Enclosure  Report  by  Munroe,  dated  March  192  1. 
66  PRO,  FO  37  1  n92  I  -E3160/43/44,  Greek  Chargd  d'Affaires  to  FO,  Memo  compiled  by  the  official 
administration  of  Smyrna  on  Greek  attitude  towards  Moslems  and  efforts  made  to  promote  economic  and 
social  development  of  occupied  zone,  4  March  1922. 
67  DBFP,  vol.  XVII,  no  45,  Granville  to  Curzon,  28  February  192  1. 172 
immediate  effects  in  that  field.  There  was  considerable  concern  for  the  British  firms 
which  had  been  negotiating  Greek  contracts  or  concessions  right  after  the  decision  of 
the  Allies.  Already,  signs  of  economic  crisis  had  made  their  appearance  as  the  drachma 
had  started  to  drop  with  consequences  for  British  trade  in  Greece.  " 
According  to  the  two  economic  agreements  signed  between  Greece  and  the 
Allies  on  the  10  November  1918  and  10  May  1919,  respectively,  the  latter  were  to  give 
credit  to  Greece  that  amounted  to  the  sum  of  850,000,000  golden  francs.  However,  after 
the  return  of  Constantine,  the  Allies  refused  to  honour  the  agreement.  Further,  while 
British  imports  to  Greece  in  the  years  1919-1920  had  reached  the  amounts  of 
L16,800,000  and  E15,3343,200  respectively  from  1921  to  1923,  the  amount  of  British 
imports  for  the  three  years  was  less  than  E3,000,00.  "  Granville  was  in  favour  of  giving 
Constantine  'a  chance  rather  than  ensure  complete  collapse  of  Greece  by  cutting  off  all 
supplies  and  moral  and  material  support.  '  Ile  was  predicting  'a  severe  blow'  to  British 
interests,  position  and  prestige  in  the  Near  East.  " 
The  situation  of  Britain's  strategic  interest  in  Greece  was  clearly  illustrated  by 
the  presence  of  the  British  Naval  Mission  in  Greece.  71  For  the  British  Minister,  'the 
policy  of  His  Majesty's  Government,  in  sending  out  not  only  a  Naval  Mission,  but  such 
a  particularly  strong  and  important  Naval  Mission,  was  to  assist  tile  Greek  Government 
to  turn  a  small  but  thoroughly  efficient  Navy,  on  which,  in  view  of  the  close  relations 
between  the  two  countries,  we  should  be  able  to  count  to  relieve  us  of  some  of  our  naval 
68  The  Foreign  Office  had  decided  that  '  no  definite  promises  or  advice  could  be  extended  to  British  firms 
from  official  quarters  ...  As  regards  the  several  large  contracts  which  were  at  present  being  negotiated  in 
Athens  by  British  groups  ...  nothing  should  be  done  to  prevent  the  continuance  of  these  negotiations  with 
the  new  Greek  Govermnen.  Each  case  should  be  considered  on  its  merits  in  consultation  between  the 
Department  of  Trade  and  the  Foreign  Office.  Private  firms  should  be  referred  to  the  Department  of  Trade 
who  could  reply  in  consultation  with  the  Foreign  Office.  '  DBFP,  vol.  XIII,  no  474,  Curzon  to  Granville, 
II  December  1920,  p.  543. 
69  T.  Veremis,  'Two  letters-  Memoranda  of  E.  Venizelos  to  Winston  Churchill',  Deltio  Kentrou 
Mikrasiatikon  Spoudon  -JEAr1o  Ktvrpov  MiKpaaiaTiKd5v  Zrovbd)v,  4  (1983),  pp.  347. 
70  DBFP,  vol.  XVII,  no  469,  Granville  to  Curzon,  9  December  1920,  pp.  540-1. 173 
responsibilities  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean.  "'  In  June  1920,  there  was  a  British 
suggestion  to  sell  some  old  ships  to  Greece.  Vice-Admiral  Kelly,  the  head  of  the  British 
Naval  Mission  had  met  Venizelos,  the  minister  of  Marine,  M.  Miaoulis,  and  the  Chief  of 
the  Naval  General  Staff  in  order  to  discuss  this  issue.  The  British  Admiralty's  offer 
included  two  light  cruisers,  six  destroyers,  two  '11'  class  submarines,  and  two  mine 
sweeping  trawlers,  for  the  sum  of  E2,336,000.  Venizelos  had  replied  that  Greece  would 
be  forced  to  turn  the  offer  down,  due  to  its  strained  financial  situation.  "  Granville, 
forwarding  Vice-Admiral  Kelly's  report,  underlined  the  importance  of  an  efficient 
Greek  navy  in  the  services  of  H.  M.  G,  urging  for  a  'financial  sacrifice'  on  the  part  of 
Britain.  On  8  October,  Mr.  Russell  telegraphed  to  Foreign  Office:  'Greek  Government 
will  decline  offer  of  all  or  any  ships  on  grounds  of  economy  ... 
Personally  I  doubt  utility 
of  further  pressure  [for  purchase  of  ships].  '  However,  despite  all  efforts,  by  both  him 
and  his  colleagues,  throughout  the  course  of  the  negotiations  in  London,  the  Allied 
orders  after  the  Second  Conference  of  London  left  no  room  for  their  recommendations, 
as  they  were  detennined  to  keep  Allied  unity.  This  unity  also  served  British 
unwillingness  and  inability  to  reinforce  what  it  had  originally  called  its  'proxy'  in  the 
area.  Granville  was  pushing  for  closer  co-operation  with  the  King  immediately  after  the 
result  of  the  plebiscite  that  brought  Constantine  back. 
THE'LONDON  RESPONSE'AND  THE  ERRONEOUS  GREEK  IMPRESSION  ABOUT  BRITISH  HELP. 
Harold  Nicolson  of  the  Foreign  Office,  in  a  memorandum  prepared  only  three 
days  after  the  Greek  election,  had  outlined  the  possible  options  for  Britain.  These 
ranged  from  complete  abstention  from  interference  through  to  support  of  the  new 
71  The  heads  of  the  Mission  from  1911  to  1923  were  Admirals  Tufnell,  Kerr,  Palmer,  Kelly  and  Aubrey 
Smith. 
72  DBFP,  vol.  XII,  no  336,  Granville  to  Curzon,  4  June  1920,  pp.  406-7. 
73  A  persobal  account  of  Kelly's  service  in  Greece  in  National  Maritime  Museum,  [thereafter  called 
NMM],  NMM  Kelly,  KEU27,  Diary  of  the  Kelly  Mission  to  Greece,  June  1919  to  October  192  1. 174 
regime.  74  Crowe  believed  that  time  was  required  to  assess  the  stability  and  political 
inclination  of  the  new  regime  first.  75  The  French,  on  the  other  hand,  appeared  from  the 
very  beginning  to  be  unwilling  to  compromise  and  more  than  ready  to  sever  relations 
with  Greece.  Crowe  tried  to  persuade  the  French  that  time  was  needed  to  see  the  effects. 
A  joint  declaration  to  denounce  the  new  regime  and  threaten  Greece  with  the 
withdrawal  of  allied  support  was  what  the  French  demanded.  76 
The  Allies,  however,  soon  had  the  assurance  of  both  the  new  Greek  Government 
in  Athens  and  of  Constantine  that  they  would  continue  Venizelos'  foreign  policy,  an 
assurance  that  came  even  before  the  Conference  that  was  arranged  to  take  place  in 
London  among  the  Allies  to  discuss  the  recent  developments.  On  the  Greek  part  it  was 
crystal  clear  that:  'Both  King  and  Government  desire  that  Greece  should  continue  same 
foreign  policy  as  before  and  should  collaborate  strictly  and  loyally  with  the  two  powers 
[Great  Britain  and  France]...  977  Furthermore,  Admiral  Mark  Kerr,  himself  a  former  head 
of  the  British  Naval  Mission  to  Greece  and  close  to  Constantine  was  'assigned,  ' 
according  to  British  reports  from  Berne,  'to  promote  in  England'  a  campaign  of 
propaganda  in  favour  of  the  ex-King'  and  to  that  effect  had  enlisted  the  support  of  the 
Morning  Post.  78  Following  this  line,  Constantine,  in  his  speech  when  he  arrived  at 
Athens,  made  the  first  promise  to  continue  the  fight  in  Asia  Minor.  It  was  the  first 
public  attempt  to  persuade  the  Allies  that  Greece  would  remain  there,  as  guardian  of 
Allied  interests.  On  23  December  1920  during  the  first  session  of  the  new  Parliament 
the  King  announced  the  determination  of  Greece  to  continue  the  fight  in  Asia  Minor.  79 
74  DBFP,  vol.  XIII,  no  438,  Memorandum  on  the  Greek  situation  by  Mr.  Nicolson,  20  November  1920, 
w.  514-9. 
76 
Ibid.,  p.  519. 
DBFP,  vol.  XII,  no  438,  Record  of  a  conversation  between  Sir  Eyre  Crowe  and  M.  Cambon,  19 
November  1920,  pp.  512-3. 
711  This  was  a  declaration  communicated  to  Mr.  Russell,  British  Minister  at  Berne,  in  DBFP,  vol.  XII,  no 
448,  Mr.  Russell  to  Curzon,  24  November  1920,  p.  527. 
78  DBFP,  vol.  XII,  no  44  1,  Mr.  Russell  to  Curzon,  22  November  1920,  pp.  5224. 
79  Session  of  23  December  1920,  Greece,  House  ofParliament  Debates. 175 
However,  the  first  reactions  coming  from  the  British  High  Commissioner  at 
Constantinople  were  not  encouraging  and  were  indicative  of  the  climate  in  the  European 
capitals.  In  the  meantime,  all  heads  of  Greek  delegations  abroad  appeared  anxious  to  be 
kept  informed  about  the  situation  in  Greece;  the  first  few  months  after  the 
announcement  of  the  results  of  the  plebiscite,  saw  the  Greek  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs 
flooded  with  despatches  with  press  reactions  from  all  over  Europe,  full  of  critisisms  on 
the  return  of  Constantine.  80 
Sir  Maurice  Hankey,  present  at  a  discussion  over  the  hot  issue  of  Greece  had 
recorded  in  his  Diary  that  old  feelings  reared  their  heads  again:  Bonar  Law  had, 
according  to  the  Cabinet  Secretary,  'gone  back  to  the  old  Tory  fondness  for  the 
Turks.  98  1  Lloyd  George  and  Curzon  did  not  share  Bonar  Law's  wish  for  the  revision  of 
the  Treaty  of  S6vres,  arguing  that  it  would  be  'a  victory  for  agitation  and  a  sign  of 
weakness.  '  82  It  was  the  official  beginning  of  a  'wait  and  see'  attitude. 
The  Second  Conference  of  London  opened  on  26  November  1920.  The  French 
proposals,  despite  the  fact  that  M.  Leygues  had  eloquently  stated  in  the  beginning  that 
'he  had  come  with  no  cut-and-dried  proposals,  and  was  quite  prepared  to  explore  the 
whole  subject,  '  were  harsh  and  targeted  the  revision  of  the  Treaty  of  S6vres.  The  French 
had  arrived  with  a  set  of  precise  desiderata:  an  immediate  Allied  decline  to  recognise 
Constantine,  the  severing  of  the  diplomatic  relations  with  Greece  and  the  refusal  of  any 
further  financial  assistance.  The  Greeks,  demanded  the  French,  should  be  warned  that 
'the  Allies  could  not  entrust  important  strategical  positions  in  the  Near  East  to  an 
80  See  MFA,  1920.35.1.  The  file  contains  various  despatches  with  press  cuttings. 
81  Hankey  Diary,  28  November  1920,  in  Roskill,  Hankey,  p.  200. 
82  Ibid. 176 
unfriendly  Government.  '  83  The  French  had  no  doubt  come  to  the  Conference  with  the 
intention  of  removing  Smyrna  and  any  control  of  the  Straits  from  Greek  hands. 
In  a  British  Cabinet  meeting  on  2  December  1920,  however,  'there  was 
unanimous  agreement  with  the  view  that  the  possibility  of  handing  back  Smyrna  to  the 
Turks  by  the  Allies  could  not  be  entertained.  '  84  In  the  meantime,  it  was  also  stated  that 
the  question  regarding  which  side  the  British  should  prefer  'would  have  to  be  reviewed 
in  the  event  of  the  Greeks  failing  to  maintain  their  position  in  that  area.  '  The  Cabinet 
minutes  reveal  extra  attempts  to  satisfy  every  side.  The  disagreements,  however,  were 
many  and  explicitly  stated. 
Churchill  had  circulated  a  note  to  express  his  strong  opposition  to  this  'wait  and 
see'  attitude  which  the  Prime  Minister  had  urged  upon  the  Cabinet.  For  him,  'the 
restoration  of  Turkish  sovereignty  or  suzerainty  over  the  Smyrna  province'  was  'an 
indispensable  step  to  the  pacification  of  the  Middle  East.  '  The  language  used  was 
caustic  and  aimed  bluntly  at  discrediting  Lloyd  George's  handling.  Churchill  even 
85  rejected  the  idea  of  turning  the  Smyrna  zone  into  an  autonomous  area.  In  the 
memorandum  submitted  to  the  Cabinet,  he  enlisted  the  support  of  his  fellow  ministers, 
Andrew  Bonar  Law,  Austen  Chamberlain,  and  the  Secretaries  of  State  for  the  Colonies 
and  India,  Viscount  Milner  and  Edwin  Montagu.  All  had  voiced  their  objections,  some 
more  strongly  and  consistently,  like  Montagu,  in  a  series  of  memoranda  and  notes.  For 
Churchill,  'the  Greece  for  whose  benefit  the  Treaty  was  made,  '  had  disappeared.  86  He 
urged  for  a  change  of  policy  to  align  with  Italy  and  France  before  it  was  too  late.  The 
'drain  in  men  and  money'  that  the  War  Office  was  advocating  had  forced  him  to  urge 
93  The  proceedings  of  the  Second  Conference  of  London,  November  26  -  December  4,1920  in  DBFP, 
vol.  VIII,  Chapter  XIV. 
94  PRO,  CAB  23/23,2  December  1920. 
85  PRO,  CAB  23/23,2  December  1920,  Conclusions  of  a  Meeting  of  Ministers  and  Appendix  IX  Greece 
and  Middle  Eastern  Policy,  Note  by  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War  regarding  Conclusion  (2)  of  the 07 
for  immediate  action,  less  costly  for  Britain.  The  Greeks  would  soon  need  military 
forces  if  they  were  to  sustain  their  position.  87  After  all,  for  Churchill,  Turkey  was  the 
right  and  less  costly  proxy  for  Great  Britain  in  the  region,  and  the  sooner  Turkey  was 
out  of  the  Bolshevik  orbit,  the  better  for  the  protection  of  the  Empire.  Unquestioned 
Greek  backing  was  no  longer  a  subject  for  debate  at  British  Cabinet  meetings.  The 
expressed  concerns  and  the  disagreements  had  finally  acquired  a  more  insistent  tone. 
A  further  debate  had  emerged  within  the  Foreign  Office  itself,  taking  the  form  of 
memoranda  and  minutes.  This  issue  went  even  beyond  the  Greek  case.  Allied  unity  was 
another  crucial  question  on  the  horizon,  and  on  that  subject  there  was  divergence  of 
opinion  in  the  Foreign  Office.  Harold  Nicolson  in  a  memorandum  on  future  policy 
towards  Constantine  was  suggesting  the  adoption  of  a  clear-cut  policy,  whether  this 
would  mean  abandoning  Greece,  supporting  Constantine  or  taking  steps  to  depose  him. 
For  the  Foreign  Office  expert,  a  solution  which  would  involve  'the  middle  course  of 
leaving  King  Constantine  at  Athens  and  subjecting  him  to  a  series  of  intermittent  pin- 
pricks'  was  a  solution  to  be  avoided,  as  such  'a  course  would  achieve  nothing  and  be 
fatal  alike  to  our  prestige  and  to  our  commerce.  '  Nonetheless,  this  was  the  policy  that 
Lloyd  George  favoured  at  that  point. 
Nicolson  was  proved  right  in  his  statement  that  such  a  course  would  prove 
'fatal.  '  It  was  fatal  for  Greece  more  than  it  was  for  British  prestige  and  commerce, 
however.  Crowe,  in  his  minutes  on  this  memorandum  was  in  favour  of  'neither  openly 
supporting  Greece  nor  consistently  fighting  Constantine.  '  Ile  was  advocating  what  in 
fact  characterised  British  policy  from  that  point  onwards  until  the  final  Greek  debacle  in 
Smyrna;  he  was  'in  favour  of  continuing  the  waiting  attitude.  '  Curzon,  on  the  last  point, 
Conclusions  of  a  Conference  of  Ministers  held  on  Thursday,  2nd  December,  1920.  See  also  CHAR, 
Churchill  Papers,  CHAR  16/53/B,  Churchill  Memo  on  the  Near  East,  23  November  1920. 
6  PRO,  CAB  24/115,  C.  P  2153,  Situation  in  the  East.  Note  by  E.  Montagu,  22  November  1920. 
7  PRO,  WO  33/1004-CID  255-B,  General  Staff,  War  Office,  20  July  1920. 178 
was  far  more  adamant,  and  categorically  dismissed  Nicolson's  description  of  British 
policy  as  'a  series  of  intermittent  pin-pricks.  '  The  ultimate  motive  for  the  British 
waiting  game  was  to  prolong  Allied  solidarity.  However,  the  Secretary  had  admitted 
that  the  overall  British  position  was  not  a  'logical'  one. 
Nicolson's  return,  with  a  new  memorandum  on  the  Greek  situation,  brought  into 
the  open  further  disagreements  on  the  right  course  of  action.  He  was  certainly  not  on  the 
side  of  those  who  advocated  a  closer  understanding  and  co-operation  with  France  by 
following  in  their  footsteps  by  punishing  Greece.  For  him,  the  Treaty  of  Rvres  had 
either  to  be  supported  altogether,  or  abandoned.  'Drastic  measures'  and  'positive  action' 
in  the  case  of  Greece  was  the  answer.  'If  we  feel  that  we  cannot  afford  to  incur  the 
logical  consequences  of  our  desire  to  maintain  that  treaty,  it  is  only  honest  to  say  so  at 
once,  and  to  save  the  Greeks  further  disillusion  and  further  expenditure.  '  Further, 
Crowe,  the  Permanent  Under-Secretary  of  State,  reserved  'a  special  and  privileged 
position'  for  Greece  in  Smyrna  in  the  event  of  the  modification  of  the  treaty.  Crowe  was 
not  in  favour  of  the  reestablishment  of  the  Turks  in  Europe,  thus  having  them  re- 
established  on  both  sides  of  the  Dardanelles.  However,  he  did  not  share  Nicolson's 
opinion  in  favour  of  sole  British  action.  'The  question  of  policy  will  have  to  be 
88  discussed  at  Paris,  '  was  Crowe's  concluding  remark. 
On  the  other  hand,  Curzon's  suggestions  included,  first,  the  admission  of 
Turkish  sovereignty  over  Smyrna  and  in  addition,  leaving  the  Turks  the  Enos-Midia  line 
in  Europe  contrary  to  Crowe's  view.  89  Nicolson  disagreed.  To  offer  concessions  to  the 
Nationalists  would  whet  their  appetite  for  more,  which  would  probably  include  the 
Straits  and  then  Adrianople.  For  him,  Greece  continued  to  be  'a  very  positive  asset  in 
88  PRO,  FO  371/6077-CS42/20/19,  FO  minute  by  Nicolson  on  Action  in  regard  to  the  Greek  Question,  8 
January  1921  and  -C1339/20/19,  FO  memo  by  Nicolson,  Minutes  by  Crowe  and  Curzon,  18  January 
1921. 
89  In  the  Treaty  of  Rvres  the  Turks  were  given  the  Chatalia  line  and  they  were  thus  confined  in  Asia. 179 
British  imperial  policy.  '  Nicolson  saw  no  excuse  for  abandoning  Greece  in  favour  of  a 
French  alliance  in  the  Near  East.  'A  compromise  on  the  question  will  not  either  please 
Greece,  placate  Turkey  or  be  loyally  subscribed  to  by  the  French.  '  Crowe  saw  no  other 
solution  but  to  make  concessions  over  Smyrna  and  facilitate  France's  wish  to  withdraw 
from  Cilicia;  this  way,  'we  are  entitled  to  have  our  general  policy  towards  Greece,  and 
could,  if  necessary  renew  financial  and  diplomatic  support  to  a  Constantinist 
Government  even  if  France  did  not  join.  Italy  probably  would,  '  he  concluded.  90  It  was 
however,  already  too  late.  Curzon  and  Crowe  were  already  on  the  course  of  defending 
the  policy  of  'wait  and  see,  '  a  policy  which  contributed  to  the  final  outcome  and  debacle 
of  the  Greek  adventure  in  Anatolia. 
In  a  Cabinet  Meeting,  on  20  January  1921,  the  Greeks  were  still  regarded  as 
'strong  enough  to  resist  any  force  which  could  be  brought  against  them.  '  The  decision 
which  was  taken,  however,  was  that  Britain  would  have  to  act  in  accordance  with 
France  and  Italy  on  the  matter.  91  Lloyd  George  and  Curzon  went  to  Paris  to  prepare  the 
forthcoming  Allied  conference.  There,  Philip  Kerr  had  meetings  with  Venizelos,  in 
order  to  discuss  the  developments.  Venizelos  was  adamant: 
To  go  back  to  the  Treaty  of  S&vres  would  be  to  set  back  the 
clock  of  civilisation.  Mustapha  Kemal  was  carrying  out  a 
systematic  policy  of  extermination  of  the  Greeks  and  other 
civilised  elements  and  if  they  restore  Smyrna  to  his  control,  it 
would  simply  mean  that  he  would  attempt  to  exterminate  the 
Greeks  and  their  civilisation  there  also.  92 
The  French  were  set  from  the  beginning  upon  presenting  a  misleading  picture  of 
the  Greek  Army  and  persuading  the  British  that  they  themselves  were  facing  grave 
90  PRO,  FO  371/6077-C1339/20/19  Memo  by  Mr.  Nicolson  on  the  Revision  of  the  Treaty  of  Sývres,  18 
January  1921. 
91  PRO,  CAB  23/24,  Conclusions  of  a  meeting  of  Ministers,  20  January  1921. 
92  NAS,  Lothian  MSS,  GD  40/17/1133,  Copy  memorandum  on  interview  with  M.  Venizelos  in  Paris  (26 
January)  about  Smyrna,  A  Kemal,  King  Constantine  and  the  recent  Greek  elections,  27  January  192  1. 180 
problems  with  Kemal 
. 
93  Nicolson  and  Osborne  had  prepared  a  pre-conference  agenda. 
Smyrna  was  central  with  a  vital  addition  to  the  proposed  revision  of  the  Smyrna  articles: 
'The  province  to  pay  tribute  to  Turkey  in  the  shape  of  a  contribution  to  the  Ottoman 
public  debt.  994 
On  18  February  1921,  the  Cabinet  discussed  the  guidelines  for  the  Conference. 
The  idea  of  a  complete  Greek  withdrawal  from  Smyrna,  leaving  only  a  Christian 
government  with  a  special  international  gendarmerie,  was  warmly  supported.  Curzon 
was  anxious  to  ensure  that  the  clauses  of  the  Treaty  of  S6vres  which  provided  that 
95  Constantinople  and  the  Straits  be  internationalised,  remained  unaltered.  However, 
Montagu  was  pressing  for  further  concessions  to  Turkey  in  Thrace.  "  In  the  midst  of  the 
London  Conference,  Lloyd  George  had  a  meeting  with  the  Indian  representatives  where 
the  latter  expressed  their  chief  concerns  over  the  Turkish  situation.  On  the  issue  of 
Smyrna,  the  Indian  representatives'  opinion  was  adamant:  'Smyrna  is  an  absolute 
necessity  to  the  Turks.  '  97  The  British  Premier  had  the  chance  to  give  his  own  account  of 
the  Greek  presence  in  the  area: 
We  were  largely  responsible  for  the  Greek  occupation  of 
Smyrna.  Smyrna,  I  think  we  have  a  very  large 
responsibility  for  and  I  do  not  mind  pointing  out  exactly 
why  that  was  done.  Matter  was  whether  Smyrna  was 
going  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  Greeks  or  Italians.  We 
have  therefore  a  special  responsibility  for  Smyrna  because 
we  authorised  the  Greeks  to  OCCUPY  it.  [SiC]98 
The  Indian  representatives  were  extremely  persistent  throughout  the  course  of  the  two 
meetings.  Lloyd  George  seemed  willing  to  take  matters  into  consideration.  On  the  issue 
93  DBFP,  vol.  XV,  Chapter  I,  Proceedings  of  the  Second  Conference  of  Paris  and  Records  of 
Conversations  connected  therewith,  January  24  -29  192  1. 
94  PRO,  FO  371/6078-C3401/20/19,  Memorandum  by  Mr.  Osborne  and  Mr.  Nicolson  on  the  Greco- 
Turkish  Conference,  17  February  192  1. 
95  PRO,  CAB  23/24,  Appendix  I,  Conference  of  Ministers,  IS  February  192  1. 
96  Ibid. 
97  PRO,  CAB  23/35,  Confidential  S30,12  March  1921. 
98  Ibid. 151 
of  Constantinople,  he  stated  that  he  was  in  favour  of  its  evacuation,  leaving  the  control 
of  it  in  the  hands  of  the  Sultan's  Government.  On  the  issue  of  the  Straits,  he  stated  his 
belief  that  they  should  be  internationalised,  while  he  favoured  handing  Thrace  over  to 
the  Greeks,  unlike  his  co-discussants.  99 
THE  IMPACT  ON  THE  BRITISH  NEAR  EASTERN  POLICV  -  THE  BRITISII-GREEK  DISCUSSIONS  OF 
WINTER  1921. 
Prior  to  the  opening  of  the  Conference,  Lloyd  George  had  had  a  meeting  with 
the  Greek  Prime  Minister  Kalogeropoulos,  where  he  got  the  latter's  assurances  that  the 
Greek  Army  was  willing  and  able  to  continue  fighting  efficiently  in  Asia  Minor.  The 
Greek  Prime  Minister  presented  only  one  request:  to  allow  Greece  to  get  hold  of  Allied 
financial  credits.  100  Lloyd  George,  however,  put  forth  the  plan  for  a  Greek  administered 
Smyrna,  excluding  any  hope  that  Greece  would  leave  the  Conference  without  making 
concessions.  101 
Throughout  the  meetings,  Lloyd  George  was  providing  moral  support  for  the 
Greek  case.  For  example,  when  Colonel  Sariyannis,  the  representative  of  the  Greek 
General  Staff,  was  asked  to  comment  on  the  views  of  General  Gouraud,  who  had 
presented  his  pessimistic  interpretation  of  the  military  situation  and  the  Kernalist  forces 
based  on  his  own  experience  fighting  them  in  Cilicia,  he  was  assisted  by  Lloyd  George. 
The  British  Prime  Minister  stressed  the  fact  that  the  military  advisers  of  the  western 
powers  had  been  proven  wrong  on  their  estimations  regarding  Greek  capabilities  during 
the  advance  of  summer  1920.  'The  Greeks  did  not  intend  to  clear  out  of  Smyrna'  and 
they  had  made  their  point  clear  to  the  Conference  that: 
99  PRO,  CAB  23/35,  Confidential  S30,12  March  1921,  and  24  March  1921. 
100  The  Allies,  after  the  end  of  the  War,  had  given  financial  credits  to  Greece.  With  the  return  of 
Constantine  the  Allies  had  refused  to  honour  the  agreement.  See  this  Chapter:  'The  British  reaction  to  the 
elections-  The  view  from  Athens.  '  p.  17  1. 
101  DBFP,  vol.  XV,  no  13,  Interview  between  the  Prime  Minister  and  M.  Calogeropoulos,  on  February  18, 
192  1,  pp.  125-6. 182 
The  Greek  Army  in  Asia  Minor,  121,000  strong,  is  in  a 
position  to  scatter  the  Kemalist  forces  and  to  impose  the 
will  of  the  Powers  as  embodied  in  the  Treaty  of  Sevres.  In 
every  respect  the  Greek  Army  is  overwhelmingly  superior 
to  the  Kernalist  levies,  which  along  the  Greek  front  attain 
a  total  of  30,000  to  34,000  men,  including  irregulars.  112 
Lloyd  George  himself  was  in  favour  of  the  Greek  plan  of  action,  to  attempt  an  offensive 
and  establish  itself  firmly  in  the  region;  after  all  if  this  was  successful  it  would  be  to  the 
advantage  of  Britain,  with  no  further  cost.  Kalogeropoulos,  reporting  on  a  conversation 
with  the  British  prior  to  the  official  opening  of  the  Conference,  had  expressed  his  belief 
that  although  France  and  Italy  were  not  to  be  trusted,  'we  have  no  disbelief  towards  the 
British  Government  and  we  will  submit  any  possible  explanation  [of  our  attitude] 
willingly.  '  103 
Lloyd  George  was  giving  his  private  advice  to  the  Greeks  backstage  at  the 
Conference,  as  the  Greek  representatives  were  continuously  reporting  to  Athens. 
Through  intercepts,  it  became  known  that  Philip  Kerr  and  the  British  Prime  Minister 
appeared  to  have  advised  the  Greek  representatives  that  'Greece  ought  to  refuse  to 
concur  in  the  decision  of  the  conference.  '  Further,  Hankey  was  assigned  by  the  Prime 
Minister  to  inform  the  Greeks  that  'it  was  of  vital  importance  to  the  safety  of  the  Greek 
Army  to  strike  a  blow  at  Mustapha  Kemal.  104  Hankey  vividly  pictured  the  image  of  the 
old  Greek  Prime  Minister  being  relieved  at  the  news  since,  according  to  the  Cabinet 
Secretary,  'he  declared  that  he  would  never  have  sanctioned  an  attack  without 
authority.  '  This  air  of  authority  was  lent  by  Lloyd  George  to  the  Greeks,  who  were  now 
entangled  in  exactly  the  situation  that  Nicolson  had  predicted.  105  However,  it  does  not 
follow  in  any  way  that  the  decision  of  the  Greeks  to  dismiss  the  Allied  proposals  did  not 
102  DI3FP,  vol.  XV,  Notes  of  a  Conversation  between  Lloyd  George  and  Briand,  Appendix  to  no  15,21 
February  1921,  pp.  1334. 
103  MFA'  192  1,  File  25,  Subfile  2,  no  1455,  Calogeropoulos  to  MFA,  II  February  192  1. 
104  Han"key  Diary,  9  March  192  1,  Roskill,  Hankey,  p.  222. 183 
rest  entirely  on  the  shoulders  of  the  Greek  Government.  Kalogeropoulos  stressed  the 
need  not  to  detach  Greece  completely  from  British  advice: 
Greece  cannot  leave  the  issue  of  retaining  its  territories  on 
the  decisions  of  a  Committee.  The  suggestion  should  be 
turned  down.  A  simple  no,  however,  would  annoy  the 
British  Prime  Minister.  Thus,  the  Government  should 
appear  mediocre  and  not  that  it  dismisses  the  suggestion. 
The  Parliament  should  do  that.  " 
The  Greek  politician's  impression  was  that  the  British  Prime  Minister  'wanted  to  find 
out  the  degree  of  real  resistance  of  which  Greece  is  capable  in  the  event  of  its  having  to 
assume  alone  the  burden  involved  in  the  continuation  of  hostilities.  '  107 
The  bottom  line  was  that  Lloyd  George  refused  to  take  a  strong  line  and  support 
the  Greeks,  limiting  himself  to  friendlY  advice  which  made  things  worse  for  the  Greek 
Government's  judgement.  108  The  Conference  officially  concluded  on  18  March  1921. 
The  French,  as  indicated  before  the  proceedings  of  the  Conference,  did  not  support 
British  designs.  Lloyd  George  officially  abstained  from  taking  a  stronger  line  in  favour 
of  Greek  desiderata.  Officially,  it  was  decided  to  ask  the  two  sides,  Greeks  and  Turks, 
to  consent  to  a  commission  being  despatched  to  Smyrna  and  Thrace.  For  the  Greek 
Government  the  decision  had  been  taken:  the  Greek  offensive  started  on  23  March  and 
the  orders  were  sent  to  the  Greek  front  while  the  Greek  Prime  Minister  was  still  in  the 
British  capital.  Gounaris  from  London  cabled  to  Stergiadis,  Smyrna,  instructions  to 
Papoulas,  the  Commander  of  the  Greek  forces  in  Smyrna:  '[  ...  ]I  have  received  the 
impression  here  that  is  of  essential  importance  that  you  should  achieve  the  first  stage  of 
105  See  this  Chapter:  'The  London  response  and  the  erroneous  Greek  impression  about  British  help.  '  p.  173. 
106  MFA,  192  1,  File  25,  Subfile  2,  no  165  8,  Calogeropoulos  to  MFA,  16  February  192  1. 
107  PRO,  FO  371/6079  in  a  'flimsy'  Calogeropoulos  to  Baltazzis  (Athens),  19  February  192  1,  and  PRO, 
HW  12/19,  February  1921,  no  005593,  Calogeropoulos  to  Baltazzis  [19  February  1921],  23  February 
1921. 
10'  He  had  stated  in  the  midst  of  the  London  Conference:  'Leave  the  Turks  and  Greeks  alone  to  fight  it 
amongst  themselves.  '  DBFP,  voI.  XV,  Proceedings  of  the  Third  Conference  of  London  and  Records  of 
Conversations  connected  therewith.  Feb.  18  to  March  18,1921,  p.  275. 184 
your  operation  before  the  time  limit  which  the  Turks  have  fixed  for  their  answer  comes 
to  an  end.  "09 
THE  WAR  OFFICE  'ALTERNATIVE':  TURKEY  RECONSIDERED. 
On  military  grounds,  there  were  substantial  objections  to  any  further  Greek 
advance.  The  British  military  were  alarmed,  because  in  the  event  of  the  Greeks  being 
entangled  in  the  interior  of  Anatolia  they  would  turn  to  Britain  for  help,  and  Britain  was 
neither  in  a  position  to  nor  willing  to  proceed  with  military  operations.  The  Army 
estimates  for  1920-21  had  recorded  that  British  troops  in  Constantinople  and  the  Straits 
would  reach  9,500.  In  the  meantime,  British  forces  of  6,000  troops  were  engaged  in 
Egypt,  9,000  still  in  Palestine  and  14,000  in  Mesopotamia.  The  troops  in  Constantinople 
were  costing  L50,000  a  day,  according  to  Churchill.  '  10 
In  July  1920,  General  Paraskevopoulos  had  proposed  to  Milne  the  renewal  of  the 
Greek  offensive,  in  order  to  advance  further  up  towards  the  Anatolian  Railway, 
occupying  Eski-Shehr  and  Afion  Karahissar  and  eventually  deep  into  Angora.  However, 
General  Milne  had  been  opposed  to  any  further  Greek  advance.  At  the  time,  only  the 
French  benefited  from  such  an  advance  in  the  area  of  Cilicia,  as  it  would  keep  the 
Nationalists  occupied  in  the  event  of  a  Greek  offensive.  The  proposal  was  thus  rejected 
since  it  did  not  serve  British  interests.  "'  Nevertheless,  British  policy  in  the  region  had 
had  to  rely  on  the  Greek  forces  in  late  summer-  early  autumn  of  1920.  The  strained 
situation  which  Britain  faced  in  Mesopotamia  made  things  worse.  112  Churchill,  in 
August  1920,  had  telegraphed  directly  to  Venizelos  that  it  would  be  necessary  to 
withdraw  a  substantial  number  of  British  troops  from  Constantinople  'in  the  near 
109  PRO,  HW  12/2  1,  April  192  1,  no  005  93  8-  Gounaris  to  Stergiadis,  [25  March  192  1  ],  I  April  192  1. 
1  Gilbert,  Churchill,  Vol,  IV,  p.  437  and  p.  478. 
1  DBFP,  vol.  XIII,  no  102,  Admiral  de  Robeck  to  Curzon,  28  July  1920,  pp.  106-7. 185 
future.  '  He  pressed  Venizelos  for  the  Greek  division  that  would  lighten  the  load  for 
British  forces.  113 
For  Churchill,  Venizelos'  defeat  was  the  opportunity  to  reconsider  British 
policy.  In  November,  in  a  memorandum  on  the  Middle  East,  Churchill  concluded  that: 
,...  the  Bolsheviks  have  established  a  direct  connection  and  working  arrangement  with 
the  Turkish  Nationalists  under  Mustafa  Kemal,  thus  our  position  in  Constantinople  is 
seriously  affected.  "  14  He  urged  for  the  reversal  of  'policy  of  relying  on  the  weak  and 
fickle  Greeks.  '  For  him,  Turkey  was  the  horse  to  back,  as  had  always  been  the  case,  in 
order  to  defend  British  interests  in  opposition  to  Russian  ambitions.  Attention  was 
drawn  once  again  to  the  fact  that  current  British  policy  of  supporting  Greece  had  drawn 
Turkey  and  Russia  closer  together,  'an  extraordinarily  unnatural  union  between  those 
opposite  forces.  '  A  solution  would  be  to  'establish  a  just  and  lasting  peace  with  the  real 
leaders  in  Turkey.  '  115 
Along  similar  lines,  Wilson  and  the  Director  of  Military  Intelligence  General 
Thwaites  advocated  the  idea  of  opening  direct  negotiations  with  Kemal.  Most  probably 
they  felt  that  they  could  negotiate  with  him  on  equal  terms,  Kemal  being  a  man-of-war 
like  themselves.  However,  the  idea  was  rejected  by  the  Foreign  Office.  As  was  proven 
later,  Kemal  had  been  transformed  into  a  political  leader  and  was  behaving  as  such.  The 
Foreign  Office  gave  its  consent  for  opening  negotiations  with  Kemal  only  in  June  1921 
and  even  that  was  done  very  watchfully.  116 
112  There  were  local  uprisings  there  and  'the  cause  for  all  this  was  Bolsheviks,  Turks,  and  Syrians,  in  that 
order.  '  Busch,  From  Mudros  to  Lausanne,  p.  407.  See  B.  C.  Busch,  Britain,  India  and  the  Arabs,  1914- 
1921  (London,  1971)  especially  Chapter  VIII,  pp.  371422. 
113  CHURCHILL  COLLEGE  ARCHIVES,  Churchill  Papers,  CHAR  17/6,  Churchill  to  Venizelos,  31 
August  1920. 
114  CHURCHILL  COLLEGE  ARCHIVES,  Churchill  Papers,  CHAR  16/53/A,  Churchill  Memorandurn, 
16  November  1920. 
115  CHURCHILL  COLLEGE  ARCHIVES,  Churchill  Papers,  CHAR  16/53/13,  Churchill  Memorandum, 
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A  personal  letter  soon  followed  Churchill's  memorandum  to  Lloyd  George,  in 
which  he  outlined  again  the  advantages  of  changing  British  Eastern  policy.  In  the  letter, 
much  is  revealed  about  the  strained  situation  which  Lloyd  George  was  facing  in  the 
Government.  Churchill  urged  him  to  change  his  personal  policy  which  'was  damaging 
the  unity  and  cohesion  of  several  important  elements  of  opinion  on  whom  you  have 
hitherto  been  able  to  rely.  "  17  Churchill  was  trying  to  warn  Lloyd  George  on  the 
apparent  disquiet  expressed  by  the  Conservative  circles.  But  above  all,  his  advice 
concerned  the  British  attitude  regarding  the  Bolshevik  factor:  'We  seem  to  becoming 
the  most  anti-Turk  and  most  pro-Bolshevik  power  in  the  world.  '  For  Churchill,  the 
return  of  Constantine  to  the  throne  had  destroyed  the  position  which  Greece  had 
enjoyed  in  relation  to  Britain.  This,  coupled  with  the  fact  that  British  military  strength 
was  'extremely  weak,  '  necessitated  an  immediate  reconsideration  of  policy.  The 
'enormous  and  varied  interests'  of  Britain  had  to  be  safeguarded  by  local  powers.  In  the 
Secretary's  view,  Britain  at  that  moment  could  not  count  on  any  local  power:  'When 
Russia  was  our  enemy  the  Turk  was  our  friend.  When  Turkey  was  our  enemy  Russia 
was  our  friend.  [ 
... 
]  When  everything  else  had  been  let  go  we  had  at  least  the  Greeks. 
Now  we  are  out  of  joint  with  the  whole  lot  at  once.  '  Churchill  insisted  on  the  fact  that 
Britain  could  not  count  any  more  on  the  'pro-German'  Greeks.  Ile  further  bolstered  his 
argument  with  the  issue  of  the  Muslim  feeling.  His  proposal  was  clear:  'We  should 
allow  the  Greek  position  in  Smyrna  to  collapse  so  that  we  have  no  responsibility  for 
what  happens  and  then  bow  to  the  accomplished  fact...  "  18 
Why  was  Churchill  so  adamant  in  preserving  Turkey  as  Britain's  barrier  in  the 
area?  The  evidence  suggests  that  a  great  part  of  his  rationale  had  been  based  on  the 
information  he  had  as  War  Secretary,  coupled  with  his  strong  belief  that  the  Greek 
117  CHURCHILL  COLLEGE  ARCHIVES,  Churchill  Papers,  CHAR  17/6,  Churchill  to  Lloyd  George,  4 
December  1920. 187 
policy  was  only  forcing  the  Nationalists  into  the  anus  of  the  Bolsheviks.  '  19  Alongside 
came  the  fact  that  the  military  were  not  convinced  that  the  fighting  capabilities  of 
Greece  could  drag  it  out  of  the  crisis  victoriously. 
Churchill's  suggestions  had  started  materialising.  Already,  supplies  and  money 
were  cut  off.  Greece  was  on  its  own  on  the  battlefield,  since  Allied  neutrality  had  been 
decided.  The  moral  support  was  there,  indirectly  pursued  by  Lloyd  George.  The  course 
of  events  that  Churchill  had  outlined  in  his  memo  was  however,  gradually  starting  to 
materialise.  The  Secretary  for  War  had  a  time  limit  in  his  mind:  '[...  ]if  we  are  to  make  a 
satisfactory  peace,  do  it  before  the  Greek  annies  in  the  field  have  crumbled  away  or 
being  withdrawn.  '  120  This  did  not  happen;  the  Greek  forces  were  in  fact  left  to  crumble 
and  that  made  the  peace  a  little  bit  more  difficult  for  the  British. 
The  Greek  operations  up  until  April  1921  in  Anatolia  were  characterised  by  the 
General  Staff  as  being  'too  optimistic.  '  The  crux  of  the  matter  was  that  they  did  not 
coincide  with  the  ultimate  plan  of  the  British  War  Office:  the  pacification  of  the  Eastern 
Anatolia.  The  point  was  that  Greek  activity  further  threw  the  Turks  into  the  anns  of  the 
Bolsheviks.  Even  if  the  Greek  Anny  managed  to  reach  Angora,  this  would  not  mean  the 
end  of  the  hostilities:  'The  Nationalist  forces  in  Eastern  Anatolia,  '  concluded  the 
commentary  of  the  General  Staff,  'will  still  be  in  existence,  and  Mustapha  Kemal,  by 
this  time  having  been  forced  to  consolidate  his  position  with  Russia,  will  be  able  to 
make  his  plans  for  continuance  of  hostilities  at  his  leisure.  "" 
The  British  General  Staff  was  in  a  position  to  know,  from  American  sources  as 
well  as  from  its  own  excellent  intelligence,  that  the  Nationalist  Army  was  in  good 
1"  Ibid. 
119  As  discussed  in  Chapter  Three:  'The  British  case:  The  debates  among  the  British  officials.  '  p.  14  1. 
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condition,  with  plenty  of  ammunition,  since  it  had  captured  considerable  military  stores 
recently  from  Armenia.  The  War  Office  believed  that  if  the  Greeks  proceeded  with  the 
operations,  this  would  mean  the  further  dissipation  of  the  already  weak  Allied  forces  at 
Constantinople  since  they  would  need  their  forces  that  had  at  the  disposal  of  the  Allies 
at  Ismid.  122  At  least  in  this  domain,  the  Greek  presence  was  considered  vital  and 
necessary. 
Judging  from  a  combined  paper,  based  on  the  report  of  the  British  military 
Attachd  in  Athens,  Brigadier  General  E.  S.  Nairne,  and  the  reports  of  Major  General 
Marden  and  Lieutenant  General  Harington,  days  before  the  launching  of  the  summer 
Greek  offensive,  it  was  believed  that,  the  Greek  Army  was  well  trained  and  equipped. 
However,  apart  from  'some  initial  successes'  it  was  not  considered  capable  of  obtaining 
a  decisive  victory.  'Greece's  great  need,  '  concluded  the  paper,  'is  man-power.  '  123  The 
last  was  something  that  the  Allies,  and  primarily  the  British,  were  not  prepared  to 
supply. 
THE  GREEK  MARCH  OFFENSIVE  AND  ITS  EFFECTS. 
The  orders  for  the  launching  of  the  March  offensive  were  given  from  the  Greek 
Prime  Minister  in  London.  Greece  had  taken  a  yet  another  leap  into  the  Asia  Minor 
adventure.  The  Greek  forces  met  effective  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  Turkish 
Nationalist  forces.  They  suffered  heavy  losses  and  were  forced  to  retreat.  The  total 
casualties  of  the  operation  were  4,000  soldiers.  However,  there  was  an  immediate 
reinforcement  of  6,000  from  Greece.  An  appreciation  of  a  British  official  concluded  that 
'the  Higher  Command  had  failed  in  not  having  ascertained  beforehand  the  strength  and 
122  PRO,  WO  32/5656,  Greek  memo  on  'The  military  situation  in  Greece'  and  Comments  by  the  General 
Staff  on  'The  military  situation  in  Greece,  '  21  February  1921. 
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positions  of  the  Turkish  defences.  '  124  The  failure  was  attributed  to  the  attacks  being 
'disconnected'  and  to  the  failure  of  ammunition  supply.  The  Greek  forces  were  forced 
to  retire  to  their  original  line.  Rumbold,  from  Constantinople  was  expressing  tile  fear, 
since  there  was  no  reliable  information  on  the  strength  of  the  Kernalists,  that  there 
would  be  opportunities  for  Kemal  to  advance  towards  Constantinople.  125 
The  news  of  the  failure  of  the  Greek  Offensive  certainly  had  an  impact  on  the 
morale  and  feelings  of  the  people  in  Greece.  When  the  news  was  finally  published 
Granville  was  noting  that  'in  the  upper  classes  there  is  a  deep  feeling  of  depression.  '  126 
The  Government  had  tried  to  conceal  the  facts  and  quiet  the  people  with  declarations  of 
the  kind  which  stated  that  the  attack  on  Eskishehr  'was  never  intended  as  a  serious 
operation.  '  However,  it  was  the  Greek  chance  to  prove  that  the  Army  was  in  a  position 
to  enforce  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  SMes  and  secure  the  Greek  presence  in  the  area  in 
the  eyes  of  the  Allies. 
Right  after  the  offensive,  the  Greek  Government  called  up  two  further  classes. 
The  next  step  was  to  prepare  the  army  for  the  summer  campaign  period.  As  time  went 
by  and  summer  approached  it  was  expected  that  the  Greeks  would  attempt  a  further 
offensive.  In  the  meantime,  the  Greek  press  and  people  longed  for  a  change  in  British 
attitude.  The  pro-govemment  press  appeared  optimistic,  the  Venizelist  papers  were 
sceptical  while  the  independent  ones  were  expressing  considerable  doubts  for  such  a 
progress.  127 
124  PRO,  WO  106/1437,  Account  on  a  visit  to  the  Greek  Army  in  Asia  Minor  by  Major-General  T.  0. 
Marden,  June  1921. 
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THE  BOLSHEVIK  FACTOR  IN  BRITISH  THINKING. 
The  objections  to  a  further  Greek  offensive  were  many  and  were  outlined  in  the 
communiquds  from  the  British  on  the  spot  to  London.  A  further  Greek  advance  would 
only  benefit  the  Turkish  Nationalist  movement  while  the  Sultan's  government  would  be 
once  more  discredited  in  the  eyes  of  the  people  as  being  unable  to  establish  peace.  It 
was  true,  Turkey  had  two  governments,  the  one  being  the  Sultan's  government  in 
Constantinople  under  Allied  tutelage  while  the  other  was  well  established  in  the  depths 
of  Anatolia,  run  by  the  Nationalists.  Earlier  in  the  winter  the  Allied  High 
Commissioners  had  submitted  to  their  respective  governments  the  proposal  of 
recommending  to  the  Sultan's  government  'the  formation  of  a  mission  composed  of 
persons  possessing  real  authority  and  capable  of  obtaining  a  hearing  from  moderate 
Nationalists.  '  128  The  mission  would  emphasise  that  'acceptance  of  treaty  would  result  in 
termination  of  war,  of  actions,  of  conscription  and  the  establishment  of  order, 
tranquillity,  good  administration  and  the  prosperity  of  the  country.  '  129  The  attempt  was  a 
failure.  The  mission  was  actually  sent  to  Angora  in  early  December  1920  and  was 
escorted  by  British  officers  to  ensure  free  passage  through  the  areas  under  the  control  of 
the  Greek  forces.  Sir  Horace  Rumbold  had  prophesied  however,  that  'the  prospects  of 
the  mission  achieving  any  success  with  the  Kernalists  on  the  basis  of  the  acceptance  of 
the  Treaty  in  its  present  form  are  almost  nil.  '  130 
Kemal  had  already  established  his  power,  set  his  goals  and  reserved  support  for 
his  plans.  Only  the  use  of  serious  military  action  taken  by  the  Allies  in  collaboration 
with  Greek  forces  could  possibly  have  stopped  him,  and  this  was  a  step  that  the  Allies 
were  simply  not  willing  to  take.  British  military  men  had  already  foreseen  that  any 
128  DBFP,  vol.  XIII,  no  189,  Rumbold  to  Curzon,  6  December  1920,  pp.  196-8. 
129  Ibid. 
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pacific  missions  had  little  hope  of  success.  13  1  The  evaluation  by  Andrew  Ryan,  of  the 
Constantinople  High  Commission,  reinforced  this  point:  'Even  with  the  whole  hearted 
support  of  the  Allies  it  would  be  impossible  for  the  Turkish  Government  to  organise  a 
force  adequate  to  repress  the  Nationalists  and  restore  order  in  Anatolia.  '  132  The  course 
of  action  proposed  was  twofold  and  had  been  the  obvious  solution  to  the  British 
officials  on  the  spot  immediately  after  the  signing  of  the  Treaty.  The  Nationalists  were 
the  true  force  in  Turkey,  so  the  Allies  must  either  'yield  to  them  over  the  treaty  or  fight 
them  in  some  way.  '  The  latter  option  had  been  extensively  debated  during  the  First 
Conference  of  London  in  1920  when  the  peace  treaty  was  still  discussed.  To  oppose  the 
Nationalists  would  entail  either  Allied  action,  further  use  of  Greeks  or  use  of  'such 
Turkish  elements  as  are  prepared  to  accept  the  treaty  as  a  necessary  evil.  '  The  Allies  had 
lost  the  opportunity  to  use  this  option:  they  had  followed  a  course  of  action  which  had 
turned  practically  all  elements  of  the  Turkish  political  scene  towards  Kemal.  The  last 
straw  had  been  the  occupation  of  Constantinople  in  March  1920.  The  Allies  had  had  the 
chance  to  support  those  elements  that  could  oppose  Kemal  but  had  failed,  primarily  due 
to  their  inability  to  decide  among  themselves  the  right  course  of  action  to  take,  while  not 
detaching  themselves  from  their  interests. 
Sir  Horace  Rumbold,  who  had  replaced  Admiral  De  Robeck  in  November  1920 
as  the  British  High  Commissioner,  provided  London  with  the  full  picture  of  Nationalist 
strength.  For  him,  Kemal  was  no  longer  to  be  regarded  as  'a  brigand  chief.  '  His  relation 
[Kemal's]  with  the  Bolsheviks  was  a  recurring  theme  in  his  communications.  Rumbold 
pinpointed  one  common  element:  they  were  both  'especially  hostile'  to  Great  Britain.  133 
Rumbold  believed  that  the  Bolsheviks  and  the  Turkish  Nationalists  would  come  to 
131  PRO,  FO  406/44,  no  144  [E  12474/3/44],  De  Robeck  to  Curzon,  Enclosure  Memo  by  Ryan,  respecting 
the  Nationalist  movement  in  Anatolia,  28  September  1920. 
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terms,  'leaving  the  Nationalists  free  to  concentrate  their  attacks  upon  the  Greeks  and  the 
Allies.  '  134 
The  weekly  intelligence  reports  compiled  by  the  Secret  Intelligence  Staff  at 
Constantinople  and  forwarded  to  the  Foreign  Office  via  Rumbold  were  of  considerable 
importance.  '  35  On  the  Nationalist  relations  with  the  Bolsheviks  the  evaluation  was  that: 
'...  the  Nationalist  administration  is  hastily  drawing  up  and  applying  various  measures 
obviously  intended  to  appeal  to  the  Bolsheviks.  '  136  Regarding  these  'measures,  '  Louis 
Fisher  in  his  study,  The  Soviets  in  World  Affairs,  points  out  the  excellent  techniques  of 
the  Turkish  Nationalist  leader:  j 
... 
]  Kemal  even  adopted  Communist  terminology  and 
addressed  a  letter  to  Chicherin  [the  Soviet  Commissar  for  Foreign  Affairs]  on 
November  29,1920  which  contained  strictures  against  "international  capital"  and 
references  to  "proletarian  masses  of  the  world"  through  whose  efforts,  seconded  by  the 
"opposed  peoples  of  Asia  and  Africa,  "  the  rule  of  the  bourgeoisie  would  end.  '  137 
Despite  the  Bolshevik  danger,  Rumbold  believed  that  Britain  could  retain 
control  over  Constantinople,  given  the  fact  that  the  situation  in  the  old  Ottoman  capital 
was  strained,  primarily  due  to  the  bad  economic  situation  and  the  influx  of  refugees 
from  Russia.  138  There  were  fears  of  a  revolt  of  all  the  impoverished  refugees  against  the 
Allied  authorities  of  the  city.  Rumbold's  reports  were  also  a  good  source  of  evidence  on 
the  split  of  opinion  between  the  Allies  in  Constantinople,  a  factor  which  was  becoming 
evident  during  the  Third  Conference  of  London.  His  reports  contributed  to  the  idea 
already  formed  in  the  minds  of  the  Foreign  Office  officials;  that  the  French  would  be 
ready  at  any  given  minute  to  abandon  the  British  in  Constantinople.  The  French  proved 
134  M.  Gilbert,  Sir  H.  Rumbold  (London,  1973),  p.  225. 
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Rumbold  right.  Their  first  hit  below  the  belt  was  the  signing  of  the  separate  agreement 
with  Kemal's  representatives  in  London,  during  the  conference  that  was  supposed  to 
give  an  Allied  solution  to  the  problem.  In  the  meantime,  on  16  March  1921,  Kemal  had 
concluded  a  'Treaty  of  Friendship  and  Brotherhood'  with  Soviet  Russia.  The  Treaty  was 
proof  of  Soviet  assistance  to  the  Nationalists  on  military  and  financial  terms,  while  the 
Russians  further  ceded  the  Armenian  provinces  of  Kars,  Ardahan  and  Artvin  to 
Turkey.  139  It  should  be  pointed  out,  however,  that  at  that  time  the  Nationalists  had 
attempted  to  persuade  the  British  of  the  necessity  of  reaching  an  understanding.  140  The 
negotiations  were  fruitful  only  on  the  issue  of  the  exchange  of  prisoners  between  the 
two  sides,  on  which  subject  there  was  actually  an  agreement  signed  by  Bekir  Sami  and 
Robert  Vansittart.  141 
One  option  was  open  to  the  British  High  Commissioner:  'Unless  the  Allies  are 
willing  themselves  to  undertake  difficult  military  operations  in  interior  [to  accelerate 
pacification  of  Asia  Minor]  can  now  only  be  attained  by  going  a  long  way  to  meet 
Nationalists.  ""  Regarding  the  Greeks,  the  British  High  Commissioner,  shortly  after  he 
took  on  his  duties  and  immediately  after  the  results  of  the  Greek  elections,  had 
suggested  the  conversion  of  the  Smyrna  area  'from  purely  Greek  zone  into  specially 
administered  vilayet  under  Turkish  sovereignty  accompanied  by  international  control, 
and  by  making  non-territorial  disposition  somewhat  less  stringent.  '  143 
138  PRO,  F0371/6556,  Rumbold  to  Curzon,  4  January  1921.  'The  streets  of  the  city  were  full  of  famished 
and  utterly  demoralised  Russians  who  are  a  danger  to  the  security  and  health  of  the  town.  ' 
139  A.  Zapantis,  Greek-Soviet  Relations  1917-1921  (New  York,  1982),  p.  76.  The  text  of  the  treaty  in 
English  can  be  found  in  Manchester  Guardian,  27  September  1922  and  in  Current  History,  November 
1922.  With  this  treaty  Russia  aggreed  'not  to  recognise  any  international  acts  bearing  on  Turkey  and  not 
recognised  by  the  National  Government  of  Turkey  at  present  represented  by  her  Great  National 
Assembly.  ' 
140  DBFP,  vol.  XV,  no  33,  Notes  of  a  meeting  between  Lloyd  George  and  Bekir  Sami,  4  March  192  1, 
pi270. 
1  Billent  G6kay,  A  Clash  ofEmpires.  Turkey  between  Russian  Bolshevism  and  British  Imperialism, 
1918-1923  (London,  1997),  p.  125. 
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On  the  Greek  offensive  of  March  1921,  in  a  letter  to  Sir  Lancelot  Oliphant, 
Assistant  Under-Secretary,  Rumbold  had  expressed  his  opposition,  considering  it  a 
delay  to  peace.  'As  the  Greeks  have  elected  to  start  fighting  again,  '  noted  Rumbold,  'the 
best  thing  which  could  happen  would  be  for  the  two  parties  to  fight  to  a  stalemate  and 
be  thoroughly  exhausted.  Then  there  may  be  some  chance  of  their  proving  tractable.  '  144 
In  this  letter,  the  British  official  also  had  an  interesting  comment  to  make  upon  the 
relations  of  the  Foreign  Office  and  the  Prime  Minister:  'I  have  long  known  of  the 
curious  relations  between  the  Foreign  Office  and  No  10  and  appreciate  the  fact  that  the 
latter  tries to  concentrate  affairs  in  its  hands.  But  surely  if  the  P.  M  wishes  for  good 
results  his  Agents  should  be  kept  fully  informed.  '  145  Following  the  Greek  offensive,  his 
estimation  was  that  the  situation  in  Asia  Minor  would  be  even  more  difficult  later  on  in 
the  summer,  as  he  thought  that  'the  Greeks  have  bitten  off  more  than  they  can  chew  and 
would  be  at  the  end  of  their  tether  in  some  three  months  from  now.  '  146  In  his  official 
communiques  to  the  Foreign  Office,  the  British  High  Commissioner  was  more  than 
clear;  the  Nationalists  were  tough  players,  showing  their  strength  at  every  opportunity. 
In  private,  for  the  British  official,  the  Nationalists  'had  their  tails  up'  and  '[we]  have 
means  to  exercise  pressure  on  the  Greeks  but  not  to  Kemal  if  he  were  to  triumph  over 
the  Greeks.  '  147  On  that  as  well,  Rumbold  was  prophetic,  as  he,  a  member  of  the  British 
Delegation  at  the  Lausanne  Conference,  had  had  to  deal  with  the  Turks  almost  a  year 
and  a  half  later. 
The  British  High  Commissioner  was  on  official  leave  from  May  until  the  end  of 
July  1921  when  the  Greeks  launched,  on  8  July,  their  summer  offensive.  William 
Rattigan  was  the  Acting  High  Commissioner  during  his  period  of  absence.  The  rest  of 
144  PRO,  FO  800/253  TU  21/2,  Rumbold  to  Oliphant,  30  March  192  1. 
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146  PRO,  FO  800/253  TU  21/3,  Rumbold  to  Oliphant,  3  May  192  1. 
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the  British  officials  at  Constantinople  shared  more  or  less  the  same  attitude,  being 
equally  cautious  in  their  handling  of  the  Nationalists.  Co-operation  with  the  Greeks  was 
used  by  the  British  at  Constantinople  only  with  the  aim  of  ending  the  Greek  occupation. 
It  was  not  that  the  British  at  Constantinople  opted  for  Kemal.  On  the  contrary,  Kemal 
was  considered  equally  unwanted,  the  aim  was  to  create,  under  the  Sultan,  'a  tractable 
but  not  too  reduced,  Turkey.  ""  The  idea  was  to  try  and  keep  Kemal  in  check  this  time 
and  let  the  Greeks  out.  A  spirit  of  pessimism  was  however  evident  with  regard  to  British 
standing  in  relation  to  the  Nationalists.  This  pessimism  found  its  expression  in  crucial 
Cabinet  meetings  shortly  afterwards. 
THE  QUESTION  OF  CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE  ATTEMPTED  BRITISH  RAPPROCHEMENT 
WITH  KENIAL  PRIOR  TO  THE  SUMMER  OFFENSIVE. 
One  point  was  crystal  clear  during  the  early  summer  of  1921:  British  troops 
stationed  at  Constantinople,  according  to  the  Commander  of  the  British  and  Allied 
forces,  General  Harington,  and  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff  Sir  Henry 
Wilson,  were  not  adequate  for  the  protection  of  the  city  and  the  Straits.  Wilson  stressed 
the  need  'to  come  away.  '  149  'To  come  away'  from  Constantinople  meant  to  abandon  the 
Straits,  and  this  was  an  option  that  the  Government  did  not  relish.  One  alternative  could 
be  to  try  and  use  the  card  that  British  policy  makers  had  played  the  previous  summer, 
the  Greek  forces.  Only  this  time,  especially  after  the  March  offensive,  there  was  not 
very  much  hope  that  this  could  work. 
The  situation  was  discussed  by  the  Cabinet  in  the  course  of  General  Harington's 
visit  to  London  and  just  before  Curzon's  departure  for  Paris,  so  that  the  latter  would  be 
able  to  press  his  views  regarding  the  offer  of  mediation  on  the  French.  The  Cabinet  met 
148  PRO,  FO  371/6471-E6786/l/44,  Rattigan  to  Foreign  Office,  Enclosure  Memo  by  A.  Ryan,  13  June 
1921. 
149  Callwell,  Field  Marshal  Sir  Henry  Wilson,  p.  292. IYO 
on  31  May  to  discuss  the  situation  in  Anatolia.  Greece  was  'a  broken  reed.,  1  50  Military 
Intelligence  suggested  that  the  Nationalist  forces  had  been  thoroughly  studying  their 
opponent  and  'were  even  well  informed  as  to  the  probable  Greek  lines  of  advance.  ' 
How  were  the  Nationalists  so  well  informed?  The  reports  captured  the  involvement  of 
Britain's  Allies.  151 
Harington  had  suggested  withdrawal.  Curzon  did  not  support  this  'far  reaching 
and  calamitous'  idea.  152  With  no  British  forces  at  Constantinople,  the  Straits  and  their 
internationalisation  were  in  danger.  In  addition,  Curzon  feared  that  this  would  push  the 
French  and  Italian  further  towards  Kemal.  153  Montagu  and  Churchill  warmly  supported 
the  military.  Montagu  had  put  forth  the  need  to  foster  Muslim  support  while  Churchill 
had  in  mind  the  precarious  position  of  the  British  in  Mesopotamia  and  Palestine. 
The  Cabinet  decided  that  it  would  be  'desirable'  and  'valuable'  to  establish  some 
contact  with  the  Kernalists.  The  proposed  withdrawal  was  ruled  out.  Harington,  assisted 
by  a  diplomat,  as  had  been  suggested,  would  prove  'the  informal  and  unofficial  line  of 
communication,  '  an  opportunity  not  to  be  missed.  There  was  a  suggestion  to  include  in 
the  meetings,  if  they  were  to  take  place,  a  diplomat,  since  it  was  believed  that  otherwise 
Kemal  would  endeavour  to  engage  the  British  in  separate  negotiations,  a  solution  which 
was  not  yet  advised  primarily  because  the  military  situation  remained  still  blurred. 
The  British  officials  at  Constantinople  were  in  favour  of  entering  into 
negotiations,  provided  that  the  Constantinople  government  was  not  further  undermined. 
150  The  phrase  belongs  to  Ilarington,  in  PRO,  FO  371/6470-E6129/l/44,  Directorate  of  Military 
Intelligence  Constantinople,  30  May  192  1. 
151  PRO,  FO  371/6470-E6129/l/44,  Directorate  of  Military  Intelligence,  Constantinople  and  PRO,  FO 
371/6470-E65  89/l/44,  Directorate  of  Military  Intelligence,  9  June  192  I.  The  two  memoranda  submitted 
by  Harington.  The  first  was an  appreciation  from  December  1920  to  April  1921  concluding  that  'Greece 
was a  broken  reed.  '  The  second  memo  referred  to  the  organization  of  the  Turkish  Nationalist  Army: 
'Documents  captured  at  Brusa  showed  that  they  possessed  fairly  accurate  knowledge  of  the  opposing 
Greek  force,  well  informed  as  to  the  probable  Greek  lines  of  advance  while  telegraphic  communications 
was open  between  Angora  and  Constantinople.  Angora  received  very  valuable  information  as  to  the 
Greek  strength  and  disposition  and  intention.  ' 
152  PRO,  CAB  44/21,31  May  192  1. 197 
Further,  Rattigan  believed  that  to  tighten  neutrality  towards  the  Greeks  would  be  unwise 
since  Kemal,  according  to  his  estimations,  was  'in  the  hands  of  the  Bolsheviks.  '  154  The 
Greeks  had  not  yet  launched  their  offensive  and  it  would  not  have  been  strategic  wise  to 
reject  them  until  the  result  of  their  campaign  was  known.  Rattigan  was  'personally  very 
averse  to  the  idea  of  getting  into  any  kind  of  secret  negotiations  with  Angora.  155 
Admiral  Webb,  the  Senior  Naval  Officer  at  Constantinople,  was  also  in  favour  of  clear- 
cut  solutions,  insisting  that  'it  was  no  longer  possible  to  continue  the  wait  and  see 
policy.  '  156  The  neutrality  policy  which  was  persistently  followed  under  London's 
directions  'was  viewed  at  Angora  as  a  mere  farce.  '  157  Given  the  uncertain  quality  of  the 
Greeks'  fighting  capacity,  Webb  thought  that  a  less  'distasteful'  solution  was  to  back 
the  Greeks  effectively. 
Harington  had  advocated  that  to  close  the  door  on  Kemal  would  be  a  mistake 
and  thought  that  the  situation  would  worsen.  All  sides  accused  Britain  of  helping  the 
Greeks.  For  the  British  General,  absolute  neutrality  had  to  be  safeguarded.  He  proposed 
that  Greek  ships  and  missions  should  leave  Constantinople,  in  an  attempt  to  persuade 
the  Allies  and  the  Turks  of  the  genuine  neutral  disposition  of  Britain.  158  It  was 
suggested  that,  '-with  a  view  to  countering  the  influence  of  the  Bolsheviks  at  Angora 
and  to  prepare  a  favourable  atmosphere  at  Angora  for  later  negotiations,  advantage 
should  be  taken  of  this  overture  to  enter  into  negotiations  with  Mustafa  Kemal.  '  159 
However,  the  Foreign  Office  considered  it  necessary  'not  to  give  the  appearance  that  we 
153 
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are  courting  Kemalists.  '  160  A  cautious  path  was  suggested,  in  contrast  with  the  haste  and 
nervousness  shown  by  the  War  Office,  the  officials  of  which  considered  this  to  be  a 
golden  opportunity  to  start  negotiations  with  Kemal. 
A  special  Cabinet  Committee  had  been  set  up  to  discuss  and  evaluate  all  the 
information,  under  the  name  of  the  'Committee  on  the  Future  of  Constantinople.  '  Its 
members  included  Lloyd  George,  Lord  Curzon,  Edwin  Montagu,  Winston  Churchill,  Sir 
Worthington-Evans  and  the  Minister  of  Health,  Sir  Alfred  Mond  and  a  number  of 
advisers.  161  This  special  Cabinet  Committee  met  three  times  in  early  June  1921.  Curzon 
opened  the  first  meeting  supporting  'no  withdrawal  from  Constantinople  and  surrender 
to  Kemal.  '  It  was  everybody's  belief  that  first  they  had  to  establish  the  degree  of  Greek 
capability  to  resist  Kemal's  forces,  since  the  Greek  Army  was  the  only  force  in  Anatolia 
to  deal  with  the  situation.  On  that,  the  British  policy  makers  agreed  to  see  'whether 
Greece  would  be  willing  to  place  herself  in  our  hands  and,  if  so,  whether  she  was  worth 
supporting.  If  the  results  of  these  enquiries  were  unsatisfactory,  it  would  be  necessary  to 
contemplate  an  evacuation.  '  162 
The  change  in  policy  was  made  explicit:  British  policy  makers  were  now 
preoccupied  with  the  security  of  Constantinople  and  the  Straits.  The  Greek  forces  had 
not  proven  capable  of  establishing  themselves  in  Anatolia,  a  fact  which  did  not  suggest 
they  would  be  able  to  meet  British  requirements.  Thus,  British  policy  makers  agreed  to 
a  mediation  plan  which  included  the  withdrawal  of  Greek  forces  from  Anatolia  and  to 
an  international  administration  of  Smyrna,  under  Turkish  sovereignty.  This  did  not 
necessarily,  mean,  however  the  bankruptcy  of  the  Greek  factor  in  British  planning.  The 
Greek  forces  could  continue  serving  British  strategic  needs  from  another  position.  This 
160  PRO,  FO/  371/6471-E6786/l/44,  Rattigan  to  Foreign  Office,  Enclosure  Memo  by  Ryan,  13  June  1921 
and  Minutes  by  Osborne. 
'('I  Sir  Henry  Wilson,  Sir  Edward  Grigg,  General  Harington  and  11.  A.  L.  Fisher. 
162  David  Walder,  The  Chanak  Affair  (London,  1969),  pp.  138-149. 199 
new  role  was  articulated  by  Crowe  in  a  memorandum  to  the  Cabinet  in  May  1921. 
Crowe  outlined  the  need  to  deploy  the  Greek  an-ned  forces  to  a  different  focal  point: 
'With  a  Greek  concentration  in  the  European  theatre  an  attack  on  Constantinople  from 
Anatolian  Turks  can  be  resisted.  '  163 
Indeed,  the  Allies,  after  Curzon's  visit  to  Paris  and  the  agreement  of  the  French, 
proceeded  with  an  offer  of  mediation  to  the  Greeks.  164  The  Greeks  rejected  tile  offer, 
since  their  offensive  was  about  to  begin  in  three  weeks.  165  The  Foreign  Office  finally 
gave  its  consent  to  continue  with  the  interview  between  Harington  and  Kemal,  but  even 
then  the  Office  advised  that  the  General  should  be  'accompanied  by  French  and  Italian 
representatives,  should  only  listen  to  what  M.  K.  has  to  say  and  should  discuss 
nothing.  '  166  Overall  the  trend  at  that  point  among  the  British  policy-making  elite  was  to 
initiate  discussions  with  Kemal,  a  move  which  was  obviously  under  the  pressure  of  the 
earlier  French  successes  in  the  same  domain. 
THE  BRITISH  POLICY  OF'WAIT  AND  SEE.  ' 
The  period  after  the  November  1920  elections  in  Greece,  up  until  the  end  of 
spring  1921  witnessed  the  fundamental  change  of  British  policy  away  from  supporting 
Greek  actions  towards  a  'wait  and  see'  attitude.  This  policy  is  most  clearly  seen  during 
the  Third  Conference  of  London  and  the  official  declaration  of  Allied  neutrality  in  April 
1921.  British  policy-makers  throughout  these  months  simply  implemented  this  policy 
masterfully.  They  neither  gave  active  support  to  the  Greeks  nor  sought  any  dramatic 
rearrangement  of  British  priorities  which  would  bring  them  closer  to  the  Nationalists. 
163  DBFP,  vol.  XVII,  no  20  1,  Memorandum  by  Sir.  E.  Crowe  on  the  hostilities  between  Turks  and 
Greeks,  30  May  192  1,  p.  2  10. 
'64  DBFP,  vol.  XVII,  no  88,  Notes  of  Meetings  related  to  Allied  mediation  in  the  Near  East,  Appendix  2, 
June  18-19  192  1,  p.  597. 
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The  British  waited  to  see  the  outcome  of  the  Greek  offensives,  all  the  while  practising 
diplomacy  and  safeguarding  their  interests  in  a  time  of  limited  budgets. 
Despite  the  warnings  of  Nicolson,  the  British  policy-making  elite  let  things  take 
their  course.  167  Did  the  British  believe  that  Greece  was  actually  'a  broken  reed?  '  David 
Lloyd  George  and  part  of  the  Foreign  Office  were  clearly  still  of  the  opinion  that  Greece 
could  finish  the  job.  Lloyd  George  continued  to  back  the  Greeks,  albeit  with  vague 
words,  at  the  London  Conference.  However,  Lloyd  George  was  not  himself  in  a  position 
to  materially  back  this  course  of  action.  He  never  intended  to  do  so.  He  opted  for  the 
Greek  option  as  long  as  Greece  could  establish  its  power  by  its  own  means.  In  the 
meantime,  his  handling  of  foreign  affairs  and  issues  like  public  expenditure  and  the  Irish 
Home  Rule  met  constant  criticism  and  opposition  by  a  circle  of  Conservative  back- 
benchers.  168 
In  the  meantime,  the  objections  that  certain  elements  within  the  Coalition 
Government  had  towards  the  Greek  presence  in  Anatolia  still  remained,  only  now  these 
dissenters  had  a  more  tangible  backing  to  their  arguments.  Churchill  and  elements 
within  the  War  Office,  assisted  by  Conservative  politicians,  were  haunted  by  the  spectre 
of  Bolshevism  and  wanted  a  return  to  Britain's  traditional  policy  of  support  for  Turkey 
as  a  barrier  to  Russia's  ambitions  for  an  outlet  to  the  Mediterranean.  In  addition, 
intelligence  had  confirmed  the  fears  of  those  who  believed  that  active  support  for  the 
Greeks  would  only  consolidate  the  Nationalist-Bolshevik  alliance.  Churchill  and  the 
General  Staff  were  adamant  on  this  point.  The  Cabinet  as  a  whole,  in  the  summer  of 
192  1,  was  of  the  same  opinion:  'The  Cabinet  were  very  reluctant  to  miss  an  opportunity 
167  PRO,  FO  371/6466-E2764/l/44,  Minutes  by  Nicolson,  2  March  192  1.  'It  is  only  fair  to  inform 
Calogeropoulos  of  the  probable  results  of  refusal  and  of  the  fact  that  we  can  no  longer  support  him.  If 
such  an  intimation  were  conveyed  to  him  personally  by  the  head  of  State  it  might  induce  him  to  adopt  a 
reasonable  attitude  and  save  us  from  what  I  apprehend  will  develop  into  an  indefensible  moral  position.  ' 201 
for  a  conversation  with  Mustapha  Kemal  himself.  "69  The  idea  that  British  policy  might 
bring  about  this  'unnatural'  alliance  was  not  only  held  by  Churchill  and  the  War  Office, 
it  was  now  held  by  a  number  of  officials  in  the  Foreign  Office.  170  In  the  meantime, 
intelligence  from  Constantinople  also  verified  the  suspicions  of  the  British  policy- 
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makers  that  the  French  and  the  Italians  had  entered  into  negotiations  with  Kemal.,  I 
Another  point  raised  by  the  opposers  of  the  pro-Greek  policy,  which  had  by 
November  1920  transformed  to  a  'wait  and  see'  attitude,  was  the  issue  of  Constantine 
and  the  change  of  regime  in  Greece.  They  doubted  the  credibility  of  the  new  regime  and 
its  intention  to  continue  the  fight  in  Asia  Minor.  However,  Constantine  and  the  new 
government  had  assured  the  Allies  -  and  primarily  the  British  Government  -  of  the 
decision  to  continue  the  policy  of  the  Venizelos'  government  in  Asia  Minor. 
Furthermore,  public  opinion  in  Greece  during  the  London  Conference  was 
gunanimously  in  support  of  retaining  Greek  acquisitions  and  of  fighting  to  retain 
them.  '  172  The  dissenters  in  London,  however,  believed  that  the  change  of  regime  in 
Greece  was  a  perfect  opportunity  to  change  Britain's  pro-Greek  policy. 
Nicolson  had  foreseen,  with  mathematical  precision,  the  collapse  of  the  Greek 
expedition  if  the  British  took  a  'hands  off  attitude:  'the  mere  continuance  of  our 
boycott  of  Greece  coupled  with  the  immense  encouragement  which  has  been  given  to 
Kemal  will  lead  in  a  short  period  to  a  war  between  Greece  and  Turkey  in  which  the 
latter,  with  Italian  support,  would  be  victorious.  "  73  British  policy  makers  had  entered  a 
period  of  waiting  for  events  to  shape  themselves.  There  was  no  longer  any  kind  of 
16'  Darwin  notes  that  in  March  1921  the  two  issues  that  had  caused  Conservative  discontent  were  the  high 
levels  of  taxation  and  public  expenditure  along  with  the  beginning  of  the  government's  negotiations  with 
Sinn  Fein.  Darwin,  Britain,  Egypt  and  the  Middle  East,  p.  39. 
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active  support  of  Greece.  British  policy-makers  believed  that  there  would  only  be  a  risk 
for  the  British  case  in  pushing  for  an  immediate  Greek  withdrawal.  This  would  have 
made  Kemal  all  the  more  demanding.  British  interests  required  the  containment  of  the 
Nationalist  forces  in  Western  Asia  Minor.  Kemal  and  his  movement  had  advocated  the 
return  of  the  Straits  and  Constantinople  to  Turkey,  an  idea  totally  incompatible  with 
British  aims. 
To  what  extent  British  policy-making  at  this  time  was  shaped  more  by  the 
constant  nagging  of  Churchill,  the  War  Office  and  Montagu  rather  than  Soviet,  French 
and  Italian  attempts  to  contain  British  supremacy  in  the  region  of  the  Near  East  is  far 
less  clear-cut.  What  is  more  clear-cut  is  that  the  British  'wait  and  see  policy'  regarding 
the  situation  in  Western  Asia  Minor  did  not  stem  from  the  result  of  the  November  1920 
Greek  elections,  the  fall  of  Venizelos  and  the  return  of  Constantine.  The  events  of 
November  1920  had  served  rather  as  a  stepping-stone  for  the  British  to  see  clearly  the 
attitude  of  their  Allies,  especially  that  of  France  during  this  period,  and  their  pursuit  to 
achieve  the  containment  of  British  power  in  the  area  of  the  Near  East.  Hard  and,  above 
all,  immediate  decisions,  on  the  part  of  Britain,  did  not  take  place  during  the  period 
from  November  1920  until  the  summer  of  1921. 203 
Chapter  Five 
The  diplomatic  deadlock  and  the  'Greek  tragedy.  ' 
THE  SUMMER  GREEK  OFFENSIVE  AND  THE  WAR  OFFICE  REACTIONS. 
The  first  half  of  1921  had  left  a  multitude  of  problems  unresolved  both  on  the 
diplomatic  and  military  domains  for  the  Greek  Government.  It  was  believed  that  there 
was  only  one  way  to  defend  the  Greek  claims  in  Asia  Minor:  by  means  of  arms.  Prior  to 
the  Greek  offensive  there  was  the  rejection  of  a  British  proposal  of  mediation.  '  The 
refusal  of  the  Allied  proposal  was  not  well  received  in  London.  The  Foreign  Office 
official  Osborne  had  commented:  J  ...  I  the  pacification  of  Asia  Minor  [is]  improbable 
until  the  Greek  Army  has  withdrawn,  a  mistake  to  have  ever  sent  them  there.  2 
The  preparations  on  the  part  of  the  Greek  government  for  a  new  offensive  were 
massive.  It  was  considered  absolutely  necessary  for  Greece  to  prove  its  capability  on  the 
battlefield.  King  Constantine  had  arrived  in  Asia  Minor  to  take  command  of  the 
operations  there  and  he  addressed  the  Army,  urging  them  'to  fight  for  the  Hellenic  idea, 
for  a  united  and  indivisible  Greece.  0  The  Greek  advance  began  on  12  July  1921.  The 
Greek  objectives  were  to  destroy  the  Nationalist  forces  and  occupy  Angora,  the  hub  of 
Nationalist  activities.  The  Greeks  had  available,  prior  to  the  offensive,  11  Divisions,  the 
strength  of  each  one  reaching  12,000  men  of  whom  7,300  comprised  the  infantry  and  of 
which  4,500  were  rifles  and  the  rest  artillery,  Machine  Gun  Corps  and  Automatic  Rifle 
sections.  The  total  Greek  forces  reached  200,000  men  and  50,000  animals.  The  Turks 
1  For  the  mediation  proposal  of  Jun6  1921  see  Chapter  Four:  'The  question  of  Constantinople  and  the 
attempted  British  rapprochement  with  Kemal  prior  to  the  Greek  offensive.  '  p.  195.  See  also  DBFP, 
Vol.  XVII,  no  88,  Notes  of  meetings  related  to  Allied  mediation  in  the  Near  East,  Appendix  2,18-19  June 
192  1,  p.  597. 
2  PRO,  FO  371/6519-E7247/143/44,  Granville  to  Curzon,  minutes  by  Osborne,  27  June  1921. 
3  PRO,  FO  371/6519-E7186/143/44,  Granville  to  Foreign  Office,  23  June  192  1. 204 
were  reported  to  have  at  their  disposal  16  Divisions  of  4,000  to  4,500  men.  4  Days  before 
the  launching  of  the  Greek  offensive,  the  Greek  headquarters  were  informed  by  three 
British  intelligence  reports  that  Kemal  had  asked  for  300  officers  from  the  War  Ministry 
at  Constantinople,  while  he  was  negotiating  with  the  Bulgarians  in  order  to  buy 
ammunitions  and  guns  from  them.  The  nationalist  forces  reached,  in  these  reports, 
120,000  men  with  30,000  auxiliary  troops  for  road  making  and  service  behind  the 
front.  5  These  figures  coincided  with  those  provided  by  British  military  intelligence.  The 
supply  of  ammunition  from  the  Bolsheviks  however,  was  considered  to  be  a  great  asset 
for  the  Turks.  6 
The  operations  were  divided  into  three  phases.  The  Greek  forces,  during  the  first 
phase  which  was  launched  in  early  June  and  which  ended  with  an  unsuccessful  Turkish 
counter  attack,  captured  Eski-Sehr  on  21  July.  The  Greek  army  had  maintained  a  good 
morale,  and  was  in  a  position  to  use  the  Anatolian  railway  for  reinforcements  after  the 
capture  of  Eski-Sehr.  The  Greek  press  and  public  were  enthusiastic  about  the  initial 
news  of  success  from  the  Anatolian  front.  It  was  as  if  the  Greek  Army  'had  already  put 
an  end  to  the  Nationalist  movement  and  secured  the  Greek  position  in  Asia  Minor.  '  7 
In  an  appreciation  of  the  operations  of  July  1921,  compiled  by  the  Greek 
General  Xenophon  Stratigos,  who  was  deputy  to  Commander  in  Chief  Victor 
Dousmanis  in  September  1921,  the  continuation  of  the  campaign  was  'an  imperious 
4  The  figures  are  quoted  from  PRO,  WO  106/1437,  Account  of  a  visit  to  the  Greek  Army  in  Asia  Minor 
by  Major  General  T.  0.  Marden,  June  192  1. 
3  MFA,  192  1,  File  1,  Subf  He  I-  The  policies  of  the  Governments  of  Angora  and  Constantinople,  no 
710  1,  Votsis  to  MFA,  23  June  192  1.  The  figures  for  the  Nationalist  forces  cited  by  the  Greeks  coincided 
with  those  found  in  British  Military  Intelligence  reports  of  the  same  period. 
6  See  Fisher,  Yhe  Soviets  in  World  Affairs,  p.  xv.  'Turkey  received  heavy  Soviet  supplies  as  well  as  Soviet 
military  advisers.  ' 
7  PRO,  FO  371/6525-E9010/143/44,  Granville  to  Foreign  Office,  Enclosure  Extract  from  the  Greek  paper 
Politeia  -  llo2ircla  of  21  July  1921,21  July  1921.  Siniilar  enthousiastic  reception  was  to  be  found  in  the 
Daily  Telegraph  in  early  August  192  1,  where  its  correspondent  from  Asia  Minor  eulogised  the  Greek 
Army  for  its  success  and  the  way  its  soldiers  were  dealing  with  the  tough  conditions  of  Anatolia.  See 
Daily  Telegraph,  2  August  192  1,  cited  by  Chr.  Angelomatis,  Chronicle  ofa  Great  Tragedy  -  XpoviK6v 
Meyd2qq  Tpaycoblaq  (Athens,  197  1),  pp.  123-4. 205 
necessity  for  Greece.  8  The  second  phase  of  the  operations  ended  with  the  loss  of  the 
initiative  by  the  Greeks  during  the  first  days  of  September.  During  the  period  of  one 
month  the  two  sides  had  used  all  their  reserves.  In  spite  of  this  reversal  the  Greek  Army 
had  still  in  mind  one  objective:  to  occupy  Angora.  This  move  could  force  the  Turks  to 
come  to  terms  on  a  political  level,  while  the  strategic  object  was  to  deny  the  enemy  the 
use  of  Angora/Eski-Sehr  railway  line,  the  vital  line  of  approach  to  Smyrna  from 
Anatolia.  The  Greek  Government  favoured  a  decisive  action,  the  occupation  of  Angora, 
hoping  that  this  would  help  Greek  claims  on  the  diplomatic  domain.  The  military  was 
divided  over  the  decision.  The  reservations  were  obvious  and  centred  around  one  issue 
which  had  haunted  Greek  military  men  from  the  beginning:  the  delicate  and  insecure 
lines  of  communication  of  the  advancing  forces  in  the  interior  with  Smyrna.  9  The  Greek 
army  could  advance  no  further.  However,  to  retire  and  admit  defeat  was  unthinkable  for 
the  Greek  Government.  Thus,  the  only  course  was  to  limit  its  role  to  a  policy  of  passive 
defence.  The  initiative,  for  the  first  time,  lay  with  the  forces  of  Kemal.  10 
The  Greek  army  failed  to  attain  its  objectives:  it  did  not  destroy  the  Turkish 
Army  and  did  not  occupy  Angora.  Instead,  the  Turks  succeeded  in  defeating  the  Greek 
Army  in  the  decisive  battle  of  River  Sangarios  on  the  outskirts  of  Angora.  A  general 
retreat  was  ordered  during  the  first  days  of  September  in  the  line  occupied  in  July.  A 
final  and  decisive  victory  against  the  forces  of  Kemal  was  impossible  and  the  final 
March  towards  Angora  had  proved  fatal.  The  third  phase  of  the  operations  was  the 
reestablishment  of  the  Greek  Army  at  the  line  of  occupation  they  had  attained  with  the 
successful  fighting  of  the  first  phase. 
8  PRO,  WO  106/1493,  Report,  'A  Review  of  the  operations  during  the  third  period  9/22  July  192  V  by  X. 
Stratigos,  23  September  1921. 
9  See  Appendix  IL  Maps.  3.  The  Operations  in  Asia  Minor  from  the  Vh  to  the  21"  July  192  1. 
'0  A  detailed  account  of  the  campaign  in  Greek  General  Staff,  The  Asia  Minor  Expedition  -H  Ekqparcla 
6;  rqv  MiKpdv  Aciav  (Athens,  1957).  Another  account  in  PRO,  WO  106/1438,  The  Turco-Greek 
Operations  in  Anatolia,  I  November  192  1. 206 
This  failure  to  achieve  a  decisive  victory  in  Anatolia  had  a  direct  effect  on  the 
internal  political  scene  and  the  fragile  tranquillity  of  the  Greek  political  scene.  Up  until 
that  point  the  Liberal  Party  had  supported  the  war  effort  of  the  Gounaris  Government. 
However,  it  had  always  advocated  that  the  basis  of  the  policy  in  Asia  Minor  relied  upon 
the  alliance  with  the  Great  Powers  and  above  all  with  Britain.  On  strict  diplomatic 
grounds,  the  help  assumed  to  be  implicit  in  this  alliance  was  not  provided,  not  only  by 
France  and  Italy  who  had  long  ago  withdrawn  any  kind  of  support,  but  this  time  by 
Britain  as  well.  Venizelos,  now  in  Paris,  had  expressed  his  disapproval  of  the  rejection 
of  the  Allied  proposal  in  June  in  a  letter  addressed  to  General  Panayiotis  Danglis,  the 
person  who  had  replaced  him  as  leader  of  the  Liberal  Party.  The  former  Greek  Prime 
Minister  even  blamed  his  own  party  for  not  opposing  the  plans  of  the  Government  to 
continue  with  the  offensive.  He  characterised  the  rejection  of  the  proposal  as 
'unsuccessful'  which,  according  to  Venizelos,  had  been  'even  more  favourable'  for  the 
Greek  side.  The  offensive  had  worsened  the  Greek  position.  "  Granville,  who  had 
reported  the  contents  of  the  letter  of  Venizelos  to  Curzon  stressed  the  former  Prime 
Minister's  opinion  that  a  complete  victory  was  impossible  and  that  'Greece's  economic 
and  military  exhaustion  will  oblige  her  to  beg  for  mediation.  '  12  On  top  of  this  came  the 
evaluation  of  the  British  policy  makers:  Greece  was  no  longer  in  a  position  to  take  itself 
out  of  the  crisis. 
THE  BRITISH  APPRECIATION  AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  SANGARIOS. 
The  Greek  objective  to  destroy  the  Turkish  forces  and  occupy  Angora  -  had 
completely  failed.  There  was  disappointment  on  the  British  side  as  Britain's  interests 
11  The  letter  was  published  in  the  Greek  newspaper  Elefitheros  Typos  -  Mc6Ocpoq  T67roc  on  19  September 
192  1,  cited  in  Yiannis  Yannoulopoulos,  Our  noble  blindness  -H  EvMýq  Paq  T&PACOaiq  (Athens,  1999), 
pp.  286-8.  In  another  letter,  dated  13/20  August  192  1,  Venizelos  had  given  an  account  of  his  thoughts 
about  the  summer  offensive  again  to  his  successor  in  the  leadership  of  the  Liberal  Party,  General  Danglis. 
He  was  by  far  more  polemic  with  the  offensive  stating  that  even  a  victory  would  not  have  given  Greece 
the  final  victory  that  it  needed.  In  Eleftheros  Typos,  20  September  192  1. 
12  PRO,  FO  406/48,  no  10,  Granville  to  Curzon,  3  October  192  1. 207 
would  have  been  well  served  with  a  decisive  Greek  victory.  After  all  Greece  was  still  a 
faithful  British  ally  and  admirer.  However,  although  there  was  still  no  final  declaration 
of  an  overall  Greek  defeat,  and  above  all,  there  had  been  no  retreat  from  Asia  Minor,  all 
interested  departments  and  officials  seemed  to  lean  in  one  direction:  to  let  things  take 
their  own  course.  13 
Curzon  suggested  that  it  was  the  right  time  to  launch  an  effort  for  mediation,  to 
discuss  the  basis  for  a  meeting  of  the  Supreme  Council  for  the  revision  of  the  Treaty  of 
S6vres.  14  Still,  there  was  no  clear  picture  of  the  military  situation,  on  which  all 
departments  could  base  their  recommendations.  At  that  point,  early  October  1921,  the 
military  reports  from  both  camps  were  conflicting.  In  a  Military  Intelligence  report,  the 
casualties  of  the  Greek  Army  reached  15,000  men,  according  to  Greek  sources. 
However,  the  number  presented  for  'public  consumption,  '  as  it  was  indicated  in  the 
report,  was  10,000  to  11,000  men.  'The  Greek  Army  could  not  advance  and  would  be 
content  to  play  a  defensive  role,  '  underlined  the  report.  15 
There  was  a  stalemate  and  the  winter,  which  was  already  on  its  way,  left  no 
room  for  manoeuvres  in  the  forthcoming  months.  Thus,  it  was  considered  a  favourable 
time  for  intervention.  British  policy-makers  were  kept  inforined  through  Intelligence 
about  the  situation  in  the  two  opposing  camps.  The  'pro-Turk'  policy  makers' 
misgivings  about  Greece's  abilities  were  proved  correct:  Financially,  Greece  was  in  dire 
straits,  finding  it  difficult  to  continue  financing  the  campaign.  The  Greek  government 
was  forced  to  call  the  1922  classes  since  there  was  shortage  of  reserves.  In  the  political 
realm,  things  were  no  better. 
13  PRO,  FO  371/6574-E8973/143/44,  Rumbold  to  Foreign  Office,  5  August  192  1.  See  for  example  the 
advice  of  the  Constantinople  High  Commissioner  in  this  early  August  report  to  London:  [ 
... 
]  Nationalists 
will  only  prove  amenable  when  and  if  they  sustain  another  defeat.  Intervention  would  therefore  be 
premature.  ' 
14  PRO,  FO  371/6533-E  11861/143/44,  Lord  Curzon's  memo  circulated  to  the  Cabinet,  7  October  192  1. 208 
Gounaris  had  asked  to  see  the  British  Govemment  right  after  the  results  of  the 
final  stage  of  the  Greek  offensive  in  late  August.  The  reception  of  the  Greek  plea  for  a 
meeting  signified  British  intentions:  neither  Curzon  nor  the  Prime  Minister  would  agree 
to  meet  the  Greek  Prime  Minister.  16  A  meeting  was  scheduled  to  take  place  around  the 
middle  of  October.  Valuable  time  which  could  have  assisted  Greece's  chances  at  the 
negotiating  table  was  lost.  Gounaris'  position  was  characterised  as  'insecure.  '  The  only 
course  open  was  to  initiate  peace  negotiations.  But  this  time  there  was  no  rush  on  the 
British  side.  The  High  Commissioner  at  Constantinople  had  clearly  stated  his 
assessment  of  the  situation:  j 
... 
]  the  moment  for  intervention  should  come  somewhere 
near  the  end  of  October.  Nationalists  are  pretty  fed  up  with  the  war  and  I  hope  that  by 
the  end  of  October  the  failure  of  the  Greeks  to  smash  up  Kemal  and  get  to  Angora  will 
have  its  repercussion  on  the  internal  situation  in  Greece  in  the  sense  that  it  will  make  the 
Greeks  amenable-to  an  arrangement.  '  17  Time  was  working  only  against  the  Greeks.  At 
the  same  time,  the  British  had  no  reason  to  approach  Kemal  as  long  as  he  did  not 
attempt  to  alter  the  situation  regarding  the  Straits  and  Constantinople. 
THE  IMPLICATIONS  OF THE'GREEK  POLICY.  ' 
Churchill,  one  of  the  most  prominent  critics  of  Lloyd  George's  eastern  policy, 
was  still  very  much  involved  with  policy  regarding  Turkey.  During  the  fateful  second 
half  of  1921,  he  produced  many  letters  and  memoranda  on  the  situation  and  possible 
ways  out  of  it.  At  the  end  of  July  1921,  the  fighting  in  Northern  Mesopotamia  had 
intensified.  The  Colonial  Secretary  had  informed  the  Cabinet  that  the  upheaval  of  the 
local  element  was  assisted  by  the  Turkish  Nationalists.  His  aim  was  to  make  Lloyd 
15  PRO,  FO  371/6530-EI0868/143/44,  Director  of  Military  Intelligence  to  F.  0,  Copy  of  report  by  Major 
Johnson  on  conversation  with  Colonel  Sariyannis  and  Colonel  Pallis  (Greek  Army  Asia  Minor)  of  10 
September  1921,27  September  1921. 
16  Gounaris  had  formed  a  new  government  and  was  now  the  Greek  Prime  Minister. 
17  PRO,  FO  800/253,  TU  21/6,9/2  1.  From  Rumbold  to  Sir  Lancelot  Oliphant,  20  September  192  1. 209 
George  understand  the  gravity  of  the  situation  for  Britain  in  the  area  if  the  fighting 
continued. 
The  implications  of  the  continuous  warfare  in  the  sensitive  area  of  the  Middle 
East  were  enormous: 
This  war  between  the  Greeks  and  the  Turks 
...  produces 
continuous,  uniform  disadvantage  to  British  interests 
... 
There  is 
no  greater  interest  in  the  whole  of  the  Middle  East  than  the 
interest  of  Britain  to  secure  a  cessation  of  this  protracted, 
vicious,  mischievous  strife  between  these  two  forces  which 
impoverishes  and  distracts  the  whole  of  the  region  and  leads  to 
every  kind  of  dislocation  of  our  affairs  both  in  Palestine  and  in 
Mesopotamia.  18 
A  primary  fear  was  that,  in  case  Kemal  was  unable  to  achieve  a  decisive  victory  in  the 
West  against  the  Greeks,  there  would  be  one  option  open  for  him  to  push  towards  the 
direction  of  Mosul,  coming  into  contact  with  the  limited  British  forces  in  the  region. 
There,  according  to  Churchill's  estimations,  Kemal  could  easily  accomplish  a  victory. 
The  Secretary  of  the  Colonial  Office  was  adamant:  'Retention  of  Mosul  and  a  forward 
policy  on  the  part  of  the  Greeks'  were  two  policies  that  could  not  be  reconciled.  The 
cost  in  Mesopotamia  was  too  much  for  Britain.  There  was  no  room  for  provision  of  help 
to  the  Greeks.  19  However,  the  initial  Greek  successes  on  the  battlefield  were  not 
assisting  his  aim  of  persuading  Lloyd  George  to  abandon  the  policy  of  'wait  and  see,  ' 
which  according  to  Churchill  was  equally  harmful  to  British  interests.  During  the  third 
Conference  of  London,  the  British  Prime  Minister  was  obviously  much  attracted  to  the 
idea  of  seeing  the  Greeks  victorious  in  Turkey.  20 
18  PD.  C,  v.  144,  c.  1630,14  July  1921. 
19  PRO,  CAB  24/128,  C.  P  3328,  Greece  and  Turkey,  Colonial  Office,  26  September  192  1. 
20  See  Chapter  Four:  'The  impact  on  the  British  Near  Eastern  policy  -  The  British-Greek  discussions  of 
winter  192  L'  p.  18  1. 210 
The  War  Office  assessment  was  that  the  Greek  army  was  not  capable  of 
enforcing  any  decisive  victory  against  the  Nationalist  Turks.  21  In  September,  there  were 
a  number  of  intelligence  reports  with  information  regarding  Bolshevik  aid  in  guns,  rifles 
and  ammunition  to  the  Turks.  Furthermore,  British  policy  makers  knew  that  their  Allies 
were  supplying  war  material  to  the  Turkish  Nationalists.  22  On  the  other  hand,  the  Greek 
Army  did  not  have  the  luxury  of  reinforcements  either  in  men  or  in  material,  due  to  the 
financial  situation  of  the  country.  23 
By  November  the  situation  in  Anatolia,  as  was  explicitly  stated  in  a  memo  by 
the  Secretary  of  State  for  War,  Worthington-Evans,  was  perilous  for  Britain.  First,  there 
was  the  worrying  possibility  that  the  French  would  evacuate  Constantinople  and  Ismid, 
leaving  the  limited  British  forces  alone.  Second,  the  British  position  in  Iraq  depended 
upon  peace  in  Mosul,  an  issue  which  was  further  complicated  by  the  activities  of  the 
Turkish  Nationalist  forces.  Further,  there  was  the  need  to  make  an  announcement  of 
policy  with  regard  to  the  Turkish  question,  to  achieve  a  Muslim  appeasement.  24  Before 
the  meeting  of  the  Allied  representatives,  the  voices  of  protest  concerning  India  and  the 
impact  of  the  'Turkish  policies'  so  far  adopted  by  Britain,  had  grown  more  insistent. 
The  following  statement  of  the  Viceroy  of  India,  Lord  Northcliffe,  on  25  January  1922, 
characterises  the  climate: 
On  the  eve  of  the  Greco-Turkish  Conference  we  feel  it  our  duty 
to  lay  before  HMG  the  intensity  of  feeling  in  India  regarding  the 
necessity  for  the  revision  of  the  S6vres  treaty  ...  The  Government 
of  India  particularly  urge,  subject  to  the  safeguarding  of  the 
neutrality  of  the  Straits  and  of  the  security  of  the  non-Moslem 
population,  the  following  three  points,  namely:  the  evacuation  of 
Constantinople,  the  suzerainty  of  Sultan  over  Holy  Places,  the 
21  PRO,  CAB  24/129,  CY  3434,  War  Office,  21  October  192  1. 
22  DBFP,  vol.  XVII,  no  112,  Curzon  to  Granville,  16  April  192  1,  p.  130,  no  684,  Letter  from  Mr.  Oliphant 
to  the  Secretary  of  the  Army  Council,  13  July  192  1,  pp.  883-4,  no  729,  Rumbold  to  Curzon,  10  August 
1921,  p.  920,  no  738,  Rumbold  to  Curzon,  21  August  1922,  pp.  930-1,  no  746,  Curzon  to  Ilardinge,  29 
August  1922,  pp.  937-8. 
23  For  Greece's  financial  situation  see  this  Chapter:  'The  Greek  Muddle  and  the  British  refusal  for 
financial  help.  '  p.  227. 
24  PRO,  CAB  24/129,  C.  P  3474,  The  Situation  in  the  Near  East  War  Office,  9  November  192  1. 211 
restoration  of  Eastern  Thrace  (including  Adrianople)  and 
Smyrna.  The  fulfilment  of  these  three  points  is  of  greatest 
importance  to  India.  25 
Edwin  Montagu  was,  of  course,  following  the  same  line.  In  December  1921  and  early 
January  1922  he  circulated  two  more.  memoranda  for  the  Cabinet.  26 
Up  until  the  last  days  of  August  1921,  Greece  had  been  victorious  on  the 
battlefield,  thus  there  was  no  rush  for  any  kind  of  diplomatic  negotiations.  The  failure  of 
the  Greek  Army  to  achieve  a  decisive  victory  over  the  Nationalists  left  only  one  option: 
diplomacy.  The  Greek  Army  could  not  launch  a  new  offensive  while  a  possible 
compression  of  the  front  would  benefit  the  Nationalists.  The  possibility  of  evacuating 
Asia  Minor  was  ruled  out  for  both  British  and  Greek  policy  makers:  the  first  were  losing 
a  barrier  for  their  position  in  the  Straits,  while  the  Greeks  could  not  abandon  without 
guarantees  the  Greek  populations  of  the  region  to  the  hands  of  the  Nationalists.  By  the 
middle  of  September,  it  was  clearly  understood  that  'the  Greek  advance  on  Angora  had 
been  definitely  checked.  '27  However,  in  the  beginning,  there  was  some  attempt  on  the 
part  of  the  Greek  government  to  try  and  give  a  rather  optimistic  version  of  events.  From 
an  intercepted  telegram  from  Athens  to  the  London  Legation,  the  Greek  Minister  for 
War,  stressed  that  the  Greek  Army  was  not  'relentlessly  pursued  and  worn  down  as 
Kemalist  communiqu6s  indicate.  [  ... 
]  Our  Army  is  maintaining,  as  always,  complete 
freedom  of  action.  '  28 
Rumbold,  from  Constantinople,  was  stressing  the  difficulties  of  getting  in  touch 
with  Angora.  The  failure  of  the  Greek  offensive  had  supplied  the  Nationalists  with 
25  PRO,  FO  371n857-E2600/5/44,  Viceroy  of  India-25  January  1922,3  March  1922. 
26  PRO,  CAB  24/135,  C.  P  3576,22  December  1921  and  C.  P  3602,10  January  1922.  Montagu's 
Memoranda  for  the  Cabinet.  He  talked  about  'blunders'  in  British  diplomacy  and  was opposed  to  every 
measure  taken  that  was not  actively  pro-Turk. 
27  PRO,  FO  371/6530-EI0939/143/44,  Granville  to  Curzon,  23  September  1921.  Following  a  telegram 
from  Rumbold  on  the  18th  of  September. 
28  PRO,  HW  12/27,  October  192  1,  no  008016,  M.  Theotokis  to  Greek  Legation,  [24  September  192  1  ],  I 
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further  assistance.  Along  with  the  Bolshevik  bogey,  Italy  and  France  were  openly 
supporting  Kemal.  Moreover,  France  appeared  to  threaten  British  standing  in  the  region. 
Now  in  the  minds  of  most  British  officials  a  'reconstituted  great  Turkey'  was  no  longer 
a  distant  possibility.  29  The  French  had  acquired  a  rather  protective  role  towards  the 
Nationalist  forces  and  it  did  not  seem  unlikely  that  they  would  have  a  privileged 
position  in  the  event  of  eventual  Nationalist  predominance.  Reports  coming  from 
Constantinople  suggested  that  the  French  were  more  than  anxious  to  close  any 
unfinished  business  in  Cilicia.  Thus,  an  understanding  with  Kemal  would  be  very 
useful.  Sir  Eyre  Crowe  had  even  made  this  point  explicit  to  Venizelos,  in  a  meeting  he 
held  with  him:  '[ 
... 
]  not  only  in  France  but  even  in  England  there  was  a  movement  of 
considerable  strength  in  favour  of  seeking  accommodation  with  Angora,  in  order  to  put 
an  end  to  Turkish  and  Moslem  hostility.  '  30  From  November  1921  onwards,  there  was  no 
room  for  blurred  thinking  regarding  British  relations  with  Kemal.  As  the  Greek  Army 
was  deteriorating  day  by  day  in  the  plains  of  Anatolia,  British  policy  makers  were 
considering  it  essential  to  get  in  touch  with  the  Angora  Government.  There  was  even  the 
suggestion  in  the  air  that  Angora  could  be  as  anxious  as  Athens  to  reach  a  settlement.  31 
There  was  in  fact  a  Nationalist  move  in  that  direction;  a  mission  was  despatched  to 
Europe  headed  by  the  Nationalist  Foreign  Minister,  Yusuf  Kemal.  Before  proceeding  to 
Europe,  Yusuf  Kemal  had  visited  Constantinople  and  met  Rumbold.  Yusuf  Kemal 
stated  that  'the  solution  of  the  Turko-Greek  conflict  lay  with  Britain.  32  In  March  1922, 
the  Nationalist  mission  arrived  in  London,  where  the  Nationalist  representative  met 
29  PRO,  FO  371/6514-E6263/143/44,  Memo  by  Sir  Eyre  Crowe  on  the  hostilities  between  Turks  and 
Greeks,  30  May  1921. 
30  PRO,  FO  371/6532-E  11473/143/44,  Record  by  Sir  Eyre  Crowe  of  a  conversation  with  Venizelos,  13 
October  1921. 
31  PRO,  FO  371/6536-El  2848/143/44,  FO  minute  Edmonds,  16  November  192  1. 
32  DBFP,  vol.  XVII,  no  53  1,  Rumbold  to  Curzon,  17  February  1922,  pp.  622-25. 213 
Curzon.  33  Yussuf  Kemal  remained  firm.  There  was  no  progress  on  the  issue  of 
minorities  and  the  question  of  the  Straits  was  not  discussed  extensively.  In  a  Foreign 
Office  file  in  the  minutes  of  a  report  (the  report  itself  has  been  removed)  we  read:  'The 
Kernalists,  whose  finances  are  said  to  be  so  bad,  seem  quite  prepared  to  spend  60  and  a 
half  million  lire  on  armaments.  It  is  clear  that  they  are  preparing  for  an  offensive  so  if 
they  are  too  ready  for  it  they  may  be  reluctant  to  put  it  off  . 
934 
The  issue  now  was  the  retention  of  the  Greek  Anny  in  Anatolia  until  a 
diplomatic  solution  was  discussed  and  decided  among  the  Allies.  The  Foreign  Office 
official  had  underlined  the  importance  of  it: 
Whether  or  not  an  allied  conference  takes  place  soon,  it  seems 
all  important  that  the  Greeks  should  be  induced  to  hang  on. 
Direct  official  financial  help  or  the  offer  of  arms  and 
ammunition  from  government  stocks  however  will  mean  a 
change  in  our  official  neutrality  and  may  therefore  require 
Allied  decision,  and  the  French  we  know  want  an  evacuation.  35 
The  issue  of  financial  help  so  desperately  requested  by  the  Greek  side  was  totally  out  of 
the  question  for  the  British  policy  makers,  despite  the  reassurance  that  the  Greek 
ministers  had  taken  in  December  1921  from  the  signing  the  Gounaris-Horne 
Agreement.  36  'It  is  clear  that  we  cannot  provide  the  money...  nor  can  we  give  or  sell 
them  the  necessary  military  supplies,  '  underlined  the  Foreign  Office.  At  the  same  time, 
the  withdrawal  of  the  Greek  Army  would  endanger  the  Christian  populations,  the  Straits 
and  Iraq.  37  Complete  Greek  withdrawal  from  Western  Asia  Minor  was  now  the  British 
policy.  Greece  was  no  more  a  trustworthy  line  of  defence  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean. 
33  DBFP,  vol.  XVII,  no  523,  Rumbold  to  Curzon,  5  February  1922,  pp.  611-2,  no  53  1,  Rumbold  to 
Curzon,  17  February  1922,  pp.  622-5,  no  543,  Rumbold  to  Curzon,  27  February  1922,  pp.  63940,  no  556, 
Memorandum  of  an  interview  between  Curzon  and  Yusouf  Kemal  Bey,  18  March  1922,  pp.  660-5. 
34  PRO,  FO  371/7927-E3258n6/44,  Minutes,  23  March  1922. 
35  PRO,  FO  371/7882-E1454/127/44,  Lindley  to  Foreign  Office,  7  February  1922,  Minutes  by  Forbes 
Adam,  9  February  1922. 
36  For  the  Gounaris-Home  Agreeement  see  this  Chapter:  'The  Greek  muddle  and  the  British  refusal  for 
financial  help.  '  p.  227. 
37  PRO,  FO  37ln855-EI931/5/44,  Minute  by  Osbome,  16  February  1922. 214 
The  British  had  returned  to  the  policy  of  trying  to  reconstitute  Turkey  again  in  this 
position. 
THE  FRENCH  CONNECTION. 
Curzon's  first  priority  after  the  failure  of  the  summer  Greek  offensive  and  the 
Franklin-Bouillon  agreement  of  1921  was  to  clear  the  situation  with  France.  He  disliked 
the  idea  that  the  French  had  acted  first  and  had  violated  Allied  solidarity  so  openly.  This 
was  an  additional  weapon  in  Kemal's  diplomatic  artillery.  The  British  position  was 
endangered  by  the  French  since  the  latter  were  'contemplating  facilities  for  the  use  of 
the  Cilician  section  of  the  Baghdad  railway  for  the  transport  of  Turkish  troops  to 
Kurdistan,  thus  facilitating  any  pressure  which  Mustafa  Kemal  may  put  upon  us  in  that 
area  in  reprisal  for  our  anti-Turkish  policy.  '  38 
The  first  diplomatic  response  was  a  Curzon  Note,  in  November  1921.  It 
expressed  an  open  'indignation'  over  France's  categorical  denial  of  every  legal  tie 
which  existed  among  the  Allies.  The  French  were  not  supposed  to  conclude  any 
separate  peace  treaties  with  the  enemy.  Further,  the  ceding  of  territory  in  such  a 
6sensitive'  and  'vital'  area  could  be  considered  as  an  open  blow  to  the  Alliance.  The 
truth  was  that  no  party  desired  a  total  breach,  as  they  still  needed  each  other.  There  were 
a  number  of  reliable  reports  reaching  London  from  all  directions  on  French  activities 
which  were  clearly  leading  to  a  separate  agreement  with  the  Nationalists.  The  French 
anxiety  to  reach  such  a  settlement  was  more  than  obvious  and  the  British  were  well 
informed  on  that.  Rumbold  was  adamant  in  saying  that  the  French  'were  undoubtedly 
helping  the  Nationalists  as  far  as  they  can.  '  39 
38  PRO,  CAB  24/129,  C.  P  3447,  French  Negotiations  with  Angora,  Memo  by  the  Secretary  of  State  for 
the  Colonies,  Colonial  Office,  26  October  192  1. 
39  PRO,  FO  406/48,  no  4,  Rumbold  to  Curzon,  24  September  192  1.  For  a  recent  Turkish  appreciation  of 
Cilicia.  and  the  French-Turkish  Agreement  see  the  article  of  Yacel  GilqlU,  'The  Struggle  for  Mastery  in 215 
The  settlement  of  the  Near  and  Middle  East  had  been  a  thorny  issue  between  the 
two  great  Allies  since  the  beginning  of  the  war.  With  the  Sykes-Picot  Agreement  in 
March  1916,  a  partition  of  a  large  area  of  the  Middle  East  was  agreed.  The  French  were 
to  receive  Syria  and  Lebanon  and  the  British  the  area  of  Mesopotamia  excluding  Mosul, 
which  was  to  fall  under  French  control.  With  the  1917  Treaty  of  St.  Jean  de  Maurienne 
Italy  entered  the  scramble  for  the  Middle  East  with  the  allocation  of  a  sphere  of 
influence  in  Southern  Anatolia.  Italy  had  been  allotted  an  extended  economic  sphere  of 
influence  with  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Rvres  in  August  1920. 
The  first  friction  among  Britain  and  France  over  the  spoils  was  over  Syria  in  the 
early  days  of  the  Paris  Peace  Conference  in  March  1919.40  It  was  agreed  that  control  of 
the  area  would  go  to  France  after  the  withdrawal  of  the  British  forces.  However,  the 
British  had  come  to  put  new  ideas  on  the  table  of  the  negotiations:  they  had  started 
advocating  the  creation  of  an  independent  kingdom  of  Syria.  The  French  Premier, 
Clemenceau,  was  adamant  in  rejecting  the  British  proposal.  The  British  retained  their 
forces  in  the  region  of  Syria  until  September  1919  and  were  replaced  by  the  French,  not, 
however,  due  to  French  insistence.  It  was  decided  that  after  all  there  was  not  much 
interest  in  the  region  for  the  British  .41  France  was  granted  the  mandate  for  Syria.  This 
first  quarrel  was  the  beginning  in  a  series  of  conflicts  over  the  issue  of  the  Middle  East 
between  the  two  allies. 
The  French  felt  betrayed  over  the  issue  of  Syria.  The  British  had  turned  their 
back  on  French  interests  and  had  promoted  their  own  solution  for  a  settlement. 
Cilicia:  Turkey,  France  and  the  Ankara  Agreement  of  192  1,  '  International  History  Review,  XXIII, 
(September  2001):  505-576. 
40  For  the  course  of  British  presence  in  Syria  from  the  Palestine  campaign  in  1917  until  the  withdrawal  of 
British  forces  in  1919  see  Matthew  Hughes,  Allenby  and  British  strategy  in  the  Middle  East,  1917-1919 
(London,  1999). 
41  q 
... 
]  Syria  was  not  likely  to  pose  a  threat  to  the  Suez  Canal  and  Egypt.  Given  British  command  of  the 
seas,  and  a  favorable  political  situation  in  EgypQ...  ]  the  development  of  the  country  by  her  own 
population  need  not  cause  anxiety  to  the  British  General  Staff.  '  CAB  27/391EC2824  cited  in  Goldstein, 
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Obviously  they  were  not  to  forget  it  easily.  It  was  their  belief  that  'they  maintained  their 
control  of  Syria  in  the  face  of  a  British  conspiracy  with  the  Arabs  to  get  them  oUt.  142 
French  mistrust  was  to  become  a  serious  disadvantage  for  British  schemes.  Britain 
needed  French  backing  in  any  attempts  to  stabilise  the  situation  in  Turkey. 
Traditionally,  France  was  an  influential  factor  in  Ottoman  politics.  French  suspicions 
and  mistrust  were  evident  in  the  handling  of  everyday  affairs  in  allied  occupied 
Constantinople.  In  December  1919,  the  British  had  evacuated  Syria.  However,  the 
French  were  not  welcomed  in  the  region.  The  Turkish  Nationalists  had  decided  not  to 
surrender  without  a  fight  on  the  front  of  Cilicia.  The  first  contacts  with  Kemal  had  been 
traced  then,  via  the  French  High  Commissioner  in  Syria,  M.  Georges  Picot,  with  the  aim 
being  to  assure  economic  gains  after  the  evacuation  of  the  area.  43  In  January  1920,  the 
French  army  at  Marash  suffered  a  severe  blow.  The  French  were  forced  to  land  more 
troops  and  start  a  war  in  the  region  to  regain  control  over  the  territory.  Before  the 
outbreak  of  the  war: 
The  French  Governments  considered  Syria  and  the  area  of 
Constantinople  and  the  Straits  as  zones  of  maximum  political 
importance.  [ 
... 
]  In  Syria  (including  Lebanon  and  Palestine) 
there  was  a  marked  concentration  of  French  interests 
... 
Hence, 
French  policy-makers  were  inclined  to  think  of  Syria  as  an  area 
of  exceptional  political  significance,  where  France  might  one 
day  have  territorial  claims  and  where,  therefore,  it  was  essential 
to  maintain  the  primacy  of  French  influence.  44 
When  the  British  needed  French  backing  it  was  the  latter's  turn  to  act 
independently.  Up  until  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  S&vres  in  August  1920,  there  were 
no  serious  quarrels  or  independent  course  of  action  as  both  sides  were  preoccupied  with 
42  Philip  Bell,  France  and  Britain,  1900-1940:  Entente  and  estrangement  (London,  1996),  p.  128.  The 
British  favored  the  solution  of  the  creation  of  an  independent  Syrian  kingdom  with  Emir  Feisal  as  king, 
the  son  of  Sherif  Hussein  of  Mecca  and  friend  of  Lawrence  of  Arabia.  Eventually  Feisal  was  driven  out 
of  Syria  but  was  later  enthroned  as  king  of  Iraq  with  British  help. 
43  Alexander  Pallis,  Greece's  Anatolian  Venture-  and  After  (London,  1937),  p.  I  10. 217 
Germany  and  the  issues  of  European  security.  However,  the  French  were  from  the 
outset  opposed  to  the  British  scheme  of  injecting  Greece  in  the  region  of  Western 
Anatolia.  The  French  did  not  doubt  for  a  minute  the  Anglophile  feelings  in  Greece. 
From  1920  onwards,  the  French  were  committed  to  the  idea  of  opposing  the 
Greek  presence  in  Western  Asia  Minor,  seeing  it  as  another  British  machination  to  keep 
complete  control  over  the  region.  45  Besides  that,  a  Greek  occupied  Asia  Minor  would 
completely  debar  any  French  economic  activity  in  an  area  that  the  French  valued.  After 
all,  the  Greeks  had  already  shown  their  intentions  for  the  economic  future  of  the  area.  46 
British  naval  power  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  would  be  further  assured  by  the 
assistance  of  the  Greeks,  who  would  eventually  gain  control  of  both  sides  of  the  Aegean 
Sea.  A  French  presence  in  the  region  would  be  constantly  under  threat.  Kemal  was  the 
only  alternative  for  the  French.  However,  in  the  beginning  the  nationalist  movement  did 
not  appear  very  promising.  The  French  were  keeping  their  eyes  and  minds  open  for  any 
changes.  One  thing  was  sure,  French  backing  of  British  planning  to  establish  Greece  as 
the  upcoming  power  in  the  region  of  Western  Asia  Minor  was  not  part  of  the  French 
strategic  vision. 
Based  on  a  War  Office  paper,  entitled  'Negotiations  with  the  Turkish 
Nationalists,  '  Kemal  had  been  in  touch  with  the  French  in  Cilicia  in  May  1920,  even 
prior  to  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  S&vres  for  the  purposes  of  a  temporary  armistice  in 
Cilicia.  There  was  actually  a  French  delegation  sent  to  Angora  with  Admiral  Le  Bon 
and  other  French  officers.  France  was  already  regretting  that  it  had  given  its  consent  to 
the  Greek  occupation  of  Smyrna,  and  was  making  the  best  of  a  bad  job  by  trying  to 
44  Bruce  Fulton,  'France  and  the  end  of  the  Ottoman  Empire'  The  Great  Powers  and  the  End  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire,  ed.  by  M.  Kent  (London,  1984),  p.  142. 
45  For  French  reactions  regarding  the  Greek  presence  in  Smyrna  after  the  defeat  of  Venizelos  see  Chapter 
Four:  'The  "London  response"  and  the  erroneous  Greek  impression  about  British  help.  '  p.  173. 
46  See  Chapter  Four:  'The  economic  and  commercial  effects  of  the  Greek  occupation  in  the  Smyrna 
region.  '  P.  168. 218 
make  the  Turkish  Nationalists  believe  that  the  British  were  entirely  to  blame  on  the 
matter.  The  return  of  Constantine  was  just  an  excuse  for  the  French  Government;  in  the 
words  of  the  French  Premier: 
Whatever  feelings  of  resentment  we  may  harbour  against  King 
Constantine  we  should  be  only  too  glad  that  Greece  should  not 
have  to  pay  too  heavy  a  price  for  a  compromise  and  that  she 
should  be  able  to  reap  as  much  as  possible  of  the  fruits  of  our 
common  victory.  Nevertheless,  we  are  bound  to  take  into  due 
account  the  interests  of  France;  neither  financially  nor  militarily, 
are  we  any  longer  in  a  position  to  go  on  supporting  the  many 
changes  which  weigh  upon  us  in  the  Levant.  47 
The  first  French  contact  with  Kemal  was  backstage  at  the  London  Conference  in 
February  -  March  192  1.  There  were  negotiations  for  the  signing  of  an  agreement  for  an 
armistice  in  Cilicia  between  Bekir  Sami,  the  Nationalist  representative  and  Briand; 
however,  the  agreement  was  never  ratified  by  the  Nationalist  government  of  Angora.  48 
Kemal  had  renounced  Bekir  Sami's  mission  and  the  agreements  he  had  concluded,  once 
the  latter  had  returned  to  Turkey.  In  addition,  the  situation  in  Cilicia  remained  bleak.  In 
February  192  1,  the  French  had  made  it  clear  to  the  Turkish  delegates  that  they  would  be 
open  to  start  negotiations  in  order  to  retreat  from  the  region.  It  was  at  the  London 
Conference  that  the  name  of  Franklin-Bouillon  was  first  mentioned  and  his  presence  at 
Angora  was  discussed.  The  French  Prime  Minister  Briand,  however,  reassured  Curzon 
that  Franklin-Bouillon  was  in  Angora  for  personal  reasons.  In  an  official  note  to  the 
British  Government  it  was  underlined  that  there  were  no  plans  to  re-examine  the  issue 
of  Turkey  without  a  British  appraisal. 
During  1921,  the  two  leading  Entente  Powers  were  discussing  the  question  of  an 
Anglo-French  alliance.  The  Foreign  Office  was  conducting  these  negotiations  and  the 
opinion  among  the  leading  officials  was  that  the  French  were  very  difficult  to  please.  In 
47  Cited  in  Frangulis,  La  Grice  et  la  crise  mondiale  in  Pallis,  Greece's  Anatolian  adventure,  p.  112. 219 
particular,  Eyre  Crowe  appeared  to  be  quite  discouraged  by  the  course  of  the 
negotiations,  underlining  that  the  French,  although  they  wanted  an  alliance  which  would 
protect  them  against  Germany,  were  not  ready  to  compensate  Britain  in  another  area, 
particularly  in  the  East,  where  Britain  needed  the  most  Allied  support.  'French  support 
in  the  East  or  elsewhere  is  a  thing  for  which  England  must  pay  by  special  and  valuable 
concessions,  '  stressed  the  Assistant  Under-Secretary.  'Much  as  I  am  in  favour  of  a 
comprehensive  understanding  with  France,  I  should  hesitate  to  recommend  it  on  such 
terms,  '  concluded  Crowe.  49  However,  as  time  progressed  and  the  situation  in  Anatolia 
50 
was  not  resolved,  the  British  stressed  the  continuous  hostile  attitude  of  their  Allies. 
The  French  move  that  finalised  the  breach  between  the  two  Allies  was  the 
Franklin-Bouillon  mission  and  his  consequent  agreement  with  Kemal,  signed  on  20 
October  1921.  The  Franklin-Bouillon  agreement  was  a  de  facto  recognition  of  the 
51 
government  of  Angora.  It  was  a  decisive  blow  against  the  British,  the  one  that  pushed 
them  more  towards  the  direction  of  abandoning  the  Greeks  to  their  fate.  With  this 
agreement  the  French  were  in  effect  recognising  Kemal  as  the  real  government  in 
Turkey,  abandoning  the  British  who  still  supported  the  Sultan's  government  in 
Constantinople.  The  French  were  to  retreat  from  Cilicia,  denouncing  any  claims  in  the 
region  and  gained  economic  concessions  in  return.  As  a  result  of  the  French  evacuation 
48  The  result  of  the  negotiations  was an  armistice  in  Cilicia.  The  French  were  to  evacuate  the  region  in 
return  for  economic  concessions. 
49  DBFP,  vol.  XVI,  no  634,  Mr.  Robertson  to  Curzon,  2  June  192  1,  Crowe  minute  on  Lord  I  lardinge's 
despatch,  8  June  1921,8  June  192  1,  pp.  684-5.  Curzon  had  added  next  to  Crowe's  minute:  'or  at  this 
time.  ' 
50  In  December  192  1,  Curzon  compiled  a  memorandum  on  a  future  Anglo-French  Alliance,  with  the 
assistance  of  Crowe.  There,  he  expressed  his  hope  that  the  situation  would  be  benevolent  for  Britain  if 
France  'were  to  adopt  a  policy  identical  with  our  own  in  Turkey,  Syria  and  Mesopotamia.  '  The  French 
seemed  to  promote  only  their  interests,  which  were  'inconsistent'  with  those  of  the  British.  DBFP,  vol. 
XVI,  no  768,  Memorandum  by  Lord  Curzon  on  the  question  of  an  Anglo-French  Alliance,  28  December 
192  1,  pp.  860-70. 
51  The  text  of  the  Agreement  in  DBFP,  vol.  XVII,  no  502,  pp.  564-9.  The  correspondence  between  British 
and  French  officials  on  the  same  matter  in  Great  Britain,  Correspondence  between  HUG  and  the  French 
Government  respecting  the,  4ngora,  4greement  of  October  20,1921,  Cmd  1570  (London,  1922). 220 
of  Cilicia,  the  Nationalist  forces  were  also  free  to  use  the  large  fertile  lands  and  to 
recruit  even  more  people.  In  the  words  of  Kemal: 
The  fact  that  one  of  the  most  powerful  of  the  states  that  had 
signed  the  Treaty  of  S&vres,  viz.,  France  had  come  to  a  separate 
understanding  with  us,  proved  to  the  whole  world  that  that  treaty 
was  merely  a  rag.  52 
On  the  margin  of  all  this,  the  French  had  started  openly  supplying  Kemal  with 
arms.  The  first  reports  that  verified  the  suspicions  of  the  British  that  their  Allies  were 
exploiting  the  ammunition  dumps  in  Constantinople  under  their  supervision  to  supply 
Kemal,  reached  the  Foreign  Office  in  September  1921.  In  these  first  reports  it  was 
underlined  that  it  was  'not  yet  clear  whether  the  French  officers  were  acting  officially  or 
unofficial  ly.,  53 
Further  intelligence  reports  submitted  by  the  Greek  High  Commissioner  at 
Constantinople  had  fully  uncovered  the  French  anxiety  to  conclude  quickly  a  settlement 
with  Kemal.  54  From  that  point  onwards  suspicions  became  convictions  and  in  May  1922 
the  British  authorities  in  Constantinople  supplied  the  War  and  Foreign  Offices  with 
proof  In  May  1922  British  officers  stationed  in  Anatolia  compiled  a  long  list  of  cases  in 
which  French  authorities  were  engaged  in  'smuggling  war  material  for  the  Turkish 
nationalists'  and  lists  of  arms  and  ammunitions  despatched  to  Anatolian  ports  from 
depots  under  Allied  supervision.  55  They  had  dealt  a  decisive  blow  to  the  British.  There 
52  Sonyel,  Turkish  Diplomacy,  p.  13  8. 
53  PRO,  FO  371/6530-E  1026/143/44,  War  Office  report,  20  September  192  1. 
54  PRO,  FO  406/48,  no  4  [E10961/l/44],  Rumbold  to  Curzon,  Enclosure  Intelligence  Report  submitted  by 
the  Greek  Commissioner,  27  September  192  1.  'M.  Herm  itte  [Cambon's  and  Briand's  Secretary]  a  eu  de 
nombreuses  entrevues  secr&es  avec  Ahmed  Izzet  Pasha  [the  Nationalist  representative  in  Constantinople] 
et  le  Grand  Vizir.  11  leur  a  promis  Vaide  financiere  de  la  France  pour  la  rel6vement  de  leur  pays  et  les  a 
Fri6s  d'intervenir  aupr6s  du  Gouvemement  d'  Angora  pour  engager  les  Nationalistes  A  la  moddration.  ' 
5  In  the  Archives  of  the  Greek  Foreign  Ministry  there  is  a  file  on  the  transactions  of  French  with  Kemal. 
Furthermore,  'In  addition  to  the  other  conditions  specified  in  the  Agreement  [Franklin-Bouillon],  France 
handed  over  to  the  Turks  a  large  part  of  the  munitions  and  other  war  material  of  the  French  Army  of 
occupation  in  Cilicia.  As  the  Turks  were  still  officially  at  war  with  the  Entente  and  engaged  in  hostilities 
against  the  British  at  Ismid  and  the  Greeks  in  Western  Anatolia,  the  handing  over  of  all  this  war  material 
to  the  enemy,  to  be  used  against  friends  and  former  Allies,  was  an  act  which  cannot  be  severely 
condemned  from  the  point  of  view  of  international  morality.  '  Pallis,  Greece's  Anatolian  venture,  p.  112. 221 
was  little  real  union  or  solidarity  among  the  Allies  and  the  French  had  made  that  explicit 
to  Kemal.  It  was  more  than  obvious  that  the  Nationalist  plan,  as  stated  in  reports  coming 
from  Angora,  was  to  isolate  Greece  diplomatically.  This  was  partly  achieved  with  the 
Franco-Kemalist  agreement  of  October  1921.  'They  [the  nationalists],  '  wrote  Rumbold 
to  Curzon,  'are  out  not  merely  for  recovering  Smyrna  or  Thrace  but  they  are  against  real 
safeguards  for  minorities,  capitulations,  and  any  form  of  control,  financial  or 
otherwise.  '  56 
The  first  positive  step  towards  finding  solutions  that  would  suit  both  Great 
Britain  and  France  was  the  conciliatory  tone  of  the  French  after  the  British  Note.  The 
French  were  putting  the  Franklin  Bouillon  Agreement  in  a  future  general  settlement. 
There  was  willingness  from  both  sides  to  bridge  the  gap  that  had  abruptly  widened.  The 
Franco-Kemalist  Agreement  had  been  characterised  by  the  British  as  a  separate  peace 
with  Turkey.  There  was  a  general  feeling  among  British  policy  makers  however,  that 
the  situation  had  to  be  resolved,  as  'France  appeared  to  be  adopting  an  attitude 
definitely  hostile  to  British  interests  in  the  Near  East.  '  57  It  was  believed  that  especially 
in  connection  with  the  Baghdad  railway,  Mosul  lay  open  to  the  Turks.  With  the 
Franklin-Bouillon  Agreement,  the  railway  was  transferred  to  a  French  group.  'If  France 
was  troublesome  as  a  friend  she  would  be  impossible  as  an  enemy.  ,  58  The  anxiety  of  the 
War  Office  focused  on  the  'reliability  of  the  French  troops  in  the  Constantinople  area' 
after  the  signing  of  the  Franco-Kemalist  treaty.  59 
Further,  in  PRO,  FO  371/7927-E4547n6/44,  FO  to  WO,  II  May  1922,  -E5346/76/44,  WO  to  FO,  and  in 
PRO,  FO  371n927-E6681/76/44.  Evidence  that  French  were  supplying  arms  to  Kemal.  Lists  of  war 
material.  Documents  showing  that  French  authorities  in  Constantinople  are  engaged  in  smuggling  war 
material  for  the  Turkish  nationalists  plus  a  list  of  arms  and  ammunition  dispatched  to  Anatolian  posts 
from  depots  under  Allied  supervision  from  I  May  1921  to  25  May  1922. 
56  PRO,  FO  371n853-E589/5/44,  Rumbold  to  Curzon,  15  January  1922. 
57  PRO,  CAB  23/27,1  November  192  1. 
58  PRO,  CAB  2/3/15  1,  CID  minutes,  28  November  192  1. 
59  PRO,  FO  371/6537-EI35531143/44,  Rumbold  to  FO,  9  December  1921. 222 
ANGORA  REJOICED  AND  ATHENS  DESPAIRED:  THE  LONDON  RESPONSE. 
Granville,  immediately  after  the  failure  of  the  Greek  Army  to  put  an  end  to  tile 
operations  by  marching  to  Angora,  insisted  that  the  time  was  ripe  for  a  meeting  late  in 
August.  Curzon,  however,  guided  by  the  decisions  taken  in  Paris  and  convinced  that 
things  were  taking  their  own  course,  informed  his  subordinate  that  'PM  and  I  are  just 
leaving  London  but  will  be  very  glad  to  see  M.  Gounaris  if  he  finds  it  convenient  to 
come  to  London  about  middle  of  October.  ý60  The  reaction  of  the  Foreign  Office  to  the 
crisis  was  a  deferment  of  any  action  until  October.  For  the  Greek  Government  this  was  a 
time  of  panic  and  retreat.  Gounaris  appeared  to  the  British  Minister,  according  to  the 
latter's  accounts  and  reports,  'moderate,  '  and  ready  to  retreat  on  issues  of  territory.  It 
was  no  longer  possible  to  believe  that  the  situation  would,  in  time,  correct  itself.  The 
only  weapon  that  Greece  had,  its  armed  forces,  were  restricted  to  a  defensive  role. 
British  policy  makers  had  agreed  to  wait  on  events,  which  were  not  slow  in  coming.  The 
result  of  their  policy  was  now  evident:  the  Greek  Government  was  pleading  for  British 
diplomatic  intervention. 
The  Allies,  after  the  March  1921  proposals  and  the  rejection  in  June,  had 
stopped  all  kinds  of  action  that  would  enable  Greece  this  time  to  achieve  a  political 
solution  to  the  problem.  New  military  activity  was  impossible  since  the  units  needed 
time  to  rest  and  reorganise  themselves;  furthermore,  the  contraction  of  the  front  was  not 
a  good  sign  from  the  military-strategic  point  of  view.  Therefore,  there  was  only  one 
solution  and  that  was  a  political  one.  It  was  decided  that  Prime  Minister  Gounaris  along 
with  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  Baltazzis,  followed  by  the  technical  advisers, 
should  visit  the  capitals  of  the  Allies  and  inquire  whether  it  would  be  possible  to  start 
peace  negotiations.  The  team  left  Athens  for  Paris  on  4  October  1921.  They  met  Briand 
in  Paris  on  8  and  12  October. 223 
The  ill-fated  M.  Gounaris  flitted  to  and  fro  between  Athens  and 
London  begging  for  money  and  arms  to  carry  on  the  war  and 
still  more  to  help  to  get  out  of  it.  He  was  confronted  by  Lord 
Curzon,  who  soused  him  in  sonorous  correctitudes.  At  these 
interviews  the  main  effort  of  Gounaris  was  to  throw  the 
agonised  fortunes  of  Greece  into  the  sole  hands  of  Great  Britain; 
the  main  object  of  Lord  Curzon  ývas  to  avoid  incurring  in  any 
form  or  sense  this  ugly  responsibility,  but  at  the  same  time  to 
persuade  Greece  to  accept  Allied  mediation.  61 
The  Greek  cause  was  lost  the  minute  its  army  in  Anatolia  lost  its  capacity  on  the 
battlefield.  With  the  news  of  the  unsuccessful  Greek  offensive  Churchill  immediately 
tried  to  warn  Lloyd  George  again  of  the  imminent  threat  to  Mosul  by  the  unleashed 
Nationalist  army  of  Kemal.  'The  Turkish  menace  has  got  worse.  [ 
... 
]I  have  had  to 
maintain  British  troops  at  Mosul  all  through  the  year  in  consequence  of  the  Angora 
quarrel;  this  has  upset  the  programme  of  relief  and  will  certainly  lead  to  further 
expenditure  beyond  the  provision.  I  cannot  at  this  moment  withdraw  these  troops 
without  practically  inviting  the  Turks  to  come  in.  [ 
... 
162  Churchill  was  convinced  that 
this  was  the  right  time  for  concluding  a  peace  with  Turkey.  On  that  he  had  the  views  of 
Harington  who  had  been  in  London  on  leave  in  early  October  1921.  Harington  believed 
that  a  conclusion  of  peace  with  Turkey  required  the  overall  withdrawal  of  Greek  troops 
from  Anatolia.  63 
The  Greek  forces  could  no  longer  act  as  a  tool  in  the  hands  of  Britain.  However, 
they  had  to  remain  in  Anatolia  until  an  Allied  Conference  was  arranged.  Such  a 
conference  would  allow  a  diplomatic  solution  that  would  not  exclude  Britain  from 
reaping  some  benefits  itself  For  the  next  nine  months  after  the  failure  of  the  offensive 
the  situation  of  Greeks  and  Turks  facing  each  other  on  the  plateaux  of  Anatolia 
benefited  only  the  Allies  and  Kemal. 
60  PRO,  FO  371/6526-E9516/143/44,  Granville  to  Curzon,  20  August  192  1. 
("  Winston  Churchill,  The  World  Crisis,  The,  4ftemath  (London,  1929),  p.  412-3. 
62  HLRO,  Lloyd  George  Papers,  F/9/3,  Churchill  to  Lloyd  George,  I  September  192  1. 
63  Gilbert,  Churchill,  Vol.  IV,  p.  808. 224 
Curzon,  from  the  beginning  of  the  meetings  with  the  Greek  representatives,  was 
crystal  clear:  peace  was  important  for  Great  Britain  and  it  was  obvious  that  tile  Greek 
army  was  not  in  position  to  pursue  this  on  Britain's  behalf.  Curzon  had  long  ago 
decided  that  Greece  had  no  place  in  the  region  of  Smyrna,  let  alone  in  the  wider  area  of 
Anatolia.  He  was  firm  in  his  belief  that  the  Turks  should  be  left  alone  there. 
It  was  admitted  that  time  was  on  the  side  of  the  Turks.  It  was  considered 
impossible  for  Britain  to  enable  the  Greeks  to  defeat  the  KemaliStS.  64  'There  was  a  large 
section  of  opinion  in  this  country  -  and  even  a  stronger  one  in  India  -  that  held  that  we 
should  have  peace  with  Turkey  and  that  we  are  sacrificing  our  imperial  interests  for 
Greece,  '  underlined  Curzon 
. 
65  However,  it  was  obvious  that  the  Greek  Government 
could  not  order  a  dishonourable  retreat,  and  this  was  an  asset  for  Britain.  It  was  true  that 
there  were  conflicting  reports  on  the  definite  situation  and  strength  of  the  Greek  Army. 
However,  even  from  a  military  point  of  view  the  time  was  propitious  for  intervention. 
Greece's  internal  situation,  as  evaluated  by  British  officials,  was  at  a  point  that  it  was 
ready  to  accept  mediation.  Indeed,  Curzon  returned  in  October  to  his  task  of  mediation 
from  a  position  of  power,  a  position  which  he  held  in  the  coming  months  up  until  the 
signing  of  the  treaty  of  Lausanne. 
In  the  Cabinet  meeting  where  the  question  of  Greece  was  discussed,  it  was  stated 
that  the  Greek  representatives  had  not  denied  the  'unfavourable  position  of  the  Greek 
arMy.  t  66  The  solution  offered  by  the  British  was  on  the  lines  of  the  June  1921  mediation 
proposal:  Smyrna  to  be  made  an  autonomous  province  with  a  Christian  governor  and  an 
international  gendarmerie.  Only  this  time  the  Greek  Prime  Minister  had  agreed  to  accept 
mediation  on  this  basis,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Greek  government.  It  was  stated 
64  PRO,  CAB  24/128,  C.  P3384,  Intervention  between  Greece  and  Turkey  by  Curzon,  7  October  1921. 
65  PRO,  FO  371/6534-E  11922/143/44,  Minutes  of  Meetings  held  at  the  Foreign  Office  between  Curzon 
and  Greek  representatives,  27  October  192  1. 
66  PRO,  CAB  23/27,1  November  192  1. 225 
loud  and  clear,  in  the  Cabinet  discussion,  that  Britain,  although  it  was  favourable  to 
Greece,  could  not  disassociate  itself  from  the  Allies.  Any  work  for  a  solution  would  be 
based  on  the  British  scheme  of  June  1921.  The  agenda  of  the  Greek  delegation  included 
the  petition  for  financial  assistance.  However,  on  the  issue  of  a  loan,  or  rather  of 
financing  the  presence  of  the  Greek  Army  in  Anatolia  as  a  counterbalance  to  the 
Kernalist  forces,  the  British  had  to  take  into  account  the  French  and  to  avoid  giving  a 
further  boost  to  Kemalist-Soviet  relations. 
On  27  October  1921,  the  Greek  representatives  agreed  to  leave  the  fate  of  the 
country's  presence  in  Asia  Minor  in  the  hands  of  Britain,  subject  to  the  decision  of  the 
rest  of  the  government.  67  The  Greek  representatives,  according  to  Foreign  Office 
estimations,  had  arrived  in  London  'without  any  clear  ideas.  '  On  2  November  the  Greek 
ministers  informed  Curzon  that  they  accepted  his  suggestion  to  place  themselves  in  the 
hands  of  the  Allies.  It  was  stressed  though  that  this  acceptance  did  not  entail  the 
dismissal  of  the  Treaty  of  S&vres  on  the  part  of  Greece.  68  Greece  was  however,  the  only 
participant  of  this  treaty  that  still  needed  its  enforcement.  The  Greek  Prime  Minister 
wanted  to  make  it  explicit  to  the  rest  of  the  Greek  government  back  in  Athens  that  there 
was  no  way  out  of  the  crisis  without  complying  with  the  proposed  British  initiatives.  'In 
the  event  of  a  refusal  to  accept  Lord  Curzon's  suggestion,  we  cannot  hope  for  anything 
from  Great  Britain',  he  stressed  to  his  colleagues  at  home.  69  The  Prime  Minister  had  lost 
all  hope  and  was  convinced,  this  time,  that  there  was  no  space  for  'isolated 
collaboration,  '  in  his  own  words,  between  Great  Britain  and  Greece.  The  British,  at  that 
67  PRO,  FO  371/6534  -EI  1922/143/44,  E  12085/143/44,  E  12088/143/44.  Minutes  of  Meetings  held  at  the 
Foreign  Office  between  the  Marquess  Curzon  of  Kedleston  and  Greek  representatives,  October  27, 
October  29  and  November  2,192  1. 
611  PRO,  FO  371/6534-E  12088/143/44,  FO  'Hostilities  between  Greece  and  Kemal  ists,  '  2  November 
1921. 
69  PRO,  HW  12/28,  October  192  1,  no  0083  64,  [2  November  192  1  ],  Gounaris  to  MFA,  31  October  192  1. 
The  same  communication  in  MFA,  192  1,  File  32.7,  Gounaris  to  MFA,  19  October  192  1. 226 
turning  point  wanted  'to  maintain  unbroken  the  connections  with  the  other  Allied 
Powers,  '  concluded  Gounaris.  70 
The  only  card  that  Greece  had  still  to  play  was  the  fact  that  Britain  still  needed 
the  Greek  forces  present  in  the  Near  East.  The  Greek  Army  was  essential  in  the  region 
to  help  back  up  the  British  position  in  Constantinople  and  the  Straits  if  there  was  a 
Nationalist  attack.  By  the  end  of  December  192  1,  the  British  government  was  convinced 
that  there  would  be  no  other  solution  acceptable  to  the  Turks  than  total  Greek 
withdrawal  from  Asia  Minor.  However,  it  was  most  desirable  to  the  interests  of  the 
Allies  that  'the  Greek  Army  should  be  kept  in  being  until  the  negotiations  with  the 
Turks  were  completed.  971  In  fact,  it  was  obvious  that  it  was  only  in  the  interests  of 
Great  Britain  at  that  point,  since  both  France  and  Italy  had  already  made  their  own 
arrangements  with  Kemal.  Curzon  held  this  opinion  as  early  as  in  May  192  1.72 
From  that  point  onwards  Curzon  planned  an  urgent  Conference  that  would  allow 
a  diplomatic  solution  acceptable  and  beneficial  for  all  parties  concerned.  However, 
things  did  not  turn  out  the  way  Curzon  had  envisaged.  There  was  a  set  Allied  meeting  in 
Paris  to  discuss  the  reparations  but  the  Allied  Conference  which  would  allow  a  decision 
to  be  made  was  not  held  until  March  1922.  The  Curzon  plan  for  a  conference  was 
disrupted  by  the  changes  in  government  in  both  France  and  Italy.  In  France,  Raymond 
Poincar6  replaced  Aristide  Briand.  Poincar6  seemed  to  prefer  to  negotiate  'by  an 
exchange  of  notes  to  conferences,  at  least  as  far  as  British  difficulties  in  the  Near  East 
were  concerned.  973  In  Italy,  there  was  also  a  change  in  government  after  the  fall  of  the 
70  MFA 
, 
192  1,  File  32.7,  Gounaris  to  MFA,  19  October  192  1. 
71  PRO,  CAB  23/31,21  December  192  1. 
72  PRO,  CAB  23/25,31  May  192  1.  'Objections  from  a  political  point  of  view  from  Curzon  to  a  policy  of 
withdrawal.  Once  M.  K.  [Mustapha  Kemal]  had  driven  out  the  Greeks  of  Smyrna  he  would  have  Thrace  at 
his  mercy.  ' 
73  Sonyel,  Turkish  Diplomacy,  p.  16  1. 227 
Bonomi  Government.  74  The  situation  was  clarified  in  February.  The  French  government 
appeared  'as  anxious  as  HMG  to  reach  a  fair  settlement,  '  as  Poincar6  pointed  out.  The 
British  officials  did  not  feel  that  France  was  that  anxious  but,  at  least,  they  reckoned  that 
the  French  seemed  'more  ready  to  discuss  our  [British]  proposals.  75  The  Foreign  Office 
was  working  feverishly  on  possible  settlement  scenarios  to  be  discussed  in  the 
forthcoming  Allied  Conference.  76 
THE  GREEK'I%IUDDLE'AND  THE  BRITISH  REFUSAL  OF  FINANCIAL  HELP. 
The  internal  situation  in  Greece  was  perilous.  It  was  no  longer  possible  to 
believe  that  the  situation  would,  in  time,  correct  itself  The  financial  situation  was 
getting  worse  and  worse,  the  Nationalist  Turks  were  running  wild  and  in  the  Allied 
minds  Greece  was  now  a  'broken  reed.  '  The  impact  of  the  Greek  ministers'  futile 
missions  in  Europe  was  depicted  by  reports  sent  by  Granville  to  the  Foreign  Office. 
Greek  officials  and  newspapers  were  claiming  that  there  could  be  no  question  of 
abandoning  Asia  Minor.  However,  Granville  reported  that  in  private  conversations  with 
Greeks  an  evacuation  seemed  the  only  solution  and  way  out  of  the  crisis.  It  was 
underlined  that  the  acceptance  of  this  solution  would  mean  also  accepting  the  immediate 
fall  of  the  government.  77  There  was  social  upheaval  in  September,  right  after  the  Greek 
retreat  on  the  Asia  Minor  front.  There  was  a  big  shipping  strike  at  Piraeus  where  crews 
of  steamers,  having  failed  in  their  demand  to  obtain  an  increase  in  wages,  went  on 
74  Ivanoe  Bonomi  resigned  on  2  February  1922  and  Luigi  Facta  replaced  him  as  Prime  Minister,  with 
Carlo  Schanzer  as  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.  Benito  Mussolini  took  power  and  established  his  fascist 
regime.  For  a  discussion  of  the  political  scene  in  Italy  and  the  rise  of  fascism  see  Richard  Bosworth,  The 
Italian  dictatorship.  Problems  and  Perspectives  in  the  Interpretation  ofMussolini  and  Fascism  (London, 
1998). 
75  PRO,  FO  37  in855-E  1252/5/44,  Note  from  M.  Poincare,  Minute  by  Forbes  Adam,  3  February  1922. 
76  PRO,  FO  371/7855-El  304/5/44,  Settlement  of  Near  East  Question,  Memorandum  prepared  by  Mr. 
Forbes  Adam  and  Mr.  Edmonds,  6  February  1922. 
77  PRO,  FO  371/6533-E  11645/143/44,  Granville  to  Foreign  Office,  21  October  192  1. 228 
strike.  78  The  Government's  position  grew  worse  day  by  day.  In  the  middle  of  the  crisis, 
it  was  bitterly  criticised  even  by  its  own  press.  The  Foreign  Office  officials  were 
alarmed  by  the  situation  in  Greece  underlying  that  a  possible  collapse  of  Gounaris  could 
'lead  to  anarchy.  79  In  the  meantime,  the  Greek  Minister  of  Marine,  Petros 
Mavromichalis,  on  28  December  1921  telegraphed  Gounaris  who  was  still  in  London: 
Total  lack  of  money.  The  Minister  of  Finance  is  not  in  a  position 
to  spare  the  necessary  amount  of  money  for  the  payroll  of 
December.  Please  allow  me  the  recalling  of  the  fleet  from 
Constantinople  and  Smyrna  since  in  a  matter  of  few  da  s  even  U 
the  supply  of  foodstuffs  to  the  crews  will  be  impossible. 
Greece  was  nominally  under  the  orders  of  the  Allies.  In  the  meantime,  the  army 
was  not  in  a  position  to  start  a  new  offensive;  the  element  of  surprise  had  been  drowned 
in  Sangarios.  But,  above  all,  on  the  Anatolian  front,  the  morale  of  the  troops  was  at  very 
8  82  low  ebb.  1  British  intelligence  also  reported  that  there  were  many  desertions.  The 
British  Minister  in  Athens,  Lindley,  who  had  replaced  Granville  in  November  1921, 
complained  in  January  1922  that  the  Delegation  was  cut  off  from  'all  direct  knowledge 
in  the  Army.  '  83  The  military  Attach6  in  Athens,  Colonel  Nairne,  had  not  been  allowed 
to  visit  the  front  after  the  offensive.  However,  his  infon-nation  allowed  him  to  report 
that,  on  the  one  hand,  the  Army  was  'completely  weary  of  the  campaign,  '  while  there 
were  sources  that  implied  that  'General  Papoulas  and  many  officers  will  refuse  to  leave 
Asia  Minor  if  ordered  to  do  so.  '  84  The  deterioration  of  the  Greek  Army  was  now  a 
written  fact.  Reports  that  reached  London  from  Greece  stated  that  a  considerable 
78  PRO,  FO  371/6097-CI7533/17533/19,  Granville  to  Foreign  Office,  5  September  192  1. 
79  PRO,  FO  371/6083-C20645/20/19,  Granville  to  Foreign  Office,  minutes  by  Nicolson,  28  October  192  1. 
0  MFA,  192  1,  File  32.7,  Mavromichalis  to  Gounaris,  28  December  192  1. 
1  For  an  example  of  how  officers  and  troops  in  the  front  felt  see  the  following  letter  from  a  Venizelist 
officer  serving  in  the  front,  referring  to  an  outbreak  of  desertions:  'First  of  all,  the  morale  of  our  men  is 
pitiable.  Just  imagine  they  heard  with  enthusiasm  the  report  that  Asia  Minor  was  to  be  evacuated.  .. 
'Let  us 
go  home  and  to  hell  with  Asia  Minor.  '[ 
... 
]I  fear  that  with  a  battle  lasting  a  few  days  we  would  run  the 
risk  of  dissolution.  [ 
... 
]'  Smith,  Ionian  Vision,  p.  262. 
92  PRO,  FO  371/6536-E  13183/143/44,  Rumbold  to  Curzon,  I  December  192  1. 
93  Lindley  was  appointed  British  Representative  to  the  Greek  Government  on  25  November  192  1. 229 
number  of  officers  and  men  had  even  signed  an  agreement  to  refuse  to  evacuate  Asia 
Minor  if  ordered  to  do  so.  85 
The  financial  situation  of  the  country  grew  worse  and  worse.  'Drachmas  in  open 
market  already  reach  120  to  the  f  I,  '  wrote  Bentick  to  Curzon  in  December.  'If 
additional  sources  of  revenue  are  not  found  drachma  will  collapse  and  British 
bondholders  and  British  commercial  interests,  including  important  British  insurance 
companies  will  suffer.  '  86  In  December  1921,  the  Greek  Prime  Minister  signed  the 
Gounaris-Horne  agreement  which  allowed  Greece  to  look  for  loans  on  the  private 
British  market.  87  The  British  financiers  however  seemed  reluctant  to  conclude  any  loan 
agreements  and  the  negotiations  were  fruitless.  In  Foreign  Office  telegrams  and  minutes 
it  was  suggested  that  the  documents  that  Greece  presented  in  support  of  its  plea  for 
assistance  were  inadequate.  The  general  figures  used  were  'entirely  unsupported.  08 
There  was  even  the  suggestion  that  'Gounaris'  efforts  to  get  a  concrete  offer  had  been 
merely  dictated  by  political  considerations  and  regard  for  his  own  personal  interests.  '  89 
The  issue  of  facilitating  a  loan  for  Greece  was  fiercely  debated  in  the  Foreign  Office. 
The  financiers  wanted  an  official  assurance  that  the  British  government  was  reluctant  to 
give.  The  issue  of  the  loan  had  implications  for  the  financing  of  the  presence  of  the 
Greek  Army  in  Anatolia.  Nicolson  was  the  Foreign  Office  expert  that  called  for  a 
84  PRO,  FO  406/49,  no  9,  Lindley  to  Curzon,  7  January  1922. 
5  PRO,  FO  371/6537-E  14230/143/44,  Bentinck  to  Foreign  Office,  28  December  192  1.  :6 
PRO,  FO  371/6087-C23  804/60/19,  Bentinck  to  Curzon,  22  December  192  1.  See  Appendix  1.  Tables.  3. 
The  Cost  of  War  for  the  Greek  Economy  1919-1923  and  the  relation  of  drachma  to  pound. 
87  The  main  points  of  the  Gounaris-Horne  Agreement  in  DBFP,  v.  XVII,  no  499,  Curzon  to  Bentinck,  3 
January  1922,  p.  559.  In  Greek  in  MFA,  192  1,  File  32.7,  no  14858,  Gounaris  to  Ministry  of  Finance,  23 
December  1921. 
88  PRO,  FO  37  In59  I  -Cl  116/21/19,  Treasury  to  Foreign  Office,  Extract  from  private  letter  by  Sir  George 
Armstrong  to  Viscount  Long,  Minutes  by  Nicolson,  23  January  1922. 
89  Ibid. 230 
reassurance  to  the  financiers  since  'a  premature  withdrawal  of  the  Greeks  would  be 
disastrous,  '  as  he  stressed  in  his  minutes.  90 
On  8  December  1921,  after  the  intervention  of  Lord  Long,  the  Greek 
representatives  had  a  meeting  with  the  British  Prime  Minister.  He  instructed  Home  to 
give  attention  to  the  Greek  demand  for  facilitating  a  loan  on  the  private  market  for 
Greece.  91  This  did  not  work  out.  'The  British  attitude  to  the  financial  question  was  a  test 
of  the  strength  of  British  support  for  Greece.  '  92  The  Greek  Government  ended  up  with 
the  solution  of  an  internal  forced  loan  that  only  proved  the  desperate  economic  situation 
of  the  country  and  offered  to  Kemal  the  signs  that  he  was  waiting  for:  the  proof  of 
Greece's  inability  to  continue  fighting  on  its  own  means.  The  Minister  of  Finance  had 
already  proceeded  with  the  issuing  of  550  million  drachmas,  without  the  necessary 
reserves  of  course.  All  other  possible  sources  of  revenue  had  been  exhausted.  93 
In  the  meantime,  Lloyd  George  had  made  up  his  mind:  'With  regard  to  Smyrna, 
no  peace  was  possible  unless  the  Greek  forces  were  withdrawn.  The  only  alternative 
would  be  for  the  Greeks  to  fight  it  out.  '  94  He  was  adamant  in  his  conviction  that  he  and 
his  government  had  done  their  best  to  help,  being  disappointed  that  'events  had  made  it 
impossible  for  Greece  to  be  established  in  Smyrna  as  protector  of  the  Christian 
populations.  95  The  time  had  long  passed  when  Lloyd  George  had  strong  faith  in  the 
Greek  military  strength.  It  was  now  obvious  that  he  consulted  his  ministers,  and  kept 
track  of  the  Conservative  feeling  in  the  Government  and  in  the  House:  the  signs  of 
90  PRO,  FO  371n591-C2600/21/19,  Lindley  to  Foreign  Office,  20  February  1922.  C2786/21/19,  Greek 
Chargd  d'Affaires  to  Vansittart,  21  February  1922.  C3348/21/19,  Parliamentary  Question  (Lord 
Larnington),  Minutes  by  Nicolson,  2  March  1922. 
9'  MFA,  1921,32.7,  no  1485  8,  Gounaris  to  Ministry  of  Finance,  Text  of  Gounaris-Home  agreement  in 
Greek. 
92  Smith,  Ionian  Vision,  p.  243. 
93  There  was  heavy  taxation  on  agriculture,  on  the  profits  of  enterprises,  further  increases  on  custom  taxes 
and  income  taxes.  E.  Kehimoglou,  'Greece  and  its  friends  in  1922  -  11  EXX&Sa  icat  ot  TfXOt  T71;  TO  1922,  ' 
Istorika  -  Io-ropiK6,46  (31  August  2000):  6-14. 
94  DBFP,  vol.  XVII,  no  504,  Note  of  a  Conversation  held  at  the  Villa  Valetta,  Cannes,  on  Thursday,  12'b 
January  1922,  pp.  572-3. 231 
distress  were  obvious.  They  no  longer  seemed  willing  to  support  a  Government  that 
went  against  traditional  Conservative  policies.  And  not  to  support  Turkey  as  British 
barrier  in  the  region  was  opposed  to  traditional  Conservative  policies.  96 
In  the  meantime,  the  Greek  government,  amid  the  tun-noil  of  the  internal 
situation,  launched  its  last  attempts  to  maintain  at  least  a  certain  level  of  prestige. 
Britain  no  longer  had  any  kind  of  obligation  to  the  Greek  cause.  Back  in  May  192  1,  the 
Allies  had  declared  neutrality  in  the  Greek-Turkish  conflict.  From  May  until  October 
1921,  the  situation  had  been  resolved  even  for  the  British.  They  had  to  enforce  their 
policies  on  Turkey  via  diplomatic  solutions.  This  was  the  right  course  for  Britain,  the 
period  of  the  wait  and  see  attitude  had  passed.  The  Foreign  Office  was  now  concerned 
with  new  planning.  Curzon  had  taken  it  upon  his  shoulders  to  accommodate  everyone's 
needs. 
Shortly  before  the  departure  of  the  Greek  delegation  from  Europe,  Prime 
Minister  Gounaris  sent  a  letter  to  Curzon,  depicting  in  clear  language  the  desperate 
situation  that  the  country  and  his  government  were  facing.  Most  important  in  his  listing 
of  Greek  inabilities  was  the  section  which  dealt  with  the  conditions  prevailing  on  tile 
army  stationed  in  the  Anatolian  front: 
The  Greek  command  in  Asia  Minor  state  that  they  cannot 
undertake  to  give  assurance  of  ability  to  cope  with  the 
contingency  of  a  Turkish  offensive  unless  they  receive: 
Lreinforcements,  2.  Supplies  of  war  material,  3.  Financial 
assistance...  The  Greek  Government  can  call  more  troops  to  the 
colours  but  not  furnish  the  army  with  financial  assistance  and 
war  material.  [  ...  ]  the  morale  of  Greek  troops  is  unimpaired  but 
the  enemy  has  a  numerical  superiority  of  10,000  men.  97 
95  Ibid. 
96  See  Chapter  Six:  'The  fall  of  the  Coalition  Government.  '  p.  271. 
97  PRO,  FO  37ln855-EI931/5/44,  Gounaris  to  Curzon,  15  February  1922. 232 
The  Greek  Prime  Minister  had  abandoned  any  hope.  In  a  telegram  to  Athens,  his  first 
phrase  was:  'No  prospect.  I  should  return  to  Greece.  '"  In  this  communication  he 
informed  the  rest  of  the  Government  about  the  letter  that  he  intended  to  send  to  Curzon. 
'After  taking  these  steps  [the  letter  about  the  desperate  Greek  situation]  successful  or 
unsuccessful  necessary  for  me  to  return  and  for  us  to  lay  before  the  assembly  the  true 
state  of  affairs  and  to  make  proposals  for  such  measures  as  arise  out  of  it.  "'  A  few  days 
later  he  asked  to  see  David  Lloyd  George  but  the  British  Prime  Minister  was  unable  to 
grant  him  an  interview.  '  00 
Curzon  replied  to  Gounaris  underlining  that  'in  these  circumstances  the  wisest 
course  is  unquestionably  to  expedite  the  diplomatic  solution  of  the  anxious  position  in 
which  all  are  placed.  '101  In  the  meantime,  he  was  trying,  admittedly  in  a  most 
diplomatic  manner,  to  appease  the  weary  tone  of  Gounaris'  letter,  reminding  him  that 
Greece  had  to  stay  in  Asia  Minor  hoping  that  'the  military  position  in  Anatolia  is  less 
immediately  critical  than'your  note  would  lead  me  to  think  and  that  the  remarkable 
patriotism  and  discipline  of  the  Hellenic  Armies  will  not  fail  them  in  any  emergency 
that  may  conceivably  arise.  '  102  Curzon  advised  the  Greek  Government  to  avoid  the  trap 
of  hasty  decisions.  Everything  had  to  take  place  according  to  the  plan  that  Curzon  had 
formed:  an  orderly  Greek  evacuation  which  would  allow  both  the  protection  of  the 
Christian  population  and  the  safeguarding  of  British  interests  followed  by  the 
conclusion  of  an  overall  Near  East  settlement.  However,  this  optimistic  projection  was 
not  shared  by  all.  Rumbold,  for  example,  was  sure  that  'a  peaceful  evacuation  of 
98  PRO,  HW  12/31,  February  1922,  no  009497,  Gounaris  to  MFA,  [3  February  1922],  9  February  1922. 
"  Ibid. 
100  It  seems  that  Lloyd  George  had  agreed  to  leave  all  negotiations  to  Curzon.  Even  an  interview  at  that 
time  could  be  interpreted  as  a  sign  of  open  support.  With  the  Greek  forces  unable  to  strike  a  decisive  blow 
apparently  Lloyd  George  was  not  interested  any  more.  British  intelligence  from  Constantinople  and  the 
Greek  front  depicted  a  bleak  picture  of  the  Greek  forces.  For  the  first  time,  it  appears  that  the  British 
Premier  had  taken  that  into  consideration.  01  PRO,  FO  371n855-E2471/5/44,  Curzon  to  Gounaris,  6  March  1922. 
02  Ibid. 233 
Anatolia  cannot  be  hoped  for,  in  the  absence  of  a  strong  covering  force  of  Allied 
troops.  '  103  General  Harington,  in  the  meantime,  had  transmitted  to  the  War  Office 
complete  and  detailed  plans  for  the  evacuation  of  the  Greek  forces  from  Asia  Minor.  104 
While  Gounaris  was  in  Paris  in  January  1922,  General  Papoulas  kept  him 
informed  about  the  situation  in  Western  Asia  Minor.  Greek  intelligence  suggested  that 
'the  enemy  are  continuing  an  energetic  organisation  of  their  reinforcements.  "  0'  Tile 
numbers  cited  were  impressive:  17  classes  were  under  anus  while  Kemal  was  keeping 
in  the  front  23  Infantry  Divisions,  5  Country  Divisions  and  one  Brigade  of  Cavalry.  The 
fighting  force  numbered  91,000  men.  In  the  meantime,  the  Greek  Arrny  requested 
acroplanes  and  money  for  supplies.  106  The  Minister  of  War,  Nikolaos  Theotokis,  warned 
the  Prime  Minister  that  the  Nationalists  were  acquiring  a  fighting  strength  superiority  of 
22,000  men.  His  Minister  of  Finance,  Petros  Protopapadakis,  also  reported  that  the 
needs  of  the  army  were  too  large  and  if  help  did  not  arrive  soon,  they  would  have  to 
proceed  with  evacuation,  'a  decision,  '  he  concluded,  'that  should  be  taken  in  time  and 
not  under  pressure.  '  107 
The  British  Government,  by  means  of  its  effective  intelligence  network,  was 
well  aware  of  the  dire  straits  that  Greece  now  found  itself  in.  All  communication  either 
from  Constantinople  to  Athens  or  from  Athens  to  London  was  in  British  hands.  The  use 
of  deciphered  diplomatic  and  military  messages  depicting  the  harsh  reality  of  the  Greek 
situation  probably  played  a  part  in  the  decision  to  continue  pursuing  the  Greek  policy, 
meaning  the  retention  of  the  Greek  Army  in  the  region,  only  by  diplomatic  means.  108 
103  0,  FO  371/7883-E5204/27/44,  Rumbold  to  Curzon,  22  May  1922. 
04  PRO,  WO  32/5658,  no  number,  Evacuation  of  Smyrna  by  the  Greek  Army,  9  March  1922. 
05  PRO,  HW  12/3  1,  February  1922,  no  00953  8,  Theotokis  to  Gounaris,  [8  February  1922],  14  February 
1922,  and  no  009563,  Protopapadakis  to  Gounaris,  [10  February  1922],  16  February  1922. 
"'6  PRO,  HW  12/30,  January  1922,  no  009397,  General  Papoulas,  Smyrna  to  Gounaris,  Paris,  [5  January 
1922],  31  January  1922. 
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Ibid. 
log  The  influx  of  the  deciphered  messages  is  revealing.  The  IIW  12  filcs  at  the  PRO  contain  deciphered 
messages  from  Athens  and  Constantinople  on  all  aspects  of  the  crisis. 234 
The  Conference  of  the  Allies  met  finally  in  March  1922  in  Paris  and  there  the 
Allies  decided  to  offer  the  belligerents  an  armistice.  '09  The  March  1922  proposals  of  the 
Allies  included  the  loss  of  Smyrna  and  half  of  Eastern  Thrace  for  Greece.  The  end  result 
of  these  negotiations  was  a  proposal  that  included  the  period  of  four  months  for  Greece 
to  complete  the  evacuation  of  Asia  Minor,  the  retention  of  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula  in  the 
military  occupation  of  the  Allies  and  the  handing  over  of  Constantinople  to  the  Turks. 
Gradually  the  Turkish  demands  were  finding  their  way  into  Allied  decisions.  110  The 
March  proposal  moved  closer  and  closer  to  the  expressed  Turkish  desitlerata.  Tile 
French  had  made  it  clear  that  they  would  not  take  arms  against  the  Turks.  Their  decision 
took  on  full  significance  during  the  Chanak  crisis.  "'  During  March  1922,  Edwin 
Montagu,  the  Secretary  for  India,  authorised,  without  a  Cabinet  decision,  the  publication 
of  a  protest  received  by  the  government  of  India  against  the  policy  so  far  followed  by 
the  Coalition  Government.  The  Indian  government  accused  the  British  government  of 
being  openly  and  unjustifiably  pro-Greek.  The  Viceroy,  after  himself  first  receiving  this 
protest,  had  asked  the  British  government,  through  Montagu,  to  publish  a  declaration 
that  would  assure  the  Indian  government  and  its  people  to  the  contrary.  Montagu 
proceeded  with  the  publication  of  the  Indian  government's  protest  without  Cabinet 
authorisation.  The  whole  event  took  place  just  before  the  beginning  of  Curzon's 
negotiations  with  the  French,  something  that  infuriated  both  the  Prime  Minister  and  tile 
Foreign  Secretary.  Montagu  resigned,  but  not  without  first  publicly  attacking  the 
Cabinet. 
109  The  records  of  the  Conversations  that  took  place  in  Paris  among  the  Allies  on  the  issue  of  the  Greco- 
Turkish  conflict  in  DBFP,  vol.  XVII,  Chapter  IV.  Conversations  in  Paris  between  British,  French  and 
Italian  Representatives,  March  22-6,1922,  pp.  668-763. 
110  DBFP,  vol.  XVIII,  Chapter  IV,  Conversations  in  Paris  between  British,  French,  and  Italian 
representatives,  March  22-6,1922,  Nos  560  to  570,  pp.  668-763.  See  also  PRO,  CAB  23/31,7  September 
1922,  Paris  agreement  as  surnmarised  by  Curzon  in  the  proceedings  of  the  meeting. 
M  For  the  Chanak  Crisis  and  the  French  attitude  see  Chapter  Six:  'The  Chanak  Crisis  of  September  1922: 
"An  avalanche  of  fire.  "'  p.  257. 235 
It  was  obvious,  given  the  grave  situation  of  tile  Greek  Government  that  they 
could  not  reject  the  proposal.  However  there  was  no  easy  way  to  accept  it  publicly 
either.  Throughout  the  course  of  the  military  expedition  in  Asia  Minor,  the  public  was 
never  fully  informed  about  the  real  picture,  either  on  the  Anatolian  front  or  in  the 
diplomatic  field.  It  would  have  been  absurd  to  try  to  explain  the  necessity  of  accepting 
such  an  offer  at  that  point.  The  Greek  people  still  believed  that  the  victorious  Greek 
Army  was  in  a  position  to  finally  realise  the  long  lived  dream  of  the  Afegali  Mea, 
especially  since  it  had  suffered  and  continued  to  suffer  for  the  presence  of  this  huge,  by 
Greek  standards,  army  in  Anatolia.  A  total  withdrawal  from  the  region  such  as  the 
Allies  proposed  would  sound,  and  indeed  was,  an  admission  of  defeat,  a  mockery  of 
everything  the  people  had  endured.  However,  on  a  diplomatic  level  there  was  no  room 
for  such  considerations.  The  Allies  and  especially  Great  Britain  were  demanding  an 
answer. 
The  Gounaris  Government  had  accepted  the  first  phase  of  the  Allied  plan,  the 
armistice.  The  Opposition,  primarily  the  Liberal  Party,  after  the  session  of  tile 
Parliament  which  discussed  the  situation,  demanded  the  resignation  of  the  Gounaris 
Government  and  withdrew  its  members.  112  Gounaris  lost  the  vote  of  confidence  of  the 
Parliament  and  resigned.  King  Constantine  had  the  right  to  appoint  as  Prime  Minister 
the  leader  of  the  second  party.  However,  he  ignored  General  Danglis,  the  leader  of  the 
Liberal  Party  and  appointed  instead  Nikolaos  Stratos,  who  did  not  manage  to  form 
government,  failing  the  test  of  the  parliament.  Constantine  again  appointed  Gounaris 
who  again  formed  government.  "  3  It  was  only  the  Kernalist  answer  that  temporarily 
saved  the  Greek  Government.  Kemal  rejected  the  Allied  plan.  His  counter  proposal 
'2  PRO,  FO  371n859-E3502/5/44,  Lindley  to  Foreign  Office,  I  April  1922. 
13  It  was  a  rather  awkward  situation  with  Cabinets  that  lasted  only  for  days.  These  arrangements  however 
did  not  seem  enough  to  provide  solutions  to  the  question  of  retaining  or  withdrawing  the  Greek  forces. 236 
demanded  the  withdrawal  of  the  Greek  Army  after  the  signing  of  the  armistice  and 
before  the  commencement  of  any  peace  negotiations.  114  Gounaris  remained  in  office 
until  May  1922  and  was  replaced  by  Petros  Protopapadakis.  1  15  After  tile  Turkish 
rejection,  no  new  initiative  was  taken.  The  Greeks  underlined  that  the  negotiations  had 
relaxed.  Curzon  was  once  again  sick,  as  was  his  personal  Secretary  Robert  Vansittart. 
The  Greek  Ambassador  in  London,  in  one  of  his  communications  to  Athens  in  April, 
stressed  that  'almost  every  person  that  deals  with  the  Anatolian  issue  is  absent  from  the 
Foreign  Office.  '  116  From  Constantinople,  the  Greek  High  Commissioner  kept 
transmitting  the  political  intelligence  regarding  the  situation  in  the  opposite  camp:  'The 
Nationalist  Army  will  proceed  with  an  offensive  in  case  this  is  not  attempted  by  the 
Greek  Army.,  117  One  report  was  particularly  alarming,  since  it  suggested  that  the 
possible  offensive  might  begin  in  25  to  30  days.  118 
Summer  was  approaching  and  with  it  the  time  for  any  military  initiatives  in 
Anatolia.  One  adversary  was  surely  in  no  position  to  take  such  initiatives,  and  that  was 
Greece. 
THE  ASIA  MINOR  DEFENCE  MOVEMENT  AND  THE  ILLUSIVE  PLAN  FOR A  GREEK  OCCUPATION 
OF  CONSTANTINOPLE. 
The  Greeks  made  two  last  attempts  to  reverse  the  situation  during  the  critical 
months  of  spring  and  summer  1922.  However,  both  failed  in  their  initial  stages.  The 
first  was  the  movement  for  the  creation  of  an  independent  Ionian  State  and  the  second 
Nikolaos  Stratos  was  leader  of  the  Ethnikon  Syntiritikon  Komma  (National  Conservative  Party).  Ile  had 
served  as  Minister  of  the  Interior  in  Gounaris'  Government  and  he  was  an  opponent  of  Venizelos. 
'"  PRO,  FO  371n860-E3677/5/44,  Rumbold  to  Foreign  Office,  5  April  1922,  and  -E4222/5/44,23  April  0 
1922,  Rumbold  to  Foreign  Office. 
115  Petros  Protopapadakis  bad  served  as  Gounaris'  Minister  of  Finance. 
:6  MFA,  1922,6.5,  no  3856,  Rangave  to  MFA,  15  April  1922. 
7  MFA,  1922,4.5,  Turkey  -  Internal  Situation,  no  6704,  Simopoulos  to  MFA,  I  July  1922. 
'  MFA,  1922,4.5,  Turkey  -  Internal  Situation,  no  7  10  1,  Simopoulos  to  MFA,  II  July  1922. 237 
the  plan  for  the  Greek  occupation  of  Constantinople.  '  19  At  the  end  of  Octobcr  1921, 
when  Gounaris  and  Baltazzis  had  already  made  the  first  failed  attempts  for  a  diplomatic 
solution  in  the  face  of  the  military  stalemate,  a  group  of  eminent  Smymiots  proceeded 
with  the  following  plan;  the  forination  of  a  secret  organisation  for  the  defence  of  tile 
Asia  Minor.  On  6  March  1922,  the  Committee  sent  a  telegram  to  the  Prime  Ministers 
and  Foreign  Ministers  of  Britain,  France,  Italy  and  the  United  States.  The  crux  of  tile 
message  was  to  remind  them  of  the  existence  of  the  Christian  populations  in  tile  region 
and  their  duty  to  protect  them.  'Its  withdrawal  [that  of  the  Greek  army]  will  bring 
disorder  and  anarchy  and  will  bring  disaster  to  the  area,  '  underlined  the  message.,  20 
There  was  also  a  proclamation  made  to  the  people  of  Asia  Minor  calling  on  them  to  help 
in  the  struggle  with  every  means.  The  Foreign  Office's  information  regarding  the 
movement  in  its  initial  stages  stressed  that  it  was  'primarily  Mikrasiatic  [of  Asia  Minor 
origin]  as  distinct  from  Hellenic.  '  12  1  They  were  trying  to  avoid  an  evacuation  which 
would  result  from  a  consequent  Turkish  occupation  of  the  area.  It  was  their  belief  that 
the  Christian  populations  would  suffer  from  such  an  event.  Moreover,  tile  report  from 
Smyrna  underlined  that  'in  spite  of  all  official  warnings  to  the  contrary  they  believe  that 
HMG  is  with  them  in  spirit.  '  122 
Of  special  interest  were  the  views  of  Venizelos,  as  expressed  during  an 
interview  he  had  with  CroNye  in  late  May  1922.  Venizelos  expressed  his  anxieties  and 
concern  about  the  fate  of  the  local  Christian  populations  and  confided  to  Crowe  that  tile 
districts  could  be  patrolled  and  guarded  by  local  organisations;  however,  the  Greek 
Government  could  not  supply  the  money  needed.  Curzon  however,  dismissed 
119  For  the  Greek  plans  for  the  occupation  of  Constantinople  also  of  interest  PRO,  FO  371n868- 
E7484/5/44,27  July  1922,  Bentinck  to  Foreign  Office,  -E7517/5/44,29  July  1922,  and  FO  371/7869- 
E7753/5/44,  Rumbold  to  F.  0,  'Measures  to  be  taken  in  event  of  Greek  advance  on  Constantinople',  3 
August  1922. 
120  Angelornatis,  Chronicle  ofa  great  tragedy,  p.  137-8. 238 
Venizelos'  belief  that  the  safety  of  the  minorities  could  be  achieved  by  the  arming  of 
local  organisations.  He  found  such  solutions  'quite  illusory,  '  while  tile  possibility  of  tile 
Allies  financing  such  schemes  was  'quite  out  of  the  question.  '  123  General  Papoulas,  the 
Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Greek  forces  in  Asia  Minor,  was  in  favour  of  such  a  plan. 
The  Greek  Government,  however,  was  opposed.  Papoulas  had  expressed  his  opinion  in 
a  telegram  to  the  Prime  Minister: 
In  view  of  the  sacrifices  of  the  Greek  nation  in  Asia  Minor,  we 
cannot  abandon  it.  Of  course,  if  the  Government  is  forced,  due 
to  the  stalemate  of  the  situation,  to  abandon  and  evacuate  Asia 
Minor,  I  beg  you  to  allow  me  declare  the  autonomy  of  the 
region.  If  this  is  not  possible  then  the  Government  has  to  replace 
me.  124 
The  Greek  Government  however,  had  decided  that  without  any  prior  agreement  of  the 
Great  Powers  it  would  not  withdraw  the  Greek  Army  from  Anatolia.  The  reaction  of  the 
Allies  was  immediate.  Curzon  instructed  Lindley  to  inform  the  Greek  Government  that 
'such  a  movement  would  be  viewed  by  HMG  with  the,  greatest  disappointment  and 
displeasure  and  could  only  have  disastrous  effects.  '  125  The  assurance  that  there  was  no 
distribution  of  arms  to  the  population  of  Smyrna  came  from  the  Greek  High 
Commissioner  of  Smyrna  himself,  Aristidis  Stergiadis,  during  a  trip  to  Athens  to 
discuss  the  issue  of  local  resistance.  126  In  the  meantime  the  issue  was  debated  in  tile 
House  of  Commons.  Various  reports  had  been  received;  however,  the  British 
Government  stated  that  'the  importance  of  the  movement  seems  to  have  been  somewhat 
exaggerated.  '  127  By  the  end  of  March  1922  Lindley  in  Athens  and  Lamb  in  Smyrna,  the 
121  PRO,  FO  371/7882-E4701/27/44,  Rumbold  to  Curzon,  Enclosure,  Memo  by  Mr.  I  lole,  (dated 
27.4.1922,  Smyrna),  2  May  1922. 
122 
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123  PRO,  FO  37ln865-E5425/5/44,  Memo  by  Crowe  on  an  interview  with  Venizelos,  Curzon  Minute,  26 
May  1922. 
124  Papoulas  to  Gounaris,  March  1922,  cited  in  Angelomatis,  Chronicle  ofa  great  trage(ly,  p.  142. 
125  PRO,  FO  371n858-E3360/5/44,  Curzon  to  Lindley,  31  March  1922. 
126  DBFP,  vol.  XVII,  no  601,  Lindley  to  Curzon,  20  April  1922. 
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British  Minister  in  Athens  and  the  representative  of  the  British  High  Commissioner  of 
Constantinople  in  Smyrna  respectively,  had  made  it  clear  to  the  Greek  Government  that 
Britain  disapproved  of  the  movement. 
The  situation  in  Athens  was  critical.  General  Papoulas  had  submitted  a  petition 
for  demobilisation.  The  two  people  who  could  replace  him  were  General  Dousmanis 
and  General  Hadjianestis.  The  government  of  Protopapadakis  chose  Hadjianestis  as 
Commander  of  the  Greek  forces  in  Asia  Minor.  His  appointment  was  actually  'a 
considerable  surprise  to  the  well-informed  public.  '  128  He  had  not  been  in  action  since 
the  Balkan  Wars  and  was  considered  to  be  'eccentric  to  a  notable  degree.  '  129  Papoulas 
departed  from  Asia  Minor  on  23  May  and  Hadjianestis  immediately  took  over  the 
command.  In  July  1922,  the  Nationalists,  on  a  diplomatic  level,  demanded  the 
immediate  departure  of  the  Greek  forces  before  they  would  conclude  an  armistice  from 
the  line  of  occupation  that  stretched  from  Eski-Sehr  to  Aflon  Karahissar.  On  15  July 
1922,  the  Greek  High  Commissioner  of  Smyrna  declared  the  autonomy  of  the  Smyrna 
region  in  an  attempt  to  safeguard  the  area  from  the  Turks.  But  it  was  an  act  'of 
despondent  desperation.  9130  The  ministerial  council  'in  the  name  of  the  Greek  State' 
authorised  the  Greek  High  Commissioner  'to  create  in  Western  Asia  Minor  a  political 
entity.  '  13  1  The  Allies  immediately  rejected  this  scheme.  Everything  now  rested  upon  the 
imminent  new  treaty  with  Turkey. 
The  second  Greek  attempt  constituted  a  scheme  for  the  occupation  of 
Constantinople  by  Greek  forces.  In  the  early  summer  of  1922,  the  Greek  government 
notified  the  Allies  that  only  the  occupation  of  Constantinople  could  lead  to  the 
conclusion  of  peace  with  Turkey  and  asked  the  governments  of  Britain,  France  and  Italy 
128  PRO,  FO  371/7884-E6358/27/44,  Lindley  to  Foreign  Office,  16  June  192  1. 
129  PRO  FO  371n884-E6358/27/44,  Lindley  to  Foreign  Office,  16  June  192  1. 
30  Angelornatis,  Chronicle  ofa  great  tragedy,  p.  163. 
: 
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to  allow  the  advance  of  the  Greek  Army  to  the  Ottoman  capital.  General  Harington  had 
warned  both  the  War  and  Foreign  Offices  of  the  possibility  of  a  Greek  advance  on 
Constantinople  from  Thrace  and  his  intention  to  take  precautionary  measures  to  avoid 
such  an  event.  Greece  maintained  two  divisions  in  Western  Thrace  and  at  tile  beginning 
of  June,  two  more  divisions  were  added,  ones  which  had  been  withdrawn  from  tile  Asia 
Minor  front.  Officials  from  both  Offices  expressed  their  concurrence.  In  addition,  the 
Arrny  Council  stressed  that  'it  will  be  Harington's  clear  duty  to  resist  with  all  forces  at 
his  disposal  any  attempt  of  the  Greek  Army  to  seize  Constantinople.  '  132  The  issue  did 
not  pass  unnoticed  in  the  House  of  Commons.  Questions  were  posed  often  and  the 
Prime  Minister  was  forced  to  answer  on  more  than  one  occasion.  Lloyd  George  was 
trying  to  assure  the  House  that  there  was  no  cause  for  alarm  as  the  Greek  Government 
had  reassured  him  that  'the  Greek  forces  would  on  no  account  enter  the  neutral  zone 
without  Allied  consent.  '  133  Of  special  significance  is  the  interpretation  of  the  issue  of  a 
possible  Greek  occupation  of  Constantinople  by  Admiral  De  Robeck.  In  a  Note  written 
in  August  1921,  in  the  midst  of  the  Greek  offensive,  the  Admiral  stressed  that  it  would 
be  a  fatal  mistake  to  allow  Greece  to  establish  itself  in  Constantinople  and  the  Straits. 
De  Robeck  believed  that  because  of  lack  of  money  and  strength  Greece  could  never  be 
established  firmly,  and  as  such  Russia  'would  never  tolerate  them  as  a  power  which 
would  control  the  exit  of  the  Black  Sea.  '  134  Greece  however  had  found  an  ally  among 
the  British  policy-makers:  A.  J.  Balfour  in  a  letter  to  Worthington-Evans  urged  him  to 
consider  'whether  it  would  not  be  in  our  interest  to  allow  Greece  temporarily  at  any  rate 
132  PRO,  FO  371/7884-E7444/27/44,  War  Office  to  Foreign  Office,  Copy  report  of  I  larington 
, 
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1922,27  July  1922. 
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to  enter  Constantinople.  "  35  This  would  only  be  in  case  the  British  ultimately  decided  to 
reduce  their  garrisons  in  Constantinople. 
The  Greek  High  Commissioner  in  Constantinople,  Simopoulos,  reported 
continuously  upon  the  interventions  and  objections  that  he  was  receiving  from  Allied 
generals  who  were  all  for  the  aborting  of  the  operation.  136  In  the  Archives  of  the  Greek 
Foreign  Ministry,  there  is  a  series  of  files  which  contain  all  the  communications 
connected  with  the  planning  of  the  operation  but  above  all  with  the  reported  objections 
of  the  Allies  stationed  in  Constantinople.  The  Allies  considered  the  plan  an  'insult.  ' 
Simopoulos  was  trying  to  convey  the  message  to  the  Greek  Government  throughout  his 
communications  in  July  1922.137  The  decision  to  march  against  Constantinople  was 
planned  for  July  16  th 
. 
On  June  18,  the  Allies,  with  a  short  reply  forbade  the  plan  and  the 
Greek  Government  complied  with  their  decision.  However,  the  evaluation  of  prominent 
members  of  the  British  Government,  like  that  of  Winston  Churchill,  that  the  Greeks 
were  in  a  position  to  occupy  the  Ottoman  capital  without  too  much  effort,  was  true.  In 
the  case  of  such  an  eventuality,  the  Allies  had  planned  to  close  the  Straits  and  blockade 
all  Greek  ports.  A  warm  supporter  of  the  Constantinople  occupation  plan  was  the  new 
Commander  of  the  Greek  forces  in  Asia  Minor,  General  Hadjianestis.  He  gave  the  order 
to  withdraw  three  infantry  regiments  and  two  battalions  from  the  Anatolian  front  and 
sent  them  to  Thrace.  138  These  forces  never  in  fact  returned  to  the  Anatolian  front,  even 
after  the  cancellation  of  the  operation  in  late  July. 
The  Greek  Anny  could  not  have  survived  any  longer  in  Anatolia.  The  prospect 
of  facing  a  yet  another  winter  had  partly  initiated  the  plan  to  combine  f6rccs  and  attempt 
135  PRO,  WO  32/5738,  General  Staff  paper  on  present  situation  regarding  Near  East  problem  enclosing 
Balfour  to  Worthington  Evans,  3  July  1922. 
136  MFA,  1922,3.1,  On  Greek  plans  for  the  occupation  of  Constantinople,  no  7632,  Simopoulos  to  MFA, 
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38  Smith,  Ionian  Vision,  p.  277. 242 
an  attack  on  Constantinople.  However,  Greece  was  not  in  a  position  to  jcopardise  itself 
in  an  armed  conflict  with  the  Allies,  and  above  all  to  risk  the  disruption  of  its  diplomatic 
relations  with  Britain.  The  Greek  plan  served  other  purposes:  it  was  a  way  of  putting 
pressure  upon  the  Allies  for  the  hastening  of  a  solution.  It  could  also  be  used  to 
persuade  public  opinion  in  Greece  that  the  Government  was  looking  for  ways  out  of  the 
crisis.  Lastly,  it  was  the  last  attempt,  on  the  part  of  the  Greek  Government,  to  put 
pressure  on  Britain  for  financial  help,  in  return  for  not  proceeding  with  tile  plan. 
The  only  form  of  support  that  Greece  acquired  was  the  inspiring  but  not  very 
helpful  speech  of  David  Lloyd  George  in  the  House  of  Commons: 
Here  is  war  between  Greece  and  Turkey.  We  are  defending  the 
capital  of  one  of  the  parties  against  the  other.  We  must  not 
overlook  that  fact,  and  it  is  a  very  important  fact.  If  we  were  not 
there,  there  is  absolutely  no  doubt  that  the  Greeks  would  occupy 
that  capital  in  a  very  few  hours,  and  that  would  produce  a 
decision...  139 
Fine  words;  but  no  action.  There  was  nothing  for  Greece  but  moral  support  and 
admiration  but  no  mention  or  even  reference  to  some  sort  of  financial  help. 
THE  COLLAPSE  OF  THE  GREEK  FRONT  IN  ASIA  MINOR. 
The  Greek  forces  in  Asia  Minor  at  their  height  numbered  220,000  men.  The 
actual  Anatolian  front,  the  defensive  line  to  which  the  Greek  forces  had  retreated  after 
the  operations  of  the  summer  of  1921,  was  made  up  of  140,000  men.  In  the  meantime, 
the  Asia  Minor  forces  had  980  machine-guns,  2,592  light  machine-guns  and  264  field 
139  PD.  C,  vol.  157,  c.  2003-4,4  August  1922.  In  Greece  the  result  of  the  speech  had  acted,  according 
with  the  reports  of  the  British  Ministry  in  Athens,  as  'a  distinct  tonic  to  the  moral  of  the  country  and  of 
the  army,  and  has  hardened  the  determination  to  continue  the  struggle.  '  In  PRO,  FO  37  in871- 
E8331/5/44,  Bentinck  to  Curzon,  10  August  1922. 243 
guns.  There  were  also  55  aircrafts  of  different  types,  most  of  these  however  were 
reconnaissance  aircraft.  140 
In  the  official  history  of  the  Greek  General  Staff,  we  read  that  the  morale  of  tile 
army,  high  at  the  beginning  of  the  Expedition  in  1919,  had  suffered  in  various  instances 
throughout  the  three  years  but  had  reached  a  low  ebb  in  August  1922,  just  before  the 
collapse  of  the  front.  The  number  of  desertions  was  high,  especially  in  May  1922.  The 
quality  of  the  everyday  conditions  was  poor  and  there  was  no  prospect  for  improvement. 
Of  course,  there  were  variations  from  unit  to  unit,  depending  on  the  position  and  tile 
individuals.  However,  the  overall  evaluation  did  not  allow  the  officers  to  conclude  that 
the  Greek  forces  in  Asia  Minor  were  ready  and,  above  all,  in  a  position  to  resist  a  well 
organised  attack  -  let  alone  to  assume  an  offensive. 
From  autumn  1921,  the  arrangement  of  the  Greek  forces  was  defensive.  The  line 
of  the  front  was  713  kilometres  and  the  overall  occupied  position  covered  an  area  of 
80,700  square  kilometres.  141  On  the  other  side  of  the  line,  the  Nationalist  forces  had  also 
suffered  considerable  losses  during  the  operations  of  the  summer  1921;  however,  it  was 
much  easier  for  them  to  recover  lost  ground.  Reports  from  Constantinople  suggested 
that  large  numbers  of  Ottoman  officers  were  leaving  the  city  to  join  the  Kernalist  forces 
and  the  Military  Academy  of  Angora  was  continually  supplying  them  with  its  graduates. 
In  addition,  all  the  reservist  officers  were  called  to  the  colours.  A  further  asset  for  the 
Nationalist  army  was  an  improvement  in  intelligence,  through  which  the  Turkish 
General  Staff  was  kept  informed  about  Greek  movements.  The  French  and  the  Italians 
supplied  the  Kernalist  forces  with  clothing  through  the  ports  of  Mersina,  Alexandretta 
and  Adalia.  The  supply  in  arms  and  ammunition  had  been  continuous,  especially  after 
the  conclusion  of  the  Franklin  Bouillon  Agreement  in  October  1921.  The  Turkish 
140  G.  Christopoulos  and  1.  Bastias,  eds.,  The  History  of  the  Greek  Nation  1913-1941,  Vol.  IE  -  Impla 
TODEWIVIK06  EOvovq  1913-1941  T6,  uoq  1E  (Athens,  1978),  p.  201. 244 
forces,  in  contrast  with  the  Greek  army,  had  been  improving  throughout  the  period  of 
winter  and  spring  1922.  British  and  Greek  military  intelligence  were  estimating  them  at 
a  figure  of  120,000  men. 
From  May  1922,  the  Turks  were  informed  of  the  situation  of  the  Greek  Army, 
and  especially  of  the  low  morale.  The  summer  of  1922  was  dreadful  for  the  position  and 
prestige  of  the  Greek  Army.  Withdrawal  was  opposed  without  guarantees  for  the 
minorities,  yet  there  were  no  signs  of  preparation  for  a  new  offensive  or  even  retirement 
to  a  shorter  line.  142  On  the  other  hand,  there  was  information  from  March  1922  that  the 
Kernalists  were  preparing  themselves  for  an  offensive  as  they  had  already  secured  help 
from  the  Soviets.  143  In  the  meantime,  Henderson,  the  acting  British  High  Commissioner 
at  Constantinople,  had  advised  the  Foreign  Office  that  'the  army  would  welcome  a 
settlement  effectually  safeguarding  Christian  element  enabling  Greece  to  withdraw  with 
honour.  '  144  All  directions  recommended  immediate  withdrawal.  In  July,  the  British 
received  information  regarding  the  departure  of  a  considerable  fighting  force  for  the 
scheme  of  the  occupation  of  Constantinople.  It  was  the  right  time  for  the  Nationalists  to 
attempt  an  offensive.  Otherwise,  the  next  campaigning  period  had  to  wait  until  spring 
1923.  Mustafa  Kemal  fixed  the  day  of  the  attack  for  13  August  1922. 
THE  BOLSHEVIK  CONNECTION. 
There  were  continuous  reports  sent  by  the  British  stationed  in  Anatolia  about  the 
relations  between  Nationalist  Turkey  with  the  Soviets  during  the  autumn  and  winter 
1921-1922.  The  financial  and  material  assets  of  the  Nationalist  forces  of  Kemal  were 
many:  For  the  period  from  March  to  October  1920  there'was  'continuous  traffic  in 
41 
Ibid.,  p.  201. 
42  PRO,  FO  37ln884-E6714/27/44,  Harington  to  War  Office,  4  July  1922. 
143  PRO,  FO  371/7927-E3258n6/44,  Minutes  of  a  paper  that  has  been  removed  from  the  file,  23  March 
1922. 
144  PRO,  FO  371/7884-E6764/27/44,  Henderson  to  FO,  FO  minutes,  6  July  192  1. 245 
munitions  from  the  Southern  Russian  ports  of  Anatolia.  '  145  Further,  Kernal  had 
received  a  first  instalment  of  a  projected  loan  of  f50,  OOO,  OOO  in  gold  roubles  plus  tile 
reassurance  of  closer  diplomatic  and  commercial  co-operation.  From  November  1920  to 
June  1921,  according  to  a  memo  by  General  Headquarters  in  Constantinople,  there  was 
r.  an  increase  of  trade  in  war  material.  '  In  the  midst  of  the  Greek  summer  offensive,  the 
Turkish  ambassador  at  Moscow,  according  to  British  sources,  had  received  a  request 
from  Angora  to  the  Russians  for  a  new  loan  -  which  they  got.  146 
Harington,  even  in  the  midst  of  the  July  1921  offensive,  sent  reports  which 
strongly  suggested  that  the  time  was  right  for  a  rapprochement  with  Turkey.  'There  is 
no  evidence,  '  wrote  the  British  General,  'that  Angora  has  definitely  capitulated  to 
Bolshevism.  '  147  In  the  Constantinople  High  Commission  though,  Rattigan  had  a 
different  outlook  on  the  situation.  He  was  opposed  to  neutrality  because  he  thought  that 
Mustafa  Kemal  was  in  the  hands  of  the  Bolsheviks.  148  This  idea  was  shared  by  Winston 
Churchill,  who  had  repeatedly  expressed  his  fears  to  Lloyd  George.  The  Secretary  for 
the  Colonies  believed  that  Kemal  would  get  reinforcements  from  the  Bolsheviks  and 
then  'a  stream  of  Russian  reinforcements  pouring  down  the  Caucasus'  would  certainly 
find  its  way  into  the  area  of  Mesopotamia.  Then  the  fear  was  that  this  'would  encourage 
the  anti-British  elements  on  the  Mesopotamian  frontier.  '  149  Churchill  underlined  that  'a 
combined  Turco-Bolshevik  movement  against  Mesopotamia.  [  ....  ]  would  be 
disastrous.  '  150  Rumbold,  in  January  1922,  had  outlined  the  danger  of  the  Bolshevik- 
Nationalist  relationship.  His  theory  was  that  at  that  point  there  were  'several  signs  of  a 
d6tente  between  Angora  Government  and  Moscow  whose  mutual  relations  seemed 
145  PRO,  FO  371/6537-E13700/143/44,  War  Office  to  Foreign  office,  Memo  by  the  General  Staff 
Headquarters,  Constantinople,  12  December  1921. 
146  Ibid. 
4  PRO,  FO  371/6473-E8417/l/44,  Harington  to  War  Office,  22  August  192  1. 
48  PROI  FO  371/6523-E8196/143/44,  Harington  to  War  Office,  18  July  192  1. 
'149  HLRO,  Lloyd  George  Papers,  F/9/3n7,  Winston  Churchill  to  Prime  Minister,  9  August  192  1. 246 
pretty  strained  in  November.  '  15  1  Admiral  Webb,  the  Senior  Naval  Officer  in 
Constantinople,  was  of  the  opinion  that  British  neutrality  had  reduced  itself  to  a  'mere 
farce.  '  He  sided  with  the  War  Office  and  most  of  the  experts  in  the  Foreign  Off-ice  in  the 
belief  that  if  the  Greeks  were  left  by  themselves  they  would  collapse.  However,  lie 
found  'an  open  and  effective  support  of  the  Greeks  less  distasteful.  '  152  His  suggestions 
were  disregarded. 
The  Bolshevik  factor,  in  connection  with  the  Anatolian  settlement,  constituted  a 
serious  issue  for  the  British  government.  Through'the  War  Office  files,  one  can  follow 
the  climax  of  British  fears  taking  the  form  of  an  interdepartmental  'Committee  on 
Bolshevism'  comprised  by  members  of  the  Foreign,  War,  Colonial  and  India  Offices.  153 
On  the  connection  between  Bolshevism  and  Turkish  nationalism,  the  report  of  the  first 
interdepartmental  Committee  had  concluded  that  there  was  definite  evidence  that 
'Bolshevik  munitions  were  supplied  to  the  Turks'  and  money  was  received  from 
Moscow  in  Angora.  General  Harington's  telegrams,  though,  reported  that  Kemal 
himself  was  reluctant  to  accept  direct  Bolshevik  aid.  The  Committee  however  noted  that 
there  were  serious  possibilities  for  closer  co-operation  since  there  was  a  group  among 
the  Nationalists  that  staunchly  supported  closer  co-operation  with  the  Soviets  and 
acceptance  of  further  assistance.  That  would  certainly  cement  the  relationship 
extensively.  The  evidence  and  the  language  of  the  report  were  alarming.  154 
The  government  of  Angora,  throughout  the  crucial  months  of  autumn  1921  and 
winter  1922,  had  extensively  used  both  of  its  weapons:  diplomacy  and  warfare.  Kemal 
150 
Ibid. 
131  PRO,  FO  406/49,  no  20,  [E/I  107/27/441,  Rumbold  to  Curzon,  24  January  1922. 
52  PRO,  FO  371/6523-E8346/143/44,  Webb  to  Admiralty,  20  July  192  1. 
53  The  members  of  the  Committee  were  the  following  individuals:  R.  C.  Lindsay,  Vice  Secretary  F.  0; 
Mr.  R.  A.  Leeper,  F.  0;  Mr.  0.  C.  Harvey,  F.  0;  Sir  Basil  Thomson,  Secret  Intelligence  Service;  Sir  A. 
Sinclair,  Personal  Secretary  to  the  Secretary  for  State  for  Colonies;  Mr.  G.  L.  Clauson,  Colonial  Office; 
Colonel  W.  H.  Bartholomew,  War  Office;  Major  Bray,  India  Office.  PRO,  WO  32/5728,  Committee  on 
Bolshevisrn,  11  August  1921. 247 
used  successfully  the  National  ist-Bolshevik  relationship  to  attract  Allied  attention.  In 
December  1921,  the  arrival  of  the  Ukrainian  General  Frunze  for  negotiations  in  Angora 
further  alanned  the  British.  Intelligence  reports  evaluated  the  reception  of  tile  Soviet 
delegation  as  being  spectacular  and  of  special  importance  for  the  Kemalists.  Indeed,  on 
2  January  1922,  the  Soviet  delegation  signed  an  agreement  with  tile  Nationalist 
Government  for  the  supply  of  military  material,  enough  'for  three  brigades.  '  So  far,  the 
Soviets  had  supplied  the  Turks  with  help  that  reached  the  amount  of  6,000,160 
roubbles.  155  The  strength  of  the  Turkish  Army  was  now  estimated  to  be  181,000 
soldiers.  156 
Members  of  the  Conservative  Party  feared  a  definite  fall  of  Kemal  into  the  hands 
of  Moscow,  if  Britain  continued  supporting,  even  on  theoretical  terms,  Greece.  The 
questions  of  Nationalist-Bolshevik  relations  and  Conservative  fears  were  regularly 
debated  in  the  House  of  Commons,  before,  but  especially  after  the  signing  of  the  Treaty 
of  S6vres.  The  danger  of  Bolshevism  lurked  in  the  background.  During  the  autumn  of 
1921  and  the  winter  of  1922  the  questions  were  especially  numerous.  157  Rose  Inball 
notes  that  'Conservatives  were  certain  that  Bolshevik  Russia,  appealing  to  anti-colonial 
and  nationalist  sentiments,  conducted  a  "conspiracy"  against  the  Empire.  '  158 
154  PRO,  WO  32/5728,  Bolshevik  activities  against  the  Empire,  Formation  of  an  inter-departmental 
conunittee,  29  June  192  1. 
155  The  arrival  of  the  Soviet  Delegation  under  General  Frunze  is  mentioned  in  G6kay,  A  Clash  ofEmpires, 
p.  133  who  also  cites  a  British  intelligence  report  dated  3  December  1921  found  in  PRO,  FO 
371/6480/EI38  10,  Copy  of  a  Telegram  from  Sir  Percy  Cox  (Baghdad)  to  Secretary  State  for  Colonies. 
Further  information  on  the  conclusion  of  the  agreement  and  the  supply  of  material  is  to  be  found  in  Eltsin 
Matzar,  'The  manoeuvres  of  Kemal  -  Ot  ictvfiam;  Tolu  Kcpa,  '  Istorik-a  -  laroptKii,  46  (31  August 
2000):  16-19. 
156  Eltsin  Matzar,  'The  manoeuvres  of  Kemal,  '  p.  18. 
157  PD.  C,  vols.  153,154,155,156,157.  The  M.  P  who  repeatedly  'assisted'  the  Nationalist  cause  in  tile 
House  of  Commons  was  Major-General  Sir  Charles  Townshend. 
158  Inball  cites  articles  of  the  Morning  Post  and  The  Times  mainly  that  underlined  the  danger  of 
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BRITISH  POLICY  MAKING  FROM  THE  SUMMER  OF  1921  UP  UNTIL  THE  GREEK  DEBACLE  OF 
SEPTEMBER  1922. 
When  the  Greek  Army's  efforts  in  the  late  summer  of  1921  to  put  an  end  to  tile 
conflict  in  Anatolia  through  the  achievement  of  a  total  victory  over  tile  Nationalist 
forces  failed,  demands  for  an  immediate  revision  of  British  policy  increased  markedly. 
Politicians,  diplomats  and  military  advisers  all  began  to  turn  towards  one  conclusion: 
from  the  'wait  and  see'  attitude  of  the  previous  months  to  the  total  withdrawal  of  the 
Greek  forces  from  Anatolia  and  a  British  accommodation  with  Kemal 
.1 
59  The  impetus 
for  change  was  given  extra  force  by  the  appearance  of  alanning  evidence  of  an 
improvement  in  Turkish-Soviet  relations  and  the  signing  of  the  Franklin-Bouillon 
agreement  of  October  1921.  These  two  factors  had  a  marked  effect  on  the  decision- 
making  process  of  the  British  policy-making  elite  in  the  second  half  of  192  1. 
After  the  Greek  Army's  failure,  the  War  and  Colonial  Offices  had,  for  the  first 
time,  the  hard  evidence  needed  to  make  the  case  that  the  Greek  power  was  not  sufficient 
for  Britain  to  rely  on  it  to  support  British  interests  in  the  region.  The  inability  of  the 
Greek  Army  to  strike  a  decisive  blow  against  the  Nationalist  forces  of  Kemal  was 
particularly  worrisome  when  the  British  considered  their  own  position  at 
Constantinople.  160  In  the  light  of  the  strategic  need  to  safeguard  British  position  in  the 
Straits  and  Constantinople  the  change  in  policy  was  imperative:  the  British  side  was 
now  ready  to  conclude  a  settlement  with  Kemal  with  further  concessions  regarding 
Smyrna,  Eastern  Thrace  and  the  handing  over  of  the  city  of  Constantinople  to  the 
Turks.  161 
159  PRO  CAB,  23/31,21  December  1921. 
160  See  this  Chapter:  'The  implications  of  the  "Greek  policy"'  p.  208. 
161  See  this  Chapter:  'The  Greek  "muddle"  and  the  British  refusal  of  financial  help.  '  p.  227.  Especially 
p.  248. 249 
In  the  meantime,  British  policy  makers  were  convinced  that  closer  co-operation 
between  the  Soviets  and  the  Turkish  Nationalist  forces  was  a  reality  and  they  were 
loathe  to  let  this  relationship  develop  any  further.  This  was  particularly  the  case  once 
the  latter  seemed  able  to  achieve  a  decisive  victory  in  Anatolia.  Evidence  suggests  that 
the  British  Government  unanimously  considered  the  Bolshevik  factor  in  connection 
with  the  Near  East  settlement  a  serious  issue.  The  alarming  conclusions  reached  by  tile 
interdepartmental  'Committee  on  Bolshevism'  leave  little  room  to  suggest  otherwise.  162 
Evidence  suggests  that  the  Soviets  had  indeed  supported  Turkish  nationalism,  as  well  as 
encouraging  Persian  nationalism,  and  had  also  provided  assistance  to  rebellious  groups 
in  Iraq;  but  there  is  no  evidence  that  they  had  master-planned  any  of  these  troubles.  It  is 
clear  however  that  the  new  regime  in  Russia  approached  the  area  as  a  potential  theatre 
for  imperial  ambitions,  although  this  came  as  no  surprise.  There  can  be  little  question 
that  the  intensification  of  Soviet-Turkish  relations  in  the  latter  half  of  1921  and  first  half 
of  1922  had  a  dramatic  impact  on  British  Near  Eastern  policy. 
On  almost  equally  worrying  lines,  the  French  had  successfully  concluded  an 
agreement  with  the  Nationalists  that  worried  the  British  in  two  different  areas.  Firstly,  it 
acted  as  a  proof  for  Kemal  that  Allied  unity  was  no  longer  solid.  Secondly,  it  was  a 
matter  of  great  prestige  for  the  French  that  with  the  conclusion  of  the  Franklin-Bouillon 
agreement  British  supremacy,  in  at  least  one  occasion  in  the  Near  and  Middle  East,  was 
contained. 
It  cannot  be  argued  that  the  alarming  conclusions  reached  by  the  British  policy 
makers  about  Soviet-Turkish  relations  during  this  period  were  more  influential  than  the 
French  rapprochement  with  Kemal  -  indeed  they  probably  worked  in  tandem  to  alter 
British  policy  once  the  Greek  forces  were  proved  inadequate  at  the  end  of  the  summer 
162  For  the  'Committee  on  Bolshevism'  and  an  analysis  of  the  Bolshevik  factor  during  this  period  see  this 
Chapter:  'The  Bolshevik  Connection.  '  p.  244. 250 
of  1921.  However,  despite  the  decision  of  the  British  policy-makers  to  approve  further 
concessions  to  Kemal,  this  did  not  necessarily  mean  that  they  abandoned  the  plan  for 
British  control  and  influence  over  the  Straits  and  thus  containment  of  Turkey,  as  was 
proved  during  the  handling  of  the  Chanak  crisis  of  September  1922. 251 
Chapter  Six 
'Turkey  reconstituted'  and  the 
Empire  strikes  back  at  Lausanne 
THE  END  OF  THE  GREEK  ANATOLIAN  ENTANGLEMENT. 
The  Nationalist  offensive  was  launched  on  13  August  1922.  Soon,  the  news  of 
the  offensive  reached  Greece.  The  press  was  calling  for  solutions;  Kathinlerild,  a 
staunch  supporter  of  Gounaris,  warned  the  Government  that  all  efforts  to  seek  solutions 
via  British  help,  which  was  obviously  not  forthcoming,  had  to  stop.  'Greece  must  itself 
find  a  solution,  '  underlined  the  paper.  The  rest  of  the  press  called  for  action  on  similar 
lines.  Gounaris  continued  to  be  the  real  leader  of  the  government,  despite  his 
resignation.  Harsher  measures  of  press  censorship  were  introduced  and  all  forms  of 
public  gatherings  were  banned.  In  late  August  a  new  government  had  taken  office, 
under  the  premiership  of  Nikolaos  Triantafillakos.  1 
By  the  end  of  the  month  the  Greek  front  had  collapsed  and  the  Greek  Army  was 
in  full  flight,  incapable  of  offering  further  resistance  as  the  Turkish  Army  approached 
Smyrna.  The  remains  of  the  Army  departed  on  board  Greek  battleships  from  Tsesme, 
and  Smyrna  was  finally  in  the  hands  of  the  Nationalist  forces.  2  On  2  September  1922 
the  Greek  Government  requested  'HMG  to  arrange  an  armistice  for  them  on  the  basis  of 
1  The  new  Prime  Minister  was  a  staunch  anti-Venizelist,  former  High  Commissioner  in  Constantinople. 
He  undertook  responsibility  for  the  Ministries  of  War  and  Navy.  Nikos  Kalogeropoulos  was  assigned  the 
post  of  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.  The  immediate  issues  that  faced  the  government  centred  upon  the 
refugees  and  their  reception  as  well as  the  fate  and  transfer  of  the  Greek  forces  from  Asia  Minor  to 
Greece.  The  country  was  already  facing  grave  problems  regarding  food  supplies.  Due  to  British 
intervention  there  was  however  a  supply  of  wheat  from  Egypt  to  deal  with  the  increase  in  demand  due  to 
the  influx  of  the  refugees.  2  PRO,  CAB  23/31,7  September  1922.  And  PRO,  FO  371/7886-E8986/27/44,  FO  memorandum,  5 
September  1922,  E9096/27/44,  Lamb  to  Foreign  Office,  9  September  1922. 252 
evacuation  which  Kemal  had  demanded.  93  The  Greeks  had  asked  British  help  in 
establishing  an  annistice  and  for  the  protection  of  the  city  of  Smyrna. 
On  9  September  1922,  the  Turkish  forces  entered  Smyrna.  Brusa  was  captured 
the  next  day.  Kemal  himself  entered  Smyrna  the  next  day  and  the  city  was  set  on  fire. 
Only  the  Turkish  quarter  remained  intact.  4  Kemal's  proclamation  when  he  entered  the 
city  was  that  all  males,  Greeks  and  Rayas  [Greek  Ottomans],  between  the  ages  of  17  to 
45  were  prisoners  of  war.  Everybody  else  was  free  to  go.  The  High  Commissioner  at 
Constantinople  and  his  representative  in  Smyrna  transmitted  detailed  accounts  of  what 
took  place  in  Smyrna  and  what  happened  to  the  Greek  inhabitants  of  the  City.  5  However, 
it  is  worth  citing  the  comment  of  a  British  Foreign  Office  official  on  the  question  of  the 
fire: 
Fires  in  Turkey  often  have  a  political  significance.  There  is  little 
doubt  that  the  Kemalists  intended  the  sacking  and  burning  of 
Smyrna  to  be  a  symbol  of  their  extirpation  of  local  Christians 
and  foreigners.  6 
When  the  British  Prime  Minister  was  informed  of  the  successful  Turkish 
offensive,  on  9  September,  he  gave  the  following  instructions  to  Curzon:  first,  Lloyd 
George  suggested  that  if  it  was  considered  certain  that  the  Greek  Army  was  unable  to 
check  the  Turks,  they  should  seek  an  immediate  armistice  on  the  basis  of  the  evacuation 
of  the  Asia  Minor.  He  then  instructed  the  British  Naval  Forces  around  Smyrna  to 
provide  for  the  temporary  protection  of  the  refugees  arriving  there.  7  The  Prime  Minister 
3  PRO,  FO  371/7885-E8749/27/44,  Bentinck  to  Curzon,  2  September  1922,  and  -E8750/27/44,  Bentinck 
to  Curzon,  3  September  1922. 
4  On  the  question  of  the  fire  in  Smyrna  Marjorie  flousepian's  monograph  Smyrna  (New  York,  197  1)  is 
detailed  and  well  documented. 
5  PRO,  FO  424/255,  October  to  December  1922,  no  29,  Rumbold  to  Curzon,  Copy  of  a  report  from  Mr.  P. 
Hadkinson,  Mitylene,  25  September  1922. 
6  PRO,  FO  371n888-E9404/27/44,  File  7  Refugees,  Minorities  and  Atrocities,  FO  minute  W.  S. 
Edmonds,  18  September  1922.  'With  the  exception  of  the  Turkish  quarter  and  200  to  300  buildings 
situated  at  the  Point,  nothing  remains  of  the  town  of  Smyrna.  ' 
7  PRO,  FO  371n885-E8919/27/44,  Telegraphic  Message  from  Sir  E.  Grigg  to  Curzon,  4  September 
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and  his  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs  still  very  much  favoured  the  course  of  action  that 
they  had  planned,  the  retention  of  the  Greek  Army  in  the  area  until  a  final  diplomatic 
settlement  could  be  reached,  in  an  attempt  to  minimise  Nationalist  demands  and  secure 
British  interests.  Two  days  later,  however,  Curzon  turned  to  the  combined  attempts  to 
proceed  with  an  armistice. 
The  initial  response  reaching  London  from  the  British  on  the  spot  was  quite 
bleak.  Rumbold  suggested  that  if  the  Greek  collapse  were  definite,  the  British  position 
would  definitely  be  in  danger.  His  suggestion  was  that  'HMG  should  study  possibility 
of  comprehensive  balance  as  between  ourselves  and  Kernalists.  Greek  collapse  might 
offer  alternatives  of  complete  surrender  to  Kernalists  or  strong  independent  action.  '  8 
The  communication  of  Lamb,  his  representative  in  Smyrna,  was  dramatic:  'only  force 
remaining  in  Anatolia  is  British.  '9  The  British  High  Commissioner  had  predicted  that 
the  Greek  evacuation  of  Asia  Minor  could  not  have  taken  place  without  force  in  May 
1922-10  It  was  now  a  question  of  the  Straits,  Constantinople  and  Eastern  Thrace.  The 
issue  of  Smyrna,  its  hinterland  and  the  Greek  evacuation  of  Western  Anatolia,  which 
had  been  a  thom  in  the  side  of  Curzon  and  his  attempts  for  settlement,  had  been  dealt 
with  by  the  successful  Turkish  offensive. 
The  Greeks  had  already  approached  Great  Britain  to  arrange  an  an-nistice  on 
Greece's  behalf  with  the  Nationalists,  on  the  basis  of  the  March  proposal.  The  question 
now  turned  to  a  re-evaluation  of  British  policy  in  the  region.  With  the  evacuation  of 
Asia  Minor  by  the  Greeks,  Britain  had  to  reconsider  its  presence  in  tile  Dardanelles.  On 
7  September,  the  first  Cabinet  meeting  took  place.  Curzon  opened  the  discussion  with  a 
complete  summary  of  the  situation.  First,  the  Secretary  felt  obliged  to  state  that  the 
8  PRO,  FO  371n885-E8873/27/44,  Rumbold  to  Curzon,  4  September  1922. 
9  PRO,  FO  371n885-E8893/27/44,  Lamb  to  Curzon,  5  September  1922. 254 
failure  to  honour  the  March  proposal  was  partly  due  to  'the  consistent  treachery  of 
France.  "'  The  Curzon  plan,  as  it  was  decided  in  the  Paris  meetings,  called  for  'the 
return  of  the  Asiatic  shore  of  Dardanelles  to  the  Turks,  the  retention  of  the  Gallipoli 
peninsula  in  the  military  occupation  of  the  Allies,  retention  of  Greek  sovereignty  over 
Eastern  Thrace  and  handing  over  of  Constantinople  to  the  Turks.  '  Curzon  did  not  see 
any  reason  to  abandon  the  scheme  as  far  as  Thrace  and  Gallipoli  were  concerned,  even 
after  the  failure  of  the  Greeks.  Winston  Churchill  was  also  adamant: 
The  line  of  deep  water  separating  Asia  from  Europe  was  a  line 
of  great  significance,  and  we  must  make  that  line  secure  by 
every  means  within  our  power.  If  Turks  take  the  Gallipoli 
peninsula  and  Constantinople  we  shall  have  lost  the  whole  fruits 
of  our  victory,  and  another  Balkan  War  would  be  inevitable.  12 
Lloyd  George  did  not  hesitate  to  add  that  he  was  not  completely  convinced  that  'the 
Greek  Army  had  suffered  a  complete  debacle,  '  and  he  considered  it  'possible  for  the 
Greeks  under  new  Commander-in-Chief  may  find  and  improve  the  situation.,  13  At  that 
meeting  it  was  decided  to  maintain  the  position  of  the  Allied  forces  on  the  European 
shore  of  the  Dardanelles.  The  Greek  evacuation  of  Smyrna  and  its  surrounding  areas 
was  already  taking  place. 
The  Greek  evacuation  of  Eastern  Thrace  soon  followed,  despite  British  attempts 
to  retain  the  Greeks  there.  The  British  policy-makers  preferred  a  Greek  presence  on  the 
European  side  of  the  Straits:  Britain  had  warmly  supported  the  Greek  desideratuni  for 
Thrace  during  the  Paris  negotiations.  14  The  Greek  populations  evacuated  Eastern  Thrace 
shortly  after  the  military  debacle  and  the  evacuation  of  the  Greek  populations  of 
10  PRO,  FO  371n883-E5204/27/44,  Rumbold  to  Curzon,  Eclosure  Report  by  Consul  General  Lamb, 
(1.5.1922),  22  May  1922.  '1  am  more  than  even  convinced  that  a  peaceful  evacuation  of  Anatolia  cannot 
be  hoped  for,  in  the  absence  of  a  strong  covering  force  of  Allied  troops.  ' 
11  PRO,  CAB  23/31,7  September  1922. 
12  Ibid. 
13  Ibid. 
14  See  Chapter  Two:  'The  Greek  case  in  the  negotiations  in  Paris.  '  p.  77. 255 
Western  Asia  Minor.  Soon,  more  than  200,000  people  started  the  long  voyage  from 
their  homes.  The  British  tried  hard  to  prevent  it  but  support  from  France  and  Italy  was 
lacking,  as  they  were  unwilling  to  risk  a  brawl  with  Kemal  over  tile  evacuation  of 
Eastern  Thrace  by  the  Greeks.  A  Greek  occupation  of  tile  whole  of  Thrace  only 
benefited  Britain  at  the  time.  15 
THE  BRITISH  SCHEME  ON  THE  STRAITS  PRIOR  TO  THE  CIIANAK  CRISIS. 
With  the  armistice  of  Mudros,  the  British  were  primarily  the  'guards'  of  the 
Straits.  16  The  problem,  however,  was  that  the  British  were  not  willing  to  spare  adequate 
forces  to  protect  the  precious  waterways.  "  The  first  real  threat  to  the  Straits  by  Kernalist 
forces  took  place  in  June  1920.  It  was  then  for  the  first  time  after  the  defeat  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire  and  the  undeniable  British  supremacy  in  the  region  that  the  Nationalist 
forces  had  attempted  to  attack  the  stationed  British  forces  at  Ismid.  It  was  in  June  1920 
that  the  Allied  Powers  had  given  their  consent  to  the  Greek  Army  in  Asia  Minor  to 
extend  its  line  of  occupation.  This  decision  was  taken  as  a  direct  result  of  the  inability  of 
the  limited  British  forces  stationed  at  Ismid  to  defend  adequately  the  area  from 
Nationalist  attacks.  The  War  Office  had  even  asked  for  an  extension  of  the  Greek  line  of 
occupation  as  far  as  Brusa.  18  At  that  time,  the  British  Cabinet  felt  that:  'to  retire  from 
Constantinople  before  a  bandit  like  Mustafa  Kemal  would  deal  a  shattering  blow  to  our 
prestige  in  the  East.  '  19 
15  PRO,  CAB  23/31,15  September  1922,22  September  1922.  Also  the  relevant  article  of  The  Thnes,  16 
September  1922.  The  British  could  once  more  use  the  Greek  forces  in  the  region  in  case  of  a  Nationalist 
attack  against  the  Straits. 
'6  See  Chapter  Two:  'The  Armistice  of  Mudros-  Allied  tactics  and  British  preponderance.  '  p.  62. 
17  For  a  historical  background  on  the  Straits  question  see  Chapter  One:  'British  foreign  policy  towards  the 
Ottoman  Empire  before  the  War  -  The  Straits  and  Constantinople.  '  p.  2  1. 
"  For  details  see  Chapter  Three:  'The  San  Remo  Conference  and  the  unleashing  of  Greek  designs  in  Asia 
Minor:  the  British  sanction  of  June  1920  and  the  Greek  advance.  '  p.  126. 
19  PRO,  CAB  23/22,17  June  1920. 256 
These  first  attacks  at  Ismid  had  alarmed  first  the  military  authorities  in  tile  area 
and  then  those  in  London.  Winston  Churchill,  at  that  time  still  Secretary  of  State  for 
War,  had  pinpointed  the  danger  but  at  the  same  time  the  impossibility  of  sparing  more 
soldiers  in  the  region.  Thus  British  policy  makers  had  decided  to  allow  the  Greek  forces 
to  extend  their  line  of  occupation.  The  French  and  the  Italians  gave  also  their  consent, 
however,  the  latter  did  so  unwillingly.  20  Having  the  Greeks  established  in  an  extended 
area  beyond  the  Straits,  the  limited  Allied  force,  primarily  composed  of  British  troops, 
was  safe.  Lloyd  George  was  determined  to  safeguard  the  Straits,  this  way  he  established 
the  Greek  occupation  as  well.  The  opponents  of  the  'pro-Greek'  policy  had  given  their 
consent,  since  they  agreed  on  the  protection  of  the  Straits  even  if  that  meant  that  they 
had  to  send  the  Greeks  deeper  into  Anatolia.  The  Treaty  of  S&vres,  signed  in  August 
1920,  secured  the  freedom  of  the  Straits  in  peace  and  war  to  all  ships,  whether  of 
commerce  or  war.  It  also  provided  for  the  creation  of  an  international  commission  that 
would  administer  the  demilitarised  so  called  'Straits  zone.  ' 
Britain  had  taken  over  the  role  of  the  'manager'  of  the  region  after  the  end  of  the 
War.  The  occupation  of  the  Straits  and  Constantinople  was  the  key  to  such  a  task. 
Russia,  traditionally  the  opposing  power,  however,  after  a  short  pause,  was  again 
showing  its  interest  in  the  area.  The  Turkish  Nationalists  were  also  considered  a  threat 
to  British  supremacy.  At  first,  the  Turkish  Nationalist  factor  was  not  considered 
important  by  the  British.  In  the  meantime,  Greece  had  acquired  the  role  of  the  'assistant 
manager'  of  the  area.  The  danger  appeared  abruptly  for  the  first  time  when  Soviet 
Russia  and  the  Turkish  Nationalists  came  to  an  understanding  with  the  signing  of  the 
Soviet-Turkish  Treaty  at  Moscow  on  16  March  1921.  The  British  position  on  the  Straits 
had  already  started  taking  a  different  shape  from  the  one  held  during  tile  nineteenth 
20  See  Chapter  Three:  'The  San  Remo  Conference  and  the  unleashing  of  Greek  designs  in  Asia  Minor:  the 
British  sanction  of  June  1920  and  the  Greek  advance.  '  p.  13  1. 257 
century.  Britain  was  now  in  favour  of  freedom  of  passage  not  only  for  merchant  but  also 
for  war  ships.  It  was  now  Britain's  turn  to  ask  for  access  to  the  Black  Sea,  just  as  Russia 
was  asking  for  access  into  the  Mediterranean  in  the  nineteenth  century. 
Throughout  the  negotiations  that  were  taking  place  during  the  months  which 
followed  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Rvres,  the  issue  of  the  Straits  was  central.  Despite 
any  amendments  that  were  agreed  concerning  the  reduction  of  the  actual  area  that  was 
attached  to  them,  the  bottom  line  remained  the  same:  they  had  to  be  secured  from  the 
threat  of  Turkish  attack  and  possible  rcoccupation.  21  Characteristic  of  this  decision  are 
the  following  words  of  Churchill  in  March  1922:  J 
... 
]  so  long  as  the  Turks  refused  to 
concede  the  loss  of  the  Straits,  the  struggle  must  continue.  '  22  Indeed,  Kemal  had 
included  the  return  of  the  Straits  to  Turkey  among  his  demands.  After  the  Greek  defeat, 
Nationalist  attention  had  turned  to  the  Straits  as  the  next  step  and  an  explicit  objective 
of  the  Kernalist  offensive.  Kemal  had  given  an  interview  to  Ward  Price,  the 
correspondent  of  the  Daily  Mail,  published  on  15  September  1922.  There,  tile 
Nationalist  leader  had  clearly  stated  his  further  claims: 
The  frontiers  we  claim  for  Turkey  exclude  Syria  and 
Mesopotamia  but  compose  all  the  areas  principally  populated  by 
the  Turkish  race.  Our  demands  remain  the  same  aflcr  our  recent 
victory  as  they  were  before.  We  ask  for  Asia  Minor,  Thrace  up 
to  the  river  Maritza  and  Constantinople.  We  are  prepared  to  give 
every  security  for  the  free  passage  of  the  Dardanelles,  which  we 
will  undertake  not  to  fortify.  It  is  only  right  that  the  Powers 
should  agree  to  our  creating  such  defensive  works  on  the  Sea  of 
Mannora  as  will  protect  Constantinople  against  a  surprise 
attack  ... 
We  must  have  our  capital  and  I  should  in  that  case  be 
obliged  to  march  on  Constantinople  with  my  army,  which  will 
be  an  affair  of  only  a  few  days.  I  must  prefer  to  obtain 
possession  by  negotiation  though,  naturally  I  cannot  wait 
indefinitely.  23 
21  PRO,  CAB  23/27,21  December  1921  and  CAB  23/29,20  March  1922. 
22  J.  G.  Darwin,  'The  Chanak  Crisis  and  the  British  Cabinet',  History,  65,213  (1980):  3248. 
23  Interview  of  Kemal  to  Ward  Price  of  Daily  Mail,  15  September  1922,  cited  in  Walder,  Tile  Chanak 
Affair,  p.  182. 258 
However,  on  the  issue  of  the  Straits,  the  British  remained  the  one  power  directly 
involved,  since  they  had  landed  forces  there  but  the  issue  was  complex.  Kemal  was 
openly  threatening  the  Allied  occupation  of  Constantinople.  The  issue  was  whether  or 
not  there  ought  to  be  any  response  to  the  open  threat  that  the  Turkish  leader  had  made  to 
the  British.  He  had  openly  demanded  the  return  of  Constantinople  and  Eastern  Thrace. 
In  the  days  after  the  fleeing  of  the  Greek  Army  in  September  1922,  an  armed  conflict 
between  the  Turkish  Nationalists  and  the  British  forces  defending  Constantinople  and 
the  Straits  seemed  possible. 
THE  CIIANAK  CRISIS  OF  SEPTEMBER  1922:  AN  AVALANCHE  OF  FIRE.  ' 
In  early  September  1922,  on  the  Asian  shore  of  Constantinople,  only  the  British 
remained.  As  long  as  the  Greek  troops  held  their  position  firmly  in  Asia  Minor,  the 
Allied  Powers  were  in  a  position  to  act  as  spectators  in  Kemal's  efforts  to  establish  a 
new  Turkish  state  in  Anatolia.  The  Allies,  and  primarily  the  British,  had  not  been  forced 
to  take  any  critical  decisions  as  long  as  the  Greek  forces  played  the  role  of  the  buffer. 
The  Greek  collapse  and  forced  retreat  was  more  than  a  warning  bell.  The  British  were 
face  to  face  with  reality.  The  Allied  occupied  areas  were  now  referred  to  as  a  'neutral 
zone.  '  At  the  vital  and  sensitive  area  of  the  Dardanelles,  limited  British  forces 
safeguarded  the  Straits.  The  Greek  forces  stationed  in  the  area  had  retreated  to  the 
European  shore,  while  limited  French  forces  were  stationed  on  the  Ismid  peninsula.  In 
the  meantime,  Kemal  with  a  large  part  of  his  force  was  in  Smyrna.  The  Greeks  had 
already  admitted  defeat  and  retreated  from  Western  Anatolia  and  could  Provide  no  real 
help  on  the  battleground.  Italy  and  France  had  long  before  expressed  their  wish  for 
accommodation  with  Kemal.  Britain  was  alone.  The  fears,  long  expressed  by  the 259 
military  and  by  many  in  the  Foreign  Office  were  actually  being  realised:  Kemal  and  his 
Nationalist  forces  were  on  the  verge  of  challenging  the  British  forces  in  the  Straits. 
The  first  sign  that  Kemal's  next  objective  was  Constantinople  and  the  Straits 
was  given  by  Rumbold,  who  reported  to  the  Cabinet  Harington's  proposal  on  how  to 
deal  most  effectively  with  the  possibility  of  confronting  Kemal  in  Constantinople: 
General  Harington  requested  a  demonstration  of  Allied  unity  'by  dispatch  of  small 
contingents,  '  French  and  Italian,  to  show  the  flag  in  the  neutral  zone  of  the  Straits,  at  the 
time  only  held  by  British  troops.  24 
On  II  September  1922,  the  Cabinet  met  at  Churt,  Lloyd  George's  house.  The 
Secretary  of  State  for  War,  Sir  Larning  Worthington-Evans,  announced  to  the  Cabinet 
that  Kemal  would  soon  threaten  Chanak  with  forces  or  would  make  a  public  demand 
that  British  troops  should  be  withdrawn.  Chanak  was  the  area  that  'commanded'  the 
entrance  to  the  Dardanelles,  through  which  everything  connected  to  the  defence  of 
Constantinople  had  to  pass.  The  decision  taken  was  for  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty 
to  instruct  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Mediterranean  fleet,  Admiral  Brock,  to  take 
every  action  necessary  to  prevent  the  Turks  from  being  conveyed  to  the  European  shore. 
For  the  time  being,  there  was  no  intention  of  defending  Chanak  by  land 
reinforcements.  25 
However,  the  first  rifts  had  become  evident.  Rumbold  anxiously  expressed  his 
view  on  the  situation  in  a  private  letter  to  Sir  Lancelot  Oliphant.  It  was  necessary  to 
avoid  any  action  that  would  lead  to  war.  The  British  High  Commissioner  was  certain 
that  there  was  no  way  to  save  Eastern  Thrace  and  Adrianople  for  the  Greeks  and  was 
sure  that  they  were  to  be  restored  to  Turkey.  26  In  the  meantime,  General  Harington,  the 
24  DBFP,  vol.  XVIII,  Rumbold.  to  Curzon,  10  September  1922,  cited  as  footnote  2  to  no  23,  Rumbold  to 
Curzon,  13  September  1922,  pp.  21-22. 
25  PRO,  CAB  23/3  1,11  September  1922. 
26  PRO,  FO  800/253,  Sir Lancelot  Oliphant,  1922,  Tu  22/35,  Rumbold  to  Oliphant,  26  September  1922. 260 
commander  of  the  Allied  forces  in  Constantinople,  had  proceeded  with  some  initial 
measures  on  his  own  initiative.  He  had  already  made  some  provisions  for  the  defence  of 
Chanak,  asking  also  the  co-operation  of  the  Allies.  Ile  had  instructed  Colonel  D.  1. 
Shuttleworth  to  take  command  of  Chanak.  The  colonel  arrived  there  on  II  September. 
He  was  ordered  to  defend  Chanak  against  all  attack  until  further  order.  Tile  British 
forces  in  the  area  comprised  at  the  time:  'one  squadron  of  the  3  rd  Hussars,  92  nd  Battery, 
Royal  Field  Artillery,  armed  with  eighteen-ponders,  a  section  of  Royal  Engineers,  and 
one  infantry  battalion,  the  I"  Loyal  Regiment.  '  27  On  13  September,  the  battleship  Ajax 
arrived  from  Smyrna.  Gradually  more  reinforcements  arrived,  including  another 
squadron  of  the  3rd  Hussars  and  a  battery  of  field  artillery.  28 
The  Cabinet  had  informed  Rurnbold  that,  for  the  present,  Britain  was  to  continue 
holding  Gallipoli;  thus  Chanak  was  not  a  priority  on  the  defence  agenda.  Harington 
however,  had  already  assured  the  limited  Allied  contribution  to  the  defence  of  the  area, 
and  for  a  moment  in  Constantinople,  it  seemed  as  if  the  Allies  were  united.  On  the  other 
hand  Kemal,  still  in  Smyrna,  seemed  ready  to  proceed  with  his  next  objective. 
Constantinople  and  the  Straits,  still  under  Allied  but  primarily  British  occupation  and 
control,  lay  open  in  front  of  his  troops. 
While  the  British  Government  still  debated  the  question  of  how  to  deal  with  the 
menace  of  the  Turkish  nationalist  forces  which  were  for  the  first  time  so  close  to  the 
Allied  occupied  Ottoman  capital,  the  French  and  the  Italians  had  made  up  their  minds. 
The  French  Prime  Minister,  Poincard,  declared  to  his  people,  that  'France  would  not  go 
to  war  with  Turkey.  '  The  Italians  followed  the  same  line.  29  The  two  Allies  gave  orders 
to  their  representatives  in  Constantinople  to  withdraw  their  forces,  leaving  the  British  all 
alone.  On  a  practical  level  they  had  abandoned  Allied  solidarity  a  long  time  ago  and 
27  Cited  in  Walder,  The  Chanak  Affair,  p.  199. 
28  Ibid.,  p.  204. 261 
their  contribution  to  the  occupation  of  the  Straits  and  Constantinople  had  been  kept  to  a 
minimum. 
The  first  movements  of  Turkish  forces  were  detected  on  13  and  14  September. 
On  15  September  1922,  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War,  Worthington-Evans,  infort-ned 
the  Cabinet  that  General  Harington  had  reported  that  he  could  not  hold  Constantinople 
for  long  'unless  he  could  also  hold  opposite  shores  of  the  Asiatic  side  of  Bosphorus.  ' 
The  Greek  retreat  was  complete  and  'the  situation  in  Asia  Minor  had  been  cleared  up,  ' 
in  the  words  of  Curzon.  Then,  it  was  Churchill  who  attempted  a  brief  evaluation  of  the 
treatment  of  Greece: 
Greek  Army  had  been  used  in  a  half-hearted  way.  A  policy 
neither  pro-Turkish  nor  pro-Greek  with  the  result  that  the  Greek 
Army  had  neither  been  supported  or  restrained  ... 
We  ought  to 
obtain  as  much  as  we  could  for  Greece,  but  we  ought  not  to  be 
placed  in  the  position  of  being  the  sole  and  isolated  champion  of 
Greek  claims.  30 
The  British  had  to  be  careful  not  to  present  themselves  as  the  champions  of  the 
Greek  cause.  After  all,  they  had  little  to  offer.  Even  at  this  late  hour  though,  the  British 
wanted  Greece  to  be  on  their  side.  It  was  therefore  considered  necessary  'to  ascertain 
from  the  Greek  Goverm-nent  in  detail  what  forces  they  have  whether  in  Thrace  or 
elsewhere  which  could  be  utilised  for  the  defence  of  the  Straits  and  how  they  could  be 
made  available.  '  31  Nothing  much  was  left  in  Thrace,  although  the  Greek  Government 
put  even  the  last  available  resources  at  the  disposal  of  the  British,  in  a  last  desperate 
attempt  to  retain  at  least  Western  Thrace  with  their  help. 
Venizelos  was  instructed  to  ask  the  Revolutionary  Committee,  which  was  now 
in  charge  of  Greece  and  had  appointed  him  as  Greek  representative,  to  report  on  the 
29  Sonyel,  Turkish  Diplomacy,  p.  174. 
30  PRO,  CAB  23/31,15  September  1922. 
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Greek  forces  in  Thrace.  32  The  British  had  decided  that  it  was  necessary  to  know  whether 
they  could  count  on  Greek  assistance  in  the  event  of  an  armed  conflict  with  Kernal.  Tile 
answer  that  reached  Venizelos  at  the  Greek  Embassy  in  London  came  directly  from  tile 
Greek  General  Staff.  The  Greek  officers  referred  to  the  following  figures:  One  division 
was  already  in  the  region,  five  could  reach  the  area  in  fifteen  days,  and  there  was  a 
cavalry  division  available  as  well,  a  total  of  60,000  men.  It  was  estimated  that  with  the 
calling  up  of  1923  classes  to  the  colours,  by  the  end  of  November  they  would  reach 
80,000  men.  However,  the  Greek  General  Staff  underlined  the  shortages  in  munitions, 
horses  and  clothing.  On  the  army  morale  the  report  was  that  'it  was  improving 
gradually.  '  In  the  meantime,  the  General  Staff  stressed  that  if  the  troops  knew  that 
Britain  would  assist  them  in  real  terms,  morale  would  improve  considerably.  33 
Churchill  in  that  meeting  outlined  again  the  importance  of  keeping  the  Straits 
open.  He  proposed  making  an  appeal  to  the  Dominions  for  reinforcements.  Ile  believed 
that  'the  Empire  would  put  up  some  force  to  preserve  Gallipoli,  with  the  graves  of  so 
many  of  its  soldiers.  '  The  Cabinet  had  decided  to  defend  the  neutral  zone  by  force  if 
necessary  and  Churchill  was  to  prepare  the  appeal  for  the  Dominions.  At  the  same  time, 
the  Foreign  Office  recommendation  was  that  the  presence  of  the  Greek  forces  near 
Constantinople  could  prove  useful  and  it  would  not  be  'desirable'  to  push  for  its 
retirement.  34  Massive  naval,  military  and  air  reinforcements  were  ordered  to  assemble  in 
the  area  of  Chanak  but  as  Walder  comments  'it  was  largely  a  matter  of  services  and 
facilities;  the  actual  number  of  fighting  troops  was  still  pathetically  small.  935 
32  After  the  Greek  retreat  from  Western  Asia  Minor  the  political  developments  in  Greece  had  taken  a 
dramatic  twist.  The  military  had  taken  over  the  control  of  the  country  establishing  a  'Revolutionary 
Committee'  comprised  by  generals.  Venizelos,  at  the  time  in  Europe  and  'self-excluded'  from  Greek 
politics  was  asked  to  take  over  the  role  of  the  representative  of  Greece  abroad.  For  an  analysis  of  the 
crisis  see  this  Chapter:  'The  situation  in  Greece  -  The  execution  of  the  Six.  '  p.  277. 
33  MFA,  1922,3.4,  no  98  10,  Venizelos  to  the  Revolutionary  Committee,  including  the  Greek  General 
Staff  s  answer  dated  18  September  1922,19  September  1922. 
34  PRO,  FO  371n872-E9054/5/44,  FO  to  WO,  18  September  1922. 
35  Walder,  The  Chanak  Affair,  p.  209. 263 
'In  no  circumstances,  '  Lloyd  George  had  declared,  'could  we  allow  the 
Gallipoli  peninsula  to  be  held  by  the  Turks.  It  was  the  most  strategic  position  in  tile 
world  and  the  closing  of  the  Straits  had  prolonged  the  war  by  two  years.  "'  Oil  15 
September  in  the  Cabinet  meeting,  the  Secretary  of  War,  Worthington-Evans,  had 
outlined  the  power  of  the  British  forces  in  the  region  of  Constantinople,  excluding  tile 
forces  already  concentrated  in  Chanak:  there  were  five  infantry  battalions,  the  remaining 
squadron  and  headquarters  of  the  P  Hussars,  two  companies  of  engineers,  three 
batteries  of  field  guns,  an  armoured  train,  five  naval  seaplanes  and  a  number  of  scratch 
gun  sections  made  up  by  the  Royal  Navy.  The  number  of  the  Allied  troops,  including 
British,  French  and  Italian  garrisons,  numbered  7,600  troops.  The  number  of  the  Turks 
concentrated  in  the  area  already  numbered  6,000  stationed  in  Thrace  and  5,000  around 
Chanak.  The  Turkish  forces  that  were  already  in  Smyrna  were  40,000  men.  The  end  of 
the  meeting  witnessed  more  or  less  the  decision  to  continue  supplying  reinforcements  in 
the  area. 
On  16  September,  the  Cabinet  decided  to  inform  the  people  about  the  latest 
developments: 
Adequate  force  must  be  available  to  guard  the  freedom  of 
the  Straits  and  defend  the  deep-water  line  between  Europe 
and  Asia  against  a  violent  and  hostile  Turkish  aggression. 
That  the  Allies  should  be  driven  out  of  Constantinople  by 
the  forces  of  Mustafa  Kemal  would  be  an  event  of  the 
most  disastrous  character,  producing  no  doubt,  far 
reaching  reactions  throughout  all  Moslem  countries,  and 
not  only  through  all  Moslem  countries  but  through  all  the 
States  defeated  in  the  late  war,  who  would  be  profoundly 
encouraged  by  the  spectacle  of  the  undreamed-of- 
successes  that  have  attended  the  efforts  of  the 
comparatively  weak  Turkish  forces.  37 
36  PRO,  CAB  23/31,7  September  1922. 
37  Press  Communiqud  in  Churchill  Papers  17/28,16  September  1922,  cited  in  Gilbert,  Churchill,  Vol.  IV, 
and  Companion  -  Part  3,  pp.  1993-5. 264 
The  British  government  was  asking  its  people  to  keep  in  mind  the  terrible  consequences 
of  a  Kemalist  triumph.  They  even  mentioned  the  issue  of  Eastern  Thrace,  closely  linked 
with  the  security  of  the  Straits.  Orders  were  issued,  concluded  the  communiqud  to  the 
British  officials  stationed  in  the  area  'to  oppose  by  every  means  any  infraction  of  the 
neutral  zones  by  the  Turks  or  any  attempt  by  them  to  cross  to  the  European  shore.  '  38 
Nevertheless,  the  communiqud  to  the  Dominions  was  not  successful.  Only  New  Zealand 
and  Newfoundland  responded  immediately,  offering  full  support,  Australia  promised  to 
help  if  hostilities  broke  out  while  Canada  and  South  Africa  refused  any  help.  39 
In  the  meantime,  British  public  opinion  seemed  horrified  at  the  possibility  of  yet 
another  war.  The  correspondents  of  the  major  papers  were  reporting  the  details  of  what 
had  taken  place  in  Smyrna  and  the  surrounding  region  on  the  flight  of  the  Greek 
inhabitants  of  the  region  and  the  burning  of  Smyrna.  The  papers  were  filled  with  photos 
of  Smyrna,  the  bedraggled  Greek  soldiers  reaching  the  city,  but,  most  tragic  of  all,  the 
devastated  population,  mostly  women  and  children,  packed  on  the  quays.  Public  opinion 
was  not  ready  to  commit  to  yet  another  war;  the  Daily  Afail  urged  tile  Government  to 
'Stop  this  New  WarV  Demonstrations  were  organised  and  protests  were  handed  to  the 
Prime  Minister.  On  21  September  1922,  the  Daily  Mail  demanded  'GET  OUT  OF 
CHANAK.  '  On  the  same  day  the  Cabinet  was  informed  that  the  French  and  tile  Italian 
forces  on  the  area  of  Chanak  had  been  ordered  to  withdraw.  Only  the  forces  stationed  on 
the  European  side  remained  under  the  orders  of  General  Harington.  40  The  necessity  of 
drawing  the  Allies  together  in  support  of  Britain  had  resulted  in  the  opposite  effect 
being  achieved  and  now  the  breach  was  clear  to  everyone. 
Curzon  did  not  approve  of  the  Cabinet's  decision  to  oppose  militarily  Kemal  and 
his  plans  to  occupy  the  Dardanelles.  The  Foreign  Secretary  was  of  the  opinion  that  after 
31  Ibid. 
39  Roskill,  Hankey,  p.  285. 265 
all  Kemal  would  not  attempt  to  attack  the  Allied  troops,  and  the  suggestion  that  lie 
would  was  a  'gross  and  ridiculous  exaggeration.  41  He  suggested  that  he  should  go  to 
Paris  to  discuss  the  situation  with  the  French  and  the  Italians.  The  threat  of  war, 
championed  by  the  Prime  Minister  and  prominent  members  of  the  Government,  was  an 
absolute  mockery  of  what  Curzon  had  been  trying  hard  for  the  last  months  to  achieve: 
the  diplomatic  solution  that  would  allow  Britain  to  get  its  gains  along  with  the  French 
and  the  Italians.  Further,  it  looked  as  if  Lloyd  George  was  trying  to  disregard  his  work. 
This  was  not  the  case.  It  had  been  quite  a  long  period  that  Curzon  had  been  left  literally 
'undisturbed'  in  the  realm  of  the  Greek-Turkish  question.  He  was  absent  however, 
when  the  Cabinet  decided  to  issue  the  communiqud  to  the  Press. 
Curzon  went  to  Paris  with  the  ultimate  aim  of  dragging  the  Allies  back  onto  his 
side,  backing  his  scheme  first  to  negotiate  an  armistice  and  then  for  the  long  awaited 
conference  for  a  final  settlement.  42  The  French  were  worried,  especially  after  the 
publication  of  the  communiqud.  Poincard  had  already  given  orders  for  the  calling  back 
of  the  French  troops  already  despatched  to  Chanak.  France  would  not  fight  side  by  side 
with  the  British  against  Kemal.  The  Italians  had  acted  earlier,  informing  the  Turkish 
leader  of  their  neutral  intentions.  The  British  Minister  had  meetings  with  Poincard,  who 
was  also  head  of  the  Foreign  Ministry,  and  the  Italian  minister  in  Paris  who  was  well 
known  for  his  expertise  on  Ottoman  affairs,  Count  Sforza.  The  discussions  were  very 
tense.  Curzon  agreed  to  instruct  Harington  to  enter  into  direct  negotiations  with  Kemal. 
The  three  men,  Curzon,  Poincard  and  Sforza  issued  a  note  in  which  they  announced  that 
they  viewed  the  Turkish  claim  to  Eastern  Thrace  and  Adrianople  with  favour.  Further, 
40  PRO,  CAB  23/39,21  September  1922. 
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42  On  25  September,  Sir  Lancelot  Oliphant  was  conveying  to  Rumbold  his  impressions  on  what  had 
happened  in  Paris  during  the  negotiations  of  Curzon  with  Poincard.  'They  [the  French]  are  really  the  most 
impossible  of  all  creatures  and  I  doubt  whether  any  one  of  them  is  better  than  any  other.  Curzon  had  a 266 
the  Allies  intended  to  leave  Constantinople  after  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty,  as  long  as 
the  Turks,  on  their  part,  respected  the  neutral  zones  first.  43  The  note  was  immediately 
telegraphed  to  Kemal.  These  instructions  were  subsequently  telegraphed  to  Ilarington 
on  23  September.  At  Erenkoy,  less  than  ten  miles  from  Chanak,  within  the  limits  of  tile 
cneutral  zone'  which  the  British  expected  the  Turks  to  recognise,  tension  was  building 
up.  There  were  movements  of  troops  but  neither  side  had  fired  a  shot.  However,  tile 
Turkish  troops  when  requested  to  withdraw  by  the  British,  refused. 
The  meetings  of  the  British  Cabinet  were  on  a  daily  basis.  On  23  September,  the 
Cabinet  had  decided  that  there  was  'a  desirability  of  strengthening  the  Chanak  position 
still  further.  '  Lloyd  George  was  explicit,  even  after  Churchill  had  expressed  anxiety 
about  the  weakness  of  the  forces  defending  Chanak.  'The  evacuation  of  Chanak,  having 
regard  to  all  that  had  happened,  would  be  the  greatest  loss  of  prestige  which  could 
possibly  be  inflicted  on  the  British  Empire,  '  underlined  the  Prime  Minister.  The 
discussion  focused  on  the  question  of  holding  or  abandoning  Chanak.  The  Greek  factor 
was  raised  once  again.  The  Cabinet  Ministers  debated  the  practicality  of  calling  Greek 
forces  to  assist  Britain  in  the  defence  of  Chanak.  It  was  decided  to  enquire  about  'the 
number  and  character  of  the  Greek  troops  available  in  Athens,  Thrace  and  elsewhere, 
and  to  give  the  appreciation  of  their  probable  fighting  qualities.  44 
Curzon,  however,  was  alarmed  with  the  possibility,  first  because  in  the  event  of 
an  outbreak  of  war,  Britain  would  have,  in  his  own  words,  only  the  'precarious'  and 
'worthless  alliance  of  the  Greeks.  '45  His  second  objection  saw  such  a  possibility  as  a 
hectic  time  in  Paris.  '  In  PRO,  FO  800/253,  Sir  Lancelot  Oliphant,  Tu  22/34,  Oliphant  to  Rumbold,  25 
September  1922. 
43  The  'neutral  zones'  had  been  established  by  the  Treaty  of  Sývres  at  Chanak,  the  eastern  shore  of  the 
Dardanelles  and  on  the  Bosphorus  at  the  Ismid  Peninsula.  The  British  were  literally  left  on  their  own  to 
defend  them  after  the  signing  of  the  Franklin  Bouillon  Agreement  between  the  French  and  the  Kernalists 
in  October  192  1. 
44  PRO,  CAB  23/2  1,  Inner  Cabinet  Meeting,  27  September  1922. 
45  Curzon  to  Austen  Chamberlain,  27  September  1922,  cited  in  Gilbert,  Churchill,  p.  840. 267 
'blow'  to  the  fragile  Allied  unity  that  he  had  achieved  some  days  before  in  Paris.  46 
Nevertheless,  it  was  Curzon  who  early  in  September  had  objected  to  tile  proposed 
retreat  of  the  Greek  forces  in  Thrace,  as  suggested  by  the  Allied  generals  of 
Constantinople.  It  was  obvious  that  he  shared  Lloyd  George's  idea  of  using  the  Greek 
Army  card  in  future  negotiations  with  Kemal.  The  Foreign  Secretary  had  at  the  time 
pointed  out  that: 
:  ** 
fear  of  Greek  occupation  of  capital  may  be  an  important  card 
in  future  negotiations  with  Kemal;  and  Greek  support  for  Allied 
troops  in  Constantinople  and  Straits  areas  if  Kernalists  threaten 
latter,  might  also  not  be  negligible  factor.  47 
The  Greek  answer  to  the  British  enquiry  arrived  promptly  on  the  29'h.  The  Greek 
troops  in  Thrace  were  20,000.  In  Athens  it  was  reported  that  there  was  a  total  of  12,000 
soldiers.  The  British  Minister  sounded  optimistic  when  he  reported  that  'a  serious  Greek 
Army  would  be  available  if  fighting  for  definite  object  and  fully  supported  by  Great 
Britain.  548  This  renewed  interest  of  Lloyd  George  in  Greece  had  not  only  alarmed 
Curzon.  Curzon  supported  the  Greek  Army  card  as  long  as  this  was  done  without  undue 
military  risk.  According  to  a  report  of  the  Director  of  Military  Intelligence  of  a 
conversation  with  Edward  Grigg,  the  personal  secretary  of  Lloyd  George,  the  last 
appeared  to  have  misgivings  as  well.  49  Hankey,  awaiting  Kemal's  reply,  felt  that  it  was 
46 
Ibid. 
47  The  Allied  generals  request  in  DBFP,  vol.  XVIII,  no  16,  Rumbold  to  Curzon,  8  September  1922,  p.  16, 
and  Curzon's  reply  in  Ibid,  no  20,  Curzon  to  Rumbold,  10  September  1922,  pp.  18-9.  Curzon  used 
extensively  the  card  of  the  relatively  strong  and  ready  to  fight  Greek  Army  in  Thrace  during  the  Lausanne 
negotiations.  See  this  Chapter:  'The  Lausanne  Conference.  '  p.  283. 
48  More  specifically  in  Thrace  there  were  the  Yd  and  the  4  th  Army  Corps,  a  total  of  five  divisions,  3 
batteries  of  6-inch  howitzers  and  6  batteries  of  field  artillery.  In  Athens  there  were  two  regiments  of 
cavalry,  two  batteries  of  artillery  and  the  remains  of  three  divisions  that  had  already  aff  ived  from  Asia 
Minor.  In  DBFP,  vol.  XVIII,  no  72,  Lindley  to  Curzon,  29  September  1922,  pp.  112-4. 
49  PRO,  WO  106/6326,  Report  of  Director  of  Military  Intelligence  with  conversation  with  Edward  Grigg, 
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'rather  an  ugly  situation'  and  had  confided  his  fear  of  the  possibility  of  armed  conflict  to 
Balfour.  50 
Harington  had  already  entered  into  negotiations  with  Kemal  through  Ilamid 
Bey,  the  Nationalist  spokesman  and  representative  in  the  Ottoman  capital.  The  General 
was  instructed  to  ask  for  a  conference.  Kemal,  however,  was  not  at  all  co-operative.  He 
demanded  that  the  British  stop  the  shipping  of  reinforcements  and  guns  to  Chanak. 
Harington  kept  the  Government  informed  on  his  communications  with  the  Turkish 
leader,  who  seemed  determined  to  wait  on  events.  In  the  meantime,  the  British  had 
allowed  the  Greeks  to  move  their  fleet  into  the  Sea  of  Marmara.  The  Greek  factor  was 
once  again  brought  up  in  the  discussion.  Greek  forces  could  well  assist  the  British  in 
case  there  was  armed  conflict  over  Chanak.  Churchill  was  of  the  opinion  that  Great 
Britain  should  'obtain  help  from  every  quarter.  51  The  Service  Chiefs  were  also  asked  to 
report  on  'the  feasibility  of  holding  Constantinople  if  Chanak  were  evacuated.  02 
The  next  day,  the  Government  decided  to  let  Kemal  know  that  if  he  did  not 
withdraw  from  the  neutral  zone  the  Greeks  would  be  allowed  to  move  in  transports, 
since  they  had  already  been  allowed  access  to  the  sea  of  Mannara  for  their  ships.  The 
Cabinet  telegraphed  the  bottom  line  of  their  decisions  to  Harington.  Now  to  retain 
Chanak  seemed  more  a  matter  of  prestige.  It  seemed  that  they  were  ready  to  retreat  even 
on  the  issue  of  Constantinople  but  not  over  Chanak.  In  effect,  the  orders  to  Harington 
included  that:  'In  order  to  reinforce  Chanak,  you  may,  if  necessary,  evacuate 
Constantinople 
...  Our  policy  is  to  hold  Gallipoli  at  all  cost  and  to  hold  on  to  Chanak  as 
long  as  this  can  be  done  without  undue  military  risk.  '  53  On  29  September,  the  Cabinet 
50  NAS,  A.  J.  Balfour  Papers,  GD  433/2/2,  Hankey  to  A.  J.  Balfour,  26  September  1922. 
51  PRO,  CAB  23/39,27  September  1922. 
52  The  Service  Chiefs  were:  Lord  Cavan,  Chief  of  the  Imperial  Staff,  Lord  Trenchard,  Chief  of  the  Air 
Staff  and  Lord  Beatty,  First  Sea  Lord.  Walder,  The  Clianak  Affair,  p.  277- 
53  Gilbert,  Rumbold,  p.  268. 269 
decided  that  the  Greeks  should  be  told  not  to  retire  from  Eastern  Thrace  and  the 
following  telegram  was  to  be  sent  to  Harington: 
The  Turkish  Nationalists  are  obviously  moving  up  troops  and 
seeking  to  net  your  forces  in.  Cabinet  are  advised  by  tile  General 
Staff  that  if  we  allow  continuance  of  this,  the  defensive  position 
will  be  imperilled  and  that  the  moment  to  avert  the  disaster  has 
arrived.  It  has  therefore  been  decided  by  the  Cabinet  that  tile 
Officer  commanding  the  Turkish  forces  around  Chanak  is 
immediately  to  be  notified  that  if  his  forces  are  not  withdrawn 
by  an  hour  to  be  settled  by  you,  at  which  our  combined  forces 
will  be  in  place,  all  the  forces  at  our  disposal  -  naval,  military 
and  aerial  -  will  open  fire.  In  this  latter  event  the  air  forces 
should  be  used  so  long  as  the  Turkish  forces  are  inside  the 
neutral  zone.  The  time  limit  should  be  short  and  it  should  not  be 
overlooked  that  we  have  received  warning  regarding  the  date  - 
September  30th 
. 
From  our  Intelligence.  54 
Neither  the  General  nor  the  High  Commissioner  favoured  such  drastic  measures. 
It  was  somehow  an  internal  minor  rebellion  by  the  British  representatives  on  the  spot. 
Harington  never  issued  the  ultimatum  to  Kemal.  The  Cabinet  was  informed  the  next 
day.  The  two  men  in  charge  at  Constantinople  had  decided  to  continue  their  efforts  to 
communicate  with  Kemal.  The  Cabinet  was  furious  with  their  initiative:  'Sir  Horace 
Rumbold  and  General  Harington  should  apparently  contemplate  a  meeting  between  the 
General  and  Mustafa  Kemal  at  Mudania  while  the  Turkish  Nationalists  in  defiance  of 
several  remonstrances  and  warnings,  were  still  actively  violating  the  essential  condition 
laid  down  to  the  Paris  note.  55 
Rumbold  was  from  very  early  on  sure  that  there  was  no  space  for  the  rctainment 
of  Eastern  Thrace  by  the  Greeks.  He  had  repeatedly  made  this  known  to  his  superiors  in 
London.  In  a  personal  letter  to  Oliphant,  Rumbold  outlined  the  reasons  for  his  position: 
Brock,  Harington  and  1,  absolute  necessity  of  avoiding  any 
action  which  might  lead  to  war.  We  feel  that  the  last  thing  our 
country  wants  is  to  have  another  war  and  that  the  average  man 
54  PRO,  CAB  23/31,29  September  1922. 
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does  not  care  a  straw  whether  Eastern  Thrace  and  Adrianople 
belong  to  the  Greeks  or  Turks.  In  my  view,  both  are  absolute 
barbarians  and  have  proved  it  recently.  We  imagine  our  country 
would  fight  for  the  freedom  of  the  Straits,  but  for  nothing  else. 
We  have  been  badly  let  down  by  our  gallant  Allies  on  the  spot 
and  feel  very  sure  about  it.  56 
He  felt  that  peace  was  even  more  in  jeopardy  with  the  issuing  of  ultimata.  Harington 
agreed.  The  two  decided  to  continue  the  negotiations  without  the  threat  of  an  ultimatum. 
In  the  Cabinet  meeting  of  October  1",  Harington  in  a  long  telegram  presented  his 
argument  for  delaying  the  communication  of  the  ultimatum  to  Kemal.  'To  me  it  seems 
very  inadvisable  just  at  moment  when  within  reach  of  distance  of  meeting  between 
Allied  Generals  and  Kemal  which  Hamid  says  will  be  in  two  or  three  days  and  Angora 
Government  are  penning  their  reply  to  allied  note  that  I  should  launch  Avalanche  of  fire 
which  will  put  a  match  to  mine  here  and  everywhere  else  and  from  which  there  will  be 
no  drawing  back.  '  In  the  following  paragraphs  of  his  communication,  Harington  re- 
evaluated  the  military  situation  and  assured  the  Cabinet  that  if  there  was  no  reply  from 
Kemal  he  would  issue  the  ultimatum.  He  further  outlined  that  there  was  a  danger 
inherent  to  an  attack  on  the  Ismid  Peninsula,  where  it  was  estimated  that  Kemal  could 
57 
concentrate  in  nine  days  at  least  18  Divisions.  Indeed,  on  the  same  day,  Kemal  agreed 
to  the  meeting  at  Mudania  for  the  discussion  of  the  armistice  terms.  Sir  Horace 
Rumbold  informed  the  Cabinet  of  Kemal's  agreement  to  the  conference.  The  Chanak 
crisis  was  over. 
In  the  words  of  Winston  Churchill  on  the  way  he  and  'a  small  group  of  resolute 
men  58  had  managed  the  situation:  'We  intended  to  force  the  Turk  to  a  negotiated  peace 
56  PRO,  FO  800/253,  Sir  Lancelot  Oliphant,  Tu  22/35,  Rumbold  to  Oliphant,  26  September  1922. 
57  PRO,  CAB  23/31,1  October  1922. 
58  The  'small  group  of  resolute  men'  consisted  of  the  Prime  Minister,  Lord  Balfour,  Mr.  Austen 
Chamberlain,  Lord  Birkenhead,  Sir  Laming  Worthington  Evans  and  Churchill  himself. 271 
before  he  should  set  foot  in  Europe.  The  aim  was  modest,  but  the  forces  were  smal  1.09 
What  had  driven  Churchill  to  the  side  of  Lloyd  George  despite  his  strong  disagrccnicnts 
with  the  Prime  Minister's  Greek  policy?  The  answer  lies  partly  with  the  safeguarding  of 
what  was  at  stake  during  the  crisis:  the  preservation  of  British  power  and  prestige.  At 
the  same  time  Churchill  was  trying  to  establish  himself  as  a  resolute  politician,  showing 
strength  and  will  at  a  time  of  crisis. 
David  Lloyd  George  in  his  Memoirs  stressed  that  at  Chanak  'he  meant  to  fight.  ' 
However,  there  was  no  support  for  the  otherwise  strong  policy  that  Lloyd  George  had 
advocated.  The  press  and  public  had  been  against  him.  The  Dominions  had  denied  their 
help.  Even  the  King  had  advised  reconciliation  . 
60  However,  the  threat  of  the  use  of  war 
at  Chanak  was  necessary.  Britain  was  the  dominant  power  in  the  region  of  the  Straits 
and  intended  to  remain  as  such,  maintaining  its  prestige  and  strong  will.  In  the 
meantime,  the  British  navy  remained  very  much  in  control  of  the  Straits,  despite  the 
limited  ground  forces. 
T11  E  FALL  OF  TH  E  COALITION  GOVERN  NI  ENT. 
Criticism  concerning  the  handling  of  the  situation  over  Chanak  was  evident 
throughout  the  September  crisis  for  the  Coalition  Government.  61  However,  objections 
over  the  Coalition's  foreign  policy  had  accumulated  for  quite  some  time  before  the 
outbreak  of  the  Chanak  Crisis.  For  many  scholars  and  contemporaries,  both  critics  and 
supporters  of  the  Coalition,  1922  had  been  a  crucial  year  in  consolidating  the  views  of 
the  Conservative  circles  that  longed  for  a  break  of  the  Coalition.  62  According  to  Chris 
59  Cited  in  Nicolson,  Curzon:  the  last  phase,  p.  271-2. 
60  'While  congratulating  you  and  the  Government  upon  the  prompted  complete  measures  that  have  been 
taken  to  deal  with  this  grave  emergency,  the  King  is  sure  that  you  are  as  averse  as  he  is  to  a  renewal  of 
war  and  that  everything  will  be  done  to  avoid  such  a  calamity.  '  Cited  in  M.  Gilbert,  The  Roots  of 
Appeasement  (London,  1966),  p.  9  1. 
61  See  for  example  the  reactions  of  the  Press  as  discussed  above.  62  Rose  Inball.  in  particular  supports  that  the  Genoa  Conference,  its  preliminary  discussions  and  its 
proceedings  had  'crystallised  conservative  opposition  to  Lloyd  Georgian  diplomacy.  '  Inball, 
Conservatism  and  Foreign  Policy  during  the  Lloyd  George  Coalition  Government,  p.  220.  Churchill  in  a 272 
Cook,  'by  1922,  Lloyd  George  himself  was  becoming  the  most  unloved  of 
politicians.  ' 
63 
Churchill  had  wamed  Lloyd  George  of  the  disquietude  that  certain  of  his 
policies  caused  to  Liberal  and  Conservative  circles  alike.  Lloyd  George  was  'damaging 
the  unity  and  cohesion  of  several  important  elements  of  opinion  on  whom  [lie  had) 
hitherto  been  able  to  rely.  v64  He  himself  had  been  very  bitter  over  not  being  appointed  to 
the  Chancellorship  of  the  Exchequer  in  spring  1921.  Gilbert  notes  that  it  was  the  only 
65  time  that  the  two  men  had  severed  their  meetings  outside  the  Cabinet 
. 
Churchill  had 
also  been  a  constant  source  of  opposition  to  the  Prime  Minister's  handling  of  both  the 
relations  with  Soviet  Russia  and  the  Greek  question.  However,  Churchill  stood  by  him 
both  during  the  Chanak  crisis,  despite  his  previous  disagreement  over  the  issue,  and  of 
course  during  the  elections  which  took  place  in  November  1922. 
During  the  early  part  of  1922  both  Conservatives  and  Liberals  were  discussing 
the  issue  of  elections.  66  Liberals  saw  their  position  in  the  Government  diminishing  day 
by  day.  One  of  the  serious  blows  had  been  the  Montagu  incident  and  the  consequent 
'forced'  resignation  of  the  Secretary  State  for  India  in  March  1922.  Montagu  had 
authorised,  without  Cabinet  decision,  the  publication  of  a  protest  received  by  the 
government  of  India  against  the  'Greek  policy'  of  the  Government.  The  whole  event 
letter  to  Clementine  Churchill  about  Genoa  had  pinpointed  that  it  was  'not  a  national  policy  but  only  a 
purely  personal  Lloyd  Georgian  affair.  '  Cited  by  Gilbert,  Churchill,  Vol.  IV,  p.  768.  Kinnear  also  notes 
that  'the  coalition  did  not  falter  because  of  one  blow,  but  languished  over  a  year  and  a  half.  '  Kinnear,  The 
Fall  ofLloyd  George,  p.  92. 
63  Chris  Cook,  The  Age  ofAlignment,  Electoral  Politics  in  Britain  1922-1929  (London,  1975),  p.  15. 
64  CHURCHILL  COLLEGE  ARCHIVES,  Churchill  Papers,  CHAR  17/6,  Churchill  to  Lloyd  George,  4 
December  1920.  See  also  Chapter  Four:  'The  War  Office  "alternative":  Turkey  reconsidered.  '  p.  18  1. 
65  Gilbert,  Churchill,  Vol.  IV,  p.  908-9. 
66  Cook  notes  that  Coalition  Liberals  were  not  content  with  Lloyd  George,  his  closest  associates  in  the 
Goverm-nent,  with  the  exception  of  Churchill,  were  all  Coalition  Conservatives.  Cook,  The  Age  of 
Alignment,  p.  15. 273 
had  infuriated  both  Lloyd  George  and  Curzon.  Montagu  had  resigned  but  not  before  he 
had  publicly  attacked  both  the  Cabinet  and  Lloyd  George.  67 
The  Genoa  Conference,  the  venue  for  the  discussion  of  a  trade  agrcement  with 
Russia,  was  a  serious  point  of  conflict  between  Lloyd  George  and  the  Conservatives.  " 
Lloyd  George  was  convinced  that  starting  negotiations  with  the  Soviets  was  the  key  for 
a  better  understanding.  Churchill  was  completely  opposed,  while  Austen  Chamberlain, 
on  behalf  of  his  Conservative  ministers,  had  advised  him  not  to  grant  a  de  jure 
recognition  of  the  Soviets,  as  it  was  against  general  Conservative  feeling.  69 
Among  the  Conservative  MPs  and  Peers,  the  general  feeling  was  one  of 
condemnation  for  the  Coalition's  policies.  In  June  eleven  peers  and  thirty  MPs  issued  a 
declaration  expressing  their  ever-growing  objections  to  the  Coalition,  whose  policies 
produced  'chaos,  disorder  and  ruin.  70  The  Chanak  crisis  had  only  precipitated  the 
opposition  that  had  been  accumulating  over  the  last  one  and  a  half  years  against  the 
Coalition.  Conservative  circles  had  already  spoken  out  loud  and  clear  on  their 
differences  on  a  number  of  issues,  both  in  foreign  and  domestic  policies.  71 
A  first  open  declaration  of  indignation  regarding  the  handling  of  the  situation 
was  the  letter  of  Andrew  Bonar  Law  in  The  Times  on  October  7  1922.  The  fonncr 
leader  of  the  Conservative  Party  was  adamant:  'We  cannot  act  alone  as  policemen  of  the 
world.  '  Bonar  Law  admitted  that  the  British  government  was  right  in  having  tried  to 
prevent  an  advance  of  the  Turkish  forces  at  Constantinople.  However,  he  stressed  that 
'the  burden  of  taking  necessary  action  should  not  fall  on  the  British  Empire  alone.  '  The 
67  Montagu  had  been  one  of  the  staunchest  opposers  of  Lloyd  George's  Greek  policy.  See  especially 
Chapter  Three:  'The  British  case:  the  debates  among  the  British  officials.  '  p.  14  1.  On  the  issue  of  his  1-1 
resignation  see  Chapter  Five:  'The  Greek  "muddle"  and  the  British  refusal  of  financial  help.  '  p.  227. 
6'  The  proceedings  of  the  Genoa  conference  can  be  found  in  DBFP,  Vol.  XIV,  Chapter  Three:  The  Genoa 
Conference,  April  9-May  19  1922,  pp.  305-1038. 
69  For  the  attitude  of  Conservatives  regarding  the  Anglo-Soviet  rapprochement  that  Lloyd  George  was 
trying  to  promote  see  also  Chapter  Five:  'The  Bolshevik  connection.  '  p.  244. 
70  Cook,  The  Age  ofAlignment,  p.  15. 274 
factor  of  Muslim  sensibilities  was  underlined  as  well,  since  'to  show  any  hostility  or 
unfairness  to  the  Turk'  would  again  fuel  their  religious  feelings.  72  A  few  days  later  the 
news  of  the  signing  of  the  Armistice  of  Mudania  and  the  news  of  the  upcoming 
conference  that  would  finally  settle  the  question  obviously  relieved  the  Coalition 
Government.  73 
The  damage  had  already  been  done.  Public  opinion  throughout  the  crisis  had 
observed  a  Cabinet  and  especially  a  Prime  Minister  willing  to  enter  into  a  war  with 
Turkey.  The  former  leader  of  the  Conservative  Party  had  captured  the  general  feeling: 
no  more  military  entanglements.  Further,  what  Bonar  Law  had  tried  to  convey  was  that 
Lloyd  George  had  repeatedly  ignored  Conservative  feeling.  The  Liberal  Prime  Minister 
was  not  needed  any  more,  he  was  a  'broken  reed'  in  the  eyes  of  most  Conservatives  - 
and  thanks  to  the  press  -  in  the  eyes  of  the  people  as  well.  It  was  the  right  time  for  the 
Conservatives  to  sever  the  ties  and  go  to  the  election  polls  all  by  themselves. 
The  first  answer  came  from  Austen  Chamberlain.  In  a  speech  at  Bin-ningliam, 
Lloyd  George's  Minister  tried  to  regain  the  lost  ground  for  the  Coalition  and  defend  its 
decisions.  Further,  it  was  an  open  appeal  to  the  Conservative  spectrum  to  continue 
supporting  the  Government.  On  14  October,  after  the  signing  of  the  an-nistice  of 
Mudania,  it  was  Lloyd  George's  turn  to  defend  himself  and  the  Coalition's  foreign 
policy,  in  a  speech  at  the  Manchester  Reform  Club.  74  It  was  an  overall  appreciation  of 
his  conduct  of  the  foreign  policy  and  the  dominant  theme  was  of  course  his  'Greek 
policy,  '  the  one  which  according  to  many  of  his  critics  had  brought  the  country  to  crisis 
point  more  than  once.  The  Prime  Minister  started  with  a  reference  to  his  'Gladstonian' 
principle  regarding  the  Turks.  He  referred  first  to  the  facts  of  their  unquestioned 
71  Another  issue  that  had  raised  Conservative  objections  was  the  Irish  issue  and  the  negotiations  with  Sinn 
Fein  in  October  192  1. 
72  The  Times,  7  October  1922. 
73  See  this  Chapter:  'The  Mudania  Armistice.  '  p.  276. 275 
'brutality;  '  'Since  1914  the  Turks,  according  to  testimony  -  official  testimony  -  we  have 
received  have  slaughtered  in  cold  blood  one  million  and  a  half  An-ncnians,  men, 
women,  and  children,  and  five  thousand  Greeks  without  any  provocation  at  all.  '  75  Lloyd 
George  continued  by  presenting  the  'Turkish  policy'  of  Britain  step  by  step  from  the 
early  days  of  the  War  in  an  attempt  to  justify  the  outlook  of  his  government,  but 
primarily  defend  himself,  with  an  'it  was  not  my  policy  alone'  side-step. 
In  late  October  1922,  David  Lloyd  George,  the  imperious  leader  of  the  Coalition 
Government,  fell  from  power.  Hankey  marked  the  events  with  the  following  entry  in  his 
diary  on  21  October  1923:  'The  Coalition  has  broken.  Lloyd  George  had  resigned. 
Bonar  Law  is  forming  a  Conservative  Government.  06  The  original  plan  after  the 
Chanak  crisis  had  been  a  general  election  on  28  October  1922.  The  so-called  1922 
Committee  Meeting,  on  19  October  1922,  at  the  Carlton  Club,  deprived  him  of  his 
tenure  of  office.  In  that  meeting,  Lloyd  George  was  deprived  of  the  support  of  the 
majority  of  Coalition's  Conservative  MPs.  He  resigned  the  afternoon  of  tile  same  day. 
Andrew  Bonar  Law,  after  being  elected  leader  of  the  Conservative  Party,  immediately 
proceeded  to  the  Palace  where  he  was  appointed  Prime  Minister.  From  the  'old  guard' 
only  Curzon  retained  his  position.  The  Parliament  was  dissolved  on  26  October  and 
elections  were  called  for  15  November. 
The  threat  of  the  use  of  war  at  Chanak  was  necessary,  regardless  of  what  Lloyd 
George  was  trying  to  accomplish  on  a  political  scale.  Why  did  it  result  in  adding  the 
final  nail  in  the  coffin  of  the  Coalition  Government?  Lloyd  George  and  his  supporters 
acted  very  much  on  their  own.  The  handling  of  Chanak  might  have  proven  beneficial 
for  the  Coalition  and  Lloyd  George,  regardless  the  general  feeling  of  war-weariness  that 
existed  among  the  British  public,  if  they  could  have  given  it  an  air  of  international 
74  Lloyd  George's  speech  at  the  Manchester  Reform  Club,  The  Times,  16  Octo6er  1922.  75 
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authority.  Bonar  Law,  with  his  letter  in  The  Times  on  7  October  1922,  had  articulated 
this  feeling,  stating  that  Britain  could  not  act  alone  as  the  policeman  of  the  world.  77 
The  Conservatives  in  power  after  the  elections  of  November  1922  tried  to  avoid 
exactly  what  Lloyd  George  had  enjoyed  most  about  being  in  power,  practising  foreign 
policy.  Curzon  was  left  alone  to  deal  with  a  final  settlement  that  would  first  restore  the 
slightly  damaged  British  prestige  at  Chanak.  This  time  Curzon  had  free  rein  to  settle  tile 
details  of  the  issue  entirely  in  his  own  style. 
THE  MUDANIA  ARMISTICE 
On  2  October  1922,  General  Harington  left  Constantinople  aboard  Iron  Duke  for 
Mudania,  for  the  conference  that  was  to  conclude  the  annistice  on  the  state  of  war 
between  Greece  and  the  Nationalist  forces  of  Kemal.  The  next  day,  all  interested  parties 
had  gathered.  In  the  meantime,  the  British  forces  remained  at  Chanak,  waiting  for  the 
result  of  the  negotiations  at  Mudania.  General  Harington  represented  Britain,  General 
Charpy  and  Franklin  Bouillon  were  there  for  France,  and  General  Mombelli  represented 
78  Italy.  The  Nationalists  had  sent  General  Ismet  Pasha.  Greece's  representatives  were 
General  Mazarakis  and  Colonel  Sariyannis,  who  did  not  participate  at  the  actual 
meetings  of  the  conference  but  who  were  at  Mudania  being  constantly  informed  by  the 
Allied  Generals  on  the  course  of  the  negotiations.  Having  already  settled  the  issue  of 
Smyrna  by  means  of  arms,  the  Turks  demanded  the  evacuation  of  all  Eastern  Thrace 
within  thirty  days.  The  Turkish  representatives  tried  continuously  to  turn  the  discussions 
to  political  questions;  however,  the  Allied  Generals  had  no  authorisation  for  this  sort  of 
chase.  Harington  reported  the  course  of  the  conference  to  Constantinople  and  London. 
76  Diary  21'  October  1922  cited  in  Roskill,  Hankey,  p.  296. 
77  The  Times,  7  October  1922. 
78  Ismet  Pasha,  later  named  Inona,  Foreign  Minister  1922-3,  Prime  Minister  19234  and  1925-37.  After 
the  death  of  Kemal  also  President  of  Turkey,  1938-1950. 277 
The  Allied  Generals  returned  to  Constantinople  to  await  further  instructions. 
Curzon  left  immediately  for  Paris.  After  negotiations  in  Constantinople  among  the 
Allied  High  Commissioners  and  communications  with  their  respective  governments,  the 
Generals  returned  to  Mudania  with  a  final  draft  protocol  to  be  handed  to  both  Greeks 
and  Turks.  The  actual  text  of  the  Armistice  was  signed  on  II  October  1922  by  the 
Allies  and  the  Turks.  Greece  signed  only  after  presenting  certain  reservations  that  had  to 
do  mainly  'with  the  procedure  and  terms  of  reference  of  the  conference.  '79  The 
immediate  abandonment  of  Eastern  Thrace  seemed  the  worst  of  the  tenns  provided. 
Greece  had  not  been  defeated  in  Thrace.  However,  Kemal  had  demanded  the 
incorporation  of  Eastern  Thrace  into  Turkey  again.  It  was  generally  believed  that  the 
Greek  forces  already  stationed  in  the  region  could  have  kept  hold  of  the  area.  The 
armistice  called  for  the  immediate  withdrawal  of  the  Greek  presence  to  the  west  of  the 
Maritza  River.  The  Greeks  objected  that  such  a  withdrawal  would  not  guarantee  the 
protection  of  the  Greek  populations.  80 
The  armistice  terms  dictated  that  hostilities  were  to  cease  on  15  October  1922. 
On  the  issue  of  Eastern  Thrace,  the  Greeks  were  to  withdraw  in  a  period  of  fifteen  days 
to  the  left  bank  of  the  River  Maritza.  The  area  was  to  be  occupied  by  Allied  garrisons 
which  were  to  pass  control  to  the  Turkish  forces  within  thirty  days  of  the  Greek 
evacuation.  On  9  October,  Venizelos  cabled  to  Greece:  'Do  not  deceive  yourselves! 
Eastern  Thrace  has  been  lost  once  and  for  all  for  Hellenism.  81  It  was  the  end  of  the 
grandiose  plans  of  Greece,  an  end  which  entailed  much  pain  and  misery  for  all  those 
Greeks  who  had  to  evacuate  their  birthplace  and  flee  to  Greece,  first  from  Smyrna  and 
79  Sonyel,  Turkish  Diplomacy,  p.  18  1. 
80  The  Revolutionary  Committee  was  declaring  that  they  could  hold  Thrace  by  use  of  arms.  The  Allies 
who  had  targeted  a  conference  that  would  end  everything  through  diplomacy  did  not  approve  such  action. 
Venizelos  was advised  to  transmit  to  Greece  to  abandon  the  plan.  They  could  well  remain  and  defend 
Western  Thrace  and  the  Aegean  islands  in  case  of  a  Turkish  attack.  Greece  signed  the  Armistice  on  13 
October  1922. 278 
the  interior  of  Asia  Minor  and  finally  from  Eastern  Thrace.  However,  the  Greek  'retreat' 
on  the  issue  of  Eastern  Thrace  seemed  to  be  a  valuable  card  for  the  upcoming 
conference.  An  isolated  and  unsupported  Greek  decision  to  remain  in  Eastern  Thrace 
despite  Allied  disapproval  would  have  immediately  marginalised  Greece. 
The  British  were  convinced  that  it  was  primarily  if  not  entirely,  due  to  their 
82  intervention  and  threatened  use  of  force  that  the  Turks  had  finally  signed  the  annistice. 
It  was  true  that  the  Turks  had  only  fought  for  Smyrna;  Eastern  Thrace  was  handed  over 
to  them  as  a  sign  of  reconciliation  and  good  will  on  behalf  of  the  Allies  and  Greece.  But 
the  negotiations  had  shown  the  hard  bargain  which  the  Turks  were  driving,  a  factor 
which  became  explicit  during  the  Lausanne  negotiations. 
THE  SITUATION  IN  GREECE-THE  EXECUTION  OF  THE  SIX. 
The  situation  in  Greece,  when  the  news  of  the  debacle  of  the  arrny  in  the 
Anatolian  front  reached  the  wider  public,  was  tense.  After  the  announcement  of  the 
flight  of  the  Greek  Army  there  was  a  Royal  proclamation  to  the  Greek  people.  The  King 
promised  to  the  people  'to  do  whatever  the  constitution  permits  and  material  interests 
demand.  '  He  explained  the  army's  misfortune  and  appealed  for  patriotism  and 
obedience  to  local  authorities.  83  Initially,  there  was  fear  not  only  for  the  fate  of  Thrace 
but  also  over  the  possibility  of  assaults  from  Serbia  and  Bulgaria.  Lindley  had  reported 
that  the  army  could  be  reformed  after  the  debacle,  'with  British  assistance  in  short  time.  ' 
'The  Navy  morale,  '  added  the  British  Minister,  'is  satisfactory  but  ships  lack 
essentials.  184  The  worst  however  had  already  started;  the  first  ships  with  refugees  that 
had  fled  from  the  interior  of  Western  Asia  Minor  and  Smyrna  itself  had  made  their 
81  MFA,  1922,18.7  Attitude  of  Great  Britain  and  France  on  the  Anatolian  Question,  no  10565,  Venizelos 
to  MFA,  9  October  1922. 
92  DBFP,  vol.  XVIII,  no  119,  Rumbold  to  Curzon,  II  October  1922,  p.  186-7. 
:3  PRO,  FO  371n585-CI2755/13/19,  Bentinck  to  F.  0,  II  September  1922. 
4  PRO,  FO  371n585-CI3290/13/19,  Lindley  to  F.  0,21  September  1922. 279 
arrival  in  Athens  and  in  other  parts  of  Greece,  contributing  to  the  political  chaos  that 
reigned  in  the  capital. 
In  the  Army,  upheaval  and  disorder  could  be  detected  long  before  the  debacle. 
There  were  serious  disagreements  among  the  officers  themselves  over  the  campaign  but 
also  grievances  against  the  political  leadership  of  the  country  which  seemed  unable  to 
assist  the  army  to  continue  the  fight.  In  critical  moments  in  the  history  of  the  Greek 
nation  the  army  had  been  a  factor  in  Greek  politics.  85  The  outbreak  of  the  military 
movement  this  time  took  place  in  Chios  and  Mitylene,  the  two  islands  closer  to  tile 
coast  of  Asia  Minor,  and  the  leader  and  initiator  of  it  was  Colonel  Nikolaos  Plastiras, 
supported  by  Colonels  Panagiotis  Gardikas  and  Stylianos  Gonatas.  Large  parts  of  the 
army  had  been  transported  to  these  islands  from  Asia  Minor  after  the  collapse  of  the 
front.  The  Revolutionary  Committee  asked  for  the  immediate  dethronement  of 
Constantine,  the  dissolution  of  the  Parliament  and  the  formation  of  a  government  that 
would  have  the  'trust  of  the  Entente.  '  On  13  September  1922,  the  forces  that  had  loyally 
followed  the  three  generals  arrived  at  Laurion,  a  port  of  Attica,  though  quite  distant 
from  Athens.  The  next  day  the  resignation  of  Constantine  was  the  main  issue.  86  The 
King  fled  to  Italy  where  he  died  in  exile  in  January  1923.  Prince  George,  Constantine's 
elder  son,  succeeded  him  on  the  throne.  87  Lindley  informed  London  that  the  demands  of 
the  Committee  included  the  abdication  of  Constantine,  the  resignation  of  the 
Government,  the  dissolution  of  the  Chamber  and  the  strengthening  of  the  Thracian 
front.  On  28  September,  the  Committee  assumed  authority  in  the  capital.  One  element 
85  See  for  example  the  1909  Military  coup  as  discussed  in  Chapter  One.  Further,  an  excellent  study  of  the 
role  of  the  military  in  Greek  politics  is  the  book  of  Thanos  Veremis,  The  military  in  Greek  Politics 
(London,  1997). 
86  Despite  the  feelings  of  resentment  that  the  British  Government  and  officials  of  the  Foreign  Office 
reserved  for  Constantine  there  was  British  assistance  to  the  Greek  royal  family  since  it  was  strongly 
believed  that  they  were  'in  very  grave  danger'  after  the  coup.  After  all,  it  was  the  belief  of  Foreign  Office 
that  a  continued  boycott  of  the  Greek  dynasty  would  strengthen  the  hands  of  the  Republican  Party  in 
Greece.  PRO,  FO  371n585-CI3597/13/19,  Lindley  to  F.  0,28  September  1922. 280 
that  was  equally  stressed  in  the  British  Minister's  communications  was  the  expressed 
aim  of  the  Committee  'to  deal  with  those  they  considered  responsible  for  the  national 
disaster  in  Asia  Minor.  '  88 
A  Committee  of  three  Generals  was  now  in  charge  of  Greece.  However,  the 
Committee  soon  started  to  associate  with  politicians  to  lend  themselves  an  air  of 
legitimacy.  in  early  October,  Venizelos  assumed  the  duties  of  Greek  representative  to 
Foreign  Powers.  Among  their  demands  the  members  of  the  Committee  were  asking  for 
the  punishment  of  those  responsible  for  the  debacle  in  Asia  Minor,  the  'rooting  out  of 
Constantinism,  '  and  complete  reconciliation  with  the  Allies.  89  They  were  categorical 
when  they  stressed  that  'only  the  universal  stigmatising  of  the  guilty  parties,  only  the 
most  profound  acknowledgement  of  the  irretractable  bonds  which  unite  Greece  with  her 
natural  Allies  can  complete  the  task  of  national  recovery  which  the  revolution  has 
initiated.  '90 
In  the  meantime,  the  British  officials  were  worried  about  the  future  standing  of 
Greece.  Their  hope  was  to  ensure  that  that  country  would  continue  to  be  on  their  side, 
despite  its  treatment  by  Britain.  Lindley,  in  July  1922  had  informed  Balfour  that  French 
attempts  were  aimed  at  the  dethronement  of  Constantine,  'followed  by  a  French- 
patronised  Greek  republic.  '91  'British  interests  demand  a  stable  and  prosperous  Greece,  ' 
underlined  the  British  Minister.  He  did  not  overlook  the  fact  that  Greece  owed  money  to 
the  British  business  community  and  there  was  need  to  ensure  their  return.  Crowe 
commenting  on  the  report  stressed  that  he,  as  well,  had  detected  'the  undermining  and 
diminishing  of  British  influence  and  interests  in  the  country  by  the  French.  '  Further 
87  King  George  was  also  forced  to  leave  the  country  in  1924  when  monarchy  was  abolished  in  Greece.  I  le 
returned  in  1935  after  its  restoration. 
88  PRO,  FO  371n586-CI4093/13/19,  Lindley  to  Curzon,  I  October  1922. 
89  PRO,  FO  37ln586-CI4828/13/1  1,  Lindley  to  F.  0,21  October  1922. 
90  Ibid. 
91  PRO,  FO  371n585-C9765/13/19,  Lindley  to  Balfour,  Minutes  by  Crowe,  I  July  1922. 281 
worries  were  expressed  over  French  'republican'  interest  in  the  course  of  summer 
1922.92 
A  special  Court-Martial  was  created  for  the  purposes  of  'the  universal 
stigmatising  of  the  guilty  parties,  '  as  the  Committee  had  proclaimed.  Initially,  many 
politicians  and  military  men  were  arrested.  However,  the  accused  men  who  were 
brought  to  court  were  Gounaris,  Baltazzis,  Protopapadakis,  Theotokis,  Stratos,  Stratigos 
and  General  Hadjianestis.  Curzon  had  repeatedly  instructed  Lindley  to  warn  the  Greek 
Government  not  to  allow  them  to  be  executed,  as  this  was  the  expected  punishment.  The 
strong  language  used  by  the  British  Secretary  did  not  deter  the  Committee.  93  The  British 
officials  in  Athens  believed  that  certain  members  of  the  Government  had  already  made 
up  their  minds  to  proceed  with  the  executions  despite  any  protests.  It  has  to  be  noted 
however,  that  Prime  Minister  Zaimis  had  asked,  in  an  interview  he  had  with  Lindley,  for 
Britain  to  take  the  responsibility  for  the  accused  ministers  not  to  return  to  Greece  for  10- 
15  years,  in  order  to  avoid  the  executions.  The  British  were  reluctant  of  course  to 
undertake  such  a  promise.  94 
The  accused  protagonists  of  the  Greek  tragedy  in  Asia  Minor  were  convicted  of 
'having  willingly  and  intentionally  allowed  an  invasion  of  foreign  troops  into  the 
territory  of  the  Kingdom,  '  and  further,  'on  the  action  of  Gounaris  in  entrusting  the 
Greek  case  to  the  Allies  and  in  concluding  a  financial  arrangement  with  His  Majesty's 
Treasury.  '"  Gounaris,  Baltazzis,  Protopapadakis,  Stratos,  Theotokis  and  General 
Hadjianestis  were  sentenced  to  death  while  Stratigos  and  Goudas  to  life  imprisonment. 
92  PRO,  FO  371/7585-C9765/13/19,  Lindley  to  Balfour,  Minutes  by  Crowe,  I  July  1922,  and  further,  -  PRO,  FO  371n585-C  11211/13/19,  Bentinck  to  F.  0,  Atchley  memorandum,  25  July  1922,  and  -  C12094/13/1  1,  Bentinck  to  F.  0,8  August  1922. 
93  PRO,  FO  371/7586-CI5517/13/19,  Lindley  to  Curzon,  3  November  1922.  And  FO  371n587- 
C15699/13/19,  Curzon  to  Lindley,  19  November  1922.  'HMG  will  be  compelled  to  cease  diplomatic 
relations  with  Greek  Government,  withdraw  their  Minister  from  Athens  and  no  longer  receive  Greek 
minister  here.  ' 
94  PRO,  FO  37ln688-CI6549/13/19,  FO  minute,  2  December  1922. 
95  DBFP,  vol.  XVIII,  no  201,  Lindley  to  Curzon,  18  November  1922,  pp.  287-91. 282 
On  28  November  1922  the  executions  took  place.  Britain  ruptured  its  diplomatic 
relations  with  Greece  as  Lindley  departed  from  Athens  the  same  day,  ]caving  Bentinck 
as  Charg6  d'Affaires. 
In  Britain,  the  whole  issue  of  the  executions  and  the  withdrawal  of  the  British 
Minister  from  Athens  was  discussed  and  debated  extensively  in  the  House  of  Commons. 
Britain  was  considered  to  be  one  of  the  three  Protecting  Powers  of  tile  Kingdom  of 
Greece.  Was  there  a  possibility  of  British  intervention  in  order  to  bring  tile  situation 
back  to  normal?  Since  Greece  was  still  regarded  as  an  'essential'  ally  in  tile  area,  the 
Foreign  Office  dealt  with  the  matter  thoroughly.  The  legal  adviser  of  the  Office,  Sir 
Cecil  Hunt,  was  called  to  answer  the  question  of  whether  the  action  of  the  Greek 
Government  in  executing  the  Greek  Ministers  was  constitutional  and  legal  and  whether 
Great  Britain  had  any  special  locus  standi  to  interfere.  His  conclusions  were  that  the 
execution  was  unconstitutional  and  illegal.  On  the  last  question  the  Foreign  Office 
expert  underlined  that:  'the  maintenance  of  the  [Greek]  Constitution  is  not  committed  to 
the  three  Guaranteeing  Powers,  Great  Britain,  France  and  Russia  but  by  Article  III  the 
preservation  of  the  present  constitution  is  committed  to  the  patriotism  of  the  Greeks.  96 
Meanwhile,  after  the  rupture  of  relations,  an  action  that  was  characteriscd  by 
Foreign  Office  officials  as  'a  medicine'  that  was  'working  effectively,  '  since  the  Greeks 
appeared  anxious  to  resume  relations,  there  were  repeated  attempts  on  the  part  of  tile 
Greeks  to  regain  British  support. 
97  The  reports  coming  from  Athens  compiled  numerous 
attempts  from  'Greeks  of  all  parties'  to  find  ways  to  win  back  the  favour  of  Britain. 
Sometimes  these  offers  went  to  extremes.  For  example,  Bentinck  had  described  the  visit 
of  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  the  Embassy  to  ask  him  to  convey  to  the  Foreign 
Office  the  following  propositions  in  order  to  resume  relations:  'Greek  Government 
96  DBFP,  vol.  XVIII,  no  263,  Minute  by  Sir  Cecil  Hunt  respecting  the  withdrawal  of  11.  M.  Minister  from 
Athens,  7  December  1922,  pp.  377-9. 283 
would  immediately  form  a  Cabinet  composed  of  politicians  and  civilians,  will  have 
general  elections  immediately  after  peace  had  been  established,  and  if  Great  Britain  was 
forced  into  war  against  the  Turks  Greece  was  ready  to  march  into  Eastern  Thrace  with 
10  divisions.  '  98 
In  the  beginning  of  January,  primarily  due  to  the  fact  that  negotiations  still 
dragged  on,  the  Greek  side  decided  to  play  again  the  card  of  the  Greek  Army  in  Western 
Thrace.  The  truth  was  that  there  was  concentration  of  Turkish  troops  into  Eastern 
Thrace  'under  guise  of  gendarmes.  '  However,  there  was  a  warning  issued  by  the  British 
Foreign  Office  to  the  Greek  Government  that  'a  renewal  of  hostilities  would  be 
universally  condemned  in  England.  '  Harold  Nicolson,  member  of  the  British  Delegation 
at  Lausanne,  had  interviewed  Venizelos  on  the  subject.  The  Greek  politician  had 
assured  him  on  the  decision  that  Greece  would  only  attack  with  British  and  French 
support.  The  Foreign  Office  official,  however,  pinpointed  the  fact  that  military 
precautions  had  been  undertaken  carefully  by  the  Greeks.  99 
Indeed  the  climate  in  Athens  was  reversed.  There  was  depression,  anxiety  and 
anger.  It  was  felt  that  the  country  had  already  given  up  too  much.  The  Conference 
which  was  supposed  to  bring  a  final  settlement  was  dragging  on  without  decisions  for 
months.  100  Moreover,  the  Greek  Army  seemed  capable  this  time  in  Thrace  of  proving  its 
efficiency.  101  To  make  that  more  explicit  Colonel  Plastiras,  the  leader  of  the  Committee, 
went  to  Lausanne  to  consult  with  Venizelos  in  early  February  1923.  Among  the  issues 
discussed  were  the  situation  in  Thrace  and  the  time  to  call  elections  in  Greece.  Tile 
anxiety  had  reached  a  climax.  There  were  substantial  fears  of  an  outbreak  of  hostilities 
97  PRO,  FO  371/8823-C  1848/153/19,  Bentinck  to  Foreign  Office,  29  January  1923. 
98  Ibid. 
99  DBFP,  Vol.  XVIII,  no  307,  Record  by  Mr.  Nicolson  of  a  conversation  with  M.  Venizelos,  4  January 
1923,  pp.  428-9. 
100  For  the  Lausanne  Conference  see  this  Chapter:  'The  Lausanne  Conference.  '  p.  284. 284 
in  Constantinople  at  the  expense  of  the  substantial  Greek  population  of  the  city.  The 
Greek  side  had  reasons  to  be  anxious  over  the  fate  of  the  Greek  populations  there  as 
well. 
THE  LAUSANNE  CONFERENCE. 
The  Lausanne  Conference  had  been  provided  for  in  the  armistice  of  Mudania.  102 
It  lasted  from  November  1922  to  July  1923  with  a  break  of  two  and  a  half  months  from 
February  to  April.  103  When  it  was  finally  signed  it  contained  143  articles,  3  conventions 
and  two  protocols  and  its  ratification  started  in  August  1924.1  04  Representatives  of  eight 
countries  took  part  in  the  proceedings:  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy,  Japan,  Romania, 
Serbia,  Greece,  and  Turkey.  The  United  States  and  Soviet  Russia  were  also  present.  105 
Curzon  and  Rumbold  represented  Britain;  the  head  of  the  French  delegation  was  Barrere 
and  the  Italian  representative  was  Garroni.  106  Venizelos  and  Ismet  Pasha  headed  the 
delegations  of  Greece  and  Turkey  respectively.  The  Prime  ministers  of  France  and  Italy, 
Poincard  and  Mussolini  attended  the  opening  session  of  the  Conference  at  the  Casino  de 
Montbenon  in  Lausanne  on  20  November  1922. 
101  Bentinck  sugg  ggested  that  the  general  feeling  in  the  capital  was  that  the  'Greeks  must  have  peace  or 
war.  '  In  DBFP,  Vol.  XVIII,  no  350,  Bentinck  to  Athens,  29  January  1923,  p.  478. 
102  For  the  records  of  proceedings  on  the  Treaty,  see  Great  Britain,  Parliamentary  Papers,  Lausanne 
Conference  on  Near  Eastern  Affairs,  1922-3,  Records  of  Proceedings  and  Draft  Terms  of  Peace,  Turkey, 
Cmd  1814.  For  the  text  of  the  Treaty,  Great  Britain,  Treaty  Series,  Treaty  of  Lausanne,  Cmd  1929,24 
July  1923.  A  selection  of  Curzon's  communications  and  summaries  of  the  proceedings  in  DBFP,  vol. 
XVIII,  Correspondence  and  Memoranda  relating  to  the  Conference  of  Lausanne,  20  Nov.  1922  to  5 
February  1923. 
103  The  minutes  of  the  first  phase  of  the  Conference  are  in  Cmd  1814.  The  discussions  of  the  second  phase 
were  conducted  entirely  in  French  and  there  is  no  English  version.  Sir  Horace  Rumbold,  who  had 
replaced  Curzon,  as  Head  of  the  British  Delegation,  in  his  communications  to  the  Foreign  Office 
surnmarised  the  proceedings  of  the  conference.  '04  Convention  conceming  the  exchange  of  populations  and  the  relative  protocol  (30  January  1923), 
Convention  of  the  regime  of  the  Straits  (24  July  1923),  and  the  Convention  on  the  border  in  Thrace  (24 
July  1923). 
105  The  Soviets  were  invited  to  Participate  in  the  negotiations  about  the  Straits. 
106  The  Foreign  Office  section  was  headed  by  Sir  William  Tyrell,  later  replaced  by  Sir  Eyre  Crowe,  Sir 
Andrew  Ryan,  Mr.  J.  Bullard,  Mr.  Eric  Forbes  Adam,  Mr.  A.  W.  Allen  Leeper  and  Sir  Adam  Bock.  The 
American  representatives  were  Mr.  Richard  Washburn  Child,  Mr.  George  Grew  and  Mr.  Copley.  The 
Soviet  delegation  was  headed  by  the  Soviet  Commissar  for  Foreign  Affairs  Chicherin. 285 
The  Conference  had  not  started  under  the  best  possible  circumstances.  Before 
the  opening  of  the  Conference,  the  French  had  asked  to  assume  the  command  of  the 
Allied  forces  in  Constantinople.  107  This,  however,  would  weaken  British  standing  in  the 
area  and  would  allow  the  Turks  to  exploit  it  during  the  conference.  Sir  Horace 
Rumbold,  who  had  been  called  by  Curzon  to  assist  him  in  the  negotiations,  had 
expressed  fears  that  more  difficulties  were  likely  to  arise.  In  the  meantime,  it  was  to  be 
expected  that  the  military  situation  of  the  Allies  in  Constantinople  would  deteriorate. 
The  Turks  were  about  to  install  themselves  in  Eastern  Thrace,  under  the  Armistice  of 
Mudania.  Their  military  superiority  would  then  be  far  better  and  more  efficient  in  the 
area  of  Constantinople  and  in  consequence  over  the  Straits.,  08  He  was  not  far  wrong  in 
his  fears.  The  negotiations  had  to  be  suspended  once  owing  to  the  Turks'  unwillingness 
to  co-operate.  109 
Turkey  had  come  to  the  conference  with  the  air  of  the  victor.  In  less  than  four 
years  the  defeated  Ottoman  Empire  had  been  reborn  from  its  own  ashes  and  was 
prepared  to  put  its  demands  on  the  negotiating  table.  Further,  the  Turks  believed  that 
they  had  on  their  side  the  support  of  Russia,  France  and  Italy.  Greece  had  already  lost 
and  evacuated  the  Smyrna  enclave,  and  Eastern  Thrace  was  already  in  the  hands  of 
Allied  garrisons  and  ready  to  pass  to  the  hands  of  the  Turks.  The  drawing  of  the  borders 
in  Thrace  was  now  its  primary  concern  with  the  issue  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  Aegean 
islands. 
The  representatives  of  Great  Britain,  France  and  Italy  assembled  to  discuss  the 
pro-conference  agenda.  Curzon  hoped  that  the  meeting  would  take  place  in  London  but 
instead  it  was  held  in  Paris.  In  the  cabinet  meetings  of  I  and  16  November  1922,  Curzon 
107  PRO,  FO  371n9l4-E  12965/27/44,  Tel.  sent  to  Curzon  by  P.  M,  FO  minute  Sir  E.  Crowe,  19 
November  1922. 
108  PRO,  FO  800/253,  Sir  Lancelot  Oliphant,  Tu  22/4  1,  Rumbold  to  Oliphant,  28  October  1922. 
109  From  February  to  April  1923. 286 
had  informed  his  colleagues  on  the  outline  of  the  issues  that  were  to  bc  discusscd:  tlic 
S&vres  issue  and  its  dismantling,  the  Straits,  Thrace,  Mosul  and  the  question  of  the 
capitulations. 
Allied  unity  in  general  tenns  was  corroborated.  It  was  not  that  Curzon  was 
convinced  that  there  would  be  no  problems  or  disagreements.  Ile  had  confidcd  to 
Hardinge,  who  represented  the  British  Government  in  the  preliminary  discussions  with 
the  French,  that  allied  unity  had  to  be  preserved.  'Unless  there  is  a  definite  agreement,  ' 
stressed  the  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  'that  they  [the  Allies]  will  stand  together  in 
resisting  the  extreme  Turkish  pretensions  which  increase  daily  and  are  already 
intolerable  there  will  be  no  advantage  in  holding  the  Conference  at  all.  ',  '  10  They  agreed 
on  the  freedom  and  demilitarisation  of  the  Straits,  the  Syrian-Iraqi  frontiers,  Western 
Thrace  and  the  continuance  of  the  occupation  of  Constantinople  until  the  signing  of  the 
Treaty.  '  11 
The  Turkish  representative,  Ismet  Pasha,  presented  his  case  on  23  November.  112 
He  claimed  the  whole  of  Eastern  Thrace  and  asked  for  a  plebiscite  in  Western  Thrace. 
The  objections  came  almost  immediately.  Greece,  Serbia  and  Romania  objected  to 
Ismet  Pasha's  opening  demands.  Curzon,  however,  eloquently  transformed  the  issue  of 
the  plebiscite  into  a  question  of  assigning  demilitarised  zones  in  the  region. 
Immediately,  the  Turks,  thanks  to  Curzon's  intervention,  were  placed  'in  minority  of 
one.  '  113 
:  '0  DBFP,  vol.  XVIII,  no  190,  Curzon  to  Hardinge,  13  November  1922,  pp.  269-7  1. 
11  DBFP,  vol.  XVIII,  no  204,  British  Secretary's  Notes  of  a  Meeting  between  the  French  President  of  the 
Council,  the  British  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  the  Italian  Ambassador  in  Paris,  held  at  the 
Quai  d'Orsay  on  November  18  1922,  pp.  292-307. 
112  Great  Britain,  Lausanne  Conference  on  Near  Eastern  Affairs  1922-1923,  OnJ  1814  (London,  1923), 
no  6,23  November  1922,  pp.  40-6  1. 
113  Nicolson,  Curzon:  the  lastphase,  p.  300. 287 
The  next  issue  on  Curzon's  agenda  was  the  question  of  the  Aegean  islands.  Two 
meetings  were  devoted  to  the  issue.  114  The  Turkish  representative  was  asking  for  the 
demilitarisation  of  the  islands  close  to  the  Anatolian  coast,  and  the  islands  of  Imbros 
and  Tenedos  standing  in  the  mouth  of  the  Straits  to  be  returned  to  Turkey.  The  Turks 
were  asking  additionally  for  the  island  of  Samothrace  while  the  islands  of  Lemnos, 
Mitylene,  Chios  and  Ikaria  were  to  be  placed  under  a  'special  regime.  '  Their  last 
demand  was  immediately  rejected.  Actually,  as  Harold  Nicolson  points  out,  Curzon  had 
deliberately  chosen  the  question  of  the  Aegean  Islands  to  be  discussed  in  the  beginning 
of  the  negotiations  because  he  believed  that  'by  choosing  an  area  in  which  Greek 
supremacy  was  still  unquestioned,  '  it  was  a  way  'to  afford  the  Greek  delegation,  an 
opportunity  to  acquire  confidence  and  prestige.  "  15  Unfortunately,  the  excellent 
intentions  of  Curzon  were  doomed  with  the  news  of  the  execution  of  the  Six  in  Athens, 
among  them  the  ex-Prime  Minister  Gounaris  and  his  Foreign  Secretary  Baltazzis. 
Immediately  Curzon  recalled  the  British  Minister  at  Athens,  Lindley,  and  sent  a 
message  to  Venizelos  suggesting  that  'it  would  be  preferable  if  he  were  to  absent 
himself  from  the  meeting  of  the  next  day.  '  116 
The  next  session  was  devoted  to  the  question  of  the  exchange  of  Greek  and 
Turkish  populations.  '  17  The  facts  and  figures  on  which  the  Conference  was  bascd  were 
taken  from  the  memorandum  of  Mr.  Rendell,  a  second  secretary  in  tile  Eastern 
Department  of  the  Foreign  Office.  Up  to  October  1922  at  least  500,000  Ottoman  Greek 
refugees  had  left  Asia  Minor.  These  figures  did  not  include  men  of  military  age,  who 
were  retained  by  the  Nationalists  for  service  in  labour  camps  in  the  interior  of  Anatolia 
and  young  women.  Further,  from  Eastern  Thrace,  the  figures  showed  that  up  to  Octobcr 
1:  4  Cmd.  1814,  no  9,25  November  1922,  pp.  94-10  1. 
15  Nicolson,  Curzon:  the  lastphase,  p.  301.  116 
Ibid.,  p.  302. 288 
300,000  Greeks  had  evacuated  the  territory.  Ottoman  Greeks  were  also  departing  from 
Constantinople  but  there  were  no  figures  included  in  the  report.  118  Tile  situation  was 
considered  grave.  Dr.  Nansen  who  was  the  expert  on  the  issue  believed  that  the 
exchange  would  'provide  Turkey  immediately  and  in  the  best  possible  conditions  with 
the  populations  necessary  to  continue  the  exploitation  of  the  cultivated  lands  which  thc 
departed  Greek  populations  have  abandoned.  The  departure  from  Greece  of  its  Moslem 
citizens  would  create  the  possibility  of  rendering  self  supporting  a  great  proportion  of 
the  refugees  now  concentrated  in  the  towns  and  in  different  parts  of  Greece.  "  19  Ile  was 
urging  for  the  exchange  to  be  made  'without  the  least  delay.  '  Both  Greek  and  Turkish 
delegates  agreed.  The  issue  was  referred  to  a  sub  commission  and  the  final  decisions 
were  debated  and  concluded  during  the  next  two  sessions.  120  Finally,  the  Convention  on 
the  exchange  of  minorities  was  signed  on  30  January  1923.  It  provided  for  'the 
compulsory  exchange  of  Turkish  nationals  of  the  Greek  Orthodox  religion  established 
in  Turkish  territory,  except  those  established  in  Constantinople  before  October  30,1918 
and  of  Greek  nationals  of  the  Muslim  religion  except  those  of  Western  Thrace.  '  121 
The  Straits  were  next  on  the  agenda.  122  Turkey's  position  on  the  control  of  tile 
Straits  was  best  illustrated  by  Article  IV  of  their  National  Pact  where  it  was  clearly 
stated  that: 
The  security  of  the  City  of  Constantinople,  which  is  the  seat  of 
the  caliphate  of  Islam,  the  capital  of  the  Sultanate,  and  tile 
headquarters  of  the  Ottoman  Government,  must  be  protected 
from  every  danger.  Provided  that  this  principle  is  maintained, 
whatever  decision  may  be  arrived  jointly  between  us  and  the 
"?  Cmd.  1814,  no  11,1  December  1922,  pp.  111-124,  no  23,10  January  1923,  pp.  313-337,  no  26,27 
January  1923,  pp.  406426. 
118  DBFP,  Vol.  XVIII,  No  202,  Memorandum  by  Mr.  Rendell,  17  November  1922,  pp.  292-307. 
119  Cmd.  1814,  no  11,1  December  1922,  p.  115.  Dr.  Nansen  was  appointed  by  the  League  of  Nationas  in 
1922  to  deal  with  the  refugee  question  in  Greece. 
120  Ibid,  no  23,10  January  1923,  pp.  314-  337  and  no  26,27  January  1923,  pp.  406426. 
121  Psomiades,  The  Eastern  Question  -the  last  phase,  p.  66. 
122  Cmd.  1814,  no  12,4  December  1922,  pp.  125-136,  no  13,6  December  1922,  pp.  136-154,  no  14,8 
December  1922,  pp.  154-165,  no  15,8  December  1922,  pp.  165-173,  no  19,18  December  1922,  pp.  228- 
260,  no  20,19  December  1922,  pp.  260-277,  no  28,1  February  1923,  pp.  447464. 289 
other  governments  concerned  with  regard  to  the  opening  of  the 
Bosphorus  to  the  commerce  and  traffic  of  the  world  is  valid.  123 
This  was  actually  the  preamble  of  Ismet  Pasha. 
Britain  had  seen  set  on  paper  its  ideal  plan  for  the  Straits  in  tile  Treaty  of  Rvres, 
according  to  which,  Greece  had  been  established  on  the  coast  of  Mannara  and  the 
control  of  the  Straits  was  given  to  an  international  commission.  124  This  time,  however, 
there  were  more  contestants  at  the  negotiating  table.  Among  the  others,  the  Russians 
were  represented  as  well,  with  M.  Chicherin.  The  Turks  were  the  first  to  present  their 
case  reading  Article  IV  of  their  National  Pact.  Then  it  was  the  time  of  the  Soviets. 
Chicherin  appeared  to  represent  Turkey  as  well.  He  was  asking  in  essence  that  tile 
Straits  be  permanently  open  to  vessels  of  commerce,  pen-nanently  closed  to  vessels  of 
war  and  that  Turkey  should  be  allowed  to  fortify  the  area  against  external  dangers.  125 
'The  Dardanelles  and  the  Bosphorus  must  be  permanently  closed  both  in  peace  and  in 
war  to  warships,  armed  vessels  and  military  aircraft  of  all  countries  except  Turkey.  '  126 
Kemal  himself  had  expressed  this  last  point.  127  The  Soviets  had  even  protested,  in  tile 
midst  of  the  Chanak  crisis,  against  the  apparent  British  schemes  to  have  the  final  word 
on  the  future  of  Constantinople  and  the  Straits. 
...  no  decision  on  the  Straits  taken  without  Russia  will  be  final 
and  enduring.  It  will  merely  sow  the  seeds  of  new  conflicts.  Tile 
freedom  of  the  Straits,  which  Great  Britain  had  in  mind, 
signifies  only  the  desire  of  a  strong  naval  power  to  control  a 
route  vitally  necessary  to  other  states  in  order  thereby  to  keep 
them  under  a  constant  threat.  This  threat  is  directed  in  the  first 
place  against  Russia  and  Turkey.  Great  Britain  is  dispatching 
military  forces  to  the  Near  East,  and  is  trying  to  drag  France  and 
123  Cmd  1814,  no  12,4  December  1922,  p.  127. 
124  Cmd  364,  Treaty  Series  No  11,  Treaty  of  Sývres. 
125  Curzon  had  surnmarised  the  Soviet  demands  for  a  mare  clausum  in  the  Black  Sea  in  a  telegram  to 
Crowe,  DBFP,  vol.  XVIII,  no  255,  Curzon  to  Crowe,  5  December  1922,  pp.  368-370.  lie  had  also 
commented  upon  the  Russian  plan  in  the  conference  saying  that  the  Russian  plan  had  'only  one  object  in 
view,  viz,  to  convert  the  Black  Sea  into  a  Russian  lake  with  Turkey  as  the  faithful  guardian  of  the  gates.  ' 
Cmd.  1814,  no  13,6  December  1922,  p.  14  1. 
126  Ibid,  no  12,4  December  1922,  p.  122. 
127  See  the  interview  of  Kemal  to  Ward  Price  of  Daily  Mail,  15  September  1922. 290 
Italy,  as  well  as  Yugoslavia  and  Romania,  into  the  war  with 
Turkey.  128 
What  did  the  British  military  think  of  the  Straits  and  Constantinople  now  that 
Greek  backing  in  Western  Asia  Minor  was  eliminated?  The  conclusion  was  evident: 
immediate  evacuation,  a  plan  supported  both  by  those  officers  on  the  spot  like 
Harington  and  the  Commanders  at  home.  'Our  force  at  Constantinople  is  not  a 
diplomatic  asset  at  Lausanne,  but  a  weakness  and  an  embarrassment,  '  to  mention  one  of 
the  comments  exchanged  by  the  military.  129  However,  the  Foreign  Office  and  Curzon 
were  implacable  in  their  strategy  to  use  the  British  military  presence,  however  linlited 
and  useless  according  to  the  military  thinkers,  as  their  powerful  card  against  tile  Turks. 
On  that,  in  a  letter  to  Harington,  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  Lord  Cavan,  had 
confided  that,  although  for  the  military  'the  defence  of  Constantinople  is  not  a  military 
proposition,  '  yet  he  stressed  that  'for  many  political  and  weighty  reasons  they  do  not 
wish  to  come  out  of  Constantinople  until  either  the  French  show  that  they  will  stand  for 
us  or  peace  is  signed.  '  130 
Curzon  presented  the  Allied  plan  for  the  Straits  the  day  after  the  Turks  presented 
theirs.  It  was  based  on  the  principle  of  'absolute  freedom  of  navigation  both  in  war  and 
peace.  '  The  plan  also  included  certain  zones  around  the  area  that  were  to  become 
demilitarised.  A  Committee  would  also  be  created,  composed  of  one  member  each  of 
the  states  of  the  Black  Sea  -  Turkey,  Russia,  Romania  and  Bulgaria,  and  those  powers 
that  had  commercial  interests  in  the  region,  Britain,  France,  Italy,  Japan,  United  States, 
128  A  note  sent  by  the  Soviets  to  the  Foreign  Ministers  of  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy,  Yugoslavia, 
Bulgaria,  Romania  and  Greece  and  the  Prime  Minister  of  Egypt,  24  September  1922  cited  in  Gokay,  A 
Clash  OfEmpires,  p.  14  1. 
129  PRO,  WO  137/5.  The  evacuation  of  Constantinople  and  the  freedom  of  the  Straits,  Memo  by  the  First 
Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  27  November  1922. 
130  PRO,  WO  106/6326,  Near  East  situation,  General  Staff  appreciation,  Cavan  to  I  larington,  20 
November  1922 291 
Yugoslavia  and  Greece.  The  President  of  this  Committee  would  be  tile  Turkish 
representative. 
On  8  December  1922,  the  Turkish  representative  agreed  in  principle  with  tile 
proposed  plan,  however  he  asked  for  certain  modifications.  Curzon  was  furious  with  tile 
Turks  and  their  demands.  13  1  The  fact  that  the  Turks  seemed  to  comply  with  the  Allied 
plan  had  managed  to  cause  a  blow  to  the  relations  of  Angora  with  Moscow.  The  Straits 
Convention  was  finally  agreed  in  February  1923  with  certain  modifications  that  the 
Turks  had  demanded  and  without  the  signature  of  the  Soviets.  It  called  for  the  freedom 
of  navigation  for  merchant  ships  and  the  passage  of  warships  was  restricted  on 
quantitative  terms.  132 
The  question  of  Mosul  was  another  thorny  issue  at  Lausanne.  133  The  Turks 
insisted  on  its  surrender  from  the  beginning.  Mosul  had  been  granted  to  France 
according  to  the  Sykes-Picot  Agreement.  In  1920  at  the  Conference  of  San  Remo  it  was 
handed  over  to  Great  Britain  as  part  of  the  Iraq  mandate.  The  Turkish  delegation  was 
firm  that  the  petroleum  rich  area  of  Mosul  was  part  of  Turkey  opposing  the  British 
position  that  the  area  belonged  to  Iraq.  The  spot  was  also  of  importance  to  Britain,  being 
in  the  strategic  line  of  communication  to  India.  134  The  view  of  the  War  Office  was 
"I  '[Turkey]  must  either  accept  Straits  convention  as  it  stands  or  lose  it  altogether.  '  DBFP,  vol.  XVIII,  no 
283,  Curzon  to  Crowe,  19  December  1922,  p.  398. 
132  'The  maximum  force  which  any  power  was  allowed  to  send  into  the  Black  Sea  in  time  of  peace  was 
not  to  be  greater  that  that  of  the  most  powerful  navy  of  the  Black  Sea  powers  ...  the  powers  were  permitted 
to  dispatch  a  force  of  no  more  than  three  ships,  the  individual  ships  not  to  exceed  10,000  tons.  '  In  F.  Val  i, 
The  Turkish  Straits  and  NATO,  (Stanford,  California,  1972),  p.  32. 
133  Cmd.  1814  no  24,23  January  1923,  pp.  337-393,  no  25,24  January  1923,  pp.  393405. 
134  'The  Britisii  Government  are  under  a  three-fold  pledge:  firstly,  to  the  Arab  nation,  to  whom  they  0 
promised  that  they  should  not  be  returned  to  Turkish  rule;  secondly,  to  the  Arab  king  who  has  been 
elected  by  the  whole  country,  including  Mosul,  and  with  whom  we  have  entered  into  obligations;  and 
thirdly,  to  the  League  of  Nations  without  whose  consent  we  cannot  abandon  our  Mandate  over  a  large 
portion  of  the  mandated  territory.  '  Cmd.  1814,  no  24,23  January  1923,  p.  353.  There  was  also  a  reference 
to  the  oil  issue  in  the  British  statement:  'It  is  supposed  and  alleged  that  the  attitude  of  the  British 
Government  with  regard  to  the  retention  of  Mosul  is  affected  by  the  question  of  oil.  The  question  of  the 
oil  of  the  Mosul  vilayet  has  nothing  to  do  with  my  argument...  If  the  exploitation  is  successful,  frak  will 
be  the  main  gainer  and  the  world  will  gain  also.  '  Ibid,  p.  36  1. 292 
however  that  Britain  should  not  allow  the  issue  of  Mosul  to  become  a  casus  belli  with 
the  Turks.  135 
British  and  Turkish  negotiators  had  been  engaged  in  an  exchange  of  meetings 
and  notes  in  order  to  reach  a  decision.  The  negotiations  were  futile.  Tile  issue  was  not 
resolved  with  the  Treaty  of  Lausanne  and  was  referred  to  the  League  of  Nations.  Curzon 
complained  in  his  communications  to  the  Foreign  Office  overall  on  the  attitude  of  the 
Turkish  delegates.  On  December  13  th  he  decided  to  put  his  complaints  in  spccch  form. 
He  attacked  the  Turkish  habit  of  raising  'barriers  to  the  peace'  every  day.  Neither  he  nor 
the  Allies,  stressed  the  British  Minister,  'were  prepared  to  sit  indefinitely  at  Lausanne 
while  this  process  was  repeated  in  every  subject.  '  136  The  sessions  on  Mosul  were  used 
for  the  two  parties  to  restate  their  arguments  and  defer  the  question  to  the  League  of 
Nations.  The  War  Office  maintained  that  Turkey  was  to  be  helped:  'Whether  we  like 
Turkey  or  no,  we  must  help  her  to  keep  out  of  the  clutches  of  Russia,  and  avoid,  if  we 
can,  doing  anything  to  drive  her  over  to  Russia.  "  37  Even  in  the  midst  of  the  tough 
negotiations  at  Lausanne,  where  the  level  of  Turkish  intransigence  was  annoying  for  all 
diplomats  who  were  trying  to  keep  track  of  Turkish  demands,  the  fear  of  Russia 
remained  paramount  for  the  military.  The  degree  of  influence  or  control  that  tile  Soviets 
could  exercise  over  Turkey  superseded  everything  in  importance. 
THE  FINAL  SETTLEMENT 
On  4  February  1923  the  Conference  broke  up.  The  Nationalist  Turks  strongly 
opposed  two  crucial  points:  the  first  was  the  issue  of  the  capitulations.  Mosul  completed 
their  resistance  to  any  kind  of  agreement.  On  6  March,  the  Turkish  National  Assembly 
officially  rejected  the  treaty  and  the  Allied  suggestions  on  the  two  issues.  The  Turkish 
135  PRO,  WO  106/6326,  General  Staff  Memorandum  10  January  1923. 
136  DBFP,  Vol.  XVIII,  no  275,  Curzon  to  Crowe,  13  December  1922,  p.  388. 293 
representatives,  according  to  the  calls  of  their  Assembly,  were  to  reopen  tile  discussions 
based  on  the  following:  complete  abolition  of  the  Capitulations,  deferment  of  the  issue 
of  Mosul,  demand  from  Greece  to  pay  reparations  and  finally  immediate  evacuation  of 
Turkish  territories  by  Allied  troops. 
Venizelos,  in  the  meantime,  was  working  on  concluding  an  arrangement  with 
the  Turks  on  a  bilateral  level.  Rumbold,  who  had  replaced  Curzon  as  Britain's 
plenipotentiary,  was  opposed  to  a  separate  Greco-Turkish  peace.  '  38  However,  it  was  no 
longer  feasible  for  Greece  to  remain  mobilised.  Vcnizelos  had  repeatedly  tricd  to 
persuade  the  British  representatives  that  a  preliminary  peace  treaty  with  the  Turks  was 
essential. 
...  La  Gr&e,  mobilis&e  depuis  huit  ans  bient6t,  ne  pourrait,  en 
effet,  supporter  pendant  longtemps  encore  les  lourdes  charges, 
disproportion6es  A  ses  forces,  que  le  maintien  d'une  armde  de 
200,000  hommes,  sur  le  pied  de  guerre  lui  impose.  Une 
ndcessit6  ineluctable  Foblige  de  penser  sans  aucun  delA  A  la 
demobilisation  de  ses  forces  militaires  afin  qu'elle  puisse 
revenir  ä  une  vie  nationale  normale.  139 
The  Greek  side  was  trying  to  enlist  British  support  for  tile  conclusion  of  tile 
preliminary  peace  with  Turkey.  Venizelos  was  doing  his  best  to  achieve  an 
understanding  with  the  Turks  on  the  issue  of  the  reparations.  The  demands  on  tile  Greek 
side  included  the  release  and  return  to  Greece  of  80,000  to  100,000  Greek  males  who 
had  been  kept  since  September  1922  in  work  camps  in  Anatolia.  In  addition,  the  Greek 
side  was  seeking  the  co-operation  of  the  Turks  to  put  in  force  the  exchange  of 
population  agreement.  These  steps  were  considered  absolutely  necessary  for  a  return  to 
137  RO,  WO  106/6326,  General  Staff  Memorandum,  10  January  1923. 
138  PRO,  FO  371/9104-E6189/6/44,  Rumbold  to  FO,  13  June  1923. 
1351  PRO,  FO  371/9105-E6583/6/44,  M.  Collas  (Greek  Delegation)  to  Mr.  Oliphant,  Copy  correspondencc 
between  Greek-Allied  delegates  at  Lausanne  regarding  eventual  conclusion  of  prelirninary  settlcment 
between  Greece  and  Turkey,  22  June  1923,  Copy  Venizelos  to  Sir  Ilorace  Rumbold,  President  of  the 
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normal  conditions  in  Greece.  Then  demobilisation  could  take  place.  Yet  tile  Allies  did 
not  yet  have  what  they  wanted  from  the  Turks. 
The  Foreign  Office  believed  that  the  presence  of  the  Greek  Army  remained  a 
potential  threat  in  the  event  of  a  rupture  of  the  Lausanne  negotiations.  Greece  wanted  to 
demobilise  and  the  Turks  would  more  than  welcome  such  a  step.  The  only  party  that  did 
not  entertain  the  idea,  so  long  as  there  was  no  conclusion  of  peace,  was  tile  Allies.  Tile 
Greek  army  could  still  be  a  potential  weapon  in  their  Allies.  However,  there  was  no 
expression  on  the  part  of  the  British  at  least  that  they  were  ready  to  put  any  forrn  of 
pressure  on  the  Greeks  not  to  sign  a  preliminary  peace  and  start  demobilisation.  140  Thus, 
a  preliminary  peace  between  Greece  and  Turkey  was  signed  on  13  June  1923.  However, 
Venizelos  had  agreed  'to  hold  his  hand  until  July  9,  '  as  Sir  Horace  Rumbold  transmitted 
to  the  Foreign  Office.  141  The  British  were  'hardly  in  a  position  to  ask  a  favour  of  thern,  ' 
as  Foreign  Office  officials  admitted  frankly  in  their  minutes.  142  Venizelos'  concern  at 
that  point  was  to  secure  the  immediate  return  of  the  remaining  Greek  prisoners  of  war 
kept  by  the  Turks,  and  of  80,000  males  of  Greek  origin  also  in  the  hands  of  tile  Turks. 
After  the  debacle  of  September  1922,  it  was  a  question  of  practical  politics  for 
Greece  to  pursue  a  policy  that  would  allow  the  end  of  all  possible  hostilities  with  tile 
Turks.  It  was  time  for  demobilisation  and  reorganisation.  Greece  had  started  this  course 
with  the  giving  up  of  Eastern  Thrace.  In  addition,  throughout  tile  negotiations  at 
Lausanne,  moderation  had  characterised  the  conduct  of  policy,  and  this  was  not  only  the 
outcome  of  being  the  defeated  nation.  The  Greek  Army  after  all  had  not  been  defeated 
in  Thrace.  The  Greek  nation  desired  peace  with  Turkey,  even  a  peace  which  would  not 
be  in  the  context  of  a  general  peace  with  the  Allies.  It  was  in  the  best  interest  of  the 
140  PRO,  FO  371/9105-E6753/6/44,  FO  minutes,  Oliphant,  Crowe,  30  June  1923.  141 
PRO,  FO  371/9105-E6979/6/44,  Rumbold  to  FO,  5  July  1923. 
142  PRO,  FO  371/9104-E6189/6/44,  Rumbold  to  Foreign  Office,  Minutes  by  Oliphant  and  Crowe,  13  June 
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nation  to  close  this  chapter  and  go  on.  Venizclos  had  repeatedly  stated  that,  seeing  the 
problematic  conduct  of  Allied  negotiations  with  Turkey.  'It  would  be  unfair,  '  stressed 
the  Greek  statesman,  'if  the  Powers  were  to  leave  Lausanne  in  the  event  of  a  breakdown 
in  the  general  negotiations  without  making  a  serious  effort  to  conclude  a  direct  peace 
between  Greece  and  Turkey.  '  143 
The  treaty  of  Lausanne  ceded  to  Turkey  all  the  territory  held  by  Greece  in  Asia 
Minor,  Eastern  Thrace,  Imbros,  Tenedos  and  the  Rabbit  islands,  while  sovereignty  over 
the  remaining  islands  of  the  eastern  Mediterranean  passed  to  Greece  as  specified  in 
article  12.  Finally,  all  Turkish  titles  and  rights  to  the  Dodecanese  were  transferred  to 
Italy,  along  with  the  island  of  Castellorizo.  In  effect,  Greece  failed  to  fulfil  its  national 
claims,  which  had  been  satisfied  by  the  Treaty  of  S6vres.  144 
For  Greece,  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  Lausanne  was  the  beginning  of  a 
new  era  in  the  sense  that  the  treaty  was  the  last  nail  on  the  coffin  of  the  Afegali  Idca  as 
the  chief  operative  goal  of  its  foreign  policy.  New  alternatives  and  new  sources  of 
inspiration  had  to  be  sought  for  the  nation.  Despite  the  drawbacks  and  the  controversies 
which  had  characterised  the  conduct  of  British  policy  in  that  part  of  tile  world,  the 
signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Lausanne  was  a  successful  paradigm  of  adjustment  to  the  new 
political  realities  with  as  many  gains  as  possible  or  as  few  losses  as  possible.  Britain 
was  still  in  a  position  to  assume  the  role  of  the  greatest  power. 
143  DBFP,  vol.  XVIII,  no  329,  Record  by  Mr.  Nicolson  of  a  conversation  with  M.  Venizelos,  15  January 
1923,  pp.  450-2. 
144  The  Treaty  of  Lausanne  contained  433  articles  and  a  large  number  of  lengthy  appendices,  along  with 
it  three  supplementary  treaties  on  western  Thrace,  Dodecanese  and  on  the  protection  of  the  minorities  in 
Greece,  also  two  conventions,  on  special  rights  of  vigilance  and  control  and  on  zones  of  influence  in 
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BRITAIN,  GREECE  AND  TURKEY  IN  THE  INTER  WAR  YEARS. 
By  October  1923,  afler  almost  five  years  of  Allied  occupation  of  Constantinopic 
and  the  Straits,  the  last  British,  French  and  Italian  troops  had  evacuated  the  city  via  tile 
Sea  of  Marmara,  among  them  General  Harington,  the  commander  of  the  Allied  forces 
and  the  remaining  British  forces  aboard  H.  M.  S.  Arabic  and  H.  M.  S.  Marlborough.,  45  By 
that  time,  with  the  Treaty  of  Lausanne  signed  in  July  1923,  there  was  freedom  of 
passage  established  over  the  Straits  and  demilitarisation  over  an  extended  area 
surrounding  them;  these  arrangements  had  satisfied  all  concerned  parties. 
In  the  coming  two  decades  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Second  World  War 
relations  between  Greece  and  Turkey  took  a  favourable  turn  for  both  countries.  Of 
course,  there  had  been  instances  where  relations  had  reached  low  ebb  due  to  the 
exchange  of  minority  populations  after  the  signing  of  the  Lausanne  Treaty.  However, 
after  some  years  of  tension,  with  the  return  of  Venizelos  to  the  Greek  political  scene  in 
1928,  a  door  was  opened.  First,  there  was  the  rapprochement,  under  the  initiation  of 
Venizelos  and  Kemal  which  resulted  in  the  signing  of  a  Greek-Turkish  Pact  in  October 
1930  in  Angora,  otherwise  called  the  Pact  of  Peace  and  Arbitration.  It  officially 
recognised  the  existing  territorial  boundaries  between  the  two  countries  and  accepted 
naval  equality  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean.  146  In  addition,  both  countries  also 
participated  in  the  signing  of  a  Balkan  Pact  signed  in  Athens  in  February  1934  between 
Greece,  Turkey,  Rumania  and  Yugoslavia.  147 
In  the  meantime,  British  influence  in  Greece  remained  intact  via  the  continuous 
commercial  links,  loans  and  assistance  for  the  refugees.  It  was  an  influence  which 
145  The  five  year  long  military  occupation  of  Constantinople  and  the  Straits  had  cost  Britain  roughly  the 
amount  of  L29,115,000.  PD.  C,  vol.  166,  c.  1861,16  July  1923. 
146  For  a  concise  overview  of  the  Greek-Turkish  Pact  of  1930  see  the  article  of  Ifigencia  Anastasiadou, 
'Venizelos  and  the  Greek-Turkish  Pact  of  Friendship  of  1930-  0  Bcviýkxo;  icat  To  EuqVOTOI)PKIK6 
T.  6P(Pwvo  (Dtkfctq,  '  in  Studies  of  Venizelos  and  his  times,  ed.  by  Thanos  Veremis  and  Odysseas 
Din-ýitrakopoulos,  pp.  309-393. 297 
remained  of  paramount  importance  even  under  the  dictatorial  regime  of  loannis 
Metaxas  who,  despite  his  inclinations  towards  the  fascist  regimes  of  Italy  and  Gcn-nany, 
recognised  that  the  interests  of  Greece  were  attached  to  the  power  that  dominated 
Eastern  Mediterranean  and  continued  to  work  on  good  relations  with  Britain  throughout 
his  regime.  148 
As  far  as  British  relations  with  Turkey  were  concerned,  the  situation,  despite 
being  complicated  by  the  initial  Turkish  preoccupation  with  their  country's  internal 
reconstruction,  was  especially  satisfying  for  British  interests.  Mosul  being  the  only 
unresolved  issue  in  1923  was  finally  settled  in  1926.149  There  were  hardly  any  anti- 
British  feelings  in  Turkey  after  the  Lausanne  settlement,  as  illustrated  by  the  amicable 
relations  of  the  two  countries  in  the  1930s.  It  seems  that  certain  factors  had  played  a 
considerable  role.  First,  it  was  the  fact  that  relations  between  Greece  and  Turkey  had 
finally  smoothed,  after  the  signing  of  the  Greek-Turkish  Pact  of  1930.  Turkey  had,  in 
the  meantime,  joined  the  League  of  Nations.  In  addition,  in  July  1937  the  country  had 
joined  Iran,  Iraq  and  Afghanistan  in  the  conclusion  of  the  Sadabad  Pact,  or  Middle 
Eastern  Pact,  a  regional  co-operation  agreement  between  the  four  countries,  which 
indirectly  involved  Britain,  being  the  mandatory  power  of  Iraq.  150  In  spring  1939 
Britain,  joined  by  France,  began  negotiations  on  a  treaty  of  mutual  assistance  with 
Turkey  which  was  finally  signed  on  19  October  1939.151 
147  Thomas  Gallant,  Modern  Greece  (London,  200  1),  p.  153. 
148  For  the  Metaxas'  dictatorship  and  British-Greek  relations  during  this  period  see  the  study  of  John 
Koliopoulos,  Greece  and  the  British  connection  1935-1941  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1977). 
149  MOSUI  was  eventually  awarded  to  the  British  mandated  Iraq.  However,  as  Sachar  points  out:  'The 
Turks  were  assured  a  ten-per-cent  share  of  the  region's  oil  profits  for  a  period  of  twenty-rive  years.  ' 
Sachar,  The  Emergence  ofthe  Middle  East,  p.  446. 
150  Omer  KQrkqt1oglu,  'Turco-British  relations  since  the  1920s,  '  in  Four  Centuries  of  Turco-British 
Relations  ed.  by  William  Hale  and  All  Ihsan  Bagiý  (Beverley,  1984),  p.  89. 
"I  John  Kingsley  Bridge,  'Turkey  between  Two  World  Wars,  '  Foreign  Policy  Reports,  XX,  16, 
November  1944,  p.  196. 298 
THE  SETTLEMENT  OF  THE  TROUBLING  NEAR  AND  MIDDLE  EAST. 
A  memorandum  composed  by  the  General  Staff  the  day  Lloyd  George  fell  from 
power  confirmed  the  change  in  Britain's  Near  Eastern  policy: 
We  must  recognise  the  re-establishment  of  Turkish  power, 
it  will  surely  be  to  our  advantage  to  do  everything 
possible  to  give  the  New  Turkey  the  chance  of  restoring 
order  in  her  own  house  and  defending  her  territory.  The 
Turks  are  nominally  a  small  nation,  and,  surrounded  by 
potential  enemies  as  they  are...  They  can  attack  no  vital 
points  in  the  British  Empire  (neither  Iraq  nor  Palestine  can 
be  considered  as  such),  and  therefore,  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  General  Staff,  so  long  as  our  relations  with 
them  are  friendly  it  is  to  the  advantage  of  HMG  to 
strengthen  them  in  a  military  sense  than  the  reverse.  152 
British  policy  had  returned  to  the  traditional  policy  of  'making  love  to  the  Turk,  9153 
burying  the  'anomaly'  of  the  Greek  option  introduced  by  Lloyd  George's  Coalition 
Government.  During  the  period  from  August  1922  up  until  the  signing  of  the  treaty  in 
July  1923,  British  policy-makers  were  compelled  to  take  account  of  two  considerations. 
The  first  of  these  was  the  recognised  necessity  to  have  a  proxy  in  the  region.  The  second 
consideration  derived  from  the  fact  that  the  Nationalist  Turks  had  managed  to  establish 
their  revolutionary  regime  as  the  only  political  force  in  Turkey.  The  return  to  the  old 
policy  had  been  of  course  a  gradual  process  which  had  started  from  the  second  half  of 
1920  and  ended  up  with  the  Lausanne  Treaty. 
After  the  debacle  of  the  Greek  Army  in  Western  Asia  Minor  in  September  1922, 
Constantinople,  the  Straits  and  Eastern  Thrace  lay  open  to  the  Nationalist  Turkish 
forces.  In  the  event  of  a  Turkish  march  over  the  area  Britain  would  have  faced  grave 
danger  and  a  possible  defeat,  given  their  limited  military  presence  and  thus,  their 
inability  to  resist.  Lloyd  George,  Churchill,  Balfour,  Birkenbead,  Home,  Chambcrlain, 
152  DBFP,  vol.  XVIII,  Memorandum  by  General  Staff,  19  October  1922,  pp.  984-9. 
153  The  phrase  belongs  to  Sir  Henry  Wilson  and  is  used  several  times  in  his  correspondence  during  the 
period  under  examination.  For  example  see  Wilson  to  Rawlinson,  28  December  1920,  in  Keith  Jeffery 299 
all  had  advocated  a  policy  of  confrontation  with  Kemal,  which  was  met  with  horror  by 
the  rest  of  their  colleagues.  Given  the  situation,  thus,  prima  facie,  the  conduct  of  a  part 
of  the  British  policy-making  elite  seemed  reckless.  However,  any  sign  of  succumbing  to 
Kemal's  demands  would  have  damaged  the  policy  which  had  been  decided  and  pursued 
since  the  Annistice  of  Mudros  of  November  1918:  British  presence  and  influence  over 
the  Straits  and  Constantinople.  In  essence,  it  was  exactly  this  stand  taken  against  Kemal 
at  Chanak  that  facilitated  Britain  to  maintain  its  standing  in  the  region  as  tile  greatest 
power.  It  further  contributed  to  the  efforts  of  the  Foreign  Office  to  arrive  at  a  most 
favourable  political  settlement  for  the  British  interests  at  Lausanne. 
Bonar  Law's  phrase  in  The  Times  article  of  8  October  1922:  'a  good 
understanding  with  Turkey  was  our  policy  and  it  is  essential,  '  was  indeed  followed  by 
the  British  experts  at  Lausanne,  who,  in  the  meantime,  managed  to  get  across  the 
message  to  the  Turks  that  Britain  intended  to  remain  in  the  region.  154  The  Near  East 
settlement  had  been  left  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  Foreign  Office  from  1922  onwards. 
Despite  the  French  and  Italian  'strategies'  to  see  the  Nationalists  taking  over  tile  control 
of  the  Straits  and  Constantinople  along  with  the  Soviet  attempts  to  assert  their  influence 
on  the  latter,  excluding  Britain,  the  Foreign  Office  managed  to  achieve  British 
objectives.  A  return  to  the  old  proxy  was,  indeed,  necessary  given  the  force  and 
establishment  of  the  Nationalist  forces  in  the  region.  However,  this  would  have  not  been 
so  successful  for  British  interests  if  it  was  not  for  the  masterful  negotiating  skills  and 
results  of  the  Foreign  Office,  which  had  admittedly  held  a  moderate  standing  towards 
the  Nationalists.  155 
(ed.  ),  The  Military  Correspondence  offield  Marshal  Sir  Henry  Wilson  1918-1922  (London,  1985),  p. 
212. 
154  See  the  handling  of  the  negotiations  with  the  Turks  by  Curzon  regarding  the  Straits  and  Mosul  in  this 
Chapter:  'The  Lausanne  Conference.  '  P.  384. 
155  See  Chapter  Four:  'The  question  of  Constantinople  and  the  attempted  British  rapprochement  with 
Kemal  prior  to  the  summer  offensive.  '  p.  195. 300 
It  was  the  combined  efforts  of  Curzon  and  the  Foreign  Office  officials  which 
contributed  greatly,  if  not  entirely,  to  the  successful  settlement  at  Lausanne.  It  was 
unquestionably  the  Foreign  Office  which  maintained  the  leadership  and  strong  will 
throughout  the  negotiations.  The  Conservative  Government  of  Bonar  Law  had  willingly 
left  matters  entirely  to  them.  However,  it  was  not  that  the  Foreign  Office  strategy  did 
not  face  criticisms:  the  military  had  throughout  insisted  on  the  immediate  withdrawal  of 
the  British  forces  from  Constantinople  and  the  Straits.  156  This  Turkish  demand,  if 
satisfied,  would  have  cost  the  British  dear  during  the  discussions  of  the  settlement.  With 
no  military  presence  to  oppose  them  the  Nationalists  could  have  occupied  the  area 
achieving  afait  acconipli. 
What  had  driven  British  policy-makers  during  this  period  was  what  had 
characterised  the  conduct  of  British  policy  in  that  part  of  the  world  for  decades:  the 
security  of  the  Straits  through  a  British  proxy  in  the  region.  Despite  the  drawbacks  and 
the  controversies  regarding  British  Near  Eastern  policy  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of 
Lausanne  was  a  successful  paradigm  of  adjustment  to  the  new  political  realities  with  as 
many  gains  as  possible  or  as  few  losses  as  possible.  Britain  had  managed  to  safeguard 
its  interests  and  to  maintain  its  paramount  influence  in  the  region  of  the  Near  and  the 
Middle  East. 
156  See  this  Chapter:  'The  Lausanne  Conference.  '  p.  284.  Especially  p.  290. 301 
Conclusion 
The  most  striking  feature  of  British  policy  towards  the  Near  East  during  the 
Period  between  the  end  or  the  Great  War  and  the  Treaty  of  Lausanne  in  1923  was  the 
gradual  return  to  the  traditional  policy  of  supporting  Turkey  as  the  British  proxy  in  the 
region  or  Western  Asia  Minor.  Nc%-crthclcss,  the  attempt  during  this  period,  from  1919 
to  1922,  to  rcplace  the  Ottoman  Empire  %%ith  Greece  was  a  realistic  alternative  for 
Britain  to  pursue  up  until  the  point  the  Greek  Army  lost  the  initiative  on  the  battlefield. 
The  Turks  had  thcmscl%-cs  rejected  British  influence,  succumbing  to  German  interests 
long  before  the  War  and  finally  allying  with  the  latter  against  Britain  and  its  allies. 
Thus.  British  policy  making  should  not  be  assessed  as  'failing'  to  back  the  right  horse, 
that  is  Turkey.  and  opting  for  Greece,  which  in  the  end  proved  unable  to  fulfil  the  role 
that  Britain  had  assigned  to  it.  This  brief  deviation  from  traditional  British  policy  should 
be  Placed  rather  in  the  context  of  the  general  redrawing  of  alliances  and  interests  before 
and  aller  the  end  of  the  Great  War. 
British  policy-mak-crs  %vere  faced  immediately  after  the  end  of  the  war  with  the 
same  complex  conundrum  -  how  to  safeguard  the  British  Empire  and  its  interests.  The 
a'M  "as  the  Preservation  and  if  possible  the  enhancement  of  British  power.  The  Near 
and  Middle  East  was  an  area  of  considerable  importance.  The  focus  of  British  policy 
makers  was  first,  Mesopotamia  and  second,  the  territories  adjacent  to  the  Persian  Gulf 
because  of  their  proximity  to  India.  The  area  of  the  Straits  and  Constantinople,  that  is 
NVCstcM  Asia  Minor,  although  not  of  considerably  less  value  seemed  less  of  a  priority. 
PolicY-makers 
considered  it  however  important  to  secure  the  area  and  it  certainly 302 
constituted  pail  of  the  Near  and  Middle  Eastern  policy-'  Since  the  annistice  of 
November  1918  and  up  until  the  final  settlement  of  Lausanne  in  July  1923  the  military 
occupation  of  Constantinople  and  the  Straits  had  cost  Britain  f29,1  11,000.2  Up  until  the 
beginning  of  the  twentieth  century  British  interests  had  been  served  by  having  a  faithful 
ally  in  control  or  these  precious  watcr%vays,  the  Ottoman  Empire,  now  the  defeated 
enemy.  Thus,  the  turn  to  an  alliance  or  rather  to  the  search  for  a  new  client  state  to 
replace  the  old  proxy  was  a  comprehensible  policy  for  Britain  to  pursue  at  the  end  of  the 
Great  War.  Greece  seemed  to  fulfil  the  requirements  of  such  an  ally:  to  provide  security 
for  the  Straits  by  the  means  of  occupying  the  territory  that  surrounded  them,  to  be  a 
faithful  guardian  of  British  interests  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean,  to  act  as  a  barrier  to 
Russian  ambitionS.  3  The  British  had  not  even  to  look  hard  for  this  new  state.  Greece  had 
C)ff  cred  itself.  True,  the  Greek  policy  did  not  prove  itself  efficient:  the  Greek  retreat  in 
September  1922  from  Asia  Minor  left  British  policy-makers  facing  a  crisis  that  could 
have  easily  led  to  a  yet  another  armed  conflict.  However,  Britain  had  kept  its  options 
open  from  the  beginning  of  the  venture.  When  the  Greek  Army  lost  the  initiative  in  the 
4  summer  of  1921  the  Greek  'proxy'  option  %%-as  immediately  abandoned  . 
A  Primary  British  aim  in  the  Near  and  Middle  East,  immediately  afier  the  end  of 
the  %Varý  had  been  the  safeguarding  of  the  Straits  and  Constantinople.  The  international 
regime  and  control  of  the  Straits  that  all  Allies  had  initially  agreed  upon  during  their 
Preliminary  negotiations  before  and  after  the  end  of  the  Great  War  could  have  provided 
this-  110%vcvcr.  no  po%ver  was  willing  to  provide  the  necessary  military  back-up  to  such  a 
scheme.  Greece  seemed  ready  to  provide  %,.,  hat  Britain  needed  in  the  area,  initially  at  its 
PRO.  WO  106,64,  'The  strategic  importance  of  Constantinople  to  the  British  Empire'  General  Staff, 
ýý*O-  22  December  1919.  With  a  note  that.  'T'he  paper  has  been  submitted  to  the  Admiralty,  who  concur.  ' 
PD.  Cý  voL  166,  c.  1861,16  July  1923.  3  See  Chapter  Three:  'The  San  Remo  Conference  and  the  unleashing  of  Greek  designs  in  Asia  Minor:  The 
British  sanction  Of  June  1920  and  the  Greek  advance.  '  p.  126.  Especially  the  decision  taken  at  Hythe. 
P-  134.  See  also  'The  dilemma  of  Greek  sanction  and  the  British  Cabinet's  "silent"  acquiescence.  '  p.  134. 303 
own  expense,  as  long  as  this  would  serve  Greek  interest  in  the  region,  that  is  to  secure 
occupation  of  an  extended  area  in  Western  Asia  Minor,  far  beyond  the  city  and  the 
5 
sandjak  of  Smyrna. 
The  military  back-up  that  Greece  could  provide  served  British  interests,  taking 
into  consideration  the  decisions  already  taken  in  the  realm  of  expenditure  for  Britain 
and  since  accommodation  with  the  Nationalists  was  at  this  point  impossible.  The 
Turkish  Nationalists  were  not  willing  to  accept  anything  less  than  the  independence  and 
return  of  the  region  of  the  Straits  and  the  capital  to  the  Turkish  nation.  6  In  the  meantime, 
Britain's  chief  aim  remained  the  safeguarding  of  the  Empire.  The  policies  adopted  and 
thus,  the  reactions  to  all  stimuli,  stemmed  from  this  principle:  the  security  of  the  Empire 
and  its  smooth  functioning.  Britain  did  not  face  real  strategic  threats  in  this  area  but 
aimed  to  be  aware  of  and  to  eliminate  all  possible  sources  of  disruption  and  disorder.  ' 
Thus,  in  the  absence  of  an  alternative  policy,  the  solution  of  keeping  Greece  as  the 
British  proxy  continued  under  the  'silent'  acquiescence  of  the  British  government  well 
after  the  1920  summer  advance:  The  Greeks  promised  to  keep  the  Nationalist  Turks 
from  troubling  the  British  forces  even  in  Mesopotamia,  since  they  would  keep  them 
engaged  in  Anatolia.  The  Greek  option,  or rather  the  Greek  Army,  was  serving  British 
interests  even  after  the  failure  of  the  1921  summer  offensive.  'It  was  most  desirable  that 
4  See  Chapter  Five:  'Angora  rejoiced  and  Athens  despaired:  The  London  response.  '  p.  222. 
5  This  had  been  the  case  especially  after  the  British  sanction  for  the  Greek  advance  in  June  1920  which 
secured  an  extended  area  around  the  Straits  and  Constantinople. 
6  See  Chapter  Three  for  the  Nationalists'  declaration  and  aims:  'The  shift  in  the  military  situation  in 
Anatolia  and  the  Bolshevik  factor  in  British  thinking.  '  p.  134. 
7  PRO,  CAB  24/132,  C.  P.  3619,  Memo  by  General  Staff,  20  January  1922.  'We  have  definite  evidence  of 
a  world-wide  conspiracy  tormented  by  all  the  elements  most  hostile  to  British  interests  Sinn  Feiners  and 
Socialists  at  our  own  doors.  Russian  Bolsheviks,  Turkish  and  Egyptian  Nationalists  and  Indian 
Scditiorlists.  Up  to  the  present  we  have  been  lucky  in  not  having  experienced  trouble  in  more  than  one 
theatre  at  the  same  time,  but  when  it  is  remembered  that  the  hostile  combination  is  working  with  the 
connivance  -  if  not  under  the  active  direction  of  -  the  German  Foreign  Office,  it  would  be  folly  to  ignore 
the  probability  of  better  co-ordinated  attacks  in  the  future.  ' 304 
the  Greek  Army  should  be  kept  in  being  until  the  negotiations  with  the  Turks  were 
completed.  8 
Britain  had  managed  to  remain  an  influential  factor  in  the  area  of  the  Straits  and 
retain  its  predominant  position  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean;  this  had  been  tile  aim  from 
the  beginning  and  this  is  what  Britain  pursued  successfully  in  the  case  of  tile  Greek- 
Turkish  conflict  in  Asia  Minor.  Britain  did  not  face  any  real  strategic  threat  in  tile 
region.  There  was  no  need  to  pursue  stem  measures,  i.  e.  strong  and  effective  military 
backing,  a  measure  pursued  in  the  other  theatres  of  the  region,  Mesopotamia  and  the 
adjacent  to  the  Persian  Gulf  territories.  With  the  unsuccessful  occupation  and 
consequent  expulsion  of  the  Greeks  from  the  area,  British  prestige  was  only  slightly 
damaged  but  at  least  there  was  a  scapegoat  for  the  whole  venture:  David  Lloyd  George 
and  his  pro-Greek  policy.  This  is  a  view  held  by  many  scholars.  For  example,  C.  J. 
Lowe  and  Michael  Dockrill  underline  that:  'It  must  be  admitted  that  the  Prime 
Minister's  judgement,  usually  accurate  when  dealing  with  Russia  and  Germany  in  1919- 
1920  deserted  him  in  the  case  of  Turkey.  '9  In  addition,  Kenneth  Morgan  comments  on 
the  Greek  policy  of  Lloyd  George:  '[It]  was  the  one  great  aberration  in  Lloyd  George's 
foreign  policy,  the  one  area  of  belligerent  commitment,  totally  at  variance  with  his 
otherwise  conciliatory  policy.  "O  This  thesis  has  argued  that  up  to  1920  Lloyd  George's 
Policy  of  Greece  replacing  Turkey  was  not  thoughtless;  criticism  certainly  may  be 
directed  at  the  conduct  of  his  favourcd  policy  but  not  against  the  decision  per  se. 
In  addition,  for  the  British  policy-makers,  if  there  was  to  be  a  conflict  in  a 
broader  sense  in  the  region  of  the  Straits,  British  interests  were  served  by  the  existence 
of  a  Proxy,  a  proxy  which  had  to  be,  on  purely  geopolitical  grounds,  either  Turkey  or 
8  See  Chapter  Five:  'Angora  rejoiced  and  Athens  despaired:  The  London  response.  '  p.  222.  Especially 
r.  226. 
Lowe  and  Dockrill,  The  mirage  ofpower,  p.  373. 
10  Morgan,  Consensus  and  disunity,  p.  319. 305 
Greece  who  fought  the  British  cause.  Although  in  the  opinion  of  the  Prime  Minister  of 
1918-1922  the  right  choice  was  Greece,  for  a  considerable  majority  of  tile  British 
policy-making  elite  it  ought  to  have  been  Turkey,  the  successor  of  tile  traditional  British 
ally,  the  Ottoman  Empire.  When  the  Greek  forces  failed  to  establish  themselves  in 
Anatolia  the  British  turned  again  to  Turkey.  It  was  simply  a  realpolitik  decision.  11 
British  policy-makers,  and  we  could  claim  Lloyd  George  himself,  despite  his 
flamboyant  and  reckless  behaviour  in  certain  instances  during  the  last  two  years  of  tile 
Greek  presence  in  the  region  of  Anatolia,  had  retained  a  passive,  non-committal 
attitude.  '  2  Even  in  the  first  two  enthusiastic  years  of  the  Greek  occupation  of  Westerri 
Asia  Minor,  during  which  Lloyd  George  vigorously  supported  the  Greek  option,  there 
was  no  substantial  policy  that  could  back  the  Greeks  up  properly.  In  June  1920  there 
was  the  perfect  opportunity  for  Greece  to  attempt  a  decisive  advance  against  the 
Nationalists  after  the  attack  at  Ismid.  Then  with  British  backing,  at  a  time  when  the 
Turks  were  still  not  substantially  supported  by  Britain's  foes  and  friends  alike,  Greece 
could  have  struck  the  decisive  blow.  13  However,  British  military  thinkers  did  not 
support  such  a  move.  Lloyd  George  did  not  object  to  their  decision.  14  Lloyd  George's 
support  was  from  the  beginning  dependent  upon  under  certain  conditions,  that  'would 
have  to  be  reviewed  in  the  event  of  the  Greeks  failing  to  maintain  their  position  in  the 
area.  "'  It  is  true  a  large  party  of  the  Cabinet  and  the  leading  Departments  believed  that 
This  has  been  the  'accusation'  of  a  party  of  Greek  writers  immediately  after  the  Asia  Minor  debacle. 
See  for  example  the  work  of  Christophoros  Angelomatis,  Chronicle  ofa  great  tragedy  -,  VpoviK6v 
ME70qq  Tpa7w&aq  (Athens,  n.  d). 
12  See  Chapter  Four:  'The  impact  on  the  British  Near  Eastern  policy  -  The  British-Greek  discussions  of 
winter  192  L'  p.  18  1.  Another  'futile'  and  unnecessary  intervention  was  Lloyd  George's  speech  in  the 
House  of  Commons  in  August  1922,  days  before  the  final  Greek  debacle  in  Asia  Minor.  See  Chapter 
Five:  'The  Asia  Minor  Defence  Movement  and  the  illusive  plan  for  a  Greek  occupation  of 
Constantinople.  '  p.  236. 
13  The  Greek  General  Staff  during  the  surnmer  of  1920  had  specifically  asked  for  further  operations  to 
secure  firmer  borders  and  strike  a  decisive  blow  to  the  Turkish  forces.  See  Chapter  Four:  'The  Venizelist 
arameter.  9  p.  152 
4  In  Chapter  Three:  'The  dilemma  of  Greek  sanction  and  the  British  Cabinet's  "silent"  acquiescence.  ' 
V;  13  1.  See  also  Chapter  Four:  'The  November  1920  Greek  elections  and  the  defeat  of  Venizelos.  '  p.  156. 
PRO,  CAB  23/23,2  December  1920. 306 
Greece  did  not  have  the  fighting  capacity  to  maintain  its  position  by  its  own  means. 
Greece,  however,  put  itself,  on  military  terms,  out  of  the  game  only  in  1921.  Up  until 
that  point,  the  Greek  Army  had  retained  the  initiative  on  the  battlefield.  16 
It  has  often  been  stated  that  the  Greek  landing  at  Smyrna  and  what  followed  was 
entirely  a  Lloyd  Georgian  'scheme.  '  It  is  true  that  the  British  Prime  Minister  favoured 
Greece  rather  than  Italy  in  the  area,  but  the  same  preference  was  shown  by  tile  Foreign 
Office  and  the  Admiralty  as  well,  since  Italy  was  a  manqui  maritime  superpower  in  tile 
Eastern  Mediterranean.  17  One  of  the  British  aims  for  the  region  was  to  avoid  exactly  tile 
overwhelming  pre-eminence  of  any  one  state  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean.  Thus,  when 
the  circumstances  arose,  and  it  was  a  matter  of  choice  as  who  would  get  hold  of 
Smyrna,  the  British  Premier,  along  with  President  Wilson,  equally  annoyed  by  tile 
conduct  of  the  Italians,  favoured  a  Greek  landing  in  the  area  in  order  to  keep  order  and 
safeguard  the  Christian  populations.  "  Unlike  President  Wilson's  aims,  British  aims  did 
not  hold  the  fate  of  local  populations  as  their  primary  concern.  British  support  was  not 
an  'emotional  impulse.  '19  Opting  for  Greece  remained  an  option  until  the  fighting 
capabilities  and  strength  of  the  Greek  forces  were  exhausted. 
The  British  Prime  Minister's  'Greek  policy,  '  however,  was  one  of  the  points  of 
disagreement  with  the  Foreign  Office,  partly  because  on  that  matter,  as  in  various 
others,  he  oflen  acted  on  his  own  initiative  and  the  advice  of  his  close  associates.  Lloyd 
George  had  been  characterised  as  'one  of  the  chief  sources  of  embarrassment  to  the 
16  See  Chapter  Three:  'The  dilemma  of  Greek  sanction  and  the  British  Cabinet's  "silent"  acquiescence.  ' 
fi  13  L  Also,  Chapter  Four:  'The  War  Off  ice  "alternative":  Turkey  reconsidered.  '  p.  184. 
See  Chapter  Two  on  Paris  negotiations  and  Britain's  decision  to  back  Greek  claims  in  Western 
Anatolia  rather  than  Italy's  landing  at  Adalia:  'The  Allied  decision  for  the  Greek  landing  at  Smyrna.  '  p. 
88. 
18  The  Italians  in  April  1919  had  occupied  Adalia  and  had  secretly  landed  troops  at  Budrurn,  Makri  and 
Alaya. 
19  'The  idea  which  prompted  our  support  of  Greece  was  no  emotional  impulse,  but  the  natural  expression 
of  our  historical  policy  -  the  protection  of  India  and  the  Suez  Canal  ... 
Geographically  the  position  of 
Greece  was  unique  for  this  purpose:  politically  she  was  strong  enough  to  be  completely  subservient  in 
war.  '  PRO,  FO  286/732,  Future  Policy  towards  Constantine  by  Mr.  Nicolson,  20  December  1920. 307 
Foreign  Office  during  the  three  years  after  the  war.  20  However,  the  British  Prime 
Minister  had  not  been  entirely  alone  on  his  'Greek  policy.  '  Foreign  Office  experts 
believed  that  if  Greece  were  not  allowed  to  land  forces  in  the  region,  Italy  was  ready  to 
step  in  and  occupy  large  chunks  of  territories  on  the  shores  of  Western  Asia  Minor, 
especially  in  the  beginning  of  1919.  Italy  was  not  a  small  regional  ally  for  Britain.  It 
was  rather  a  medium  power  ready  to  challenge  British  supremacy  in  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean.  21  In  addition,  Lloyd  George's  policy  was  never  backed  sufficiently  to 
cause  a  serious  and  irreversible  break  in  the  government.  Lastly,  the  Greek  case  had  not 
been  the  only  instance  in  which  Lloyd  George  made  use  of  the  services  of  the  circle  of 
his  personal  friends  and  advisers.  22 
Lloyd  George's  Greek  policy  was  conducted  on  two  levels.  On  the  official, 
diplomatic  level  the  British  Prime  Minister  gradually  retreated  from  his  initial  pro- 
Greek  attitude  using  as  an  excuse  the  outcome  of  the  Greek  elections  of  November  1920 
and  the  overthrow  of  Venizelos.  However,  on  the  level  of  the  private  prime-ministerial 
foreign  policy  which  he  enjoyed  practising,  Lloyd  George  lent  his  support  to  Greece. 
Even  at  the  eleventh  hour,  Lloyd  George  gave  the  following  advice  to  the  Greeks:  'A 
quick  settlement  would  be  a  bad  settlement  for  Greece.  They  must  be  patient  and  stick  it 
out.  '  23 
In  the  case  of  the  Anatolian  debacle,  it  seems  that  Lloyd  George  had  initially 
held  the  belief  that  in  the  end  his  policies  would  succeed.  This  was  not  the  case:  lie  was 
20  Maisel,  The  Foreign  Ojjice  and  Foreign  Policy,  p.  64.  A  widely  held  view  supported  by  scholars  such 
as  Dockrill  and  Goold,  Peace  without  Promise  (London,  198  1),  Anthony  Lentin,  Guilt  at  Versailles 
(London,  1984),  Alan  Sharp,  'The  Foreign  Office  in  eclipse,  1919-1922,  '  History,  61,1976. 
21  See  Chapter  Two:  'The  Allied  decision  for  the  Greek  landing  at  Smyrna.  '  p.  88. 
22  During  the  War  Lloyd  George  'much  to  the  embarrassment  of  Spring  Rice  he  sent  Lord  Northcliffe,  the 
proprietor  of  Yhe  Times,  to  Washington  as  the  head  of  a  British  War  Mission,  and  to  the  irritation  of 
Bertie,  who  was  still  ambassador  at  Paris,  he  consorted  with  Lord  Esher,  who  had  crideavoured  to 
establish  himself  as  a  sort  of  unofficial  intermediary  between  the  British  and  French  governments.  '  In 
Keith  Hamilton,  and  Richard  Langhorne,  Thepractice  ofdiplomacy,  its  evolution,  theory  and 
administration  (London,  1995),  p.  146. 
23  HLRO,  Lloyd  George  Papers,  F/86/2/3,  Lloyd  George  to  Venizelos,  30  May  1922. 308 
the  leader  of  a  Coalition  government  with  no  majority  of  his  own,  his  powcr  rcsted  on 
the  Conservative  Party  and  their  consent.  Gradually,  he  was  changing  his  attitudc  to  his 
prior  convictions.  Lloyd  George  after  the  November  1918  elections  was  no  longcr  the 
War  Prime  Minister,  in  charge  of  a  six-member  War  Cabinet.  Ile  had  to  takc  into 
consideration  the  opinions  of  an  enlarged  peacetime  Coalition  Government.  Ilowcvcr, 
despite  their  disagreements,  none  of  those  opposed  had  resigned  in  order  to  dcclarc 
openly  their  dissent.  And  when  the  Nationalist  forces  of  Kemal  attacked  the  British 
stationed  at  Ismid,  none  of  them  rejected  the  help  'offered'  by  Vcnizelos.  In  a  sense, 
they  remained  and  shared  the  effects  of  their  agreed  policies.  The  disagreements  were 
there  and  were  recorded.  However,  it  is  the  action  and  the  steps  taken  that  make  tile 
difference. 
The  British  Prime  Minister  had  indeed  encouraged  the  Greeks  outside  of  formal 
channels  to  continue  fighting.  This  naturally  is  not  recorded  in  Lloyd  George's 
Memoirs.  However,  it  was  one  of  the  Prime  Minister's  close  associates,  Sir  Maurice 
Hankey,  along  with  the  various  intercepted  messages  from  the  Greek  Embassy  in 
London  to  Athens  in  the  critical  winter  of  1921  which  support  the  contention,  liowcvcr 
circumstantial,  of  his  'independent  course  of  action.  '24  Hankey  had  personally  delivered 
the  message  to  the  Greek  Delegation.  When  all  facts  and  projections  showed  that  there 
was  only  one  way  out  of  the  crisis:  assistance  in  real  terms  or  retention  of  a  delimited 
zone  of  Greek  occupation,  Lloyd  George  gave  his  blessing  to  the  fateful  course  of 
925  Greece.  He  advised  the  Greeks  'to  strike  a  blow  at  M.  K.  [Mustapha  Kemal]. 
According  to  Frances  Stevenson,  Lloyd  George's  mistress  and  secretary,  and  later  his 
second  wife,  'he  is  perfectly  convinced  he  is  right  over  this,  &  is  willing  to  stake 
24  See  Chapter  Four  for  the  advice  from  Downing  Street  that  the  Greeks  were  receiving  :  'The  Greck  case 
reconsidered  -  The  changes  in  the  Army  -  The  internal  situation.  '  p.  165. 
25  Hankey's  Diary  entry  for  9  March  192  1,  Roskill,  Hankey,  p.  222. 309 
everything  on  it.  '  26  He  did  not  'stake  everything.  ý27  Evidence  that  the  British  Prime 
Minister  wholeheartedly  supported  Greece  in  its  imperialistic  advcliturc  is 
circumstantial.  His  actions  and  interventions,  apart  from  the  decision  for  the  Grcck 
landing  at  Smyrna  and  the  June  1920  consent  for  the  offensive,  which  allcr  all 
safeguarded  British  interests,  were  not  decisive  and  did  not  constitute  the  real  help  that 
Greece  required. 
Curzon  played  an  equally  prominent  role  in  the  Greek-Turkish  entanglement. 
The  Foreign  Secretary's  wish  was  to  see  the  treaties  work  and  himself  in  the  Prime 
Minister's  seat.  He  understood  that  the  former  could  happen  only  if  the  Greeks  managed 
to  impose  the  terms  on  the  Nationalist  Turks.  Thus,  he  had  tacitly  sided  with  Lloyd 
George  when  the  Prime  Minister  had  decided  to  let  things  take  their  own  coursc  by 
leaving  the  two  sides  workout  their  differences  on  the  battlefield.  Actually  there  was  a 
point  when  Curzon  was  accused  'by  Montagu  of  being  pro-Greek,  by  Lloyd  George  of 
being  pro-Turk,  and  of  being  freely  belaboured  by  both  parties.  '28  In  fact  Curzon  was 
only  'belaboured'  by  his  wish  to  see  himself  first  successful  in  his  office  and  then  as 
Prime  Minister. 
The  Foreign  Secretary  did  not  share  Lloyd  George's  enthusiasm  for  the  Grcck 
option.  However,  he  did  not  opt  for  the  Ottoman  one  either  for  Constantinople  or  the 
Straits.  Lloyd  George  and  the  Foreign  Secretary  had  worked  together  on  the  Treaty  of 
S&vres.  It  was  Curzon's  own  plan  to  ask  the  Greeks  in  June  1921  to  place  their  fate  in 
Allied  hands  and  Lloyd  George  and  the  Cabinet  approved.  The  Greeks,  however, 
rejected  the  Allied  offer,  confident  that  they  could  strike  a  blow  and  manage  to  defeat 
26  Frances  Stevenson's  Diary  entry  for  20  July  192  1,  A.  J.  P  Taylor,  ed.,  Lloyd  George  -A  Diary  by 
Frances  Stevenson  (London,  1971),  p.  230. 
27  In  a  speech  at  the  Manchester  rcfonn  Club,  Lloyd  George  tried  to  defend  the  'Greek  policy.  '  adding 
that  it  was  not  his  policy  alone.  For  the  full  text  of  the  speech,  see  The  Times,  16  October  1922.  Tile 
speech  was  delivered  though  on  14  October  1922. 310 
the  Turks  on  the  battlefield.  The  Greek  rejection  was  probably  bitterly  swallowed  by  the 
Foreign  Secretary.  Douglas  Dakin  actually  suggests  that  the  Greek  rejection  'weakened 
the  resolution  of  a  man  who  might  have  fought  harder  for  them,  and  they  certainly  gave 
him  some  excuse  for  his  halting  retreat  under  French  pressure  in  the  year  that 
followed.  929  Curzon's  contribution  to  the  preservation  of  British  standing  in  tile  area  had 
been  considerable.  It  was  largely  due  to  his  insistence  that  in  May  1921  tile  British 
government  did  not  give  in  to  the  recommendations  of  Wilson  and  Harington  for  British 
withdrawal  from  Constantinople.  30  Britain  would  not  have  the  luxury  of  insisting  on  a 
settlement  which  was  favourable  to  its  interests  in  the  Straits  if  the  British  forces  were 
withdrawn.  Further,  Curzon  had  the  chance  to  achieve  a  great  victory  and  gains  for 
British  policy-making  with  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Lausanne.  Lloyd  George  was 
not  alone  in  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs.  Certainly  there  were  clashes  between  tile 
Prime  Minister  and  his  Foreign  Secretary.  However,  in  Balfour's  words:  'it  is  tile  rarest 
thing  when  the  Prime  Minister  and  the  Foreign  Secretary  don't  clash.  [ 
... 
]  You  can't 
31  expect  the  Prime  Minister  not  to  interfere  with  Foreign  Office  business. 
The  conduct  of  British  policy  in  the  region  cannot  be  examined  without 
consideration  of  the  Bolshevik  factor.  This  thesis  sides  with  those,  like  Busch,  who 
consider  Russia  as  'part  of  the  story.  '  32  The  Soviets  did  have  their  share  in  what  took 
place  in  the  region  of  the  Straits.  Despite  the  rapprochement  that  Lloyd  Gcorge  had 
championed,  Russia  remained  for  a  considerable  part  of  the  policy-making  clitc  of 
Britain  the  number  one  potential  danger  to  British  interests  in  the  area.  The  relations  of 
Bolshevik  Russia  with  the  Nationalist  Turks  had  been  a  terrible  'licadaclic'  for  the 
28  Curzon  to  Montagu,  26  April  192  1,  Montagu  Papers,  AS  3/3/143,  cited  in  David  Gilmour,  Cumon 
(London,  1994),  p.  532. 
29  Douglas  Dakin,  'Lord  Curzon's  policy  towards  Greece  (1920-1922),  '  in  Essays  in  Atemory  ofBasil 
Laourdas  (Thessaloniki,  1975),  p.  543-4. 
30  As  discussed  in  Chapter  Four:  'The  question  of  Constantinople  and  the  attempted  British 
rapprochement  with  Kemal  prior  to  the  summer  offensive.  '  p.  195. 311 
British  policy-makcrs.  33  This  certainly  played  a  role  in  the  way  tlicy  approachcd  Kcnial 
and  tilcir  final  decision  to  accommodate  hirn.  During  this  licriod,  wc  witness  tile 
important  role  that  the  British  attaclicd  to  the  cxtcridcd  area  of  the  Near  and  Middle  East 
as  a  dcfensivc  stronghold  against  the  Sovicts. 
In  this  post-war  settlement,  a  considcrabic  part  was  playcd  by  a  raction  outside 
the  strictly  governmental  channels.  The  British  local  element  in  Smyrna  opposed  from 
the  outset  the  possibility  of  a  Greek  administration.  Their  objections  had  been  various 
and  their  protests  more  than  frequent.  Although  there  is  no  hard  evidence  in  tile  roml  of 
direct  acceptance  in  official  documents  which  might  suggest  that  their  objections  were 
connected  to  tile  more  general  change  of  policy  regarding  the  Greek  presence  in 
Western  Asia  Minor,  one  cannot  leave  their  well  documented  objections,  in  the  forril  of 
petitions  and  letters  sent  to  Foreign  Office  unnoticed  . 
34  Their  repeated  attempts  to  try  to 
persuade  London  of  the  necessity  of  maintaining  Ottoman  administration,  or  at  least 
British  or  Allied  control,  were  yet  another  blow  to  the  Greek  case.  The  irony  of  their 
actions  was  that  they,  like  the  Greek  populations  or  the  area,  were  forced  to  evacuate 
Smyrna  when  tile  Nationalist  forces  entered  the  city.  Considerably  fewer  or  them 
returned  to  the  city  to  resume  their  businesses  and  their  status  was  never  tile  same. 
Turning  to  the  Greek  side,  when  Vcnizclos  accepted  the  mandatc  of  Smyrna  and 
the  Greek  Army  landcd  in  Asia  Minor,  it  was  not  the  case  that  the  difflcultics  were 
instipcrablc,  thcy  were  not  even  visible  to  the  untraincd  eye.  The  Ottoman  Empire  had 
been  dcfeatcd  and  Greece  was  on  the  side  of  the  victors.  Great  Britain,  tim  any  or 
Greece,  was  the  master  of  the  Straits  and  Constantinople.  Ilowcvcr,  Britain  was  not 
alone  in  this  ganic.  Tnic,  thm  was  no  clear  plan  for  the  area  or  Smyrna;  no  strategic  or 
31A.  J.  Balfour  cited  in  Bishop,  TheAdministration  of  British  roreign  Rehitions,  p.  73. 
32  Busch,  Front  Aluilros  To  I.,  jusanne,  p.  392. 
33  See  Chapter  Five:  'I'he  Bolshevik  connection.  '  p.  244. 312 
military  calculations  existed.  All  sclicnics  that  had  been  dccidcd  anti  signed  with  tile 
Secret  Treaties  of  1915-17  were  simply  invalidated.  Even  under  these  treaties,  Greece 
was  not  entitled  to  any  territory  in  the  Smyrna  area;  oil  the  contrary.  tile  area  was 
assigned  to  Italy.  The  only  reference  to  a  Greek  claim  to  Smyrna  was  tile  British  ofTer 
by  Asquith's  Government  in  1915.  When  Vcnizelos  lcd  the  country  onto  the  side  of  the 
Entente,  under  the  wing  of  Britain,  to  act  as  the  British  proxy,  lie  followed  his  belief  that 
tile  country  could  only  realise  its  national  aspirations  via  this  role.  Vcllizclos  did  not 
hesitate  to  proceed  with  actions  that  entailed  great  risks,  both  for  the  country  and  for  his 
own  personal  standing. 
Vcnizclos  had  either  failed  to  detect  the  degree  of  tile  ollicrwisc  evident  intcr- 
allied  animosities  or  lie  had  chosen  to  dismiss  all  potcntial  problems  or  threats.  But 
above  all  lie  had  put  too  much  faith  in  British  willingness  to  be  present  everywhere,  a 
misjudgemcnt  contrary  to  the  rcalism  lie  had  shown  in  the  early  years  of  his  tenure  of 
office.  lie  hoped  that  Britain  would  be  willing  to  involve  itself  in  new  operations  out  or 
a  wish  to  safeguard  and  maintain  its  supremacy  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean. 
However,  Britain  did  not  face  any  real  strategic  threats  in  Western  Asia  Minor  and  the 
Straits  strong  enough  to  pursue  stem  measures,  ix  to  provide  military  backing  to 
Greece.  When  Vcnizclos  was  forced  to  accept  the  reality  of  British  reluctance  it  was  too 
late;  the  decision  had  already  been  taken  and  lie  himself  no  longer  held  office.  The 
Greek  Anny  was  already  entangled  in  the  interior  of  Anatolia  and  the  Greek  pcoplc 
were  convinced  that  this  was  the  tinic  for  the  rcalisation  of  the  Ategall  ItIm  that  would 
finally  bring  into  being  the  creation  of  a  Great  Greece  that  would  include  all  its 
nationals.  The  decision  to  allow  Greece  to  land  at  Smyrna  lind  proved  a  '11yrrhic 
victory.  ' 
34  See  Chapter  Three:  'The  British  local  element  against  the  Greek  tutelage  or  Smyrna.  *p.  96.  And  Chapter 
Four:  'The  economic  and  commercial  effects  orthc  Greek  occupation  in  the  Smyrna  region.  '  p.  168. 313 
The  Greek  Governments  which  succccdcd  VcnizcIos,  oil  the  otlicr  hall(],  rctaincd 
only  one  option:  the  seeking  of  the  protection  of  the  sea  po%vcr  which  had  control  or  tile 
Eastern  Mediterranean.  This  was  the  principle  that  charactcriscd  Grcck  policy  and  it 
was  strictly  followed  throughout  the  crisis.  No  room  for  nianocuvrc  was  left.  Oil  the 
other  ]land,  when  the  Greek  Govcrnrncnt  decided  to  play  with  its  options  (hiring  tile 
stalemate  of  tile  discussions  at  Lausanne,  and  uscd  the  weapon  of  a  Grcck  attack  ill 
Thrace,  it  worked  quite  satisfactorily.  35  oil  tile  issue  or  tile  cfI`cctivcncss  or 
ineffectiveness  the  question  can  well  be  modified:  It  is  not  that  the  Grcck  Arnly  was 
ineffective,  despite  the  hardships  that  it  had  cridurcd  in  1921  and  tile  first  half  of  tile 
1922.  Simply  put,  it  may  have  been  the  case  that  the  Grcck  forccs  found  thcrnscIvcs 
matched  against  tile  best  fighters  the  Nationalists  could  concctitratc,  fighting  oil  ground 
they  knew  well,  with  fresh  rcinforccnicnts  and  better  communicat  ions.  The  Grccks  did 
not  understand  the  realities  of  the  post-war  world.  The  Asia  Minor  dcbaclc  had  serious 
and  lasting  consequences  for  Greece.  Above  all  it  marked  the  beginning  of  a  ncw  period 
for  the  Greek  state,  which  entailed  the  abandonment  of  its  expansionist  plans  and  its 
attempts  at  the  internal  rcorganisation  for  the  country. 
For  Britain,  this  snapshot  of  post-war  scttlcmcnt  in  the  region  or  the  Ncar  anti 
Middle  East  provided  a  paradigm  for  its  new  role  as  a  great  powcr.  Grcat  Britain  had 
retained  its  role  as  a  great  power  since  its  policy-makcrs,  Lloyd  George  includcd,  had 
maintained  throughout  the  crisis  in  Asia  Minor,  intentionally  or  unintcritionally.  flcxibic 
options  and  freedom  of  manocum.  The  Greek  Governnicnt's  lack  of  options,  vis-il  vis 
Turkey,  constrained  their  diplornacy.  The  flexibility  of  Britain's  position  is  verificd  by 
the  opening,  in  the  summer  of  1921,  of  channels  or  communication  with  KcInal, 
although  -  and  this  has  to  be  underlined  -  these  channels  %%-crc  minimil  and  rathcr 
35  Sce  Chiptcr  Six:  'The  situation  In  Grccce  -  The  cxccution  of  the  Six.  '  p.  277. 314 
insignificant  in  tile  handling  of  the  Nationalists  and  their  accommodation.  I  lowcvcr,  the 
British  attempt  to  keep  a  channel  or  communication  open  with  Kemal  was  a  minimal 
safeguard,  a  necessary  element  in  crisis  diplomacy.  The  credit  for  this  task  goes  directly 
to  the  combined  forces  of  both  tile  British  diplomatic  and  military  rcprcscntativcs  in  the 
area.  Special  credit  though  is  to  be  given  to  the  Foreign  Office  ror insisting  not  upoll 
going  further  with  this  channel  of  communication  since  such  a  move  would  only  boost 
Kemal's  authority  in  future  negotiations.  British  policy  was  guided  by  realistic 
principles,  remained  cool  headed  and  above  all  managed  to  keep  British  prestige  fairly 
untouched  without  committing  to  Kemal,  in  contrast  to  tile  French  and  tile  Italians,  who, 
notably,  were  betrayed  by  tile  Nationalists  during  the  Lausanne  negotiations.  As  far  as 
relations  with  Greece  were  concerned,  'tile  situation  did  not  develop  into  an 
indefensible  moral  position,  '  as  a  Foreign  Ofrice  official  had  remarked  . 
36  The  British 
policy  making  dlite  had  played  the  game  masterfully.  Greece  continued  to  look  upon 
Britain  as  its  ally  cvcn  allcr  the  debacle.  Britain  had  not  abandoned  Greece  publicly 
cvcn  at  tile  height  of  the  crisis.  37 
Was  the  initial  backing  of  Greece  a  valid  and  rcalistic  policy  in  its  conccption?  If 
it  had  been  vigorously  pursued  by  the  British  policy  makers  who  had  initially  supported 
it,  yes,  but  who  can  tell  if  Kemal  and  the  Nationalist  Turks  would  not  have  bccn  tlIcn 
more  intensively  backed  by  Britain's  friends  and  foes  alikc.  A  successful  Greek  backing 
would  have  entailed  armed  intervention  from  the  British  sidc,  a  scheme  that  was  not 
recommended,  especially  in  a  region  such  as  the  Straits  and  Eastcm  Nictlitcrrancan 
where  the  British  did  not  face  any  real  strategic  threats  and  traditionally  British  policy 
involved  simply  the  employment  of  a  proxy. 
36  PRO,  FO  371/6466-E2764/t/44,  NI  inute  by  Nicolson,  2  March  192  1. 
31  British  moral  support  was  made  through  the  medium  of  a  speech  delivered  by  Lloyd  George  at  the 
I  louse  of  Commons  days  Wore  the  launching  of  Kemal's  offensive  and  the  Greek  retreat  from  Asin 313 
Why  then  was  Britain  161  to  suffer  even  this  minor  blow  to  its  prcstigc? 
Churchill  had  surnmarised  eloquently  the  problem:  'We  arc  simply  flopping  about 
without  a  resolute,  consistent  policy:  or  rather  with  the  interplay  or  scvcral  resolute 
consistent  poliCiCS.  '38  The  conduct  of  British  policy  regarding  the  Grcck-Turkish 
entanglement  in  Anatolia  was,  however,  only  a  minor  blow  to  British  prestige  which 
was  repaired  during  the  Lausanne  Coiifcrcncc.  British  policy  makers  had  managed  to 
retain  its  high  standing  in  Western  Asia  Minor,  saftuard  its  intcrcsts  regarding  thc 
Straits,  maintain  excellent  relations  and  exert  innucticc  over  Grcccc,  plus  skilfully 
starting  to  build  a  relationship  with  Kcrnalist  Turkey.  Abovc  all,  Britain,  by  1923,  had 
managed  to  achieve  a  relative  stability  extending  over  the  region  or  the  Near  and  Nliddlc 
East,  an  order  which  was  not  challenged  until  the  outbreak  orthc  Second  World  War. 
Minor.  See  Chapter  Five:  'British  policy-making  from  the  surnmcr  or  1921  up  until  the  Greek  debacle  or 
September  1922.  'p.  248. 
38  Gilbert,  Churchill,  Vol.  IV,  p.  897. 316 
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LA  p  endix  I  xFP 
Tables 
1.  Table  showing  the  area,  population  and  territory  acquired  by  Greece  In  1913  (Treaty 
of  Bucharest)  and  in  1920  (Treaty  of  Sivres) 
Area  (square 
klms) 
Territory  before 
the  Balkan 
Wars: 
Old  GreeCe3  65,000 
Territories 
acquired  in 
1913: 
Macedonia  34,000 
Epirus  7,000 
Crete  8,000 
Aegean  4,000 
IslandS4 
Territories 
acquired  in 
1920: 
Western  Thrace  8,000 
Eastern  Thrace  21,000 
Smyrna 
Enclave  20,000 
Population 
Greeks  Moslems'  OtherS2  Total 
2,782,000  3,000  44,000  2,829,000 
515,000  348,000  213,000  1,079,000 
271,000  20,000  2,000  293,000 
321,000  23,000  3,000  347,000 
247,000  8,000  5,000  260,000 
69,000  100,000  40,000  209,000 
188,000  300,000  27,000  515,000 
550,000  299,000  92,000  941,000 
Total  167,000  4,946,000  1,101,000  426,000  6,473,000 
Source:  A.  A  Pallis,  Greece's  Anatolian  Venture-  andAfter  (London  1937),  p.  224 
1  Turks,  Albanians,  Gypsies,  Pomaks. 
2  Foreign  subjects,  Bulgarians,  Armenians,  Spanish  Jews,  &c. 
3  Peloponnese,  Continental  Greece,  Euboea,  Thessaly  and  Arta,  Ionian  Islands,  Cyclades. 
4  Lesbos,  Chios,  Samos,  Lemnos,  Imbros,  Tenedos,  Ikaria. 334 
2.  Results  of  Greek  Elections 
LIBERALS  ROYALISTS  AGRARIANS  COM.  OTHERS  TOTAL 
PARTY 
1910a  68  244  46  4  -  362 
1910b  314  Abstention  28  -  20  362 
1912  151  30  -  -  -  181 
1915a  189  125  -  2  316 
1915b  Abstention  316  -  -  316 
1920  118  251  -  369 
1923  377  Abstention  3  18  398 
Source:  Giorgos  Niavrogordatos,  M&Ureq  Kai  imiueva  71a  rivaepioJo  1909-1940  -Studies  and  Texts 
for  theperiod  1909-1940  (Athens,  1986),  p.  17 
The  cost  of  war  for  the  Greek  economy  1919-1923  and  the  relation  of  drachma  to 
pound 
Year  Cost 
1919  2.8 
1920  3.5 
1921  6.8 
1922  8.0 
1923  6.5 
Year  Drachma 
Pound 
1919  25 
Nov.  1920  25 
Dec.  1920  46 
Jan.  1921  48 
Apr.  1921  51 
Jun.  1921  64 
Sep.  1921  65 
Jan.  1922  100 
Sep.  1922  280 
Nov.  1922  300 
Dec.  1922  425 
Jan.  1923  440 
Apr.  1923  400 
Sep.  1923  250 
Source:  Ioannis  Yannoulopoulos,  'Ot  t4ckf4m;  aTqv  Ellilml  oucovopfa  ax6TO  1919  to);  TO 
1923,  '  In  History  ofthe  Greek  Nation  1913-1941  (Athens,  1978),  p.  300-1. 335 
Appendix  11 
Maps 
I.  I  urko:  \\  artime  Partition  Agreements 
Source:  Briton  Cooper  Busch,  Aluilros  to  Lausanne  (New  York,  1976),  1).  68. 3 
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Source:  Michael  Llewellyn  Smith,  Ionian  Vision  (London,  1973),  1).  63. 3.  The  Operations  in  Asia  Minor  from  the  7"'  to  the  21"  Julv,  1921. 
MEMORANDUM. 
Places  where  Greek  Army  concentrated. 
Lines  of  attack. 
Turkish  Dr9a"ised  defenjive  positions. 
Daily  marches  of  Creek  Troops, 
Dates  (old  style)  ndfcated  by  numbers. 
Rad,  v-, 
Source:  PRO,  FO  371/6530-F:  1056t)/143/44,  Creek  Charge  (I'AlTaires,  Ceneral  SuminarN,  of'  Military  Operations  I'roni  7to  21  July  1921,20  September  1921. 